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Iosif Stalin’s successors were implicated, to one degree or another, in the Terror that swept the Soviet 
Union and consumed much of the party-state’s founding elite. Yet in the months following the dictator’s 
death in March 1953, a contingent within the new collective leadership began to allow cases against 
certain “enemies of the people” who had been put to death to be reopened, and their convictions to be 
vacated. This policy, which broke with decades of Soviet precedent, was initially conceived as a means of 
discrediting deposed secret police chief Lavrentii Beriia, but soon acquired more ambitious dimensions. 
This dissertation foregrounds the official intentions that underpinned the decision to implement 
posthumous rehabilitation, the investigative work that went into determining which figures merited 
absolution and on what grounds, and efforts by the families of the repressed to obtain recognition of and 
restitution for losses and suffering endured during the era of High Stalinism. Posthumous rehabilitation 
thereby merged a symbolic “resurrection” of the dead – through distinct but intertwined legal and political 
processes – with tangible socio-economic benefits for their survivors. Drawing upon documents 
generated by the USSR Procuracy, Council of Ministers, and Supreme Soviet, as well as the Central 
Committee of the Communist Party, citizens’ letters of petition, and memoirs, this dissertation argues for 
posthumous rehabilitation as a crucial means through which the post-Stalin Soviet government attempted 
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 This dissertation explores how an illiberal, authoritarian state confronted and 
attempted to make amends for its extraordinary history of mass violence, specifically the 
Soviet Union’s efforts to posthumously exonerate eminent political, military, and cultural 
figures executed in the 1930s and early 1940s. All of Iosif Stalin’s successors were 
implicated, to one degree or another, in the Terror that swept the Soviet Union and 
consumed much of the party-state’s founding elite. Yet in the months following the 
dictator’s death in March 1953, a contingent within the new collective leadership began 
to allow cases against certain “enemies of the people” who had been put to death to be 
reopened, and their convictions to be vacated. This policy, which broke with decades of 
Soviet precedent, was initially conceived as a means of discrediting deposed secret police 
chief Lavrentii Beriia, but soon acquired more ambitious dimensions. This dissertation 
foregrounds the official intentions that underpinned the decision to implement 
posthumous rehabilitation, the investigative work that went into determining which 
figures merited absolution and on what grounds, and efforts by the families of the 
repressed to obtain recognition of and restitution for losses and suffering endured during 
the era of High Stalinism. Posthumous rehabilitation thereby merged a symbolic 
“resurrection” of the dead – through distinct but intertwined legal and political processes 
– with tangible socio-economic benefits for their survivors. Drawing upon documents 
generated by the USSR Procuracy, Council of Ministers, and Supreme Soviet, as well as 
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the Central Committee of the Communist Party, citizens’ letters of petition, and memoirs, 
this dissertation argues for posthumous rehabilitation as a crucial means through which 
the post-Stalin Soviet government attempted to extract useable, redemptive narratives 
from its cannibalistic past, and as an avenue for the families of the wrongfully repressed 
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In the Party death was no mystery, it had no romantic aspect. 
It was a logical consequence, a factor with which one reckoned  
and which bore rather an abstract character. Also death was  
rarely spoken of and the word “execution” was hardly ever used; 
the customary expression was “physical liquidation.” The words  
“physical liquidation” again evoked only one concrete idea: The 
 cessation of political activity. The act of dying in itself was a  
technical detail, with no claim to interest; death as a factor in a 
logical equation had lost any intimate bodily feature.1    
 
 The deputies of the Central Intelligence Agency were in high spirits during their 
meeting on May 16, 1956. Nikita Sergeevich Khrushchev, First Secretary of the 
Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), had aired his regime’s dirty laundry, and 
the American intelligence community was eager to exploit this move. Nearly three 
months earlier Khrushchev delivered his bombshell speech “On the Cult of Personality 
and Its Consequences” before a closed session of the CPSU’s 20th Party Congress, and as 
Deputy Director of Plans Frank Wisner announced, the agency had recently acquired 
what was purportedly a copy of the revelatory text. The organization’s leadership seemed 
especially taken with Khrushchev’s disclosures about the posthumous rehabilitation 
process underway at the time in the Soviet Union, as Inspector General Lyman 
Kirkpatrick proposed that the Agency sponsor “an Animal Farm type piece on the Soviets 
put to death by Stalin who have since been vindicated by the present leaders in Russia.”2 
Director Allen Dulles endorsed the idea as “excellent,” but cautioned that while he was 
                                                
1 Arthur Koestler, Darkness at Noon, trans. Daphne Hardy (New York: Bantam Books, 1966), 111. 
2 Deputies’ Meeting, 16 May 1956, CREST Collection, document number CIA-
RDR80B01676R002300190008-1, available at https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/document/cia-
rdp80b01676r002300190008-1 (accessed May 1, 2017). Many thanks to James Ryan for bringing this 
document to my attention. 
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prepared to allocate funding for such a venture, “he would withhold decision on whether 
to make a movie out of it as was done in the case of the Animal Farm project.”3  
 Kirkpatrick and Dulles’ enthusiasm notwithstanding, the mooted paean to fallen 
Old Bolsheviks never materialized, and the CIA found alternate ideological avenues 
through which to contest the Soviets. But the avidness with which America’s spymasters 
seized upon the stories of Iosif Stalin’s redeemed targets speaks to one of the enduring 
dilemmas of mature socialism in the Soviet Union: what prompted the party-state to 
concede that hundreds of thousands of individuals executed as “enemies of the people” 
were in fact wholly innocent of the charges for which they had been condemned? Beyond 
the potential propagandistic coup this decision offered to anti-Communist elements in the 
West, it also threatened to upend the carefully constructed and diligently maintained 
narrative of the early Soviet Union having been under existential threat from internal 
enemies, which served as justification for the bloodletting and mass incarceration of the 
1930s and 1940s. Yet during Khrushchev’s tenure as First Secretary over 900,000 
individuals in the Soviet Union – living and dead alike – had their convictions for 
putative counterrevolutionary crimes overturned and their names officially cleared.4 By 
delving into the cases of some of the Soviet notables subjected to capital punishment 
during the Great Terror – which represented a small minority of the verdicts that Soviet 
                                                
3 Ibid. On the CIA’s covert funding of the animated adaptation of Animal Farm, produced in the UK, see 
Frances Stonor Saunders, The Cultural Cold War: The CIA and the World of Arts and Letters (New York: 
The New Press, 2013), 247-248; Daniel J. Leab, Orwell Subverted: The CIA and the Filming of Animal 
Farm (University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 2007). 
4 Marc Elie, “Rehabilitation in the Soviet Union, 1953-1964: A Policy Unachieved,” in De-Stalinising 
Eastern Europe, eds. Matthew Stibbe and Kevin McDermott (Houndsmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire, and 
New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), 25. According to Elie, this figure represented approximately one 
third of those who had been “politically repressed” up to 1964, including some who had been arrested and 
had their sentences reversed under Khrushchev, though the vast majority dated to the Stalin years. On the 
problematic nature of the term “de-Stalinization,” see Benjamin Nathans, “Myth, Memory, Trauma – 
Coming to Terms” available at http://russianhistoryblog.org/2014/05/myth-memory-trauma-coming-to-
terms/ (accessed February 24, 2018). 
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authorities revisited in the 1950s and 1960s, but loomed large in the party-state’s internal 
discussions and public pronouncements – this dissertation plumbs one of the earliest and 
most fraught instances of a modern state confronting its legacy of mass violence.5 
Though the rehabilitation policies later promoted by Mikhail Gorbachev as part of 
glasnost’ were more thoroughgoing and forthright about the fates of the disappeared, the 
practices implemented by Stalin’s immediate heirs defined the longstanding goals and 
parameters of this wide-ranging revisionist endeavor.  
 
Why Rehabilitation, and For Whom? 
 For all its ubiquity in the Soviet and post-Soviet sphere, rehabilitation writ large, 
and its posthumous permutation specifically, have remained underexplored in 
contemporary scholarship relative to the amount of attention paid to the various purges 
that roiled the USSR. One can hardly open a collection of documents relating to the early 
Soviet Union without encountering names of dozens of prominent figures designated as 
having been “repressed” and then “posthumously rehabilitated” without further 
explication of what the latter status entailed or conferred upon recipients. Despite the 
inroads in exploring the motivations, mechanisms, and scope of the Great Terror, the 
process that sought, to a certain extent, to reverse or revise its excesses – albeit some two 
decades after the fact – has remained obscure.6 
                                                
5 According to partial data compiled by the Memorial Society, approximately 150,000 people who had been 
sentenced to capital punishment were posthumously rehabilitated between 1953 and 1964. Although there 
is no reliable indication of how many of these individuals were Party members, elites were likely 
overrepresented relative to the overall number of executed persons, given the priority their cases were 
shown; that said, they probably made up a small fraction of the total, given the fact that the vast majority of 
those shot during the Terror were ordinary Soviet citizens. See “Zhertvy politicheskogo terrora v SSSR,” 
available at base.memo.ru (accessed March 13, 2018).  
6 Recent works that have broadened understanding of the character and course of the terror include Rolf 
Binner and Marc Junge, Kak terror stal Bol’shim: Sekretnyi prikaz no. 00447 i tekhnologiia ego ispolneniia 
(Moskva: AIRO-XX, 2003); Wendy Z. Goldman, Inventing the Enemy: Denunciation and Terror in 
 4 
 In vindicating selected individuals who had been publicly branded “enemies of 
the people” Stalin’s heirs exposed themselves to unprecedented liabilities, jeopardizing 
the authority they had inherited from their forebear. Despite the suggestion that 
rehabilitation was an outgrowth of popular clamoring for a reckoning with the party-
state’s extraordinary history of domestic repression, at the time of Stalin’s death there 
was no means by which the Soviet citizenry could pressure its rulers to embark on such a 
sensitive endeavor. The impetus for rehabilitation was sparked within the halls of power, 
and – even taking into account portrayals of Khrushchev’s decision-making as reckless 
and impulsive – senior officials had to consider the liabilities inherent in admitting that 
hundreds of thousands persecuted under false pretenses were indeed innocent.7 In their 
estimation the payoffs evidently outweighed the potentially disastrous ramifications. 
Given that the vast majority of the post-Stalin ruling clique were involved in, or directly 
benefitted from the destruction of the old Communist Party cadres, having assumed posts 
                                                                                                                                            
Stalin’s Russia (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011); Paul Gregory, Terror by 
Quota: State Security from Lenin to Stalin (An Archival Study) (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009); 
Paul Hagenloh, Stalin’s Police: Public Order and Mass Repression in the USSR, 1926-1941 (Baltimore: 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 2009); David R. Shearer, Policing Stalin’s Socialism: Repression and 
Social Order in the Soviet Union, 1924-1953 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009); Oleg Khlevniuk, 
“The Objectives of the Great Terror, 1937-1938,” in Soviet History, 1917-53: Essays in Honour of R.W. 
Davies, eds. Julian Cooper, Maureen Perrie and E.A. Rees (London and Basingstoke: St. Martin’s Press, 
1995), 158-176; Hiroaki Kuromiya, The Voices of the Dead: Stalin’s Great Terror in the 1930s. New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 2007; Lynne Viola, The Unknown Gulag: The Lost World of Stalin’s Special 
Settlements (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2007); James Harris, ed., The Anatomy of 
Terror: Political Violence under Stalin (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2013); idem., The 
Great Fear: Stalin’s Terror of the 1930s (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2016); Stephen 
Kotkin, Stalin: Waiting for Hitler, 1929-1941 (New York: Penguin Press, 2017). 
7 For a generally admiring portrait of Khrushchev from one of his contemporaries that recognizes the 
shortcomings in his “disposition” that isolated him from the rest of the Presidium and hastened his 
downfall, see Fedor Burlatsky, Khrushchev and the First Russian Spring: The Era of Khrushchev Through 
the Eyes of His Advisor, trans. Daphne Skillen (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons: 1991). Dmitrii 
Shepilov – once one of Khrushchev’s closest collaborators within the Party and a central player in crafting 
the Secret Speech who turned on his patron during the struggle with the Anti-Party Group – conversely 
offers a scathing portrayal, depicting the First Secretary as a crass, boorish provincial who was at once out 
of his depth and at the same time an inveterate conniver; see Dmitrii Shepilov, The Kremlin’s Scholar: A 
Memoir of Soviet Politics under Stalin and Khrushchev, ed. Stephen V. Bittner, trans. Anthony Austin 
(New Haven: Yale University Press: 2007). 
 5 
previously held by the purged, revisiting legal cases against supposed “enemies of the 
people” dead nearly twenty years seemingly ran contrary to their interests. Thus a guiding 
question for this dissertation is why the Party’s inner circle considered it prudent, and 
perhaps even necessary to clear the names of so many who had been condemned by the 
very government they served.8 
 The Soviet government did not generally solicit cases for posthumous 
rehabilitation; the onus lay with relatives, friends, and occasionally erstwhile colleagues 
to initiate the review of convictions by filing an appeal with the Procuracy (the state 
prosecutor’s office), which was authorized to reopen criminal cases. This arrangement 
required persons who had already suffered tremendous loss at the hands of the regime to 
resubmit themselves and their loved ones to state scrutiny; that many were willing, if not 
eager, to do so speaks to the benefits promised by rehabilitation beyond the symbolic 
restoration of individuals’ good names. This is not to devalue the importance of 
reputation within the postwar USSR. In a polity wracked by violent upheavals – self-
inflicted and from abroad – the only remaining traces that many families had of the 
disappeared were the memories of their deeds and contributions to the construction and 
defense of socialism, and the inclusion of these exploits in the broader national narrative 
                                                
8 Igal Halfin offers this explanation for the rationale behind posthumous political rehabilitation: “Surprising 
as it may be in a Marxist, secular context, posthumous reinstatement made sense because spiritual 
affiliation with the brotherhood of the elect was more important than life itself. In readmitting the dead into 
its ranks, the Party accepted that their deaths were not in vain: they were human, they had names and 
voices, and they should therefore be remembered. Thus, they became sacrifices after all (‘victims of 
repression’) – opening comrades’ eyes to the dangers of cults of personality.” While this is a compelling 
teleology of why the Party reopened its ranks to thousands of deceased former members, it does not 
account for the particular practices that defined rehabilitation, nor the fact that political reinstatement was 
always subordinate to legal exoneration. See Igal Halfin, Stalinist Confessions: Messianism and Terror at 
the Leningrad Communist University (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2009), 467 fn79. 
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was a matter of great significance.9 That said, the survivors of those under consideration 
for posthumous rehabilitation were seldom content to confine themselves to matters of 
remembrance. While legal cases were under review they actively sought to refashion the 
narrative of the Great Terror that the Procuracy and other investigative organs were 
called upon to shape, and upon learning of their relatives’ exculpation many proved 
remarkably adept in mobilizing this status to press claims upon the government that had 
gone unanswered for decades. Conceived as a means of discrediting and disparaging the 
pasts of the new collective leadership’s adversaries – first and foremost Lavrentii 
Pavlovich Beriia and his secret police network, eventually Stalin himself, and then the so-
called “Anti-Party Group – posthumous rehabilitation assumed dimensions that its 
initiators could not have foreseen, as it ultimately became a ritualistic set of practices 
through which the party-state and Soviet citizens grappled with and reframed notions of 
loyalty, justice, retribution, and social belonging that had been rent asunder by the Stalin 
regime’s descent into near self-destruction. 
  
Precedents and Innovations 
 Posthumous rehabilitation, as a legal and political process, was in many respects 
distinct from its Imperial Russian and Soviet precedents. Mass amnesties were not 
unfamiliar occurrences under either the Romanovs or the Bolsheviks. It was customary 
for the empire’s ruling dynasty to mark momentous occasions – such as the birth of a 
royal heir – with blanket reprieves for certain classes of prisoners; notable examples 
                                                
9 On memory practices and mass mortality in modern Russia, see Catherine Merridale, Night of Stone: 
Death and Memory in Twentieth Century Russia (New York: Viking, 2001); and Alexander Etkind, 
Warped Mourning: Stories of the Undead in the Land of the Unburied (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
2013). Though Merridale deals extensively with the Great Terror and mentions the waves of returnees who 
emerged from the “distant camps” over the course of the 1950s, she makes no mention of posthumous 
rehabilitation, one of the quintessential arenas in which her chosen topics intersected. 
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included the 1856 remission of the surviving Decembrists upon Alexander II’s 
assumption of the throne, and the release of some 2,000 political deportees in conjunction 
with celebrations of the Romanov tercentenary in 1913.10 In addition to such coordinated 
liberations, convicts could seek and were occasionally extended imperial pardons; 
tellingly, the April 1906 Fundamental Law reserved the right for the sovereign to 
commute or otherwise mitigate any sentence passed.11 These decisions were taken not in 
the name of justice, but rather as a display of the autocrat’s capacity for mercy. 
 Soviet authorities acted very much in the vein of the monarchists they supplanted 
when formulating their policy on juridical forgiveness. Amnesties were proclaimed to 
coincide with the fifth and tenth anniversaries of the October Revolution in 1922 and 
1927, the founding of the USSR in 1923, as well as the twentieth anniversary of the Red 
Army in 1938.12 The single largest amnesty prior to Stalin’s death was implemented in 
1945 in honor of the Soviet Union’s victory over Nazi Germany; some 620,000 prisoners 
serving sentences of three years and under – mostly handed down under wartime 
provisions introduced in December 1941 – were afforded early releases from Gulag 
camps and special settlements, and some 400,000 more saw their sentences reduced. As 
Golfo Alexopoulous has demonstrated, the 1945 amnesty “represented an intensification 
                                                
10 Thanks to this act of imperial magnanimity several notable revolutionaries were able to return from exile, 
among them Menshevik leader Iulii Martov and Lev Kamenev. See Israel Getzler, Martov: A Political 
Biography of a Russian Social Democrat (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 
28; Stephen Kotkin, Stalin: Paradoxes of Power, 1878-1928 (New York: Penguin Books, 2014), 132. 
11 The relevant article reads: “The Sovereign Emperor has the right to pardon the accused, to mitigate the 
sentence, and even to completely forgive transgressions, including the right to terminate court, actions 
against the guilty and to free them from trial and punishment. Stemming from royal mercy, he also has the 
right to commute the official penalty and to generally pardon all exceptional cases that are not subject to 
general laws, provided such actions do not infringe upon civil rights or the legally protected interests of 
others.” See “The Russian Fundamental Law of 23 April 1906,” available at 
https://community.dur.ac.uk/a.k.harrington/fundlaws.html (accessed on February 15, 2018). 
12 Golfo Alexopoulous, “Amnesty 1945: The Revolving Door of Stalin’s Gulag,” Slavic Review 64, 2 
(Summer 2005): 276. There were no anniversary amnesties in either 1937 or 1947, though the tradition was 
revived in the following decades, and the 1938 amnesty applied only to military personnel.   
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or expansion of existing practice. It targeted the revolving majority of gulag prisoners – 
those who served shorter sentences and whose eventual release was expected – while 
doing nothing to stem the flow of prisoners coming in.”13 The sole innovation of the even 
larger mass amnesty that Beriia engineered to solemnize Stalin’s passing, according to 
Alexopoulous, was that it made no attempt to replenish the labor camp population, a 
radical move for its time.   
 Convicts in the Soviet Union were also able, in principle, to seek clemency from 
the state. Requests for pardons (khodotaistva o pomilovanii) were generally adjudicated 
by the USSR Supreme Soviet, which was empowered to intervene in criminal cases. 
Neither amnesties nor pardons, as forms of reprieve, necessitated the acknowledgment of 
any wrongdoing on the part of the judiciary or other branches of the government; as in 
imperial times, they were extended as emblematic of rulers’ clemency toward admitted 
offenders. Critically, in most instances amnesties and pardons only provided for 
prisoners’ physical release. They did not expunge individuals’ criminal records, which in 
turn gave rise to a host of difficulties in housing, employment, and the receipt of social 
benefits.14  
Rehabilitation entailed an entirely novel set of admissions on the part of the 
Soviet authorities. Rather than an official indulgence, rehabilitation was an express 
recognition of miscarriages of justice; as linguist D. M. Fel'dman notes, the very term 
"rehabilitation" had little to no connotation in the Imperial Russian or Soviet legal 
contexts prior to 1953, and in fact it migrated from the political lexicon into common 
                                                
13 Ibid., 299. Alexopoulous persuasively argues that such instability in the penal labor force reveals that the 
Gulag’s primary purpose was carceral, not economic.  
14 Marc Elie, “Les politiques à l’égard des libérés du Goulag: Amnistiés et réhabilités dans la region de 
Novosibirsk, 1953-1960,” Cahiers du Monde russe 47, 1/2 (January – June 2006): 327-347. 
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parlance over the course of the twentieth century. In the 1920s and 1930s, 
“rehabilitation” referred to the process by which the Party restored to good standing 
members who had been expelled or otherwise sanctioned for misconduct, and it was not 
until the public disavowal of the so-called “Doctors’ Plot” in April 1953 that the term 
acquired juridical significance.15 While most judicial verdicts in the USSR were subject 
to cassation review, and could be modified or thrown out entirely by higher courts, from 
December 1, 1934 such protections did not extend to counterrevolutionary crimes.16 
Promulgated in the immediate aftermath of Sergei Kirov’s murder, a decree issued by the 
Central Executive Committee denied those convicted of betraying the Revolution any 
right to appeal; death sentences were to be carried out immediately.17 Controls remained 
on the implementation of state violence, as in late autumn 1938, when approximately 
110,000 prisoners were liberated at the close of the Ezhovshchina – so named for 
People’s Commissar of Internal Affairs Nikolai Ivanovich Ezhov, who oversaw the 
Terror at its apex – and the following year nearly 1,000 NKVD operatives were arrested 
for previous “violations of soviet legality.”18 Yet at the time state security declined to 
authorize the streamlining of the existing review process, and it did not address – or 
repudiate – the systemic nature of repressions against purported opponents of Soviet 
                                                
15 Iurii Fel’dman, Terminologiia vlasti: Sovetskie politicheskie termny v istoriko-kul’turnom kontekste 
(Moskva: Rossiiskii gosudarstvennyi gumanitarnyi universitet, 2006), 65-117. As Cynthia Hooper notes, in 
January 1938 Stalin referred to the “need to ‘rehabilitate the party, primarily by admitting new members, 
reinstating those unjustly expelled, and punishing the kind of Communist who ‘is willing to expel dozens of 
members from the party on false grounds just to appear vigilant himself.’” See Cynthia V. Hooper, “Terror 
from Within: Participation and Coercion in Soviet Power, 1926-1964,” (Ph.D. diss. Princeton University, 
2003), 323. 
16 According to Peter H. Solomon, Jr., approximately nine percent of cassation reviews in the early 1930s 
modified existing sentences or verdicts. See Peter H. Solomon, Jr., Soviet Criminal Justice Under Stalin 
(Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 135-136. 
17 Ibid., 260. 
18 Lynne Viola, Stalinist Perpetrators on Trial: Scenes from the Great Terror in Soviet Ukraine (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2017), 5, 38. Viola’s monograph sheds light on the little-studied “purge of 
the purgers,” which in key respects served as precedent for the trials analyzed in Chapter 4. 
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power perpetrated over the preceding years. Functionaries were also specifically 
instructed to focus their oversight on “living persons,” thereby excluding from 
consideration the hundreds of thousands of people put to death in 1937 and 1938.19 
The first instances of posthumous rehabilitation in the Soviet Union in the closing 
months of 1953 marked a decisive break with the efforts that preceded them. Rather than 
skirting the question of the rectitude of sentences in counterrevolutionary cases, 
rehabilitation was predicated upon vindicating the accused of the charges against them, 
and in many instances dispelling the notion that their alleged conspiracies ever existed. 
The most common formulation that accompanied rehabilitation reports – “in the absence 
of a corpus delicti (za otsutstviem sostava prestupleniia)” – rejected convictions on the 
precise grounds that the proffered evidence failed to demonstrate the commission of a 
crime. The party-state thus took it upon itself to admit not only that repressed individuals 
were innocent, but that the very charges with which they had been impugned had no 
grounding in reality. For the dead, who had been liquidated with such urgency, denying 
them the opportunity to dispute their vilification, this represented an unparalleled attempt 
to set right the wrongs of the past.20 Such revisionism is all the more remarkable for the 
fact that – unlike almost every other instance of contemporary state-driven truth-telling – 
the rulers who spearheaded Soviet rehabilitation were often directly implicated in the 
                                                
19 Solomon, Soviet Criminal Justice, 259. 
20 As Kevin Platt and David Brandenberger have demonstrated, the Bolsheviks were no strangers to 
reassessing the historical legacy of figures who had previously been expunged from the past or openly 
vilified (though never before had the authorities sought to revise the standing of those who had been so 
recently disgraced and so violently effaced). Furthermore, the rehabilitations that Platt and Brandenberger 
treat involved the reputations of long-dead notables, rather than the overruling of decades-old legal 
verdicts. See David Brandenberger and Kevin M. F. Platt, “Terribly Pragmatic: Rewriting the History of 
Ivan IV’s Reign, 1937-1956” in Epic Revisionism: Russian History and Literature as Stalinist Propaganda, 
eds. Kevin M. F. Platt and David Brandenberger (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2006), 157-178. 
On the active construction and cultivation of the more recent Soviet past, see also Frederick C. Corney, 
Telling October: Memory and the Making of the Bolshevik Revolution (Ithaca and London: Cornell 
University Press, 2004). 
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crimes being decried, and professed themselves to be the legitimate successors of the 
regime whose recourse to internal violence they now disavowed.21 The operating 
assumption that transitional justice is the province of democratizing states has led 
scholars to disregard the ways in which the decidedly illiberal Soviet Union of the 1950s 
adopted policies that at times exceeded the standards set by post-authoritarian societies – 
particularly with regard to property restitution to survivors – and performed the delicate 
balancing act of admitting past atrocities without delegitimizing the wider Bolshevik 
project.  
Historiography 
 The rehabilitation process became the subject of scholarly inquest within a decade 
of its inception. Western Sovietologists, eager to discern the USSR’s future course absent 
the guidance of the only ruler it had known for most of its thirty-odd-year history, seized 
upon the scanty information emerging from behind the Iron Curtain in the period 
following the 22nd Party Congress in October 1961, when reports eulogizing the 
posthumously rehabilitated began appearing in Soviet press outlets and publications in 
                                                
21 Much of the existing literature on transitional justice – of which rehabilitation was in many ways a prime, 
and quite early example – focuses on Africa, Latin America, Southeast Asia, and Eastern Europe, to the 
exclusion of the USSR; when Russia is addressed, it is almost exclusively in the post-Soviet context. See 
Ruth G. Teitel, Transitional Justice (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2000); Béatrice 
Pouligny, Simon Chesterman and Albrecht Schnabel, eds., After Mass Crime: Rebuilding States and 
Communities (Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 2007); Melissa S. Williams, Rosemary Nagy, and 
Jon Elster, eds., Transitional Justice, NOMOS LI (New York: New York University Press, 2012); Vesselin 
Popovski and Mónica Serrano, After Oppression: Transitional Justice in Latin America and Eastern 
Europe (Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 2012); Alexander Laban Hinton, ed., Transitional 
Justice: Global Mechanisms and Local Realities after Genocide and Mass Violence (New Brunswick: 
Rutgers University Press, 2011); Alexandra Barahona de Brito, Carmen González-Enríquez, and Paloma 
Aguilar, eds., The Politics of Memory: Transitional Justice in Democratizing Societies (Oxford and New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2001). 
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earnest.22 Cold War-era Kremlin watchers saw in the rehabilitation process a portal onto 
the decision-making process and political maneuverings of Stalin’s successors. Leopold 
Labedz, one of the earliest and – given the limited array of material at his disposal – more 
astute observers of Soviet rehabilitation, attributed its emergence to the demands of 
Kremlin intrigues and the desire of members of the new collective leadership to ensure 
their own survival. Based on official Soviet media and Khrushchev’s public 
pronouncements, Labedz detects only mercenary considerations in the form and tempo of 
the regime’s exoneration campaign.23 As the following chapters will demonstrate, far 
more went into the resolution to initiate wide-scale rehabilitation and follow through on 
its various aspects than wanton self-interest, but Labedz’s perspective proved to have 
considerable staying power through the USSR’s remaining lifespan, as it is echoed in the 
subsequent work of scholars seeking to make sense of the divulgences emanating from 
Moscow and other Soviet administrative centers.   
Jane P. Shapiro’s unpublished 1967 dissertation “Rehabilitation Policy and 
Political Conflict in the Soviet Union, 1953-1964” marked the first full-length study of 
Soviet exonerations in the post-Stalin years. Though Shapiro acknowledges the 
limitations of her source base – composed exclusively of official Soviet materials 
available in the West – she approaches rehabilitation as something of a barometer of the 
new ruling circle’s capacity for reform and ability to distance itself from Stalin’s 
repressive legacy. In Shapiro’s schema, the public discussion of eminent Union-wide, 
republican Party, and military officials previously excised from Soviet history augured 
                                                
22 Many of these materials, including biographic sketches and laudatory remembrances of revolutionary 
service, are compiled in Borys Levytsky, ed., The Stalinist Terror in the Thirties: Documentation from the 
Soviet Press (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1974). 
23 Leopold Labedz, “Resurrection–and Perdition,” Problems of Communism 12, 2 (March-April 1963): 48-
59. 
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efforts by Khrushchev and similarly inclined bureaucrats – impelled by various special 
interests – to dispel the lingering manifestations of coercion through state terror.24 In the 
absence of any indication of how rehabilitation functioned in practice, Shapiro devotes 
considerable attention to devising a taxonomy of the different modes of rehabilitation 
predicated on the vagaries of Soviet linguistic choices.25 Although such fine distinctions 
appear to have held little actual currency for those who spearheaded, implemented, or 
benefitted from rehabilitation, they held considerable attraction for researchers as a 
means of imposing a semblance of order on the seemingly arbitrary and inconsistent 
currents of rehabilitation.  
To give an example, in his study of rehabilitation, Albert P. Van Goudoever – 
drawing upon essentially the same source-base as Shapiro, but with twenty years’ worth 
of additional data – offers a streamlined selection of three types of rehabilitation (formal, 
public, and posthumous) that he applies to the reinstated Party and military cadres under 
consideration.26 By limiting their sample populations to Party and military elites – even 
when writers, artists, scientists, and other specialists were among the publicly 
rehabilitated – both Shapiro and Van Goudoever reinforce the impression prevalent 
                                                
24 Jane P. Shapiro, “Rehabilitation Policy and Political Conflict in the Soviet Union, 1953-1964” (Ph.D. 
diss., Columbia University, 1967). Samuel A. Oppenheim’s article, published the same year, is almost 
entirely superseded by Shapiro’s work, though it does include useful appendixes listing rehabilitees and 
where information about them had been made available, and the fates of the men elected to full Central 
Committee membership at the 17th Party Congress in 1934; see Samuel A. Oppenheim, “Rehabilitation in 
the Post-Stalinist Soviet Union,” The Western Political Quarterly 20, 1 (March 1967): 97-115.  
25 From the descriptions in the documents at her disposal, Shapiro identifies five categories of 
rehabilitation: judicial (meaning posthumous legal exoneration), physical (referring to those who survived 
their sentences), public (returning individuals to historiography), full public (commemoration of 
individuals’ activities), and historical (mention of purged figures, but without clear indication of their 
sentences having been revised). See ibid., 8-13. One of the major shortcomings of Shapiro’s highly 
quantitative approach is that she considers individuals to have been rehabilitated from their first mention as 
such in the press, when in actuality the legal proceedings that exculpated individuals predated these 
announcement by several years, which significantly distorts the process’ timeframe.   
26 Albert P. Van Goudoever, The Limits of Destalinization in the Soviet Union: Political Rehabilitations in 
the Soviet Union since Stalin, trans. Frans Hijkoop (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1986), 7. 
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during the Cold War that Stalinist state terror primarily befell the upper strata of Soviet 
society;27 however, this perspective became increasingly untenable as the true extent of 
the Terror began to emerge with the partial opening of the Soviet Union to outside 
academics during glasnost’.    
Rather than focusing their attention on the exalted martyrs of the 1930s, 
researchers allowed into the USSR during Gorbachev’s glasnost’ – inspired in part by the 
herculean efforts of civil society organizations such as Memorial – took as their subjects 
the former political prisoners (known colloquially in Russian as zeks, short for 
zakliuchennye) who emerged from the Gulag archipelago in the mid-1950s to a society 
deeply suspicious of their presence and the feasibility or desirability of their 
reintegration. Labor camp returnees – who required rehabilitation to reclaim their rights 
even after serving out their sentences or being amnestied – found a remarkably 
sympathetic audience in the form of foreign scholars eager to grant them voice. Stephen 
F. Cohen and Nanci Adler best exemplify this approach, though they have reached 
disparate conclusions regarding the regime’s role in facilitating or hindering survivors’ 
reintegration into a world that stigmatized and scorned them. 
As he details in the opening chapter of his The Victims Return: Survivors of the 
Gulag after Stalin, Cohen became a trusted intimate of Nikolai Bukharin’s second wife, 
Anna Larina, and their children, thanks to his seminal biography of Bukharin; through 
these connections Cohen was able to embed himself into the tightly-knit milieu of former 
                                                
27 This notion was largely nurtured by the work of Robert Conquest, who dubbed the height of the 1930s 
purges “The Great Terror.” See Robert Conquest, The Great Terror: A Reassessment (Oxford and New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1991). 
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elites who had been confined in the Gulag.28 Basing his narrative upon the life stories of 
members of this group to which he had privileged access – frequently identified as his 
“friends” – Cohen ties their fortunes to the machinations of competing factions within the 
Kremlin: repentant reformers, headed and exemplified by Khrushchev, who “expended 
more political capital on his anti-Stalinism than he acquired,” and unreconstructed 
Stalinists, whose crowning objective, according to Cohen, was to mask the blood on their 
hands.29 In presenting the rehabilitation of “Khrushchev’s zeks” as an integral component 
of the reformist mission – one that bore moral underpinnings – Cohen directly challenges 
the received image of rehabilitation as a purely opportunistic endeavor designed to ensure 
the political longevity of its partisans. For indeed, if Khrushchev intended rehabilitation 
to shield him from his foes within the Party, it ultimately failed in grand fashion in 1964 
when he was toppled by Leonid Brezhnev and his circle – reductively branded “neo-
Stalinists” by Cohen – and the Gulag survivors he promoted were purportedly consigned 
to the margins of society, where they remained until Gorbachev’s redemptive rise to 
power.30 Though this perspective effectively dispels the notion that rehabilitation was 
pursued purely for the sake of power politics, Cohen’s near-exclusive reliance upon and 
unstinting credulity of his informants’ subjective experiences serves to reinforce 
mythologies that the circle built around themselves, and obscures the internal dynamics 
                                                
28 Stephen F. Cohen, The Victims Return: Survivors of the Gulag After Stalin (Exeter, NH: 
PublishingWorks, 2010). 
29 Ibid., 92. This Manichean argument – in one form or another – has been a staple of Cohen’s writing since 
the 1980s, when he maintained “proposals for change throughout the rigidified Soviet system and 
opposition to change became the central features of official political life after Stalin’s death. The conflict 
between reformers and conservatives was inseparable from the Stalin question because the status quo and 
its history were Stalinist.” See Stephen F. Cohen, Rethinking the Soviet Experience: Politics and History 
since 1917 (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1985), 100. 
30 Cohen, The Victims Return, 125-154. 
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that drove the implementation of rehabilitation, which this project seeks to bring to the 
fore. 
While a great deal of Nanci Adler’s findings on the travails of Gulag returnees are 
drawn from materials originally compiled by Cohen, Adler does not share his assessment 
of the munificent impulse underlying rehabilitation; rather, she describes it as “a rear-
guard action to preserve entrenched power,” and the Soviet authorities’ attitude toward 
political prisoners as “at best ambivalent, at worst destructive.”31 Adler posits an almost 
entirely adversarial relationship between a duplicitous party-state “more interested in 
rehabilitating its public image than in rehabilitating people” and citizens attempting to 
eke their way back into “the big zone” of Soviet society after having escaped the camp 
system “zone.”32 In light of the begrudging attitudes of Soviet officials and non-repressed 
citizens that emerge in former political prisoners’ accounts, Adler asserts that many 
former zeks, frustrated by “the limited character of official de-Stalinization,” began 
“unofficially exonerating themselves,” constituting a demimonde that existed, in the 
words of her subtitle, “beyond the Soviet system.”33  
This perspective flies in the face of many documents uncovered over the course of 
researching this study, which express deep disaffection with the pace of investigations 
and the generosity of offered financial compensation, but are also cognizant of the fact 
                                                
31 Nanci Adler, The Gulag Survivor: Beyond the Soviet System. New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 
2002, 151-152, 92. Kathleen E. Smith similarly views rehabilitation as a defensive and reactionary move, 
though she presents it as a response to pressure “from below.” This reads largely as a transposition of 1980s 
and 1990s-era realities, given her overriding focus on the activities of Memorial and other civil society 
groups, onto the immediate post-Stalin period. See Kathleen E. Smith, Remembering Stalin’s Victims: 
Popular Memory and the End of the USSR (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1996), 20-40. 
32 Adler, The Gulag Survivor, 180. 
33 Ibid., 31. 
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that the only avenue for ameliorating one’s situation was through the party-state.34 In a 
similar vein, Adler’s exclusive focus on living rehabilitees – and advocating on their 
behalf – leads her to understate the import of posthumously rehabilitated figures, as when 
she refers to bureaucrats’ attempts “to render the living rehabilitated returnees as 
politically inactive as their posthumously rehabilitated comrades.”35 It is a central 
contention of this dissertation that although the dead could not speak for themselves, with 
the inauguration of posthumous rehabilitation being deceased proved to be no major 
impediment to playing an outsized role in post-Stalin political developments.          
Two emergent lines of historical inquiry within the growing bodies of scholarship 
on the Khrushchev and early Brezhnev eras with which this dissertation is particularly 
engaged are the themes of carceral reform and socio-cultural responses to the revelations 
of the so-called “Khrushchev Thaw.”36 The bulk of this scholarship has been written 
under the influence of the turn toward social history, which, in the Soviet context, has 
privileged the experiences and perspectives of “ordinary” citizens over those of 
recognized, “named” personages. While this study is primarily concerned with eminent 
figures, it is influenced by the social turn in Soviet history through its focus on 
interpersonal relationships and the material lives of returnees. Though it operated 
according to unique imperatives, posthumous rehabilitation as a legal process was very 
much embedded within the evolving judicial and penal environment of the 1950s and 
                                                
34 Adler’s most recent monograph attempts to address some of the critiques leveled at her expressions of 
incredulity in The Gulag Survivor over the fact that some returnees continued to identify with the 
Communist project by using psychological precepts to account for this Party loyalty. See Nanci Adler, 
Keeping Faith with the Party: Communist Believers Return from the Gulag (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 2012).  
35 Adler, The Gulag Survivor, 181. 
36 The tendency to identify the period under consideration intrinsically with Khrushchev the individual is 
also evident in Russian scholarship. See, for example Aleksandr Pyzhikov, Khrushchevskaia 
“ottepel,’”1953-1964 (Moskva: OLMA-PRESS, 2002); Iurii Aksiutin, Khrushchevskaia “ottepel” i 
obshchestvennye nastroeniia v SSSR v 1953–1964 gg. (Moskva: ROSSPEN, 2004). 
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early 1960s, in which the Procuracy and courts saw their bailiwicks expanded at the 
expense of the significantly reined-in organs of state security.  
Such developments are most readily perceived in the wholesale reorganization of 
the Soviet labor camp and special settlement system undertaken within months of Stalin 
having exited the scene. As Marc Elie shows, the succession of amnesties between 1953 
and 1957 that saw the outflow of millions of prisoners from the Gulag into surrounding 
localities was intrinsically related to upper-level debates surrounding the course of 
judicial reform; he attributes the hardships that many liberated prisoners faced to the 
Kafkaesque dilemmas engendered by the lack of planning for this influx of vulnerable 
people.37 In his work, Jeffrey Hardy details how the curtailment of arbitrary force within 
the Gulag was achieved in part through the empowerment of camp procurators, whose 
prestige increased as Khrushchev vested the All-Union Procuracy with increasing 
authority (including purview over the legal aspect of rehabilitation), while Alan 
Barenberg reveals how onetime slave laborers became industrial employees in Vorkuta’s 
post-Stalin industrial enterprises.38 While coercion and repression remained firmly within 
the state’s repertoire during these years, they were decisively disavowed as the first 
recourse for many offenses that in the past would have been met with serious reprisals.39 
                                                
37 Marc Elie, “Les anciens détenus du Goulag: liberations massives, réinsertion et réhabilitation dans 
l’URSS poststalinienne, 1953-1964,” (Ph.D. diss., École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales, 2007); 
idem., “Les politiques à l’égard des libérés du Goulag,” Cahiers du Monde russe 47/1-2 (Janvier-juin 
2006): 327-348. 
38 Jeffrey S. Hardy, The Gulag after Stalin: Redefining Punishment in Khrushchev’s Soviet Union, 1953-
1964 (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2016); Alan Barenberg, Gulag Town, Company Town: 
Forced Labor and Its Legacy in Vorkuta (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2014). 
39 See Steven A. Barnes, Death and Redemption: The Gulag and the Shaping of Soviet Society (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2011), Chapter 6; Amir Weiner, “The Empires Pay a Visit: Gulag Returnees, 
East European Rebellions, and Soviet Frontier Politics,” The Journal of Modern History 78, 2 (June 2006): 
333-376; Robert Hornsby, Protest, Reform and Repression in Khrushchev’s Soviet Union (Cambridge and 
New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013). On the topic of Party discipline in these years, see Edward 
Cohn, The High Title of a Communist: Postwar Party Discipline and the Values of the Soviet Regime 
(DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 2015), Chapter 3. 
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In moving away from the omnipresent threat of political violence as a ruling technique, 
the Soviet government under Khrushchev attempted to appropriate and repurpose aspects 
of the Stalinist system to meet its ends. Though it in many respects defied precedent, by 
virtue of operating through the same institutions that enacted the Terror, posthumous 
rehabilitation was very much a constituent component of this phenomenon. As with the 
penal reforms discussed in the mentioned works, rehabilitation was often constrained by 
vestiges of state oppression that could not be so easily excised. 
Khrushchev’s Cold Summer: Gulag Returnees, Crime, and the Fate of Reform 
after Stalin by Miriam Dobson effectively straddles the line between studies devoted to 
issues of correctional policy and the literary and cultural realms. Her systematic treatment 
of returnee’s petitions – the first of its kind – effectively charts a sort of transmission 
history, whereby themes and concepts that supplicants for rehabilitation employed to 
justify themselves migrated to and ultimately attained public expression in Khrushchev’s 
anti-Stalinist rhetoric.40 In treating many sources similar to those that Dobson examines, 
this dissertation is deeply indebted to her insights, though instead of reading petitions for 
recurring literary tropes, as Dobson does, it delves into the ways in which the letter 
writers sought to connect with their audiences, emphasizing their intent over their cultural 
frame of reference. Although research into literary and popular responses to Khrushchev 
and company’s admissions of Stalin’s transgressions has shed valuable light on the ways 
in which Soviet intellectuals and the reading public wrestled with and assimilated these 
revelations into their worldview, such works often reinforce a persistent impression that 
                                                
40 Miriam Dobson, Khrushchev’s Cold Summer: Gulag Returnees, Crime, and the Fate of Reform after 
Stalin (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2009), Chapters 2 and 3. 
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this study aims to complicate.41 Framing the period’s cultural history as one of reception 
of and response to signals emanating from the center, many authors take the 20th Party 
Congress as their point of departure, and treat it as the initiation Khrushchev’s efforts to 
dismantle Stalin’s legacy.42 However, as an examination of the posthumous rehabilitation 
process from its inception reveals, the Secret Speech was not so much the launch of a 
new bold campaign to confront the Stalinist past with candor as it was a culmination and 
appropriation of developments that had been proceeding quietly – though not entirely 
beyond public view – for over two years prior to late February 1956.43 
Grounded as this work is in historiographic trends, it is also informed by 
anthropological perspectives. Most useful for the purposes of the present study is the 
notion of “dead-body politics” that Katherine Verdery introduced in her study of bones 
and corpses “that have become political symbols” in postsocialist Central and Eastern 
                                                
41 On the socio-cultural sphere as the most active site for reassessing the past under Khrushchev, see Karl 
Edward Loewenstein, “The Thaw: Writers and the Public Sphere in the Soviet Union,” (Ph.D. diss., Duke 
University, 1999); Stephen V. Bittner, The Many Lives of Khrushchev’s Thaw: Experience and Memory in 
Moscow’s Arbat (Ithaca: Cornell University Press: 2008); Polly Jones, ed., The Dilemmas of de-
Stalinization: Negotiating Cultural and Social Change in the Khrushchev Era (London and New York: 
Routledge, 2006); idem., “Memories of Terror or Terrorizing Memories? Terror, Trauma and Survival in 
Soviet Culture of the Thaw,” The Slavonic and East European Review 86, 2 (April 2008): 346-371; idem., 
Myth, Memory, Trauma: Rethinking the Stalinist Past in the Soviet Union, 1953-70 (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 2013); Denis Kozlov, The Readers of Novyi Mir: Coming to Terms with the Stalinist Past 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2013); idem. and Eleonory Gilburd, eds. The Thaw: Soviet Society 
and Culture during the 1950s and 1960s (Toronto, Buffalo, and London: University of Toronto Press, 
2013). 
42 For example, though the listed chronology for Polly Jones’ monograph begins in 1953, its first chapter 
jumps directly to the Secret Speech, and devotes precious little attention to the preceding three years, even 
misstating the date of Beriia’s death. Kathleen Smith is sufficiently convinced of 1956 as the lynchpin 
moment in postwar Soviet history that her latest book is devoted exclusively to that year, with each month 
meriting its own chapter. See Kathleen E. Smith, Moscow 1956: The Silenced Spring (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 2017). 
43 For studies that emphasize continuities between the late Stalin years and Khrushchev-era reforms, see 
Elena Zubkova, Russia After the War: Hopes, Illusions, and Disappointments, 1945-1957, trans. and ed. 
Hugh Ragsdale (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharp, 1998); Yoram Gorlizki and Oleg Khlevniuk, Cold Peace: 
Stalin and the Soviet Ruling Circle, 1945-1953 (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), 
especially Chapters 5 and 6; Juliane Fürst, ed. Late Stalinist Russia: Society between reconstruction and 
reinvention (London and New York: Routledge, 2006).  
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Europe.44 Under this scenario, “[parading] the dead bodies of famous men […] uses their 
specific biographies to reevaluate the national past” and provide stability of meaning 
within systems that have been cast into disarray by earth-shaking changes.45 Although in 
the Soviet case actual mortal remains were rarely forthcoming, the death of Stalin and the 
array of developments that followed were sufficiently disruptive to unsettle the 
government’s established means of rule, as well as previously accepted patterns for 
demonstrating loyalty.46 Within this uncertain context, figures who had been excluded 
from the national master narrative following their imprisonment and execution could be 
reintegrated into Soviet history to serve as anchors for a reconceived vision of the path to 
state socialism, thereby granting them something akin to a political afterlife.47 This 
perspective allows the following investigation of posthumous rehabilitation to 
encapsulate official intentions and popular responses while envisioning both as 
components of the search for stable meaning in the wake of tumultuous transformations.  
In an effort to explain the rationale of posthumous rehabilitation to (presumably) 
baffled American readers who, as denizens of a “secular society […] put little stock in 
posthumous status,” journalist Adam Hochschild maintains that Soviet Communism was 
“psychologically, a religious culture. Just as the Great Purge was Inquisitorial in its 
                                                
44 Katherine Verdery, The Political Lives of Dead Bodies: Reburial and Postsocialist Change (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2000), 3. 
45 Here Stephen Bittner’s observation on the implications of the Thaw are especially resonant: “a universe 
of meaning was thrown into disarray, a process that was akin to the ‘cosmic reorganization’ that followed 
the collapse of communism.” See Bittner, The Many Lives of Khrushchev’s Thaw, 12 
46 The physical remains of those executed under Stalin were rarely uncovered prior to the late 1980s. Often 
there was no trace left of repressed elites, as NKVD directives for dealing with “important cases” instructed 
functionaries to cremate corpses following executions, and even after rehabilitation the authorities refused 
to provide suriviors with information regarding their relatives’ burial places. In her article on the NKVD’s 
mass graves in Vinnitsa, Irina Paperno observes that the Nazis’ discovery of various shooting sites across 
the city and their exploitation of forensic findings to advance the narrative of “Judeo-Bolshevik” violence 
against Ukrainians and Poles indelibly tainted inquiries into these executions with the stain of fascist 
occupation. See Conquest, The Great Terror: A Reassessment, 288; Irina Paperno, “Exhuming the Bodies 
of Soviet Terror,” Representations 75, 1 (Summer 2001): 89-118.      
47 Verdery, Political Lives of Dead Bodies, 20. 
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fervor, so rehabilitation, and posthumous restoration of Party membership, have offered a 
kind of sainthood for martyrs.”48 This argument draws upon a well-established literature 
that depicts state socialism as a “political religion,” and is echoed by Yuri Slezkine’s 
recent work situating Bolshevism within the vein of millenarianism.49 Though one may 
indeed detect in posthumous rehabilitation traces of a type of Marxist-Leninist 
canonization, by focusing on outward homologies this perspective obscures the decidedly 
pragmatic and instrumental motivations underpinning the process. Khrushchev and his 
cohorts were adept at invoking the posthumously rehabilitated in moments of political 
extremis, but at no point did they transform their erstwhile comrades into objects of any 
sort of regular reverence. The kind of afterlife that posthumous rehabilitation promised in 
the 1950s and 1960s was therefore one predicated on the ability of past actors to help 
mediate present-day struggles, rather than the notion of an eternal reward for faithful, yet 
repressed Communists.50    
 
Old Bolsheviks and the Victim-Perpetrator Binary 
 This project is concerned with individuals sentenced to death for supposed 
counterrevolutionary offenses – which fell under Article 58 of the Russian Soviet 
Federated Socialist Republic (RSFSR) penal code – as opposed to “conventional” 
                                                
48 Adam Hochschild, The Unquiet Ghost: Russians Remember Stalin (Boston and New York: Mariner 
Books, 2003), 169. 
49 See, for example, René Fülöp-Miller, The Mind and Face of Bolshevism (New York: Knopf, 1929); Yuri 
Slezkine, The House of Government: A Saga of the Russian Revolution (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 2017), 189 
50 As Victoria Smolkin has shown in her study of Soviet atheism, one of the main arenas in which the 
government’s campaign to suffuse the “sacred spaces” of society with positive, atheistic content failed was 
in the realm of death; unable to provide a compelling vision of what lay beyond, the Party risked losing the 
loyalty of those confronting their own mortality. See Victoria Smolkin, A Sacred Space is Never Empty: A 
History of Soviet Atheism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2018), 138, 192.  
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criminal acts.51 Although, as Oleg Khlevniuk has pointed out, this distinction is 
somewhat artificial and tenuous in the Soviet context, given that the “bulk of those 
imprisoned for nonpolitical (bytovye) crimes were […] de facto political prisoners of the 
regime” by virtue of the disproportionate punishments meted out for relatively minor 
infractions, it still merits consideration in light of the fact that, as Alexopoulous says, “the 
regime took its own categories seriously.”52 The focus on capital punishment cases is 
born both of the fact that many high-profile individuals were sent before the firing squad 
and the finality of a death sentence that has been carried out. It can be difficult to 
conceive of how a polity attempts to make amends for past injustices when the most 
directly injured parties are no longer among the living – particularly when they were 
acolytes of and then violently eliminated by the very government that now recognizes 
their blamelessness.    
The figures around whom this study is constructed generally conform to a 
common profile; this is a reflection predominantly of the types of individuals on whom 
the central authorities focused their efforts in the decade following Stalin’s death. Most of 
the men discussed – and the overwhelming majority of posthumous rehabilitees during 
this period were indeed men – were born between the mid-1880s and the 1890s – making 
them the prime age for participation in the revolutions of 1917 – though some were 
contemporaries of Lenin and Trotsky, born in the 1870s, and a select few were barely 
past adolescence when they were swept up into the Bolshevik cause during the Civil 
                                                
51 When referring to Article 58 cases, this thesis uses the terms “counterrevolutionary” and “political” 
interchangeably. Although as Steven Barnes notes the category of “political prisoner” officially ceased to 
exist in the Soviet Union in 1926, the distinction between “politicals” and hardened “criminals” within the 
Gulag continued to hold currency, even as the lines between these groups remained under dispute. See 
Barnes, Death and Redemption, 83-93. 
52 Oleg Khlevniuk, “The Gulag and the Non-Gulag as One Interrelated Whole,” Kritika 16, 3 (Summer 
2015): 481-482; Alexopoulos, “Amnesty 1945,” 275. 
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War.53 As Old Bolsheviks, almost all had enlisted in Lenin’s faction, or the pre-schism 
Russian Social Democratic Workers’ Party, prior to the October Revolution; several 
joined other leftist parties that were eventually subsumed into the Communist Party, such 
as the Jewish Labor Bund or the Azeri Hümmet, or were inducted through service in the 
Red Army. Importantly, none were members of the so-called “Stalin generation” that 
swelled the Party’s ranks after the ascendant General Secretary cemented his grip on 
power in 1928.54 These early Party cadres, who played some of the most outsized roles 
establishing Soviet power throughout the former tsarist empire, were particularly targeted 
for elimination during the purges, and therefore figured particularly prominently among 
the “true sons of the Party” whose reputations were redeemed in the first waves of 
rehabilitation.55  
 A mode of rehabilitation that cannot be substantively examined in the present 
thesis is the restoration of the rights of the “punished peoples” – national and ethnic 
minorities deported en masse from their homelands within the USSR. These groups, 
including most notably Crimean Tatars, Chechens, Ingush, Volga Germans, Balkars, and 
Kalmyks were subjected to collective punishment ostensibly on the grounds of 
collaboration with Nazi occupiers during the war, and exiled from their homes to the 
                                                
53 This generational span is encapsulated by two of the more prominently featured personages in the 
dissertation: Sarkis Kas’ian, one of the elder statesmen and theoreticians of Transcaucasian Bolshevism, 
was born in 1876, while Aleksandr Kosarev, the youthful head of the Komsomol born in 1903, was a mere 
35 years old upon his arrest. Regarding the gender balance of posthumous rehabilitees, the Sakharov 
Center’s database of individuals shot in Moscow and the surrounding region between 1918 and 1953 lists 
the names of some 25,000 men, but only 1,000 women; see “Martirolog zhertv politicheskikh repressii, 
rasstreliannykh i zakhoronennykh v Moskve i Moskovskoi oblasti v 1918-1953 gg.,” available at 
https://www.sakharov-center.ru/asfcd/martirolog/. 
54 For the canonical discussion of these cadres, see Sheila Fitzpatrick, “Stalin and the Making of a New 
Elite, 1928-1939,” Slavic Review 38, 3 (September 1979): 377-402. 
55 According to J. Arch Getty and William Chase’s quantitative analysis of approximately 900 Party elites, 
55.6 percent of those who joined the Party before 1912, and 63.9 percent who joined between 1912 and 
1920, were purged. See J. Arch Getty and William Chase, “Patterns of Repression Among the Soviet Elite 
in the Late 1930s: A Biographical Approach,” in Stalinist Terror: New Perspectives, eds. J. Arch Getty and 
Roberta Manning (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 225-246. 
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Central Asian interior, where tens of thousands died from disease, exposure, and 
starvation. Over the course of the second half of the Soviet century the government 
acknowledged that many of these groups had been falsely maligned, and haltingly 
allowed some to return to the lands from which they had been expelled, though the 
repatriation process rarely proceeded smoothly and few were able to recuperate the 
houses and property that had been lost as a result of official reprisals.56 While the 
nomenclature of the procedures for rehabilitating political prisoners and “punished 
peoples” is essentially identical, and the struggles of returned nationalities to reclaim 
their possessions is immediately reminiscent of analogous efforts on the part of former 
elites, the mechanisms of repression and remission were in most regards diametrically 
opposed. Because the groups in question were collectively penalized as entire 
communities, when they were cleared of wrongdoing blanket declarations of guiltlessness 
– often from non-judicial organs – sufficed. However, the operating logic of individual 
legal and political rehabilitation – of which the posthumous variant was a subset – was 
predicated upon exhaustively reviewing the files assembled against suspected 
counterrevolutionaries and thereby separately determining whether each figure under 
consideration merited exculpation.    
This dissertation actively avoids referring to most of its subjects as “victims,” as a 
gesture toward two distinct trends that have remained largely unarticulated in the existing 
scholarship.57 Unlike the vast majority of those arrested under Stalinism – or, for that 
                                                
56 On the rehabilitation of punished peoples, see N. F. Bugai, Reabilitatsiia repressirovannykh grazhdan 
Rossii: XX-nachalo XXI veka (Moskva: MSNK-Press, 2006); idem., Problemy repressii i reabilitatsii 
grazdan: istoriia i istoriografiia: XX v. – nachalo XXI v (Moskva: Grif i Ko, 2012); and Pavel Polian, 
Against Their Will: The History and Geography of Forced Migrations in the USSR, trans. Anna 
Yastrzhembska (Budapest and New York: Central European University Press, 2004), 181-232. 
57 For a notable exception to this trend, see Kevin M. F. Platt, “Secret Speech: Wounding, Disavowal, and 
Social Belonging in the USSR,” Critical Theory 42 (Spring 2016): 647-676. 
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matter, the groups targeted by the Nazis and other genocidal regimes – the elites swept up 
during the purges of 1937-1941 were often implicated in the very same systems of 
violence that ultimately claimed their lives. Despite Anton Antonov-Ovseenko’s adamant 
insistence that “the difference between ‘victims and hangmen’ was absolute and 
‘eternal,’”58 in actuality quite a few of the personages discussed herein were directly 
involved in the devastating collectivization campaigns of the early 1930s; some sat on 
regional NKVD troikas and signed off on mass executions and imprisonments; some 
hectored and denounced their rivals and former comrades alike, out of ideological zeal, 
vain attempts at self-preservation, or some combination thereof; others still personally 
meted out revolutionary justice and terror through their positions in the judiciary and 
state security. Russian historian Elena Zubkova observes that the purges were “often a 
thoroughly confused conglomerate of ironic dramas and broken fates. Among the victims 
were former informers and executioners, and among the loyal camp guards were genuine 
executioners and potentially honest people deluded by a perverse conception of dutiful 
service.”59 
In light of their extensive involvement in the Soviet government’s repressive 
apparatus, it is methodologically unsound to depict many of the posthumously 
rehabilitated solely as victims. The avoidance of the term “victim” is also intended to 
more accurately reflect the terminology employed contemporaneously by Soviet officials 
and citizens alike. While “victim” has become ubiquitous in scholarly and popular 
treatments of all those who endured Stalinist repression, it does not appear to have been 
as widely embraced when the authorities first began to admit the innocence of certain 
                                                
58 Quoted in Cohen, The Victims Return, 83. 
59 Zubkova, Russia After the War, 167. 
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“enemies of the people,” as emphasizing the heroism and honorable contributions of the 




 This study is based predominantly on archival documents held in former central 
Soviet repositories in Moscow, namely the State Archive of the Russian Federation 
(Gosudarstvennyi arkhiv Rossiiskoi federatsii, GARF), the Russian State Archive of 
Contemporary History (Rossiiskii gosudarstvennyi arkhiv noveishei istorii, RGANI), the 
Russian State Archive of Socio-Political History (Rossiiskii gosudarstvennyi arkhiv 
sotsial’no-politicheskoi istorii, RGASPI), and the Russian State Archive of Literature and 
Art (Rossiiskii gosudarsvennyi arkhiv literatury i isskustva, RGALI). The most frequently 
referenced collection from GARF is that of the USSR General Procuracy, which contains 
individual rehabilitation case files, internal communications between various branches of 
the judiciary, and the Procuracy’s close interactions with the Central Committee and 
specific Party leaders. Also of great value are the fondy of the USSR Council of Ministers 
and Supreme Soviet, which preserve letters from applicants for rehabilitation, and the 
Council of Ministers’ Housing Directorate, which fielded requests from former elites for 
property restitution over the course of the 1950s. 
 The papers of the CPSU, bifurcated between RGASPI and RGANI, constitute 
another major source-base for the dissertation. The records of the Central Committee 
Presidium (prior to 1952 the Politburo) and the Party Control Committee found at 
RGANI both comprise numerous deliberations relating to legal and political 
rehabilitation, and RGASPI boasts an entire fond of accounts written by survivors of the 
“lawlessness” of the 1930s-1950s in addition to the archives of numerous Old 
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Bolsheviks.60 RGALI proved fruitful for its collection of personal papers from authors 
who were both the subjects and recipients of rehabilitation appeals. 
 These materials, most of which were inaccessible to scholars until relatively 
recently, are supplemented by published documentary collections, including the 
indispensable series Reabilitatsiia: kak eto bylo (Rehabilitation: As It Happened), which 
mines the holdings of the Archive of the President of the Russian Federation, an 
institution that remains inaccessible to researchers. Beyond officially generated sources 
and petitions to the authorities, this thesis turns to memoirs, diaries, and other ego 
documents written by functionaries from the judiciary and affiliated government bodies, 
as well as beneficiaries of rehabilitation. Combined, they allow one to access the 
multifarious objectives and outcomes that made posthumous rehabilitation one of the 




The dissertation consists of five interconnected, thematically arranged chapters. 
Chapter One approaches the tentative first months and years of posthumous rehabilitation 
through the prism of patronage networks. The Great Terror often targeted individuals 
according to their personal and professional affiliations, and when Stalin’s heirs turned 
on one of their own in a coordinated attack on Beriia it signaled an opportunity for 
vindication to those who had clashed with the secret police chief and his circle in the 
past. When the official mechanisms for initiating rehabilitation proved unresponsive or 
insufficiently expeditious, survivors of the Transcaucasian Party elite reached out in 
                                                
60 Recently some components of both the Politburo/Presidium fond as well as that of the Party Control 
Committee have been transferred from RGANI to RGASPI; for the purposes of this study, references to 
files will be maintained as they appeared in RGANI’s collection. 
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considerable numbers to Anastas Mikoian – the last remaining member of the Kremlin’s 
“Caucasian clique” – to secure relief. In soliciting the intervention of Mikoian and other 
erstwhile patrons still within the halls of power, rehabilitation seekers counted on the 
continued viability of relationships that had been quiescent for the better part of two 
decades; the traction that their cases gained stands as a testament to the deeply 
personalized nature of the early rehabilitation process. 
 Building upon the findings from the previous section, Chapter Two applies a 
microhistorical approach to the remarkable case of one of Mikoian’s ill-fated 
acquaintances, the former Georgian Party Secretary Levan Davydovich Gogoberidze. 
Having leveraged their family’s history with Mikoian, Gogoberidze’s sister, daughter, 
and wife were able to directly influence the course of his rehabilitation, and also induce 
the Procuracy to open a wide-ranging investigation into his possible whereabouts. 
Despite the authorities’ repeated – and remarkable, for the time – assurances that Levan 
Davydovich had been executed in March 1937, the remaining Gogoberidzes were 
steadfast in their conviction that he was alive in one of the “distant camps” thanks to both 
the Stalin-era assertion that those sentenced to death had received “ten years without the 
right of correspondence,” and a steady stream of reported sightings at various Gulag 
outposts that made their way to the family through the pipeline of recent returnees from 
“the zone.” Though these rumors proved to be false, the lengths to which the Procuracy 
was willing to go in order to verify them speak to the premium that the post-Stalin 
authorities placed on uncovering what actually became of repressed Party luminaries in 
light of the extremes of deception that marked the legacy of state violence they inherited. 
 30 
 Chapter Three takes as its subject the central role that the various branches of the 
judiciary – particularly the Procuracy – played in establishing the procedure of 
rehabilitation, a critical topic largely overlooked by existing works. Although the Central 
Committee reserved the prerogative to dictate which individuals were eligible for 
consideration, the substantive legal work of rehabilitation, which consisted of extensive 
reviews of case files and archival documents, interviews with witnesses, and devising 
coherent narratives out of contradictory testimony – much of it extracted under duress – 
fell to the Procuracy’s investigators, and was made binding through rulings of the USSR 
Supreme Court’s subsidiary collegiums and plenums. The judiciary also bore partial 
responsibility – in consultation with the organs of state security – for determining the 
type and amount of information that would be provided to concerned citizens inquiring 
after their disappeared relatives; the inability of these state institutions to effectively 
coordinate the fictitious answers they routinely supplied engendered a serious credibility 
gap among the populace. The limited mandate under which the Soviet judiciary operated 
at this time obliged it to thoroughly dismantle certain Stalin-era fabrications to justify the 
exoneration of thousands of Bolshevik stalwarts while it diligently maintained other 
canards in the interest of concealing the Terror’s true toll and defending the Party line 
from the contagion of Oppositionism.       
 The currents surrounding posthumous rehabilitation, the judiciary’s increased 
clout under Khrushchev, and the Party’s determination to reassert control over the organs 
of state security coalesced around a series of trials against the remnants of Beriia’s secret 
police clan in Tbilisi, Moscow, and Baku between the autumn of 1955 and the spring of 
1956. These hearings are the focus of the fourth chapter. The tribunals held in the 
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Georgian and Azerbaijani capital cities were widely publicized spectacles, while the one 
in Moscow was held in camera; at each trial, posthumously rehabilitated individuals –
 and particularly their suffering while in custody – were prominently invoked to 
exemplify the former top-ranking secret policemen’s lawlessness and justify the death 
sentences that were handed down against the majority of the fourteen accused. Though 
the proceedings were in many respects reminiscent of the Terror’s show trials – insofar as 
the guilty verdicts were predetermined – rather than opening a new spate of bloodletting, 
they marked the last instance of political violence being used as a means of eliminating 
internal rivals; from that point on Khrushchev and his cohort effectively wielded 
accusations of complicity in past crimes against their adversaries, but spared the lives of 
those who found themselves on the losing side of power struggles. 
 Having established the ways in which the Soviet government instrumentalized the 
life stories of the posthumously rehabilitated to mediate the fraught aftermath of Stalin’s 
demise, the fifth and final chapter considers what survivors of the exonerated sought to 
gain – in material terms – through their participation in the rehabilitation process. Many 
figures first discussed in the opening chapter reappear here, as they mobilized patronage 
ties to secure concessions from the state in the form of improved housing, restored 
property, financial assistance, and social privileges; in many instances those linked to the 
anti-Beriia campaign were able to garner some of the earliest and most generous benefits. 
The chapter traces the evolution of restitution to rehabilitees’ families from its largely 
piecemeal beginnings to a bureaucratized procedure wherein the state’s obligations 
before the rehabilitated were codified, though inconsistently met. Appeals from families 
whose homes and belongings were seized during the Terror reveal an enduring sense of 
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entitlement that withstood decades of stigmatization directed against “family members of 
enemies of the people,” and proprietary feelings toward specific places and objects that 
seemingly ran counter to the ethos of state or collective ownership espoused in the early 
Soviet Union. This emphasis on reclaiming dwellings, belongings, and other trappings of 
privilege indicates the centrality of material possessions to notions of elite identity that 
relatives of the posthumously rehabilitated sought to recapture once they were restored 
their civil rights.    
 Several Old Bolshevik families – including the Gogoberidzes, Naneishvili-
Kosarevs, and Orakhelashvilis, among others – appear with some regularity across the 
dissertation. This is a reflection first and foremost of their prominent representation in the 
source base, but it is also intended to provide through lines between the chapters and 
some indication of how specific families experienced the various aspects of rehabilitation 
over the course of the decade-plus following Stalin’s death, a perspective that is largely 
absent from existing studies. By tracing certain individuals and their extended circles 
from their pre-Revolutionary activities to the circumstances of their arrests and 
executions, and then continuing through the process of posthumous rehabilitation and the 
restoration of some semblance of their families’ former lives, the dissertation attempts to 
provide a more holistic image of posthumous rehabilitees and their families, and situates 
itself within a narrative continuity that underscores the personal factors at play in some of 







Chapter One – Personal Patronage and the Genesis of Posthumous 
Rehabilitation 
 
…Anastas Ivanovich stood up so suddenly that we were all stupefied  
(you can’t come up with another verb). And here are his words –  
approximately, of course, but with a great guarantee for accuracy: 
 – Yes, we indeed dragged out rehabilitation for many years, rather  
than acknowledging our mistake once and rehabilitating everyone 
 immediately. Why did we not do this? I say “we,” bearing myself in mind  
personally: more than once I stood in for the General Secretary when he  
was away… Why did we not do this? Who were we afraid of? You think  
that we were afraid of each other? No! You can believe me. We were so  
afraid of Him that his successors could not fear one another after the fear  
of Him… So why did we enact “acts of rehabilitation,” rather than 
 exonerate everyone immediately? Why did we arrange the façade of court 
proceedings for acquittals? Because if we had proceeded otherwise, 
if we had proceeded according to our conscience, our people would 
 ultimately have been convinced that we were scoundrels! I remember 
 that Anastas Ivanovich hesitated for a moment. Then he concluded: 
 – Scoundrels! Which in actuality is what we were!61 
 
 In late December 1953 Antonina Aleksandrovna Kalmykova wrote to Nikita 
Khrushchev from the Siberian city of Kansk, in southern Krasnoiarsk krai. Prior to his 
arrest in November 1938, Kalmykova’s husband, Betal Edykovich Kalmykov, had served 
as the First Secretary of the Kabardino-Balkar Party obkom for much of the 1930s, and 
the announcement of Minister of Internal Affairs Lavrentii Pavlovich Beriia’s arrest in 
June 1953 and execution that December over the airwaves and in the Soviet press 
represented for Kalmykova an opportunity to free herself from exile and restore her 
family’s good name. In her petition, Kalmykova insisted that both she and her husband 
                                                
61 Natal’ia Mostovenko, Dnevnik optimistiki v inter’ere utrat: odin god (Moskva: “Magisterium,” 1995), 
169-170. Mostovenko, who was on the staff of the Great Soviet Encyclopedia, witnessed this confession on 
Mikoian’s part at a gathering in 1972 to mark the first anniversary of the death of Lev Stepanovich 
Shaumian, the encyclopedia’s former editor, a strong advocate on behalf of the rehabilitated, and one of 
Mikoian’s closest friends. In a later diary entry, Mostovenko second guessed herself over whether Mikoian 
actually said “scoundrels” or “bastards”; Mikoian’s son, Sergo – himself a historian – suggested that in 
such a situation his father most likely would have said “bastards.” See S. A. Mikoian, “Aleksei Snegov v 
borbe za ‘destalinizatsiiu,’” Voprosy istorii 4 (2006): 83.  
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were victims of “the despotism and lawlessness Beriia perpetrated.”62 Kalmykova’s 
missive narrated the via dolorosa that she had tread since Betal’s repression: subjected to 
repeated, brutal interrogations designed to force her to incriminate her husband and his 
close friend Grigorii “Sergo” Konstantinovich Ordzhonikidze, she was driven to the brink 
of suicide, then spent ten years confined to a labor camp and a further five in exile in 
Krasnoiarsk.63 Kalmykova requested that Khrushchev clear the way for her to be reunited 
with her last living relative, her daughter, and that the charges against her and Kalmykov 
be reexamined in light of Beriia’s recent unmasking. Appended to her appeal was an 
attestation from the director and Party committee chairman of the hydrolysis plant where 
Kalmykova had been employed for the past three and a half years noting that she had 
proven herself to be “hardworking,” and “honestly and diligently applie[d] herself to her 
work.”64 With this inclusion Kalmykova seemingly attempted to signal though assiduous 
labor her continued devotion to building socialism despite the misfortunes that had 
befallen her – and her worthiness of absolution.  
 Neither Kalmykova’s family saga nor her contributions to the Soviet project 
attracted Khrushchev’s notice, and her letter was appended to the growing file on Beriia’s 
case without any sign that entreaties within had been taken up for consideration. Yet her 
pleas did not ultimately go unanswered: at the end of the following April, Anastas 
Ivanovich Mikoian, the great survivor of Soviet politics, forwarded an identical copy of 
Kalmykova’s letter – sans the endorsement from her employers – as well as a second note 
from her daughter and brother-in-law to the rest of the Central Committee, suggesting 
                                                
62 Rossiiskoi gosudarstvennyi arkhiv noveishei istorii (RGANI) fond 5, opis’ 30, delo 78, list 1. 
63 RGANI f. 5, op. 30, d. 78, ll. 1-3 
64 RGANI f. 5, op. 30, d. 78, l. 5. 
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that the matter warranted further attention.65 It was no coincidence that the Kamykovs 
directed their supplications to Mikoian after failing to gain traction with Khrushchev, as 
Mikoian and Betal Kalmykov had served together in the North Caucasus, and were both 
extremely close to Ordzhonikidze. That Kalmykova’s overtures found purchase with 
Mikoian after Khrushchev was left unpursuaded underscores the centrality of patron-
client and kinship relationships to the functioning of Soviet rule. Over the course of his 
decades-long political career Mikoian proved himself to be particularly adept at 
navigating this aspect of the system by mobilizing practices and affinities that were 
forged in the crucible of revolutionary conspiracy on the borderlands of the Russian 
Empire.66  
Within the Kremlin of the mid-1950s and 1960s Mikoian came to represent the 
interests of an array of Old Bolsheviks with whom he served in Transcaucasia (today’s 
Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan) in the pre-Revolutionary and Civil War-era 
Communist underground, many of whom began their radical careers under Sergo 
Ordzhonikidze’s tutelage. As historian Erik Scott has shown in his study of the Georgian 
diaspora within Russia and the Soviet Union, Communists who traced their political 
                                                
65 Gosudarstvennyi arkhiv Rossiiskoi Federatsii (GARF) f. 5446, op. 120, d. 1100, ll. 90-95. Mikoian is 
perhaps most noted for being the only member of the Soviet leadership to have served “from Il’ich to 
Il’ich” – meaning Lenin to Brezhnev – without falling into disgrace or suffering arrest, though he came 
close to both on several occasions. Mikoian combined amiability – Stalin described him in a 1927 letter to 
Molotov and Bukharin as “a duckling in politics, a capable duckling, but a duckling nevertheless” – with a 
shrewd instinct for self-preservation. See I. V. Stalin, “Pis’mo V. M. Molotovu i N. I. Bukharinu, 27 iiunia 
1927 goda,” available at https://c21ch.newcastle.edu.au/stalin/t17/t17_165.htm; Michael Ellman, “The 
Road from Il’ich to Il’ich: The Life and Times of Anastas Ivanovich Mikoian,” Slavic Review 60, 1 (Spring 
2001): 140-150.  
66 On late Imperial precedents for Soviet-era patronage practices, see Daniel T. Orlovsky, “Political 
Clientelism in Russia: the Historical Perspective” in T.H. Rigby and Bohdan Harasymiw, eds., Leadership 
Selection and Patron-Client Relations in the USSR and Yugoslavia (London: George Allen & Unwin: 
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origins to this milieu emerged with a shared, engrained set of values: “the risk of arrest 
meant that loyalty was prized and the danger of betrayal always present. For these 
reasons, ideological commitment was wedded to a symbolic – and sometimes genetic – 
sense of fraternity among the predominantly male socialists of the Caucasus, a region 
where idealized male friendship was celebrated in poetry and practices of adoptive 
kinship were deep-rooted.”67 Though Scott emphasizes the particularly Georgian 
character of these circles, the multiethnic background of those who sought help from 
Mikoian suggests that shared service in the Communist underground was an equally 
strong locus of solidarity. Due in part to the particularly strong ties that existed among 
Transcaucasian Bolsheviks, “the purges hit this community with exceptional force,” as 
NKVD investigators recast longstanding interpersonal bonds as evidence of 
counterrevolutionary conspiracies, thereby consuming almost an entire generation of 
Party faithful.68 However, following the deposal of Beriia – himself a product of 
Ordzhonikidze’s extended network – the surviving relatives of Mikoian’s disappeared 
clients began to flood his office at the Council of Ministers (Sovmin) with requests for 
aid; their letters, along with Mikoian’s reactions, are preserved in his personal files.  
Unaware that their spouses, parents, and siblings had been summarily executed, 
petitioners sought information about their possible whereabouts, demanded their legal 
exoneration, and tried to extract material concessions, thereby reestablishing patronage 
relationships that had lain dormant for nearly two decades. Rather than ignoring these 
supplications, which arrived in the midst of major upheavals at the top of the Soviet 
party-state, Mikoian upheld his commitments to his repressed comrades and their 
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relations, taking an active part in securing their exculpation. Thus, in many of its earliest 
instances the posthumous rehabilitation of former Soviet elites was fostered largely by 
personalistic, patron-client and kinship relationships that could be traced back to the 
earliest days of Soviet power. 
Scholars have long acknowledged the important place of patronage ties in the 
establishment, consolidation, and maintenance of Soviet power across the former Russian 
Empire, though the issue of how the resulting networks manifested themselves beyond 
political maneuvers and in daily life has only been incorporated into the research agenda 
since the opening of the former Soviet archives.69 As Sheila Fitzpatrick observes, 
“[p]atronage relations were ubiquitous among the Soviet elite,” to the point that “nobody 
within the elites […] could live in a patronage-free environment.”70 As a prototypical 
patron Ordzhonikidze “expected dedication, results, and loyalty [from clients]. But he 
also offered protection, intervening energetically on behalf of ‘his people’ when they got 
into trouble with the party, the secret police, or other control agencies”; by that same turn, 
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members of Ordzhonikidze’s network were expected to alert him if there was trouble 
bound his way from the periphery, forming “mutual-protection circles.”71  
Beyond the exchange of political favors and support, patronage in the early Soviet 
Union primarily expressed itself as a function of the state’s status as “the monopoly 
distributor in a context of shortages of all goods and services. State monopoly meant that 
allocation was a major function of Soviet bureaucracy. Shortages meant that access was a 
matter of priority and privilege […] The ultimate allocational decisions were made by 
bureaucrats – but on personalistic, not bureaucratic-legal reasons.”72 This access to and 
preferential distribution of goods and services that were in short supply – which, for the 
families of purged notables included justice (broadly understood), housing, and material 
possessions – proved to be one of the most enduring aspects of patronage as practiced by 
Mikoian into the 1950s and 1960s.73  
Another one of “the normal prerogative[s] of power” wielded by Soviet patrons 
that Fitzpatrick discusses was the ability “to intervene to protect subordinates, associates, 
and clients who fell into the hands of the NKVD.”74 However, according to Mikoian’s 
memoir, this perquisite was abrogated in the lead up to the Great Terror by a “special 
Politburo decision forbidding Politburo members from interfering with the work of the 
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NKVD.”75 This marked, in Fitzpatrick’s words, “a highly significant (albeit temporary) 
change in the informal rules of the game” in which those in the upper echelons of Soviet 
power were engaged.76 It also engendered a serious dilemma for exponents of patronage 
like Mikoian: if patrons were incapable of safeguarding their clients from unjust 
execution, what loyalty, if any, did they owe the latter’s survivors? Furthermore, if a 
senior patron, such as Ordzhonikidze, was no longer on the scene was it incumbent upon 
those with whom he had served in the past, such as Mikoian, to see to the needs of his 
erstwhile clients? Materials from Mikoian and other leaders’ personal archives suggest 
that despite the disruptions and upheavals of state-sponsored terror, which was 
disproportionately aimed at kinship groups, patronage relationships among old Party 
stalwarts proved to be surprisingly resilient and inheritable in the years following Stalin’s 
death.77 However, those who benefitted from these arrangements could not and did not 
simply take it for granted that after a decade and a half in disgrace they would be able to 
pick up affairs where they had left off in 1937 or 1938; for most, the decision to seek out 
Mikoian’s intercession was a product of the party-state’s perceived unresponsiveness to 
their pressing concerns. 
The most cited studies of Gulag returnees have tended to depict interactions 
between survivors and the Soviet state as strictly adversarial, and therefore minimize the 
contacts between privileged survivors and figures still within the Kremlin.78 This trend 
has served to obscure the fact that rehabilitation policy in the period immediately 
                                                
75 Anastas Ivanovich Mikoian, Tak bylo: razmyshleniia o minuvshem (Moskva: Vagrius, 1999), 583. 
76 Fitzpatrick, On Stalin’s Team, 270. 
77 On kinship groups as specific targets of the Terror, see Golfo Alexopoulos, “Stalin and the Politics of 
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following Stalin’s death was a highly hierarchical process that required close cooperation 
between the families of the wrongfully repressed and representatives of the party-state.79 
In her recent work on the year 1956 in Soviet Russia, Kathleen Smith observes that “the 
simplest and fastest way to begin the rehabilitation process was to rely on direct ties to 
very high officials,” and despite the disruptions of state terror and the infusion of new 
cadres into the bureaucracy, “ties of kinship, histories of patronage, and traces of 
friendship remained to link prisoners and rulers.”80 The controversy over who within the 
Soviet government was responsible for initiating and pursuing rehabilitations was 
litigated with particular vigor in the memoirs of the leaders involved and has 
subsequently shaped researchers’ perspectives.  
In taking credit for raising the issue of investigations against supposed “enemies 
of the people,” Nikita Khrushchev was quick to denounce Kliment Efimovich 
Voroshilov, Lazar Moiseevich Kaganovich, and Georgii Maksimilianovich Malenkov for 
their foot-dragging. Regarding Mikoian, however, Khrushchev was decidedly 
circumspect: “I can’t remember specifically what position [Mikoian] took. As I recall, 
[Mikoian] didn’t pursue an active policy, but he didn’t try to hold back the process of 
exposing injustice.”81 Evidently stung by these allegations, Mikoian responded in his own 
autobiography that in actuality it was he who had proposed forming a commission to 
investigate Stalin-era political cases, “and there is no way that Nikita Sergeevich could 
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have forgotten this.”82 Mikoian also pointed to the large number of families that sought 
his help following Stalin’s death, and proudly claimed that of the dossiers he forwarded 
to USSR Procurator General Roman Andreevich Rudenko, “there was not a single 
occasion in which a case I sent was denied rehabilitation.”83 Although it was not possible 
to review every letter that Mikoian forwarded to the Procuracy for the purposes of this 
study – as many were not yet available to researchers – those consulted appear to bear out 
this track record, as all of the cases Mikoian gave his imprimatur were eventually 
reviewed and the charges dismissed.84   
 Stephen Cohen is among the few authors to acknowledge Mikoian’s interventions 
“on behalf of many victims, sometimes on his own initiative,” basing this impression off 
of individuals’ reminiscences.85 However, Cohen attributes this engagement to Mikoian’s 
supposed “need for absolution” in light of his own involvement in the purges, and, 
embracing Khrushchev’s account of the genesis of rehabilitation, contends that regardless 
of Mikoian’s “degree of repentance, [he] could have done little had Khrushchev not 
played his much larger role.”86 The thesis that rehabilitation constituted an act of 
contrition is difficult to substantiate – or, for that matter, dismiss – beyond the 
speculations of some of Mikoian’s contemporaries, but the documentary record from 
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recently opened former Soviet repositories suggest that this understanding merits serious 
complication. There is no indication that Mikoian waited for Khrushchev’s say-so before 
involving himself in rehabilitations, as most of the letters he received arrived in the 
immediate aftermath of Beriia’s execution in December 1953, well before Khrushchev 
consolidated power.  
Though archival materials cannot attest directly to Mikoian’s motivations, the 
shared profile of the vast majority of “his people,” the grounds on which they based their 
appeals, and the diligence Mikoian showed in taking care of them all strongly suggest 
that while advocating for posthumous rehabilitation may indeed have helped to salve his 
guilty conscience, his responses were largely conditioned by practices of kinship that had 
seen him through his entire revolutionary and political career. Through this prism, 
Mikoian’s actions can be framed as a way of fulfilling his obligation to protect his clients 
and ensure their material well-being, something he was prevented from doing by the 
extraordinary circumstances of the 1930s and early 1940s. For their own part, it was 
incumbent upon the surviving relatives of the repressed to remind him of why they were 
owed his loyalty, and what the stakes were should he fail to honor their requests. The 
affective style on display in both letters to Mikoian and, to a certain extent, in his 
responses is all the more pronounced when compared with the type of patronage 
practiced by Kliment Voroshilov, whose correspondence reflects a far more hierarchical 
streak.   
Miriam Dobson, who has worked with Mikoian and other leaders’ 
correspondence on rehabilitation – including Kalmykova’s letter – is primarily concerned 
with “ordinary” Soviet citizens, and therefore does not delve deeply into appeals by 
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former elites.87 Dobson works off the assumption that individuals’ onetime status 
afforded them special access to the halls of power without noting the fact that for the 
better part of twenty years they had been part of one of the most stigmatized groups in the 
USSR, and therefore could not count on official intervention on their behalf. In what she 
terms the “art of petitioning,” Dobson perceives direct connections between imagery 
evoked in prisoners’ appeals and tropes from early Soviet heroic narratives; however, by 
emphasizing literary form over intended function, she elides the primary impetus of the 
petitions, which was to persuade recipients of the rectitude of the appellant’s cause and 
thereby secure their exoneration. This chapter diverges from Dobson’s approach by 
foregrounding preexisting interpersonal and experiential ties between petitioners and 
addressees, which played a crucial part in dictating the grounds upon which petitioners 
based their claims, and the responsiveness of the parties they entrusted to shepherd their 
cases. 
 
Defining Mikoian’s Clients 
Historians have pointed to the April 1953 announcement of the dismissal of the 
case against the accused “doctor-saboteurs” as the official signal that provoked a flood of 
rehabilitation appeals in mid-1953, but for those who turned to Mikoian the deposal of 
Beriia that June proved to be far more portentous. The revelation that Beriia had been a 
clandestine “enemy of the people” for the duration of his career as state security chief in 
Transcaucasia, then as the region’s Party boss, and finally as head of the Union-wide 
secret police, in Dobson’s words “gave rise to a variety of confused and sometimes 
passionate reactions,” and prompted scores of those who attributed their falls from grace 
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to Beriia’s malign influence to reemerge.88 As there was considerable overlap between 
this cohort and Mikoian’s patronage network, within months of the announcement of 
Beriia’s sentence Mikoian’s office had become a veritable clearinghouse for aggrieved 
families seeking information about and exculpation of their missing relatives. 
 Who exactly, then, were “Mikoian’s people?” The vast majority of appellants 
who sought his intervention in the first post-Stalin years could trace their connections to 
Mikoian through the fight to establish Soviet power in the restive Caucasus during the 
Civil War and in the years immediately following. Most were themselves either 
Armenian (like Mikoian) or Georgian, though there were also ethnic Slavs and Jews 
among them. The oil boomtown of Baku was a particularly important locus for this 
cohort, both because of its pre-Revolutionary admixture of workers from various 
backgrounds that made it a fertile breeding ground for Communist agitation and its 
storied history during the Civil War. The heroism of the martyred 26 Commissars who 
led the Baku Commune, as well as of the Bolsheviks who continued their struggle 
underground after the Commune’s fall, was among the most potent of the Soviet state’s 
founding myths, and out of the Baku cauldron emerged many of the USSR’s future 
leaders, including Ordzhonikidze, Sergei Mironovich Kirov, and Mikoian.89 
  Mikoian and Ordzhonikidze, along with Stalin, comprised the notorious 
“Caucasian Clique” within the Kremlin during the 1920s and 1930s, and befitting their 
status – and in keeping with Union-wide practice – they seeded the provinces with their 
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clients.90 Matters began to come to a head, however, when Beriia and his affiliates 
supplanted several of Ordzhonikidze’s trusted friends in the Transcaucasian Party 
apparat; many from the former group took refuge in Moscow in order to be closer to 
their patron.91 From the capital, the “old guard that had allied itself with Ordzhonikidze” 
grumbled and intrigued over Beriia’s supposed service in a pan-Turkic militia during the 
Civil War: “Distinguished Caucasian Bolsheviks who traveled in top Kremlin circles did 
not have nice things to say about Beria and particularly enjoyed bringing up his ties with 
Musavat intelligence.”92 Ordzhonikidze’s suicide in February 1937, possibly prompted 
by his older brother Papuliia’s arrest, stripped his clients of their chief advocate within 
the Politburo, and before long those with close ties to him – including many other 
relatives – were rounded up for execution or long imprisonment; those left behind 
frequently held Beriia directly responsible for what they viewed as reprisals against 
Ordzhonikidze’s “clan.”93 Mikoian remained a voice for Caucasian Old Bolsheviks at the 
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top of the Party, but as discussed above his ability to guarantee individuals’ personal 
security was compromised by external constraints as state repression against leading 
cadres began to ramp up.   
It bears mentioning that in at least two instances during the 1930s Mikoian 
attempted to exert his influence to come to the aid of those he would later help achieve 
rehabilitation, but to little apparent effect.94 In 1937 Mikoian was dispatched to Armenia, 
along with Malenkov, to oversee the purge of the local Party apparat and intelligentsia. 
One of his tasks while there was to sign off on a list of individuals marked for arrest that 
the Armenian NKVD had prepared; on it he noticed the name of one of his oldest 
comrades from the Party’s pre-Revolutionary illegal days, Daniil (Danush) 
Aleksandrovich Shaverdian, which he struck off the list. Despite Mikoian’s efforts, 
Shaverdian was still taken into custody, and ultimately died in a labor camp.95 In a move 
that could have proven immensely costly for Mikoian, he also extended an extraordinary 
offer of help to the family of Comintern official Gevork Sarkisovich Alikhanov, the 
                                                                                                                                            
many of the figures discussed in this and subsequent chapters. In a July 1937 memorandum on 
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stepfather of Elena Bonner.96 As Bonner described in her memoir, while imprisoned at 
the Akhmolinsk Camp for Wives of Traitors to the Motherland – known as ALZhIR – her 
mother, Ruf’, instructed her to pass on a note requesting assistance from Mikoian in 
either 1939 or 1940. Bonner took the note in person to Mikoian’s dacha outside Moscow, 
where she spoke first with his wife, who she recalled being “very kind to me, perhaps 
excessively so.”97 She was then received by Mikoian himself, who admitted that it was 
beyond his power to rescue Alikhanov, but proposed that Elena and her younger brother 
come to live with his family; insulted by the suggestion, Bonner “replied very harshly, 
almost rudely,” and did not see Mikoian again until after Stalin’s death.98 
 Even before Beriia’s formal conviction Mikoian mined his own personal history 
as a Party fighter in the Caucasus to discredit the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) 
chief, and in doing so he affirmed his connections to those who had fallen into disrepute 
and physical destruction. Though Mikoian had not been an enthusiastic supporter of 
Khrushchev and his supporters’ plot to depose Beriia, and was hesitant to swiftly consign 
another member of the Party’s inner circle to the firing squad, once Beriia’s arrest had 
been carried out Mikoian duly aligned himself with the winning faction.99 On the evening 
of July 3, 1953 – little more than a week after Beriia had been taken into custody – at the 
Central Committee Plenum convened to legitimize the palace coup, Mikoian took to the 
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floor to address Beriia’s claim that during the Civil War in Baku he had infiltrated 
Musavat counter-intelligence as a double agent on behalf of the Party. Mikoian soundly 
dismissed this notion, as he insisted that he had been one of the only Party officials in the 
city empowered to dispatch individuals on such missions. When questioned by Malenkov 
as to who else possessed this authority, Mikoian mentioned two of his erstwhile 
comrades, “Sarkis” and “Viktor,” referring to Sarkis (Sergei) Ivanovich Kas’ian and 
Viktor Ivanovich Naneishvili, both of whom had been swept up in the prewar purges.100 
Mikoian’s apparent lack of concern in associating himself with known “enemies of the 
people” was underscored by his extremely familiar use of their first names without 
patronymics, rather than identifying them simply by their last names; it stood to reason, 
then, that both men’s families might eventually approach Mikoian seeking redress. 
 The profile that emerges of Mikoian’s clientele is thus of a group bound together 
by both shared revolutionary experiences and persecution. Over the course of the first 
three years following Stalin’s death Mikoian – as the last remaining member of the 
“Caucasian Clique” – became something of an Old Bolshevik ombudsman, fielding 
dozens, if not hundreds of requests from the intimates of those with whom he had crossed 
paths in the nascent days of Soviet power. Their belief, articulated through scores of 
letters, was that if someone like Beriia could be exposed for the enemy that he truly was, 
then perhaps their honest Communist relatives – who stood alongside Mikoian during the 
nascent Soviet republic’s darkest moments – could in turn be located and finally 
redeemed. 
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That said, onetime clients of Ordzhonikidze or Mikoian could not simply take it 
for granted that their entreaties would be readily received in the Kremlin. For the vast 
majority, their relationships with these men and the larger networks they cultivated had 
been sundered by death, disappearances, extended incarceration, and dispossession; 
indeed, after a patron had failed to shield so many comrades, could he be expected to help 
rectify the situation for his clients’ survivors so long after the fact?  
In one of the first rehabilitation letters to reach Mikoian, written in July 1953, 
Elena Davydovna Gogoberidze, sister of the Baku underground member and onetime 
Party Secretary of Georgia Levan Davydovich Gogoberidze, drew upon the themes of 
shared service in the Caucasus, alignment with Ordzhonikidze, and past confrontations 
with Beriia to articulate the overarching importance of clearing her brother’s name. 
Gogoberidze opened her entreaty by noting that although she had also written to 
Malenkov and Khrushchev, she was “appealing to you [Mikoian] as the only person 
within the Party leadership who from his very youth over the course of many years knew 
my brother Levan Davydovich Gogoberidze. I remember well how sincerely Levan loved 
you.”101 Building off of the recent attacks upon Beriia in the Soviet press, Gogoberidze 
stated that “it has become evident to me that the person who ruined Levan is an enemy of 
the people,” insisting that Beriia had targeted him “deliberately, fearing denunciations”: 
I doubt whether you knew for certain how much Beriia hated Levan 
because at one time (1933) Levan had material in his hands that attested to 
shameful facts of Beriia’s biography. Sergo ordered Levan to remain silent 
until irrefutable evidence was collected. Over the next two to three years, 
                                                
101 A. N. Artizov et al, eds., Reabilitatsiia: kak eto bylo. Dokumenty prezidiuma TsK KPSS i drugie 
materialy. Vol. 1. Mart 1953 – fevral’ 1956 (Moskva: Mezhdunarodnyi fond “Demokratiia,” 2000), 60. For 
Elena Gogoberidze’s letter to Malenkov, see RGANI f. 3, op. 8, d. 83, ll. 73-74. There is no indication from 
the subsequent archival record that Elena’s overtures to either Khrushchev or Malenkov elicited any 
response. 
 50 
if you recall, Levan was seriously ill, and then came 1936-1937 and Beriia 
did away with him.102 
 
By contrasting the fraternal love that Levan Gogoberidze bore Mikoian with the hatred 
that Beriia harbored for Levan, Elena Gogoberidze articulated the deeply personal hue in 
which political alliances and rivalries were cast within the Transcaucasian Bolshevik 
context. If Mikoian reciprocated Levan’s affection, as she hoped, perhaps the damage 
wrought by Beriia’s malice could, at some level, be undone.      
Given the established animosity between Levan Gogoberidze and Beriia and the 
length of time since the former’s disappearance, Elena Gogoberidze was not sanguine 
about the possibility of her brother’s survival: “I implore you, Anastas Ivanovich, save 
Levan if he is still alive – it has already been 17 years since we heard anything of 
him.”103 Were he still alive, Elena reasoned, “there is a great deal he could reveal today – 
after all, there are very few witnesses to the beginning of Beriia’s political career left 
among the living.”104 She then urged Mikoian, “regardless of whether the Party currently 
needs this type of testimony,” to “remember Levan, and if Levan has already died at least 
save his name, the name of an honorable Bolshevik who walked the glorious path of a 
fighter devoted to the Party and the people.”105 
Many of the points Elena Gogoberidze raised were echoed – unwittingly – by 
Elena Solomonovna Breitman, who also seized upon the public excoriation of Beriia as 
an opportunity to realize her siblings’ redemption in January 1954. Breitman noted that it 
“has come to my attention that in the indictment against Beriia the former Georgian 
People’s Commissar of Agriculture Matikashvili Shalva Spirdonovich figures among 
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those individuals who became victims of his criminal activities.”106 Breitman’s sister, 
Anna Solomonovna, in addition to having participated in the struggle for Baku herself, 
was married to Matikashvili and arrested alongside him, and Breitman believed that the 
invocation of Matikashvili against Beriia “[cast] a new light” on Anna Solomonovna’s 
case, as well as that of their brother, Aleksandr Solomonovich, who worked under 
Mikoian at the People’s Commissariat of the Food Industry.107 Breitman further justified 
her outreach by noting that she was “appealing personally to you, Comrade Mikoian, as 
one of the leaders of the Party and country who personally knew the Breitmans since 
1917.”108 Having had such a long acquaintance with her siblings, Breitman assumed that 
Mikoian would be able to attest to their true characters, and inform his colleagues of the 
egregious error that had been made in their cases. 
Other rehabilitation-seekers fell back upon the familiar format of the Party 
biography and rendered their requests in the guise of a record of their relatives’ 
revolutionary exploits. Artak Stambolstian devoted “[his] whole life from the age of 
reason […] to the great cause of our Communist Party,” wrote his wife, Pavla Ivanovna 
Galkina.109 Stamboltsian spent his youth in Tbilisi (then Tiflis) participating in 
Bolshevik-led student circles, joining the Party in 1916, after which point he became a 
professional revolutionary, working on behalf of the Soviets throughout Transcaucasia. 
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He found himself in Baku during the heady days of the Commune, fighting “against the 
German-Turks and Musavat counterrevolutionary bands” for which he later received a 
“certificate of honor.”110 When a British expeditionary force occupied Baku, the Party 
demonstrated its faith in Stamboltsian by selecting him to stay behind and “conduct 
underground Party work in the city.”111 Galkina’s emphasis on Stamboltsian’s past 
bravery served a dual purpose: it challenged the prevailing narrative that he had been an 
enemy of the Party, and reminded Mikoian of events that he himself had witnesssed, 
which might in turn impel him to advocate for his former comrades who no longer had a 
voice and help prove their innocence before the Party and Soviet people. 
Not every survivor who fit the above-mentioned profile needed or solicited 
Mikoian’s help in drawing the state’s attention to their cause. In December 1953 Mariia 
Viktorovna Naneishvili-Kosareva, Viktor Naneishvili’s daughter and the wife of 
longtime Komsomol head Aleksandr Vasil’evich Kosarev, pled her case before both 
Malenkov and Voroshilov, as chairmen of the USSR Council of Ministers and Supreme 
Soviet, respectively, in nearly identical letters. Writing from perpetual exile in Noril’sk, 
Naneishvili-Kosareva sought to bring “certain facts” to the attention of the party-state 
leadership “which might explain one of the reasons for Kosarev’s arrest.”112 Recounting 
an incident that would eventually become a staple of the Soviet judiciary’s anti-Beriia 
repertoire, Naneishvili-Kosareva described a visit that Azerbaijani headman and close 
Beriia confidante Mir Dzhafar Bagirov paid her family in 1937. During dinner, Kosarev 
proposed a toast to “true Bolshevik leadership in Transcaucasia, which does not currently 
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exist there,” a transparent dig at Beriia’s handling of affairs in the region.113 Several 
months after Beriia assumed the reigns of the NKVD from Nikolai Ezhov in autumn 
1938, he came in person to the Government House to seize the Komsomol secretary.114 
Naneishvili-Kosareva asked the arresting officers whether she was also to be detained, 
and though she was initially assured that they had no designs on her, as Kosarev was 
being led out Beriia instructed his subordinates to “take her too.”115  
In light of the speciousness of the grounds upon which Naneishvili-Kosareva was 
sentenced to ten years in the distant camps, followed by a second conviction that made 
her exile “perpetual,” and Beriia’s recent unmasking, she conjectured that there was 
“every reason” to review her case.116 Malenkov apparently agreed with her assessment, 
and the following month he suggested that Rudenko “inquire into this case.”117 
Naneishvili-Kosareva did not hear back from the authorities until May 8, 1954, when an 
officer from the local branch of state security came to her home and announced her full 
rehabilitation; she was subsequently put on a flight to Krasnoiarsk and from there was 
dispatched to Moscow to confirm her allegations regarding Bagirov with Chairman of the 
Military Collegium of the USSR Supreme Court Aleksandr Aleksandrovich Cheptsov 
and Deputy Chief Military Procurator D. I. Kitaev.118 Thanks to the extraordinary 
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circumstances of her and her husband’s arrest, which had direct bearing on the party-
state’s ongoing investigation into Beriia’s circle, Naneishvili-Kosareva was able to seize 
the Soviet government’s attention and secure a quite early rehabilitation for herself. 
Tellingly, though, when the judicial system proved less attentive to subsequent requests, 
it was Mikoian to whom she and her family turned for support.    
 
The Non-Responsive State: Patronage over Bureaucratic Inertia 
Beriia’s trial and execution alongside those of his closest lieutenants figured 
heavily into Mikoian’s eventual clients’ correspondence, as they were convinced that 
they and their disappeared relations would be vindicated by the revelations resulting from 
these proceedings. Their personal propinquity to and investment in the results of Beriia’s 
prosecution caused many to expect that the relevant authorities would handle their 
dossiers expeditiously. Yet they were dismayed to discover that the Procuracy, Central 
Committee, and the organs of state security did not treat their petitions with the sense of 
priority that they believed they were due, and it was only when more conventional 
avenues appeared to be a dead end that most relatives of the repressed ventured to contact 
Mikoian. Personal patronage was therefore not the first recourse of most who sought out 
Mikoian’s help, but rather a last resort when standard channels of redress appeared deaf 
or otherwise inured to their pleas.  
Antonina Kalmykova’s second attempt to draw attention to her plight was among 
a rash of letters that arrived at Mikoian’s door in April 1954. As with Elena Gogoberidze, 
Kalmykova found an explanation for her family’s persecution in Beriia’s “devious 
struggle (intriganskuiu bor’bu) against the prominent Party leader Sergo 
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Ordzhonikidze.”119 This conflict led Beriia to “[aim] his stinger at those with whom 
Sergo maintained business and friendly relations, and who indirectly from Comrade 
Sergo’s mouth could have learned of Beriia’s criminal activities in the past.”120 
Kalmykova highlighted the fact that following Kamykov’s arrest, NKVD officers 
charged with searching the family apartment were specifically ordered to locate any 
personal correspondence between Kalmykov and Ordzhonikidze. With Betal “slandered” 
as an enemy of the people, and the Party “meanly deceived” regarding his “supposedly 
hostile conduct,” any tangible ties between him and Ordzhonikidze could be employed 
“to cast a shadow of mistrust on Sergo’s cherished memory.”121 Having remained loyal to 
the Ordzhonikidzes, Kalmykova trusted that Mikoian would in turn keep faith with her 
and her husband. 
Raisa Konstantinovna Mikadze, the wife of the onetime head of Transcaucasian 
State Trade Archil Vissarionovich Mikadze, recounted in detail how Beriia intrigued 
against her husband – who had snubbed Beriia by “avoiding and ignoring” him – prior to 
his arrest in 1936.122 Raisa Konstantinovna received an eight-year sentence as the wife of 
an enemy of the people, and even after release was plagued by her criminal record, which 
“horribly complicate[d] [her] existence.”123 Yet she took solace in the fact that Beriia’s 
actual character had been exposed: “Now, after the unmasking of the real enemy of the 
people Beriia, one of whose victims was my husband, I hope and believe that the truth, 
finally, will prevail. Now I am not afraid to petition (khlopotat’) for my innocently 
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victimized husband, an honest Communist.”124 No longer threatened by reprisal from 
Beriia, Mikadze initially contacted the Chief Military Procuracy, where she was 
“promised […] that they would track down and review” her husband’s case.”125 As this 
pledge had yet to materialize – Mikadze did not indicate how long she had been kept 
waiting – she trusted that Mikoian’s “intervention […] would render invaluable help and 
expedite the search for A. Mikadze.”126 
 Emboldened by Beriia’s toppling, Natal’ia Evgen’evna Chizhova compiled all of 
the necessary documentation for her own exoneration and provided it to the Leningrad-
region branch of the MVD in March 1954; her daughter later informed her that the 
Leningrad MVD subsequently forwarded these materials to the Procuracy’s headquarters 
in Moscow. Having waited for any sign of further progress for eight months, she solicited 
Mikoian’s input. Chizhova and her second husband, the eventual First Secretary of the 
Belorussian Party Nikolai Fedorovich Gikalo, became acquainted while they were both 
working under Mikoian at the Northern Caucasus Party kraikom in Rostov-on-Don 
during the 1920s; Chizhova’s responsibilities within the press department included 
weekly reports to Mikoian on the work of the region’s newspapers.127 In the “difficult 
seventeen years” since her and her husband’s arrest, Chizhova claimed to have drawn 
moral support from Mikoian’s example, as she “clung to an old Party leader, who taught 
the young workers to fight for the Party line.”128 During that time Chizhova declined to 
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“[turn] to [Mikoian] for help” in expunging her conviction, but with Beriia out of office 
she finally “decided to do so.”129  
 Chizhova bemoaned the fact that Gikalo could neither “request the review of his 
case” nor “prove that he was innocent,” as the MVD had informed her eight years earlier 
– falsely – that he “died in 1943 somewhere in the camps.”130 Because Chizhova had 
been sentenced as the “wife of an enemy of the people,” she was at a loss for “how to 
rehabilitate [her]self,” given that she could not refute charges predicated entirely on her 
husband’s legal status.131 Chizhova emphasized that it was because she had “yet to 
receive an answer from the Procuracy on my petition to expunge my conviction” that she 
was asking Mikoian’s help in the form of a telephone call to the Procuracy confirming 
that he knew her “as an honest Party member, a participant in the Civil War, never part of 
the Opposition.”132 She assured Mikoian that “if I am readmitted into the Party’s trust I 
will prove myself worthy of it.”133 With this promise Chizhova recognized that for the 
party-state, one’s worthiness of legal redemption was inextricably tied to one’s political 
reliability, which would therefore be a central component of any argument Mikoian 
might make in her favor. 
Writing to Mikoian at around the same time as Chizhova, the wife and daughter, 
respectively, of Mikoian’s fellow Armenians Suren Petrovich Akopian and Sergei 
Kas’ian – the “Sarkis” of the Baku underground – detailed how the Party and government 
leadership’s initially promising responses to their inquiries seemingly foundered once 
they reached state security or the Procuracy. Kas’ian’s surviving family contacted both 
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Khrushchev and Malenkov in January 1954 in light of Beriia’s denunciation and were 
cheered to learn in July that the government had authorized the Georgian MVD to reopen 
Kas’ian’s case.134 Their relief was tempered by the fact, however, that “up to this point 
we do not have any results from the case review, and we do not even know whether 
Sergei Ivanovich is alive or not.”135 Likewise, Petrosian’s wife, Marusia Makovetskaia, 
noted that on May 15th of the same year she addressed herself to Khrushchev “with a 
request to give the order to review and rehabilitate my husband”; Khrushchev passed this 
on to Rudenko four days later, after which point Makovetskaia and her children received 
no reports of further progress.136  
 Mark Natanovich Belen’kii and Abram Lazarevich Gilinskii were both Mikoian’s 
deputies at the People’s Commissariat of the Food Industry during the mid-1930s, though 
the Baku-born, Sorbonne-trained Belen’kii first encountered Mikoian in the Azerbaijani 
capital in 1919. When their wife and daughter, respectively, wrote to Mikoian in 1954, 
both had been awaiting some word of the men for months, if not years. Gilinskii’s 
daughter, N. A. Stechkina, claimed that she had “appealed repeatedly to the organs of 
internal affairs in order to find him, but up to the present time” she had not gotten any 
substantive replies.137 If Mikoian’s memoir is to be believed, Belen’kii’s arrest in 
November 1937 particularly affected him. When Stalin told him that Belen’kii had been 
taken into custody, Mikoian vociferously protested his innocence, entering into a “sharp 
and pointed debate with Stalin.” The following week Stalin presented Mikoian with a 
transcript of Belen’kii’s interrogation, in which he confessed to the charges against him; 
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Mikoian described reading the document as “such a blow,” though it is unclear if his 
main concern was for his deputy or how such a development might bode for him.138 
Belen’kii’s wife, Natal’ia Vladimirovna, was arrested two months after her husband and 
sentenced as a “family member of a traitor to the Motherland (chlen semei izmennika 
Rodiny, or ChSIR),” but was released early from her camp term due to illness. At the time 
of writing, October 1954, Belen’kaia was living in the Golden Ring city of Zagorsk 
(previously and currently Sergiev Posad), which was within 100 kilometers of Moscow, 
and therefore technically off-limits to former political prisoners; however, Mikoian had 
already pulled some strings behind the scenes to help her live closer to her daughter, 
Tat’iana (later the wife of author Anatolii Rybakov).139 Belen’kaia protested that in July 
she had written to the Procuracy about reopening her husband’s case, and received 
confirmation that his file had been taken up for review, but in the intervening months 
nothing had become of the investigation, and so she requested a “huge favor (velikaia 
pros’ba) of Mikoian, that he “facilitate the expedition of the inquiry into the case.”140     
Although Mariia Naneishvili-Kosareva was shown exceptional treatment when 
she approached the authorities regarding her and Kosarev’s case, her experience in 
seeking the expiation of her father Viktor – also invoked by Mikoian in July 1953 against 
Beriia – was far more typical of the obstructions faced by other members of the extended 
                                                
138 Mikoian, Tak bylo, 318-319. 
139 Tat’iana Rybakova, “Schastlivaia ty, Tania!” O “Detiakh Arbata” i ne tol’ko (Moskva: Vagrius, 2005), 
38. My thanks to Rybakova’s daughter, Dr. Irene Kolchinsky, for providing me with supplementary 
information about her grandparents. 
140 GARF f. 5446, op. 120, d. 1168, l. 39. Given the wait times cited by other appellants, the July-October 
interval that Belen’kaia faced was comparatively short. Though Mikoian contacted Rudenko within days of 
receiving Belen’kaia’s note, and Belen’kii was rehabilitated the following March, it appears that she came 
away from the experience with an overall negative impression of Mikoian. When her daughter, presumably 
in 1955, urged Belen’kaia to again write to Mikoian in order to secure the family a new apartment – as 
Tat’iana’s friend had done via Bulganin – she refused, insisting that “Mikoian is a traitor […] for starters he 
betrayed his brother, didn’t protect him (referring to Mikoian the aircraft designer), and then he betrayed 
your father.” It is unclear in what capacity Mikioan was supposed to have been disloyal to his brother. See 
Rybakova,“Schastlivaia ty, Tania!,” 53-54. 
 60 
Transcaucasian Bolshevik network. Along with her brother Pavel, Naneishvili-Kosareva 
gave voice to their apparent dismay at the delay in their father’s rehabilitation, but the 
siblings struck a conciliatory tone in acknowledging the issues inherent in the process. In 
their February 1955 appeal to Mikoian they revealed that eight months had passed since 
their initial overture to the Military Procuracy, yet it was evident that their “father’s case 
still has not been reviewed.”141 The Naneishvilis professed to “understand all the 
complexity and difficulty of analyzing our father’s case, as he is no longer alive and 
cannot refute all the false accusations raised against him,” but contended that “surely his 
entire life as a revolutionary-Bolshevik itself refutes all the vile accusations.”142 If Viktor 
Naneishvili’s revolutionary bona fides alone were insufficient to ensure timely 
consideration of the accusations against him, Pavel and Mariia grasped, then the 
intervention of one of his last remaining comrades was imperative. Trusting in the ability 
of a concerned benefactor to spur on the Soviet bureaucracy, the Naneishvilis and other 
families in their situation carefully avoided casting aspersions on the bodies responsible 
for carrying out rehabilitations.  
Some of Mikoian’s bolder clients were far less guarded in their assessments of the 
process’ initial shortcomings. Rita Emmanuilovna Kornblium was something of an 
outlier among those who sought Mikoian’s favor: born in 1908, she was easily a decade 
younger than most of the other supplicants, her ex-husband, the playwright and Russian 
Association of Proletarian Writers (RAPP) activist Vladimir Mikhailovich Kirshon, was 
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part of the creative intelligentsia rather than the Party elite, and she and Kirshon 
dissolved their marriage after less than a decade together, some five years before his 
arrest and execution in 1937.143 Although Kornblium and Kirshon had separated 
acrimoniously, she doggedly pursued his rehabilitation by dint of the fact that she raised 
his two sons and her professed belief in the value of his work as a proletarian author and 
playwright. By the time she first contacted Mikoian in late January 1955, Kornblium had 
already “sent four petitions to KGB Chairman Comrade Serov and appealed twice to the 
Military Procuracy” for official information regarding Kirshon’s place and cause of 
death, but she had yet to “receive a death certificate for him.”144 Kornblium also raised 
the possibility of rehabilitating Kirshon with Rudenko in June 1954, but as she pointedly 
observed, “despite the fact that many petitions which were lodged at the same time as 
mine have received decisions that fully, morally satisfied them, this whole time the 
Procuracy has answered me that Kirshon’s case has still not arrived from the KGB.”145  
The discrepancies in response time on the authorities’ part led Kornblium – like 
Elena Gogoberidze – to speculate that there remained elements within the security 
apparatus that had a vested interest in keeping the truth about Kirshon under wraps: 
Over the past 17-18 years my sons and I have drained the bitter cup of 
suffering, and the totally inexplicable delay in the review of Kirshon’s 
case currently places us in an even more difficult and awkward position 
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8131, op. 31, d. 98739, l. 17. 
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and gives rise to suspicions that perhaps there remain some forces that 
have an interest in the fact that “Kirshon’s case remains unexamined 
(vnute).” What else can explain such a situation, when in 7 months’ time 
the Military Procuracy cannot get the files from Vladimir Kirshon’s 
case?146 
 
As justified as Kornblium’s misgivings were, the candor with which she expressed them 
was apparently a political liability. The heavily modified second iteration of her letter to 
Mikoian that the latter ultimately submitted to the Central Committee for consideration in 
August 1955 was stripped of any intimations about the suspect loyalties of certain cadres, 
and in reference to her petition to Rudenko Kornblium only mentioned – albeit 
inaccurately –that it had been a year and a half since she first reached out to him.147 The 
modified tack that Kornblium adopted suggests that the ability of even a highly placed 
patron like Mikoian to ensure the expedition of his clients’ cases was dependent – at least 
in part – on their complaints being couched in terms that did not question the integrity of 
the judicial or security organs, even in light of perceived obstruction in their handling of 
cases that, for the survivors of the repressed, were of the utmost urgency. 
One of the last families to seek Mikoian’s relief also experienced one of the 
longest intervals between their first contact with representatives of the party-state and 
their resort to personal patronage. Asatur Stepanovich Kakhoian, one of the elder 
statesmen of Transcaucasian Bolshevism, with a Party stazh (tenure) dating to 1898, was 
– in the words of his son Karlos – “arrested at the hands of Beriia’s traitors (Berievskikh 
izmennikov)” in Georgia in 1937.148 Eager to capitalize on the anti-Beriia sentiment in 
                                                
146 GARF f. 5446, op. 120, d. 1169, l. 43. Kornblium’s suspicions were actually quite well-placed. As 
Kirshon’s voluminous Procuracy file attests, the KGB openly resisted participating in the writer’s 
rehabilitation, given his ties to former NKVD head Iagoda, whose brother-in-law, Leopol’d Leonidovich 
Averbakh, co-headed RAPP with Kirshon. See GARF f. 8131, op. 32, d. 98739, ll. 33-34. 
147 Artizov et al, Reabilitatsiia, vol. 1, 255-257. 
148 GARF f. 8131, op. 31, d. 50450, l. 32. 
 63 
circulation, Karlos petitioned Malenkov in November 1953; though the actual text of the 
message is not preserved in Kakhoian’s Procuracy file, there is record of Malenkov’s 
secretariat forwarding the note to newly-minted KGB head Ivan Aleksandrovich Serov 
with instructions to “inform the petitioner of the results of the investigation.”149 Karlos 
and his sister, Elena, later learned that their father’s case had been placed under the 
purview of the Georgian republican KGB, and as the inquiry wound its way though the 
state security system over the next thirteen months they put themselves at investigators’ 
disposal.150 Karlos – whose own conviction as the son of an enemy of the people was also 
under consideration – was tasked with tracking down exculpatory documents and 
witnesses, including attestations from Baku Commissar Stepan Shaumian and Stalin’s 
revolutionary cohort Simon “Kamo” Petrosian’s sisters, as well as members of the 
Kas’ian family.151 The siblings were informed on July 25, 1955 that the investigation had 
concluded and its findings were being passed on to Moscow for confirmation, but by the 
time Karlos reached out to Mikoian already five months had passed and no verdict was 
forthcoming.152 Karlos entreated Mikoian “to take an interest in our case and if possible 
expedite its confirmation,” a gesture for which he would be “deeply grateful.”153   
 
“Now You Are My Only Hope”: Personal Knowledge and the Utility of 
Rehabilitation 
 
Given that some 15 years – if not more – had passed since Mikoian’s last contact 
with the families soliciting his benefaction, most petitioners felt compelled to justify 
                                                
149 GARF f. 8131, op. 31, d. 50450, l. 3. 
150 Possibly out of concern that the wrong case had been reopened, in a June 1954 note Elena Kakhoian 
admonished Malenkov not to confuse her father with the Georgian Party Secretary Mikhail Kahkiani. 
GARF f. 8131, op. 31, d. 50450, l. 7. 
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themselves before the longstanding Presidium member, and explain how he was uniquely 
positioned to render them assistance.154 In doing so, they revealed many of the operating 
assumptions that underlay Mikoian’s patronal obligations before them. The opening 
gambit of Raisa Mikadze’s letter touched upon these precise ideas. She described Archil 
Mikadze as someone Mikoian “knew personally in the past. I will not begin to describe 
him, and only say that no one who knows him believed or believes in his guilt. Those 
who knew him well and trusted in him included such people as Sergo Ordzhonikidze, 
Kamo and other famous Party figures, who, unfortunately, are no more. Now you are my 
only hope”155 As the final exponent of the once-predominant Caucasian contingent in the 
Kremlin, Mikoian was the only remaining person of influence who could attest to 
Mikadze’s true character, and it therefore fell to him, according to Raisa Konstantinovna, 
to impress this knowledge upon the functionaries at the Chief Military Procuracy. This 
same sentiment was expressed across numerous letters addressed to Mikoian, such as the 
one from the Naneishvili siblings, who maintained that he knew their “father better than 
anyone else (luchshe drugikh znavshego ottsa),” including Elena Stasova and Lev 
Shaumian, which therefore made him uniquely qualified to advocate for Viktor 
Naneishvili’s rehabilitation.156  
Patronage-seekers approached Mikoian with a clear sense of what he could do on 
their behalf, and how the rehabilitation of their disappeared relatives would tangibly 
improve their lives. Elena Gogoberidze’s overture to Mikoian highlighted one of the most 
immediate, concrete benefits that he, as someone with access to the Soviet state’s deepest 
                                                
154 The fact that many petitioners felt compelled to reintroduce themselves to Mikoian and narrate the major 
events of their and their relatives’ lives, both before and after their repression, indicates that most remained 
estranged from Mikoian through at least 1953. 
155 GARF f. 5446, op. 120, d. 1100, l. 148. 
156 GARF f. 5446, op. 120, d. 1170, l. 59. 
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secrets, could provide to Ordzhonikidze and his erstwhile clients: information about the 
whereabouts and status of their loved ones. Most families of elites sentenced to capital 
punishment in the 1930s had been told that their relatives were serving “ten years in the 
distant camps, without the right of correspondence,” and this campaign of misinformation 
on the part of the state security organs and judiciary continued unabated for the better 
part of the next two decades. Next of kin were systematically fed contradictory reports 
about “inmates’” conditions, but as the years passed without any sign of their imminent 
emergence from the Gulag many began to suspect the worst. Thus the rehabilitation 
appeals that crossed Mikoian’s desk were just as much concerned with locating missing 
persons as they were with exonerating the wrongfully convicted.157  
Many writers to Mikoian further justified their pleas for information and aid as an 
expression of concern for the welfare of their children, whose youths had been 
irrevocably marked by the repression of one or both of their parents. Antonina 
Kalmykova’s family had been devastated by both Stalin’s purges and the ravages of war. 
As she reported to Mikoian, upon her arrest her three children – two sons and a daughter 
– took shelter with Ordzhonikidze’s wife until the war’s outbreak, when her sons, “while 
valiantly defending the Motherland, perished heroically.”158 Desperate to be reunited with 
her remaining kin, Kalmykova entreated Mikoian for “the chance to live as an equal 
member of socialist society, let me at least at the end of my life be with my one living 
child – with my daughter, and with this give my daughter, a member of the Komsomol, 
the opportunity to become a member of the Communist Party in the future”;159 for a 
Communist stalwart like Kalmykova, there was no future for her daughter outside the 
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Party. Unsure of her husband’s ultimate fate, Kalmykova clung to the unlikely prospect 
of seeing him again, and closed her lengthy letter by urging Mikoian to “help me to learn 
the truth, where is Betal and is he alive?”160 Other appeals, though no less impassioned, 
were much more circumspect with regard to their subjects’ likelihood of survival.  
Elena Breitman stated that she had no idea if her sister, brother-in-law, or brother 
were still alive when she penned her overture to Mikoian, but made a point of “requesting 
their full rehabilitation even in the event that they are not.”161 Both of her siblings had 
“left behind children whom I raised and who unjustly bear the stigma of their parents 
having been ‘enemies of the people,’” and her interest in their futures animated her 
appeal in equal measure with her desire to learn what ultimately became of her 
disappeared relatives.162 Pavla Galkina pessimistically averred that it was “hardly 
necessary to search for [Artak Stamboltsian] among the living” when conducting his 
rehabilitation, given the amount of time that had transpired since he was taken into 
custody.163 That said, she still considered Stamboltsian’s vindication critical for her 
“daughter’s sake – Artak Stamboltsian’s daughter, because as a repressed person her 
father did not have a hand in her upbringing (otets ee ne stal, kak repressirovannyi, na ee 
zhiznennom puti).”164 Though Mikoian could not overcome the legacy of familial rupture 
engendered by the Terror, he was able to contribute to freeing Stambotsian and Galkina’s 
daughter from the enduring repercussions of being branded a child of an enemy of the 
people.  
                                                
160 Ibid. Kalmykova’s confusion about Betal’s whereabouts was due at least in part to “incomplete 
information” which put him at the Komsomol’sk camps on the Amur River; see GARF f. 5466, 120, 1100, 
l. 90. 
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Marusia Markovetskaia likewise bristled at her children having “suffered for their 
entire young lives because of their father, as though they were children of an enemy of 
the people, when their father was with the underground, and then under Soviet power 
gave his whole life to the cause of building Communism.”165 Markovetskaia begged 
Mikoian to aid her in “remedy[ing] the error” of Akopian’s persecution by “speak[ing] 
with Comrade Rudenko and affirm[ing] that Akopian S. P. is an honest, faithful 
Communist, and that he must be rehabilitated, independent of whether or not he is 
alive.”166 For Kas’ian’s daughter, Ruzanna, the “blot” that she, her mother, and her sister 
– herself a single parent to two children – bore as “the family of an enemy of the people” 
constituted a “serious moral outrage.”167 Even though they were unaware “whether Sergei 
Ivanovich is alive or not,” the remaining Kas’ians’ “main priority is the rehabilitation of 
Kas’ian and his family from the ignominious sobriquet enemy of the people”; as the 
family of “an old revolutionary,” for them the question of his reputation as a true 
Communist held more currency than the (unlikely) possibility of his return from physical 
exile.168   
None of Mikoian’s clients challenged, in principle, the category of “enemy of the 
people”; indeed, some avidly adopted it to describe Beriia and others whom they held 
accountable for their families’ decades of suffering. Their common objection was to the 
fact that this brand had been unjustly applied to their relatives and, by extension, 
themselves. Karlos Kakhoian assured Mikoian that he was not seeking “some sort of 
illegal favoritism (kakoi nibud’ nezakonnoi protektsii),” suggesting that the descendants 
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of true opponents of the Soviet regime did not merit succor from an eminent figure like 
Mikoian.169 Were Asatur Kakhoian “actually an ‘enemy of the people,’” Karlos 
continued, “even you would not want to utter his name, and this would be correct.”170 
Fortunately for Karlos and his family, the Georgian authorities’ case review had entirely 
exculpated his father and proven him to be a steadfast, “humble (skromnim) Communist,” 
who was therefore wholly deserving both of his place in Mikoian’s memory and any 
assistance the Deputy Sovmin Chairman could offer.171  
 
The Artists’ Warrior: Voroshilov and His Circle  
 An instructive point of comparison to the variety of correspondence Mikoian 
received and the type of patronage he practiced can be found in the files of Marshal 
Kliment Voroshilov, who held the post of Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR 
Supreme Soviet following Stalin’s death. Although he was evidently not as avid a 
practitioner of clientelism as Mikoian, Voroshilov also proved to be a popular recipient of 
rehabilitation inquiries. While the majority of Mikoian’s interlocutors depicted relations 
between him and their relatives as having been comradely, fraternal ties forged in the 
underground, in Voroshilov’s case supplicants tended to approach him as former 
commanding officer, bureaucratic superior, or – alternately – as a benefactor of the 
proletarian arts.  
In December 1954 Antonina Georgievna Vainer apprised Voroshilov of the 
“exceptionally” slow progress in the examination of the criminal file of her husband, 
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former Red Army Corps Commander Leonid Iakovlevich Vainer.172 Vainer had served 
with distinction under Voroshilov in the 14th Army during the Civil War, and after a rapid 
ascent through the ranks of the fledgling Red Army was dispatched as a military advisor 
to the Mongolian People’s Republic; recalled back to Moscow in August 1937 – 
ostensibly to receive the Order of Lenin – he was seized from his train en route, arrested, 
and sentenced the following month.  
Antonina Vainer first broached the possibility of restoring her husband’s good 
name before the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet in December 1953 – coinciding with 
Beriia’s trial – and in due course the case was turned over to the USSR Chief Military 
Procuracy.173 Yet after a meeting the following September with the head of the 
investigative division, Antonina Geogrievna began to despair of her husband’s chances 
for rehabilitation. The Chief Military Procuracy informed her that under interrogation 
Leonid Vainer had “incriminated himself and gave testimony against others, but during 
the trial he recanted,” and in this confession, as well as others’ denunciations, the Chief 
Military Procuracy found a pretext “to hold back the review of Vainer’s investigative file, 
as they consider it proof of his guilt.”174  
 To dispel the pall that had been cast over Vainer’s reputation Antonina 
Georgievna invoked their families’ shared revolutionary heritage and contributions to the 
Soviet project: Leonid Iakovlevich’s mother hid Bolsheviks in her home during the First 
World War and eventually joined the Party along with her five sons, while Antonina 
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Georgievna’s father was a “Baku worker-railway-man” and Party member since 1905, 
and she herself “raised two sons in the Soviet ethos,” one of whom “died a heroic death 
(pogibshego smert’iu khrabrykh) during the Great Patriotic War.”175 While relatively few 
could claim such an extensive Communist pedigree, Antonina Georgievna was attuned to 
the overriding importance of emphasizing Voroshilov’s role in Vainer’s professional 
“trajectory.”176 She therefore appealed to him first and foremost “as the former 
Commander of the 14th Army, who knew Vainer L.Ia. during the fighting of the Civil 
War” and personally promoted him to a division leadership, “and as the former USSR 
People’s Commissar of Defense, who knew Vainer L.Ia. from his work in subsequent 
years during the period of building up the [Red Army’s] defensive capacities.”177 
Through these intersections Antonina Vainer sought to assert her husband’s “rightful 
place among the names of those who selflessly fought for the freedom and happiness of 
the Soviet people,” and thereby placed her faith in Voroshilov’s willingness to defend his 
own past.178  
 N.Z. Pertsovskii’s father, Zakhar Davudovich, was a career Red Army man who 
crossed paths with Voroshilov while heading the People’s Commissariat of Defense’s 
Central Financial Department. When Pertsovskii fils wrote to Voroshilov in the fall of 
1954 on behalf of his father, who disappeared in February 1938, he was sure to mention 
his late mother’s recollections of how Voroshilov “personally valued and respected my 
father as an honest and diligent worker.”179 Bolstered by this characterization, N.Z. 
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 71 
Pertsovskii expressed his conviction that his father “was and remained loyal to the 
Motherland,” and requested that “the decision in [his] case be reviewed with the goal of 
rehabilitation.”180 In her June 1955 appeal, Sof’ia Abramovna Pavlova explained her 
decision to “disturb” Voroshilov because “only” he could help her.181 Pavlova’s husband 
from 1932 until his arrest in December 1936, Viacheslav Ivanovich Zof, had previously 
been head of the USSR’s naval forces, and as such Voroshilov had come to know him 
“personally.”182 Though most of Pavlova’s missive was given over to detailing her 
personal work history – to distinguish her career from Zof’s – and the litany of hardships 
that had befallen her as a wife of an enemy of the people, her insistence that Voroshilov 
alone was capable of defending her interests and ameliorating the injustices that had 
perpetrated against her family spoke to the expectation that as Zof’s former military 
superior, Voroshilov would serve as a character witness on his behalf in the halls of 
power.  
 As much as Voroshilov’s dabbling in the art world may have apparently cost him 
in Stalin’s eyes, it eventually made him a significant resource for the relatives of literary 
figures who had been subjected to repression.183 In a clear sign that patronage 
relationships were not exclusive propositions, and that rehabilitation-seekers were 
prepared to seek assistance from any likely corner, Rita Kornblium also addressed herself 
to Voroshilov at the same time as her first impassioned overture to Mikoian. Kornblium’s 
overture to Voroshilov was denuded of many of the familial details that marked her letter 
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to Mikoian and written in a far more impersonal register, reflecting the formal tenor of 
relations that had existed between the Kirshons and the Supreme Soviet chairman. In 
attempting to persuade Voroshilov of the rectitude of her cause she made explicit 
mention of the fact that Isaak Babel’ and Mihkail Kol’tsov’s families were among those 
that received rehabilitation decisions from the Procuracy before her, even though she 
filed her claim at the same time as them.184 Kornblium closed by imploring Voroshilov 
“to once again come to the aid of [her] family,” suggesting that at some point in the past 
he had already extended help to the Kirshons in his role as advocate for the art world.185 
However, Kornblium’s decision to pursue the matter further with Mikoian rather than 
Voroshilov suggests that she was dissatisfied with the response she received – if any – 
from the art world’s preeminent defender within the Kremlin. 
 
Patronal Obligations: Mikoian and Voroshilov’s Responses 
Mikoian displayed a remarkable degree of consistency in his commitment to 
getting decades-old political cases reopened. Usually within days or weeks of receiving a 
petition – though on occasion there were gaps of months between a letter’s date of 
composition and Mikoian taking action – he would forward a copy to Rudenko with his 
commentary attached; drafts of these memos, affixed to the appeals in question, are 
preserved in the archives. Each note to Rudenko began with the request that he 
“consider” the following missive and “inform [Mikoian] of the results.” The fact that 
Mikoian wanted to remain apprised of each case’s progress indicates that his investment 
in seeing rehabilitations through to fruition went beyond simply passing the buck. To 
                                                
184 On Voroshilov’s dealings with the families of Isaak Babel’ and Mikhail Kol’tsov, see Chapter 3. 
Kornblium did not specify the source of this (in principle correct) information, though news of Babel’ and 
Kol’tsov’s rehabilitations likely traveled quickly through Moscow’s literary grapevine. 
185 GARF f. 8131, op. 31, d. 98739, l. 24. 
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underscore his personal involvement, Mikoian often appended an additional sentence or 
two listing the subject’s commendable qualities. He thus described having known Artak 
Stamboltsian as “an honest and steadfast Bolshevik.”186 During their time together Archil 
Mikadze proved himself to be “an honest and good worker,” while Gevork Alikhanov – 
Bonner’s stepfather – was “honest and faithful.”187 Suren Akopian warranted special 
mention, because Mikoian had known him “since childhood.”188 The underlying message 
that emerged in all these assessments was the same: the image of these men as inveterate 
foes of Soviet power that had been promulgated during and after the Terror was a 
distortion of the truth that Mikoian knew from having spent his formative years with 
them. This gave the lie to the notion that Stalinist state violence was justified by its 
ability to uncover seemingly loyal cadres’ true, conspiratorial selves, and it fell to 
Rudenko and his subordinates within the judiciary to reconstruct the truth of these 
individuals, as Mikoian recalled them, from the materials assembled in their criminal case 
files.189 
 Mikoian followed a distinct protocol for those cases that involved former Party 
Secretaries or others whose pasts were of a more politically sensitive nature. Rather than 
going directly to Rudenko, Mikoian would first make his pitch to the Communist Party’s 
Central Committee. In these proposals Mikoian went beyond the rote phrases that 
characterized his communiqués to Rudenko, turning instead to more forcefully worded 
arguments. Writing to Khrushchev and Malenkov in January 1954 – exactly six months 
after Elena Gogoberidze’s initial letter – Mikoian recalled the conditions in which he and 
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Levan Gogoberidze worked together most closely: “I knew L. Gogoberidze during the 
difficult time of illegal work in Baku under the English occupation. He conducted himself 
selflessly and exemplarily.”190 While serving in the Baku underground Gogoberidze 
proved his bravery when he suffered three nearly fatal bullet wounds fired by a Musavat 
assassin, something that, Mikoian implied, shaped Gogoberidze’s future hostility toward 
Beriia, who eventually “did away with him.”191 Echoing many petitioners’ appeals to 
pathos, Mikoian acknowledged Gogoberidze’s female survivors – his daughter, wife, and 
sister – before recommending that the Party “instruct” Rudenko “to carry out a review of 
Gogoberidze’s case for his rehabilitation.”192  
Shortly thereafter, Mikoian presented Kalmykov’s exoneration as a pressing 
imperative, stating that he “consider[ed] it necessary to assign Comrade Rudenko to take 
an interest in Kalmykov B.E.’s case and submit his suggestions to the Central 
Committee.”193 Unusually, when presenting Natal’ia Chizhova’s entreaty, Mikoian opted 
to foreground his connection with her over her more notable husband, Nikolai Gikalo; in 
Mikoian’s words Chizhova had shown herself to be “an honest and good worker” in 
Rostov-on-Don who not only warranted legal rehabilitation but also reinstatement into 
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Party.194 Gikalo had been known to Mikoian “for many years and, it seems to me, that it 
would follow to instruct Comrade Rudenko to also review Gikalo N.F.’s case.”195 It is 
unclear whether this apparent lack of enthusiasm reflected Mikoian’s low opinion of 
Gikalo, but what is most telling is that Mikoian did not allow any reservations he might 
have had about Gikalo to stand in the way of his patronal obligations before Chizhova 
and her late spouse. Although Mikoian may not have been the only member of Party’s 
ruling circle to bring rehabilitation cases before his peers, he was almost certainly the 
most prolific in this respect, and the evident pride that he expressed at his untarnished 
success rate is a striking indication of the premium that he placed on meeting his 
obligations before the survivors of his onetime clients and comrades.196  
The continued delays faced by Voroshilov’s onetime adjutants in attaining 
rehabilitation are a further indication of the noteworthy efficacy of Mikoian’s energetic 
advocacy. Like Mikoian, Voroshilov succinctly annotated the letters he received with 
instructions for Rudenko, and occasionally included personal assessments of the figures 
in question. Writing to Rudenko in early December 1954, Voroshilov requested that 
orders be given to expedite the investigation into Vainer, whom he “knew well”; this 
might have reminded Voroshilov that he had yet to weigh in on Pertsovskii’s case, as a 
little over a week later he dispassionately requested that Rudenko “consider” N.Z. 
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corroborated Belen’kii’s testimony after recognizing the scar on his left cheek in a photograph, and 
graciously agreed to confirm all his statements. See Sergei Gromov, Zapiski “vazhniaka” (Moskva: 
Detektiv-Press, 2001), 26-31.    
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Pertsovskii’s appeal.197 Voroshilov reserved his most effusive endorsement for Zof, 
asking the Procurator General to both examine the case and “inform of [his] decision,” 
because Voroshilov “knew Zof V.I. very well and always believed in him.”198 From 
receipt of Voroshilov’s instructions it took anywhere between an additional five to ten 
months for the judiciary to hand down their decisions, during which time the families in 
question remained perpetually in limbo. Such wait times were by no means unheard of 
during the first decade of the rehabilitation process, but as the following chapter 
demonstrates, once Mikoian made clear his personal investment in a case, it often wound 
its way through the justice system at a considerably faster clip.199 
 
Conclusion 
In response to a question regarding why Anastas Mikoian took such an interest in 
her welfare upon her return to Moscow in 1954, Lana Gogoberidze attributed this 
“special affection (osobuiu teplotu)” to Mikoian’s guilt over his inability to protect her 
father in 1937.200 While Mikoian may indeed have felt morally culpable for the 
annihilation of so many of his friends and colleagues at the hands of the state they helped 
to build, his involvement in posthumous rehabilitation does not seem to have been born 
primarily out of pangs of conscience. Rather, the mediating role that Mikoian played 
                                                
197 GARF f. 7523, op. 107, d. 123, ll. 9, 20. 
198 GARF f. 7523, op. 107, d. 138, l. 15. 
199 It is also possible that many of Mikoian’s clients were given priority treatment in this regard because of 
their direct connections to Beriia’s past, which Voroshilov’s subordinates could not boast. There seems to 
have been a perception within some segments of the Procuracy, though, that Voroshilov’s commitment to 
rehabilitation was opportunistic. Military procurator Boris Viktorov, having read Voroshilov’s 
denunciations of other Red Army commanders from the 1930s, was taken aback when in “1955-1956 
Voroshilov changed his views (perestroilsia) and began to support requests for rehabilitation of many of 
those commanders whose arrests he sanctioned. In his resolutions on petitions he wrote: ‘I knew him as a 
dedicated commander,’ ‘I doubted that he could commit sabotage (vredit’),’ ‘He was an excellent political 
worker,’ etc.” Viktorov clearly doubted the sincerity of these sentiments. See B. A. Viktorov, Bez grifa 
“Sekretno.” Zapiski voennogo prokurora (Moskva: “Iuridicheskaia literatura,” 1990), 235. 
200 Lana Gogoberidze response to author’s questionnaire, May 22, 2015. For more on Mikoian’s material 
assistance to Lana Gogoberidze, see Chapter Five.  
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between the families of the wrongfully repressed and various branches of the Soviet 
bureaucracy reflected his status as the last man standing of a once-powerful network of 
Transcaucasian Bolsheviks that made its outsized influence felt far beyond the confines 
of the Soviet Union’s southern periphery. The experience of underground agitation 
inculcated in Mikoian and his fellow revolutionaries a sense of mutual responsibility and 
deeply held loyalty that remained with them as they forged separate paths within the 
fledgling socialist state; these bonds were broken only by the physical annihilation of 
most of this cohort’s members during the Great Terror, which cast asunder all existing 
guarantees of reciprocal protection and aide. Following such a pronounced rupture, the 
families of Ordzhonikidze and Mikoian’s close associates could not be sure that the latter 
would be open to their entreaties, or recognize them as belonging to his extending 
network. Yet when they approached him with appeals for help with rehabilitation that 
invoked his responsibilities to those who served alongside him but whom he was 
ultimately unable to protect, Mikoian consistently and vigorously extended his patronage, 
showing concerted interest in his former comrades’ absolution. Though these rekindled 
relationships did not serve to recreate the pre-Terror status quo ante, they did prove to be 
remarkably resilient, and Mikoian remained engaged with many of those who contacted 
him in the early 1950s over the coming decades, helping to see to their welfare and other 
needs. One family in particular, the Gogoberidzes, proved extraordinarily adept at 
leveraging Mikoian’s involvement not only to secure rehabilitations, but also induce the 
Procuracy to inaugurate a search for one of the Terror’s missing millions that occupied 
months and stretched from Vladivostok to Estonia; the following chapter explores their 
efforts to uncover what actually became of Levan Gogoberidze.     
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Chapter Two – Resurrecting Levan Davydovich: Truth, Justice, and Gulag 
Rumors 
 
Many died in the camps and prisons, but the news of their 
deaths might take years or decades to reach their families 
and friends. The sentence had little or no predictive value. 
The gulag did not provide reality checks for either hope or 
mourning. In an indefinitely large part of the Soviet experience, 
death could not be recognized as death, and survival could not  
be relied upon as life. The state, the source of the repressions, 
was also the only source of information. This is a condition 
of uncertain loss, in which the beloved person disappears for 
reasons that nobody understands; in which she may be alive 
and might possibly return; in which no information about the 
loss is available or trustworthy.201 
 
In the short story “Aleksandr Gogoberidze” from the semi-fictional Kolyma Tales, 
Varlam Shalamov recounts his time studying under the titular camp medical assistant, 
depicted as a benevolent Georgian of elephantine proportions whose lessons in 
pharmacology offered a lifeline to his fellow prisoners. Shalamov details his 
acquaintance with this paragon of decency within the Gulag through the latter’s 
ignominious death in the Iagodnoe settlement several hundred kilometers outside 
Magadan, only noting the ostensible reason for his imprisonment in the story’s closing 
sentences: “Such was the fate of Aleksandr Gogoberidze, who perished only because he 
was Levan Gogoberidze’s brother.”202 Poignant as this coda may be, it strains credulity in 
a crucial respect: though Levan Gogoberidze had several sisters, he was – according to 
information from his family – his parents’ only son. Intriguingly, Shalamov’s account 
shares its setting with one of several locales where Levan Gogoberidze himself was 
supposedly sighted in the fifteen years after he was arrested, according to reports that 
                                                
201 Etkind, Warped Mourning, 18. 
202 Varlam Shalamov, “Aleksandr Gogoberidze,” available at https://shalamov.ru/library/7/15.html, 
accessed November 5, 2015. According to Shalamov’s official website, the story was written between 1970 
and 1971. 
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filtered back to his wife, daughter, and sisters. While it is today apparent that the self-
proclaimed Gogoberidze in the Iagodnoe settlement was an impostor – or at the very least 
not who others took him to be – amidst the confusion and uncertainty of the first post-
Stalin years Levan Gogoberidze’s survivors tenaciously clung to the prospect that 
through some twist of fate he had escaped capital punishment and survived the Stalin 
years in an outpost of the Soviet camp system.           
On January 27, 1954, Elena Gogoberidze, having already reestablished contact 
with Mikoian, approached Procurator General Rudenko with the startling revelation that 
her brother Levan had been seen alive in the Gulag as recently as 1952. Were he to be 
located and extricated from captivity, Elena Davydovna suggested, he might be able to 
shed valuable light on Beriia’s early history of perfidy.203 Despite his own misgivings 
about the reliability of this information, Rudenko surprisingly gave his assent to 
Gogoberidze’s proposal, launching a search several months later that – if the records of 
the USSR General Procuracy are any indication – was unprecedented and unrepeated in 
annals of Soviet rehabilitation.204 Little did Elena Davydovna know that the leads she 
would bring to the Procuracy’s attention over the next two years were little more than 
fantasies, and her hope to reunite Levan with his wife, the pioneering filmmaker Nutsa 
Varfolomeevna Gogoberidze, and daughter, Lana, was chimeric, as he had been executed 
in Rostov-on-Don in March 1937.205 Drawing primarily upon the voluminous Procuracy 
                                                
203 GARF f.8131, op. 32, d. 3304, l. 1.  
204 Although other presumably executed Communists were also supposed to have been spotted in the 
Gulag, there is no indication from the consulted dela that any kind of search resembling the one for Levan 
Gogoberidze was initiated; this issue is discussed at greater length later in the chapter. 
205 Lana Gogoberidze would go on to become one of the Soviet Union’s most prominent female directors 
and a politician in independent Georgia. The Gogoberidzes’ central role in Georgian filmmaking was 
highlighted during a recent retrospective at the Museum of Modern Art in New York. See J. Hoberman, 
“Independent Nation With Films to Match: A Survey Celebrates Georgia’s Rich Film Tradition,” The New 
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file that collected the documents assembled for Levan Gogoberidze’s posthumous 
rehabilitation – among the very first in the Soviet Union’s history – as well as the 
materials generated by the fruitless investigation into his possible whereabouts, this 
chapter applies a microhistorical lens to the vicissitudes of the party-state’s earliest 
attempts to get to the truth behind the destruction of Old Bolshevik cadres. [William 
Chase has argued – regarding Béla Kun’s fall during the Terror – that “[m]icrohistory 
offers a potent method that enables us to identify and track the twists and turns in 
people’s lives that may have contributed to their becoming victims of the Stalinist mass 
repression.”206] As this chapter demonstrates, the microhistorical perspective can be 
equally illuminating with regard to how certain individuals were given priority in 
attaining legal absolution, and what their families expected would result from this 
process.207 
In terms of its timing, the personages involved, and the intense interest that the 
Procuracy and the Party took in various aspects of the case, Levan Gogoberidze’s 
rehabilitation was exceptional. His family had privileged access to Mikoian, which seems 
to have afforded them a remarkable degree of leverage with the judiciary, and the 
circumstances of his arrest in late 1936 fit neatly within the anti-Beriia narrative being 
promulgated at the moment. However, for all its remarkability, Gogoberidze’s case 
                                                                                                                                            
York Times, September 18, 2014, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/21/movies/a-survey-
celebrates-georgias-rich-film-tradition.html (accessed September 21, 2014). 
206 William Chase, “Microhistory and Mass Repression: Politics, Personalities, and Revenge in the Fall of 
Béla Kun,” The Russian Review 67 (July 2008): 479. 
207 Western scholars have been aware of Gogoberidze’s rehabilitation since the mid-1960s thanks to official 
publications and transcripts of the 22nd Party Congress, at which Gogoberidze was invoked alongside other 
fallen representatives of the Georgian wing of the Party in a speech by G. D. Dzhavakhishvili. However, 
none have delved into the actual process of rehabilitation that preceded these announcements by nearly a 
decade, nor have they examined the labyrinthine investigations that accompanied the inquiries into Levan’s 
fate. See, for example, Oppenheim, “Rehabilitation in the Post-Stalinist Soviet Union,” 113; Levytsky, The 
Stalinist Terror in the Thirties, 225-228; van Goudoever, The Limits of Destalinization, 97. 
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speaks to many of the issues that would come to define posthumous rehabilitation as it 
went from a process that applied to no more than 500 individuals in 1954 – the year that 
charges were dismissed against Gogoberidze – to one that two years later nearly 30,000 
people went through.208 For former members of the Soviet elite, posthumous 
rehabilitation was an essentially restorative process, one that promised to repair the 
reputations, social standing, and – eventually – material condition of families that had 
been unceremoniously banished from the halls of power and influence by accusations of 
disloyalty. Khrushchev and his contingent within the Communist Party, seeking to 
legitimize their preeminence by taking the organs of state security to task, cherry-picked 
figures from the past whose laudable commitment to Soviet power and ignominious 
demise could be held up as emblematic of Beriia’s acrimony toward true guardians of the 
Revolution.   
Amidst mistrust, duplicity, and under the weight of decades of unpunished crimes, 
posthumous rehabilitation offered the Party, Soviet judiciary, and the survivors of the 
repressed an opportunity to collaborate in formulating new, politically expedient accounts 
of the rise of Soviet power and its betrayal at the hands of opportunistic infiltrators within 
state security. Thus, posthumous rehabilitation was not only an opportunity to exonerate 
those who had been murdered and vilified during the Terror: it was also a generative 
process that helped to build the pedestals upon which the reconceived Party history 
would rest.209 However, as the Gogoberidze inquiry so aptly reveals, by embracing 
                                                
208 These (incomplete) figures are drawn from the Memorial Society’s online database “Zhertvy 
politicheskogo terrora v SSSR,” which has recently been updated to allow searches by sentence and year of 
rehabilitation, among other parameters; see base.memo.ru (accessed March 13, 2018). 
209 The most prominent example of this mobilization of rehabilitation for revisionist purposes remains 
Khrushchev’s Secret Speech, which redeemed the reputations of numerous Bolshevik stalwarts in the 
interest of diminishing Stalin’s reputation. A further illustration of this phenomenon is the transmission 
history of Mariia Naneishvili-Kosareva’s account of her husband’s rivalry with Beriia and Bagirov, which 
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revised narratives that were themselves often short on truth, the Soviet authorities risked 
giving credence to rumors spawned in the Gulag that filtered back to the populace via the 
multitudes of prisoners amnestied in 1953, and would find that in the wake of years of 
state-mandated deception, it was far more difficult to disseminate a painful reality than a 
reassuring falsehood. 
 
An Execution Foretold?: The Rise and Fall of the “Pushkin of the Revolution”210 
 Though he never ascended to the heights of the all-Union Soviet bureaucracy, 
Levan Gogoberidze had a storied political career that garnered him admirers and 
adversaries among the Caucasian Bolshevik elite. Born in 1896, Gogoberidze earned his 
revolutionary bona fides in 1915 by propagandizing to fellow conscripts in the Tsarist 
Army, for which he served a term in a penal battalion. Upon being transferred to an 
infirmary near Trabzon, he met Prokofii “Alesha” Dzhaparidze – later one of the 
immortalized 26 Commissars of the Baku Commune – whom he credited with his “Party 
education and ‘literacy.’”211 Gogoberidze was admitted to the Bolshevik Party in 
February 1916 thanks to Dzhaparidze’s endorsement, and he went on to play a variety of 
roles in the struggle to establish Soviet power in Baku and Tbilisi. By February 1918 he 
had been elected to the Presidium of the Baku Soviet, and later that year he was assigned 
to captain one of the ships involved in the failed attempt to evacuate the 26 Commissars 
                                                                                                                                            
first appeared in her letter to Malenkov from Noril’sk, was officially endorsed via the Procuracy’s 
rehabilitation report on Kosarev, and subsequently made its way into the trial against Bagirov and his 
lieutenants held in Baku in April 1956. For the various permutations of this story, see Chapters 1, 3, and 4.   
210 This sobriquet is based on filmmaker Aleksandr Dovzhenko’s glowing recollection of Levan 
Gogoberidze to his daughter Lana while she was enrolled in his course at the Moscow Institute of 
Cinematography. See Lana Gogoberidze, rac' magondeba da rogorc' magondeba (What I Remember and 
How I Recall) (Tbilisi: 2003), 117. My thanks to Teona Jikia for translating the relevant portions of this 
memoir from Georgian.  
211 Levytsky, Stalinist Terror in the Thirties, 226  
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to Astrakhan following the collapse of the Baku Commune.212 It was in the aftermath of 
this early setback for Soviet power in the Caucasus that Levan Gogoberidze had his first 
brush with both mortality and infamy.  
 On September 6, 1919 – almost a year to the date of the 26 Commissars’ mass 
execution – Gogoberidze was sitting at the New Light Café in Baku with two of his Azeri 
comrades from the city’s Bolshevik underground, when they were approached by Hajibäk 
Seidbäkov, a supporter – and according to some, an agent – of the ruling pan-Islamist 
Musavat Party. While accounts vary wildly as to what exactly transpired, all agree that 
Seidbäkov eventually produced a pistol and opened fire on the three seated 
Communists.213 The two Azeris were killed instantly; Gogoberidze, shot multiple times 
and left for hours on the floor of the crime scene to bleed and be taunted by the local 
authorities (the city’s governor-general is purported to have said “So Gogoberidze, your 
crimes have finally caught up with you!” upon arriving at the café), barely survived the 
incident.214 Although the attempted killing did not derail Gogoberidze’s revolutionary 
career in the Caucasus – he was ultimately made chairman of the Baku revkom in 1920, 
and then held the same post in Tbilisi from 1922-1924 – this violent encounter with the 
Musavat loomed large in his mind as he rose through the ranks of the Communist Party, 
and perhaps even afforded him additional revolutionary credibility, as well as in the 
memories of his family members as they sought his exoneration. 
                                                
212 Ibid., 227. 
213 Michael G. Smith has productively explored the ways in which the New Light Café shooting was 
exploited by the Bolsheviks as part of a campaign of whispers intended to depict the Musavat as mortal 
enemies of the revolution; see Michael G. Smith, “Anatomy of a Rumor: Murder Scandal, the Musavat 
Party and Narratives of the Russian Revolution in Baku, 1917-20,” Journal of Contemporary History 36, 2 
(Apr. 2001): 211-240. 
214 Ibid., 212. 
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 Following the death of his Bolshevik patron, Dzhaparidze, Gogoberidze found a 
new ally through his work in Tbilisi in the form of Vissarion “Beso” Lominadze, himself 
a close associate of Sergo Ordzhonikidze; their fortunes would be closely linked through 
the remainder of both of their lives. From 1926 to 1930 Gogoberidze held the position of 
Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Georgia, and when 
Lominadze replaced Aleksandr Krinitskii as the First Secretary of the Transcaucasian 
Party Committee (Zakkraikom) in April 1930 he brought on Gogoberidze to fill one of 
the positions vacated by Krinitskii’s men. However, in a rapid reversal of fortune, 
Lominadze, Gogoberidze, and the rest of their clique were forced from power before the 
year was out after the former spoke out against the forced collectivization policies 
introduced in the Caucasus.215 Both Lominadze and Gogoberidze were exiled to the 
People’s Commissariat for Supplies – Lominadze to the scientific research division and 
Gogoberidze to the animal husbandry department.216 Most likely stung by being so 
brusquely sidelined, Gogoberidze began to engage in intrigues against the cadre that had 
supplanted him and his comrades in the Transcaucasian krai. Using his position as a 
veteran of the internecine struggle in Azerbaijan to inveigh against the region’s new 
leadership, Gogoberidze focused his ire on the ascendant Lavrentii Beriia, whom he 
alleged had hidden his service in the Musavat counterintelligence from the Party. 
According to Elena Gogoberidze, in 1933 Levan approached Ordzhonikidze, supposedly 
with proof of Beriia’s counterrevolutionary activities. Although there is no published 
                                                
215 R. W. Davies, “The Syrtsov-Lomanidze Affair,” Soviet Studies 33, 1 (Jan. 1981): 35, 44. 
216 On Gogoberidze’s career trajectory, see RGANI f. 6, op. 3, d. 945, ll. 95-97ob. This Party Control 
Committee report, which secured Gogoberidze’s readmission to the CPSU in February 1956, was prepared 
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Shatunovskaia (La Jolla, CA: DAA Books, 2001), 40, 49, 63, 73. My thanks to Hugh Truslow of Harvard 
University’s Fung Library for providing me with a digital copy of the document from RGANI. 
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record of what this evidence constituted, Beriia’s attempt to nip this rumormongering in 
the bud was preserved in Ordzhonikidze’s personal archive.  
Beriia wrote to Ordzhonikidze in early March 1933 to complain that Gogoberidze 
– who at the time was “resting in Sukhumi,” likely due to health problems that would 
plague him over the next several years – was “disseminating vile things about me and the 
new Transcaucasian leadership in general. In particular, regarding my past work in the 
Musavat counterintelligence, he maintains that the Party supposedly did not know and 
does not know about it.”217 These accusations, which reached Beriia through Nestor 
Lakoba and others, ran directly counter to his own account of his acknowledged service 
with the Musavat. Beriia reminded Ordzhonikidze that “you know well that I was sent to 
the Musavat counterintelligence by the Party and that this question was examined by the 
CC of the ACP(b) in 1920 in the presence of yourself, Coms. Stasova, Kaminskii, Mirza 
Davud Guseinov, Narimanov, Sarkis, Rukhulla Akhundov, Buniatzade and others.”218 He 
further claimed to have sent Ordzhonikidze in 1925 “an official abstract of the decision of 
the CC of the AKP(b)” by which “I was completely rehabilitated, i.e. the fact of my work 
in the counterintelligence with the Party’s knowledge was confirmed by Coms. Mirza 
Davud Guseinov, Kasum Izmailov and others’ statements.”219 Though this 
correspondence attests to the personal enmity that existed between Gogoberidze and 
Beriia, it was not this animus that ultimately cost the former his life. 
                                                
217 Kvashonkin, et al, eds., Sovetskoe rukovodstvo, 204. 
218 Ibid. It bears mentioning that of the individuals Beriia listed, only Stasova and Narimanov were spared 
execution; the rest were posthumously rehabilitated within the 1950s, and almost all were publically 
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Beso Lominadze’s outbursts against forced collectivization in Georgia came back 
to haunt him in the flurry of repressions against oppositionists within the Party unleashed 
by Sergei Kirov’s murder. Notified of his impending arrest in January 1935, Lominadze 
chose to commit suicide rather than face a show trial; from that point, it was only a matter 
of time until the networks of Party cadres linked to Lomanidze were themselves purged. 
In October 1936 Stalin issued a directive to then-NKVD head Nikolai Ezhov on rounding 
up Lomanidze’s former circle. The first head on the chopping block was that of Stepan 
Vardanian,  
currently the secretary of the Taganrog city committee. He is undoubtedly 
a secret Trotskyite, or at least he is a patron and protector of Trotskyites. 
He should be arrested. L. Gogoberidze – secretary of one of the factory 
party committees in the Azov-Black Sea territory – should also be 
arrested. If Lominadze was a secret enemy of the party, then Gogoberidze 
is also a secret enemy of the party, since he was as close as could be with 
Lominadze. He should be arrested.220 
 
At the time, Levon Gogoberidze had been working as the Party Secretary at the Rostov 
agricultural machinery factory (Rostsel’mash) for about a year, but it was in Sochi – 
where he was probably seeking treatment for the same ailments that took him to Sukhumi 
in 1933 – that he was arrested on October 22, 1936 by the Azov-Black Sea krai 
UNKVD.221 For much of the next two months officers from the regional branch of state 
                                                
220 Quoted in Khlevniuk, Master of the House, 156. In the original version of the list of Party members 
arrested in the Azov-Black Sea krai in late-1936 and early-1937 submitted to the Central Committee by 
local NKVD Deputy Chief Kagan, both Gogoberidze and Vardanian’s names were clearly added as an 
afterthought, as both were handwritten while the other 130-odd names were typed; see RGASPI f. 17, op. 
71, d. 54, ll. 23-31.  
221 GARF f. 5446, op. 120, d. 1105, l. 12. This information is drawn from a top secret summary of 
Gogoberidze’s case file prepared by the MVD found in a file composed exclusively of Elena 
Gogoberidze’s correspondence with Mikoian and materials relating to her brother. This is remarkable both 
for the fact that similar such reports sent to the Procuracy during rehabilitation investigations were as a rule 
returned to state security organs and are now inaccessible to researchers, and because of all the repressed 
families that contacted Mikoian, only the Gogoberidzes warranted their own file within his personal opis’ 
at GARF. Gogoberidze’s warrant was authorized by the head of the Azov-Black Sea NKVD G. S. 
Liushkov, who is notorious for having defected to Japan in June 1938 while in charge of the NKVD in the 
Far East when he became convinced that his own arrest was imminent. See Marc Jansen and Nikita Petrov, 
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security questioned Gogoberidze, and induced him to confess that he had been working 
against the Party, and Beriia specifically, with Lominadze since he was stripped of his 
leadership role in Georgia.222 Likely based on these admissions, in mid-December he was 
transferred to the custody of the Transcaucasian NKVD in Tbilisi, and thereby placed 
under Beriia’s control.  
 Between December 22, 1936 and February 2, 1937 Beriia’s chief enforcer within 
the Transcaucasian NKVD, Sergei Arsen’evich Goglidze, personally interrogated 
Gogoberidze ten times; during these sessions Gogoberidze attempted to walk back his 
earlier statements, attributing them to his “nervous condition” after being arrested, but 
was assailed with a new host of charges, including accusations from his coworkers in the 
Azov-Black Sea krai – who had been taken into custody since Gogoberidze’s fall – that 
he had partaken in Trotskyite activities.223 Gogoberidze managed to smuggle two notes to 
his wife from captivity in Tbilisi, both of which bespeak the profound despair that 
marked his final months. He dismissed the charges against him of attempting to organize 
an attempt on Stalin’s life as “false, absurd, monstrous and ridiculous” in the first note, 
but acknowledged fatalistically that “it’s all over… [my] salvation: to die as quickly as 
possible”; after brief mention of a message intended for Sergo Ordzhonikidze the second 
note bemoaned the fact that “practically every day I give testimony, but all that, my dear, 
is now merely for the archive … All of my testimony means nothing against the 
testimony of 5-7 scoundrels.”224 Soon the ranks of these “scoundrels” would swell to 
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include some of Gogoberidze’s closest confederates from his years in the revolutionary 
underground. 
 The weeks leading up to Gogoberidze’s conviction saw the advent of a concerted 
campaign to denounce him and those arrested simultaneously with him as inveterate 
enemies of the Party working to subvert Soviet power from within. The task of 
disavowing and excoriating Gogoberidze fell most notably to one of his Baku comrades, 
Boris Sheboldaev, who until that January had served as the First Secretary of the Azov-
Black Sea krai Party Organization. On January 6, he was called before a meeting of the 
Azov-Black Sea Territorial committee to answer for the supposed perfidy that had 
transpired on his watch. Sheboldaev admitted to having known “Gogoberidze when I was 
in the underground in Baku in 1918”: 
As for Vardanian, I didn’t know him at all. Gogoberidze arrived here in 
1934 to serve in the region. He came to Yeisk, to the territorial committee, 
and I–we–gave him the opportunity to carry on his activities […] There is 
no doubt that, had we exercised Bolshevik vigilance, had we checked on 
our people, we could have exposed them much, much earlier […] 
Proceeding from trust, from credulity, we essentially covered up their 
activities and helped carry them out. And this was reflected in our 
decisions. There were many such incorrect decisions: the decision 
concerning Ovchinnikov, the decision concerning the car accident 
involving Gogoberidze, who killed someone because he feared him, the 
decision concerning Limarev in Shakhty, who criticized Liubarsky–these 
and a host of many other decisions about which, no doubt, you will be 
hearing, all of this, comrades, speaks of gross, totally unacceptable errors 
which I, as a leader, had committed and which, objectively speaking, have 
slowed down the unmasking of those enemies whom we, in effect, by 
virtue of our authority, shielded from the [party] organization and the 
Central Committee of our party.225 
                                                                                                                                            
“with deep love and respect for the Party of Lenin-Stalin,” and that she be told that “provocateurs abused 
mama-Liman [her pet name for him] and flayed him alive.” He begged his wife’s forgiveness for the 
“shameful end to [his] life.”  
225 J. Arch Getty and Vladimir Naumov, The Road to Terror: Stalin and the Self-Destruction of the 
Bolsheviks, 1932-1939, trans. Benjamin Sher (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1999), 342. A. A. 
Andreev elaborated on the accusation of vehicular homicide against Gogoberidze at the February-March 
plenum of the Central Committee in 1937: apparently, in June 1936 Gogoberidze was involved in a car 
crash that killed the wife of a certain engineer Nesterenko. Nikolai Glebov-Avilov, the doomed onetime 
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Having engaged in what J. Arch Getty and Vladimir Naumov term a “a ritualized 
affirmation of the new dominant line” via “apologetic performance,” Sheboldaev was 
able to spare himself – for a short while – from serious punishment, though two months 
later he was again required to debase himself before the assembled Party elite at the 
Central Committee’s plenum. Under the withering scrutiny of Stalin, Beriia, and other 
potentates, when pressed about his relationship with Gogoberidze and other supposed 
Trotskyites in his midst Sheboldaev said that he was aware only that Gogoberidze “was 
connected with Lominadze, I knew that they had a personal connection.”226 Questioned 
as to the nature of this connection, Sheboldaev replied evasively: “I am saying that I 
knew Gogoberidze from the underground”; Stalin inquired if this was “from Baku (po 
Baku),” which Sheboldaev confirmed, continuing, “It must be said, at the time he was a 
quite good (neplokhoi) member of our organization.”227  
Sheboldaev pleaded ignorance in the face of Beriia’s accusation that he had 
sheltered both Gogoberidze and Vardanian despite their past expulsions and links to 
traitors like Lomanidze, and insisted that his oversights were due to “blindness, this 
gullibility, which led to us not even subjecting these people to scrutiny, we did not 
monitor (ne kontrolirovali) them, because we trusted them.”228 As Gerald M. Easter 
notes, Anastas Mikoian, Sheboldaev and Gogoberidze’s onetime cohort from 
                                                                                                                                            
director of Rostsel’mash, testified – presumably under duress – that the incident was not an accident, and 
that Gogoberidze’s intended target had been Nesterenko, a co-conspirator in his Trotskyite cell who had 
developed cold feet. These lurid allegations were apparently never mentioned during Gogoberidze’s trial, 
and were not acknowledged during his rehabilitation. See Voprosy istorii 8 (1995): 5. 
226 Voprosy istorii 4 (1995): 15. Gerald M. Easter quotes from this exchange, though the text he employs 
differs significantly from the version in Voprosy istorii; see Easter, Reconstructing the State, 156-157. 
227 Voprosy istorii 4 (1995), 15. 
228 Ibid. 
 90 
revolutionary Baku, watched these proceedings “in silence.”229 His denunciation of the 
Azov-Black Sea “conspirators” complete, Sheboldaev was briefly allowed to resume his 
Party career before his own arrest and execution in June 1937, while Gogoberidze – 
stripped of his revolutionary credentials – was drawn interminably closer toward his 
demise and erasure from the annals of Soviet history. 
 On March 21, 1937 Gogoberidze’s wife, Nina (Nutsa) Varfolomeevna, attended a 
meeting of Rostov-area Party organizations at which the previous week’s executions of 
Glebov-Avilov, Vardanian, and others were announced. She noted “that L. Gogoberidze 
was not on this list, and when it was read out at the meeting at Rostsel’mash one of the 
attendees posed the question – And Gogoberidze? – to which the speaker answered: -
Gogoberidze is connected with the Georgian functionaries, and the investigation into the 
case has not been completed.”230 Little did Nutsa (and perhaps even the Party spokesman) 
know that Gogoberidze had been returned to Rostov the previous month and that very 
day was brought before a visiting session of the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court 
of the USSR, overseen by Deputy Chairman Ivan Osipovich Matulevich.231 The Military 
Collegium’s proceedings were carried out behind closed doors, and consisted of little 
more than reading excerpts from the accused’s testimony before the sentence – death, in 
most cases – was handed down. There was no right of appeal, and sentences were carried 
out immediately.232 Levan Davydovich’s hearing and sentencing appear to have followed 
                                                
229 Easter, Reconstructing the State, 157.  
230 GARF f. 8131, op. 32, d. 3304, l. 82.  
231 As the MVD’s case summary makes clear, Gogoberidze was transferred back to Rostov in error, as he 
was supposed to have been sent to Moscow for further interrogation at the behest of the NKVD’s Special-
Political Department; however, once in Rostov he was made to confess to all the charges pressed against 
him. GARF f. 5446, op. 120, d. 1105, ll. 13-14.   
232 Marc Jansen and Nikita Petrov, “Mass Terror and the Court: The Military Collegium of the USSR,” 
Europe-Asia Studies 58, 4 (June 2006): 589-602. Jansen and Petrov argue that the Military Collegium did 
not function as an independent judicial body; rather, it “operated as an organ of extra-judicial reprisal,” 
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this template exactly: he plead guilty, asked no quarter, and at 4 pm, within hours of 
Matulevich passing judgment on Gogoberidze, NKVD Commandant Genkin shot him in 
the presence of Deputy Procurator Pruss, there to provide the state-sanctioned murder 
with a further veneer of legality.233  
 Nutsa subsequently traveled to Moscow, where she “secured a meeting” with a 
Military Procurator named Azarin to clarify Levan’s legal status.234 Having “told Azarin 
that I was prepared for the possibility that Gogoberidze might have been shot and asked 
only that they tell me the truth” during their first appointment, Nutsa was unequivocally 
informed several days later “that Gogoberidze had not been shot,” and was eventually 
given the name of an investigator, Shalavin, to whom “Gogoberidze’s case had 
[ostensibly] been transferred for further inquiry.”235 After several months without any 
developments, Shalavin finally notified her via postcard at the end of July – in keeping 
with established protocol – that “L Gogoberidze had been sentenced to 10 years in the 
remote camps without the right of correspondence.”236 Once provided with this 
misinformation, Nutsa had precious few remaining days of freedom herself; by the year’s 
end she was arrested as the wife of an enemy of the people, and in January 1938 she 
                                                                                                                                            
providing sanction for lists of predetermined cases put forward by Stalin and the Politburo, via the NKVD, 
acting, as they suggest, as a legal façade to give the impression that the party-state elite was not subject to 
the same sort of arbitrary destruction that the rest of Soviet society faced. According to figures provided by 
Dmitrii Iurasov, between 1935 and 1940 the Military Collegium delivered verdicts on some 50,000 
individuals, 36,000 of whom were put to death; see Stephen Kotkin, “Terror, Rehabilitation, and Historical 
Memory: An Interview with Dmitrii Iurasov,” Russian Review 51, 2 (April 1992): 251. 
233 GARF f. 5446, op. 120, d. 1105, l. 14; GARF f. 8131, op. 32, d. 3304, l. 12. The “Genkin” referred to in 
Gogoberidze’s file was most likely Iakov Mikhailovich Genkin, who at the time was the Deputy Chief of 
the 10th (Prison) Department of the GUGB of the NKVD; see N. V. Petrov and K. V. Skorkin, Kto 
rukovodil NKVD: spravochik (Moskva: Zven’ia, 1999), 144. 
234 GARF f. 8131, op. 32, d. 3304, l. 82. 
235 Ibid. 
236 Ibid. In her correspondence with the Procurator General from 1954 Nutsa Gogoberidze lamented that 
she “did not preserve” this and an earlier postcard from Shalavin “for understandable reasons.” 
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received an eight-year term in a “corrective labor camp.”237 Thus the Gogoberidze family 
was shattered and cast to the wind, with Levan executed and his reputation as an 
“honorable” Bolshevik slandered, Nutsa exiled to the far reaches of the Gulag, and their 
daughter Lana effectively left an orphan. It would be nearly twenty years before this once 
powerful and privileged clan knew some semblance of normalcy, though their efforts to 
restore that which had been lost demanded the direct sanction of the ruling elites and 
exacted a grievous, unanticipated toll of their own.  
 
Hope Against Documents: Persuading the Procuracy 
Within days of the Presidium authorizing the Procuracy to assume control over 
Levan Davydovich’s investigation Elena Davydovna contacted Rudenko and laid out her 
conviction that her brother had survived his spell in Beriia’s custody.238 As with her 
entreaty to Mikoian, Elena Davydovna foregrounded the importance of having a private 
audience with Rudenko, opening her appeal “with a request to receive me in person for a 
few minutes in relation to the case of my brother, the former Secretary of the CC of 
Georgia Levan Davydovich Gogoberidze.”239 She claimed that all the information she 
had provided to Malenkov, Khrushchev, and Mikoian regarding “Levan Gogoberidze’s 
sharp confrontations with Beriia […] proved to be correct and Gogoberidze was fully 
                                                
237 GARF f. 8131, op. 32, d. 3304, l. 53. By her own account, Nutsa’s imprisonment was particularly 
harrowing. For a time, she was a cellmate of Nestor Lakoba’s wife, a “silent and calm woman [who] was 
taken away every evening and in the morning was dragged back to the cell, bloody and unconscious,” 
having refused to defame her husband; eventually she expired from this routine of abuse. See Roy 
Medvedev, Let History Judge, ed. and trans. George Shriver (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1989), 495-496. 
238 Elena Davydovna had already raised this issue in her correspondence with Mikoian, but based on the 
tenor of her protestations he does not appear to have been particularly persuaded by the evidence she cited; 
see GARF f. 5446, op. 120, d. 1105, ll. 6-7, 9-11. 
239 GARF f. 8131, op. 32, d. 3304, l. 1. 
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rehabilitated.”240 It therefore stood to reason that Levan Davydovich’s “fate is naturally 
of interest not only to our family,” but also to leading circles within the Party and 
government; she pointed to Mikoian’s phone call to Rudenko following Lana 
Gogoberidze’s January 4 visit as a prime example of how the case had grabbed the 
attention of the Party’s ruling clique.241 Yet Elena Gogoberidze did not write to Rudenko 
to convince him of the importance of clearing Levan’s name, as Mikoian’s call had likely 
already driven this point home. Rather, she proffered a much more provocative claim that 
pushed the Procurator General’s nascent investigation in previously unforeseen 
directions. 
 Elena Gogoberidze introduced her conviction that Levan Davydovich had 
survived the Stalin years with the assertion that the “[o]ne thing I know for certain” was 
that “contrary to the certificate provided by the MVD leadership and investigative organs, 
my brother L. D. Gogoberidze was still alive in 1952.”242 Giving no indication of her 
source for this startling statement, Elena once again closed her appeal with an entreaty to 
meet with Rudenko beyond the prying eyes of state security: “I beg you, Roman 
Andreevich, allow me to visit: I have some information and considerations that I am not 
comfortable including in a petition.”243 Rudenko eventually assented to this meeting on 
February 3, and although there is no record of what exactly transpired during their 
audience, two memos written by Elena Gogoberidze provide some indication of what was 
discussed, and what went unsaid that day.  
                                                
240 Ibid. In this context, Elena Davydovna’s use of the term “rehabilitated” is meant to indicate that Levan’s 
charges against Beriia had been substantiated and he had thereby been informally vindicated, rather than 





In a single typed page titled “MATERIAL on LEVAN DAVYDOVICH 
GOGOBERIDZE,” Elena Davydovna laid out the most trenchant points that she wished 
to raise with Rudenko. She highlighted the 10-year sentence supposedly handed down by 
the Military Collegium in spring 1937 and the fact that Levan “left Rostov on warrant 
No.., according to the spravka I received in the summer of 1937 at the Moscow 
Procuracy” as official substantiation for her theory, though these meager clues by no 
means served as the crux of her argument.244 More recently, Liusia Petrosian – one of the 
sisters of Stalin’s notorious (and by most accounts deranged) accomplice Kamo Petrosian 
– briefly returned to Tbilisi following her release from prison in 1945 or 1946 and while 
there reported to Elena Davydovna that she “saw L. GOGOBERIDZE in 1942 in 
Magadan.”245 Elena Davydovna characterized Petrosian’s account as “absolutely 
reliable,” given that “she knew L. Gogoberidze well.”246 Additionally, an unnamed (at-
the-time) former zek “who had returned from the remote camps reported [in January 
1954] that he ‘saw Levan Gogoberidze in 1952 in the Iagodnoe settlement (700-800 km 
from Magadan), from which L. Gogoberidze was /already in the capacity of a “perpetual 
settler” without the right of correspondence/ transferred to Pevek, Chukotka, Dal’stroi, 
the Main Administration (Glavnoe upravlenie) in Magdan [sic].”247 It remains unclear 
                                                
244 GARF f. 8131, op. 32, d. 3304, l. 5. Elena Davydovna further noted that “[t]here was no indication in 
the spravka of where L. D. GOGOBERIDZE ‘went’” when he was taken from Rostov in 1937.   
245 Ibid. Though it is possible that Liusia Petrosian shared her brother’s mental instability, at this point it 
cannot be conclusively documented, and would add relatively little to understanding the events that 
transpired in the 1950s. Noted memoirist Evgeniia Ginzburg encountered Petrosian on a prisoner transport 
train, and remembered how she played down her familial connections, describing herself as a “plain, 
ignorant girl from the mountains,” in the vain hope that she would be reprieved and summoned back to 
Moscow with her things. See Eugenia Semyonovna Ginzburg, Journey into the Whirlwind, trans. Paul 
Stevenson and Max Hayward (Harvest: New York, 1967), 261.  
246 GARF f. 8131, op. 32, d. 3304, l. 5. 
247 Ibid. The text in italics was handwritten on the original document. It also bears mentioning that Elena 
Davydovna’s original text was torn into sixteen pieces, then glued back together on another piece of paper, 
and copies were then made from the original to be sent to the MVD; see GARF f. 8131, op. 32, d. 3304, l. 
14.  
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how much of this information Elena Davydovna was able to impart to Rudenko during 
their conversation, and – more importantly – how it was received, though her letter 
written to Rudenko immediately afterward addresses several issues that she was unable to 
raise in person.  
Elena Davydovna hoped that her visit had “managed to raise some doubts for 
[Rudenko] regarding the execution of L. D. Gogoberidze’s sentence in 1937,” but 
acknowledged that “[n]aturally,” being “agitated by this conversation,” she had 
“overlooked the following information” that she deemed critical to her brother’s case.248 
Having been in Rostov while Levan Davydovich was in custody, Elena Davydovna – 
much like her sister-in-law – interacted with workers from Rostsel’mash who “were 
extremely (even openly) agitated over his fate and repeatedly questioned the Azov-Black 
Sea leadership at rallies and meetings about Gogoberidze’s ‘case.’” When they demanded 
news of Gogoberidze at the meeting during which Sheboldaev’s execution was 
announced, they were apparently told that his file had been “submitted for further 
inquiry.”249 Elena Davydovna saw this inconsistency in the timeline of Levan’s 
prosecution as indicative of the possibility that he had somehow escaped death, a position 
further supported – in her eyes – by details within documents from the Procuracy and 
MVD that contradicted the sequence of events Rudenko presented. 
 The spravka that Elena Davydovna received from the Procuracy in 1937 – 
referred to in her initial list from the conversation with the Procurator General – stated 
                                                
248 GARF f. 8131, op. 32, d. 3304, l. 6. 
249 Ibid. The December 20, 1937 edition of Pravda featured an extraordinary notification from the Military 
Collegium of the Supreme Court – seemingly the only one of its kind – announcing the conviction and 
execution of Sheboldaev, Avel’ Enukidze, Mamiia Orakhelashvili, and Lev Karakhan for terrorism and 
espionage several days prior; though these men were indeed shot over the course of late 1937, they were 
not tried together, and in June 1956 the Procuracy assembled a report identifying this account’s falsehoods 
at the behest of Khrushchev’s assistant Grigorii Shuiskii. See “V Voennoi Kollegii Verkhovnogo Suda 
Soiuza SSR,” Pravda, December 20, 1937, 5; GARF f. 8131, op. 32, d. 4578, ll. 271-273.  
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that Levan Davydovich had been transferred from Rostov in “either July or August 
1937,” thereby suggesting that he was alive well past the date of his sentencing.250 
Likewise, a spravka the MVD provided Elena Davydovna early in her search made “no 
mention of an execution” in reference to Levan Davydovich. Rather, the spravka in its 
entirety consisted of “the following: ‘L. D. Gogoberidze, year and place of birth, arrested 
in Azov-Black Sea in 1937 (instead of 1936), sentenced to 10 years – nothing more is 
known about him.’” When Elena Davydovna pressed about the possibility of her brother 
having been executed, MVD officials told her “categorically” that they had “no such 
information.”251  
These discrepancies, compounded by rumors and testimonies circulating among 
Gulag returnees from the Caucasus and Rostov, led the surviving Gogoberidzes to “have 
no doubt […] that L. D. Gogoberidze at that time [1937] was saved from death by a 
fluke, and that later, perhaps precisely this sentence saved him from Beriia’s hands.”252 
Although Elena Davydovna was credulous of the MVD’s assertion that it had no 
indication of Levan’s fate after he was supposedly dispatched to an unspecified camp, the 
mistrust that she harbored for the central institutions of the Terror, as previously 
                                                
250 GARF f. 8131, op. 32, d. 3304, l. 6ob. Elena Davydovna regretted that she could not remember the exact 
date specified in the spravka. 
251 Ibid. 
252 Ibid. Although this sort of “fluke” seems far-fetched, A. Sadovskii, the onetime commandant of the 
Moscow NKVD’s Economic Department, recalled that during the height of the Terror at the Butovo firing 
range, one of the busiest execution sites, “People who were sentenced only to prison terms were 
occasionally shot in error, and vice versa […] in the 1950s a person registered as having been shot suddenly 
reappeared and sent in a petition for rehabilitation written in his own hand. This means of course that in the 
years 1937-8 someone else must have been shot in his name, either intentionally or in error.” That said, 
Sadovskii was referring to production-line killing that took place at Butovo, rather than the more careful 
protocol that was probably observed in Rostov when dealing with a Party notable. Miriam Dobson cites a 
letter from an Ossetian man living in the Komi ASSR who for two decades lived under an assumed 
Georgian identity to escape Beriia’s grasp, and only revealed himself to the authorities upon the 
announcement of Beriia’s deposal. Sadovskii, quoted in Karl Schlögel, Moscow 1937, trans. Rodney 
Livingstone (Polity Press: Cambridge, UK and Malden, MA, 2012), 483; Dobson, Khrushchev’s Cold 
Summer, 34.     
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articulated in her letter to Mikoian from July 1953, remained a leading concern. She 
acknowledged the possibility that “as family members, despair dictates our suspicions – 
but can one rule out the possibility of resistance by such a family to inquiries from the 
depths of the very apparat of the MVD or GULAG?”253 The organs of state security were 
still viewed as a potential den of fabricators and their enablers, and Elena Davydovna 
questioned whether it could “be absolutely ruled out that people from Beriia’s structures 
still remain [within the MVD], whose interests are by no means served (kotorym otniud’ 
ne na ruku) by such a resurrection of the dead, especially of those like Levan 
Gogoberidze?”254 This sentence, suffused with religious symbolism, gave voice to the 
leading paradox of the new post-Beriia order: how could those who owed their very 
careers to a proclaimed enemy of the people be entrusted to delve into his past misdeeds? 
In Elena Davydovna’s eyes, Beriia’s history of criminality had already touched her 
family well before Levan’s 1936 arrest.  
Though she dismissed this closing observation as “already irrelevant” to the 
investigation, as Beriia had been dead for over a month, Elena Davydovna drew attention 
to “the fact that the Musavatists already put three bullets in Levan in 1919 (the Baku 
underground barely nursed him back to health). It is clear that this attempt could not have 
been carried out (ne oboshlos’) without Beriia.”255 Elena Davydovna thus depicted Levan 
Davydovich’s 1936 arrest as the final blow in a concerted campaign by Beriia against her 
brother that stretched back to the Civil War. Thanks to Mikoian’s patronage and the 
sanction provided by the Presidium, Elena Davydovna’s arguments merited serious 
consideration, and it therefore fell to Rudenko and his subordinates at the Procuracy to 
                                                
253 GARF f. 8131, op. 32, d. 3304, l. 6ob. 
254 GARF f. 8131, op. 32, d. 3304, ll. 6ob-7. 
255 GARF f. 8131, op. 32, d. 3304, l. 7. 
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arrange this constellation of contradictory claims and hearsay into a politically useful and 
legally viable narrative of the early Terror. 
 
The Aims and Parameters of Gogoberidze’s Rehabilitation 
In Rudenko’s February 6, 1954 report to the Central Committee recommending 
that Levan Gogoberidze be exonerated, the Procurator General evinced a studious 
legalism and ingenuity in reframing the case from a story of anti-Stalin terrorism nipped 
in the bud to one of a ruthless political vendetta. Though he operated along many of the 
same premises that Elena Davydovna had advanced, holding Beriia responsible for Levan 
Davydovich’s persecution, he did not share her optimistic assessment of the latter’s 
chances of survival. His report to Khrushchev and Malenkov began with the sentence 
handed down by the visiting session of the Military Collegium in Rostov-on-Don: 
“highest measure of criminal punishment – execution. In the file there is a spravka which 
states that GOGOBERIDZE’s sentence was carried out that same day.”256 For the 
purposes of Rudenko’s inquiry, Elena Davydovna’s allegations regarding her brother’s 
sentence were a nonstarter; Levan Davydovich’s rehabilitation was to be handled 
decidedly – and rightfully – as a posthumous one. The procedure for posthumous 
rehabilitation did not differ substantively from the rehabilitation of living subjects; in 
both its permutations, the imperative of legal rehabilitation was to establish the soundness 
of convictions through close scrutiny of available evidence, verdicts, and, if possible, 
interviews with directly involved persons. Though the task of posthumous rehabilitation 
was somewhat complicated by the fact that the individual under consideration could not 
                                                
256 GARF f. 8131, op. 32, d. 3286, l. 39. It bears mentioning that there is no copy of the Procuracy’s review 
of Levan Gogoberidze’s case in the delo dedicated to investigating his possible whereabouts. 
 99 
advocate on his or her own behalf, there is no indication that the Procuracy approached 
the practice as somehow outside its typical purview.  
As a prelude to dismantling the case against Gogoberidze, Rudenko laid out the 
laundry list of charges with which he had been impugned in 1937:  
According to the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR’s 
sentence GOGOBERIDZE was found guilty of being “an active 
participant in a counterrevolutionary Trotskyite-Zinovievite organization 
that on 1.XII.1934 perpetrated the foul murder of S. M. Kirov and 
prepared terrorist acts against the leadership of the VKP(b) and Soviet 
government during the period 1934-1936” (l.d. 216). The sentence also 
asserts that beginning in 1930 GOGOBERIDZE conducted active 
counterrevolutionary activities, and from 1930 he “joined the terrorist 
struggle” and took part in preparations for a terrorist act against I. V. 
Stalin. Moreover, GOGOBERIDZE stood accused, having entered into a 
criminal conspiracy with the terrorist-Trotskyites Vardanian, Livshits, and 
others, of recruiting new members for the counterrevolutionary Trotskyite 
group, and also, having established ties with the Trotskyite-saboteur 
Glebov-Avilov, of helping him conduct sabotage at the Rostsel’mash 
factory.257 
 
Rudenko observed that “[n]ot one of these accusations leveled against GOGOBERIDZE 
is corroborated by evidence, with the exception of the transcript of the interrogation of 
GOGOBERIDZE himself from March 17, 1937”; the transcript was treated as 
particularly suspect, as it “gives no indication of by whom or where GOGOBERIDZE’s 
interrogation was carried out.”258 This was far, though, from the most egregious example 
of legal misconduct to be found in Gogoberidze’s case file. 
 Over a month after his arrest Gogoberidze was “charged under articles 58-10 
(counterrevolutionary agitation) and 58-11 (participation in a counterrevolutionary 
organization) of the Penal Code,” neither of which “provide[d] for capital punishment” 
                                                
257 GARF f. 8131, op. 32, d. 3286, ll. 39-40. 
258 GARF f. 8131, op. 32, d. 3286, l. 40. 
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during peacetime.259 This proved to be little impediment to the NKVD: once a confession 
had been extracted in which Gogoberidze implicated himself, the Military Collegium 
quickly tried and sentenced him to death, rather than waiting for investigators to press 
new charges.260 Rudenko emphasized that this slapdash sentence constituted a total 
contravention of both the spirit and the letter of Soviet law.261 The case’s shaky legal 
footing additionally “[drew] attention to the fact that although GOGOBERIDZE was 
charged with participation in a counterrevolutionary organization, he was tried not with a 
group of other defendants, but alone.”262 Rudenko’s highlighting of this issue –meant to 
further cast Gogoberidze’s persecution as the product of personal antipathy on Beriia’s 
part – served to isolate Gogoberidze rehabilitation from its wider political implications: it 
did not prompt a review of the cases against those who were implicated, though not 
directly charged in Gogoberidze’s case, and Beriia and his accomplices’ systematic 
reliance upon torture to extract confessions, which Rudenko invoked as proof of their 
malign intent and Gogoberidze’s innocence, did not furnish a pretext for automatically 
reopening the investigations that the Transcaucasian NKVD had conducted.263 
 Rudenko devoted considerable attention to the Georgian NKVD’s preoccupation 
with Gogoberidze’s and Beriia’s shared past in Baku, underscoring the presence of 
Goglidze at Gogoberidze’s “repeated interrogations” in Tbilisi.264 Goglidze had been 
sentenced to capital punishment alongside his patron in December 1953, and Rudenko 





263 This is not to suggest, however, that others who could be tied to Beriia’s criminality did not have their 
cases heard in due time. As the previous chapter demonstrated, Mikoian was quite proactive in forwarding 
appeals involving Beriia to the Procuracy, and the following chapter delves into the manner in which chains 
of rehabilitation were formed in the 1950s and 1960s, as later exonerations relied on the precedents set by 
previous cases for justification.   
264 Ibid. 
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mentioned that prior to their convictions, investigators “established that Beriia and his 
accomplices were aware of the fact that GOGOBERIDZE knew about Beriia’s service in 
the Musavat counterintelligence and spoke about this with Sergo Ordzhonikidze” through 
materials written by NKVD members and – presumably – the copy of Beriia’s letter to 
Ordzhonikidze that had been entered into evidence.265 Rudenko failed to emphasize, 
though, that the letter also made it clear that Beriia did not seem especially threatened by 
these allegations, as the Party already declared the matter closed in 1920. The transcripts 
of Gogoberidze’s interrogations from both Tbilisi and Rostov-on-Don revealed that 
investigators “were particularly interested in [his] supposedly ‘slanderous’ statements 
about Beriia,” from which Rudenko concluded that “Beriia and his accomplices feared 
denunciations from GOGOBERIDZE and had an interest in his conviction.”266 While 
these materials laid bare the obvious animus that Beriia harbored for Levan Davydovich 
– inspired, in no small part, by the latter’s intriguing – they did not address the actual 
impetus for his arrest and elimination.  
As the memo uncovered by historian Oleg Khlevniuk demonstrates, Beriia was 
simply acting upon orders he had received from Ezhov, who in turn had been specifically 
directed by Stalin to have Gogoberidze arrested because of his ties to Lomanidze. 
Rudenko decidedly downplayed the close relationship between Lomanidze and 
                                                
265 GARF f. 8131, op. 32, d. 3286, l. 41; Rudenko quoted from a December 16, 1937 report written by 
Bogdan Kobulov, one of Beriia’s trusted subordinates, which had been appended to Gogoberidze’s case 
file: “Recounting a conversation with Levan Gogoberidze in Sukhumi in 1933, Agniashvili testified that 
Levan Gogoberidze disseminated a counterrevolutionary, slanderous fabrication about Comrade Beriia’s 
past based on Comrade Sergo Ordzhonikidze’s words.” For the excerpt from Beriia’s letter entered into 
evidence in 1953, see Oleg Mozokhin, ed., Politbiuro i delo Beriia: sbornik dokumentov (Moskva: 
Kuchkovo pole, 2012), 556-557. 
266 GARF f. 8131, op. 32, d. 3286, l. 41. The late Russian Marxist historian Vadim Rogovin suggests that 
this emphasis on Gogoberidze’s accusations – evident in others’ interrogation transcripts as well – was 
ultimately grounded in Beriia’s desire to posthumously discredit Ordzhonikidze. See Vadim Z. Rogovin, 
Stalin’s Terror of 1937-1938: Political Genocide in the USSR, trans. Frederick S. Choate (Oak Park, MI: 
Mehring Books, 2009), 162-163. 
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Gogoberidze, as well as the former’s role in his onetime ally’s downfall. He noted that 
Gogoberidze “convincingly refuted the charges of counterrevolutionary activity pressed 
against him” during the interrogations, “acknowledging only friendly relations with 
Lomanidze.”267 Despite its brevity, this passage is extremely telling with regard to the 
nascent objectives and assumptions of posthumous rehabilitation. Because the Presidium 
had “cleared” only Gogoberidze’s case for review, Rudenko was obliged to insulate 
Levan Davydovich from politically suspect individuals; Lominadze and most of those 
who rose alongside him remained enemies in the eyes of the Party, and therefore 
Gogoberidze’s propinquity to them had to be minimized. Even though Rudenko deemed 
the “absence in the file of any sort of other objective evidence” beyond the transcript of 
Gogoberidze’s interrogation from shortly before his execution totally insufficient to 
convict him of “grave counterrevolutionary crimes,” at no point did he extend this same 
scrutiny to other cases mentioned during Gogoberidze’s trial.268  
Likewise, the admission that it was “also known that interrogations in the cases of 
individuals from whom participants in Beriia’s counterrevolutionary treasonous group 
feared denunciations were carried out through strong-arm methods of assault and tortures 
prohibited by law” did not immediately occasion the reopening of the cases against 
thousands of other individuals who had the misfortune to fall into Beriia’s clutches.269 
Indeed, as the previous chapter attests, many families, such as the Kalmykovs, who could 
also claim to have been specifically targeted for reprisals by the NKVD chief, were kept 
in suspense for months, unsure if their dossiers had even been retrieved from the 
                                                
267 Ibid. 
268 Ibid. Vardanian and Glebov-Avilov were not rehabilitated until 1956, Iakov Livshits only in 1988, and 
because Lominadze shot himself rather than face trial he was not eligible for official legal exoneration. 
269 GARF f. 8131, op. 32, d. 3286, ll. 41-42.  
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archives. This underscores the extremely limited mandate under which the earliest 
posthumous rehabilitations operated; even as the exculpation of specific individuals 
revealed yawning fissures in the legalistic edifice that allowed the Bolsheviks to 
cannibalize themselves in the 1930s, the Procuracy was not automatically empowered to 
scrutinize other related cases. Because Gogoberidze was tried on his own and because of 
his established history of antagonism with Beriia, his case provided an ideal opportunity 
to coopt the past in the service of the new anti-Beriia Party line. 
 For all its conclusive findings, Rudenko’s report was without legal force; it was 
only within his purview to recommend that the case be dismissed and Gogoberidze 
posthumously rehabilitated by way of “a protest before the Military Collegium of the 
USSR Supreme Court.”270 However, in practice the Military Collegium appeared to have 
had little agency of its own in the rehabilitation process, as its verdicts closely mirrored 
materials that the Procuracy submitted, and it rarely– if ever – declined to endorse the 
Procuracy’s proposals in this sphere. On March 6, one month after Rudenko issued his 
conclusions, his deputy, Lev Nikolaevich Smirnov, presented the Procuracy’s argument 
before the Military Collegium.271 The Military Collegium’s ruling, issued that same day, 
summarized and reiterated the major points of Rudenko’s report, foregrounding the fact 
that the “preliminary investigation and proceedings of Gogoberidze’s case were 
conducted with flagrant violations of procedural law”; no explicit mention was made of 
the fabricated nature of the charges against Gogoberidze.272 It endorsed the interpretation 
                                                
270 GARF f. 8131, op. 32, d. 3286, l. 42. 
271 Smirnov initially came to prominence as a deputy prosecutor at both the Nuremburg and Tokyo war 
crimes tribunals, and he eventually rose to the position of chairman of the Supreme Court of the RSFSR, in 
which capacity he presided over the 1966 proceedings against dissident writers Andrei Siniavskii and Iulii 
Daniel’ (my thanks to Benjamin Nathans for pointing out this detail). Starting in mid-February 1954 he 
assumed control over the Gogoberidze dossier from Rudenko. 
272 GARF f. 8131, op. 32, d. 3304, l. 35. 
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that “Gogoberidze’s arrest and his sentencing for grave crimes was an act of reprisal by 
the enemy of the people Beriia and his accomplices because Gogoberidze knew about 
Beriia’s service in the Musavat counterintelligence and spoke about this with Sergo 
Ordzhonikidze,” thereby lending judicial credence to the narrative originally promulgated 
by Elena Gogoberidze and a small cohort of Gulag survivors.273  
The ruling actually hewed closer to Elena Davydovna’s account of Levan’s 
downfall than Rudenko’s did, in that it included mention of his being “grievously injured 
by Musavat counterintelligence” in Baku, which led “Beriia and his accomplices [to 
have] grounds […] to fear denunciations from Gogoberidze, which is why they inflicted 
reprisals on him,” though like the Procuracy, the Military Collegium unequivocally 
identified March 21, 1937 as Gogoberidze’s date of death. Given these “newly disclosed 
circumstances” and “the absence of a corpus delicti” the Military Collegium annulled 
Levan Gogoberidze’s death sentence and closed the case against him.274 Though this 
legal vindication could not negate Gogoberidze’s physical destruction, it did serve – in 
the eyes of Soviet officialdom – to efface the concerted blackening of his reputation that 
Stalin oversaw, allowing him to once again be counted among the pioneers of Soviet 
power in the Caucasus. Yet by laying ultimate responsibility for Levan Davydovich’s 
persecution at the feet of “Beriia and his accomplices” – all of whom by that point were 
either dead or awaiting trial – both the Procuracy and the Military Collegium of the 
Supreme Court reflected a continued deference to procedural and political concerns, as 
well as the reluctance of the post-Stalin ruling elite to confront the full scope of the legal 
                                                
273 GARF f. 8131, op. 32, d. 3304, ll. 35-36. 
274 GARF f. 8131, op. 32, d. 3304, l. 36. 
 105 
falsification and fabrication that allowed so many of their onetime comrades to be 
liquidated by the very system that they had striven to create. 
Once Levan Davydovich had been fully exculpated the Soviet government was 
able to make use of his past actions to discredit newly identified enemies. For example, in 
March and April 1954 as part of the case against Mir Dzafar Bagirov, investigators from 
the Party Control Committee and Procurator General Rudenko repeatedly brought up 
Bagirov’s 1918 arrest in Baku by Gogoberidze, now hailed as a “representative of the 
famous Baku commissar Dzhaparidze.”275 Prior to his rehabilitation Levan Davydovich’s 
involvement with an established martyr of the revolution like Dzhaparidze would never 
have been acknowledged, but upon his being readmitted to the fold this relationship was 
avidly exploited as a means of impugning Bagirov’s – and by extension, the late Beriia’s 
– commitment to the Soviet project. From that point on, Gogoberidze was repeatedly 
mentioned in legal proceedings, Party reports, and the press as a valiant fighter for 
Communism felled by Beriia’s machinations. In particular, at times when Moscow 
sought to discipline the Georgian Communist Party and its members, Levan 
Davydovich’s demise was consistently cited as an example of the human cost of the 
failure to practice proper Bolshevik vigilance.276 Yet as the Party began to exploit 
Gogoberidze’s memory for its own ends, his survivors continued to struggle with the 
stigma of having been “family members of a betrayer of the Motherland.” 
Also indicative of the initially limited aims of rehabilitation is the fact that the 
onus of initiating Levan Davydovich’s widow’s exoneration fell to Nutsa Gogoberidze 
                                                
275 Khaustov, Delo Beriia, 440, 442. 
276 See, for example, A. N. Artizov et al, eds., Reabilitatsiia: kak eto bylo. Dokumenty prezidiuma TsK 
KPSS i drugie materialy. Vol. 2. Fevral’ 1956 – nachalo 80-kh godov (Moskva: Mezhdunarodnyi fond 
“Demokratiia,” 2003), 151; for Dzhavakhishvili’s speech at the 22nd Party Congress, see XXII s’’ezd 
Kommunisticheskoi partii Sovetskogo Soiuza, 17-31 oktiabria 1961 goda: stenograficheskii otchet, tom III 
(Moskva: Gos. izd-vo polit. lit-ry, 1962), 118. 
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herself, even though the charges against her consisted only of being the wife of an 
“enemy of the people.”277 She wrote to Rudenko on April 7, 1954 – a month following 
the Military Collegium’s decision regarding her husband – to request that her conviction 
be reviewed, as living in Tbilisi on a former zek’s restricted passport was causing her – as 
she put it later to Smirnov – “no small measure (nemalo) of unpleasantness.”278 Over the 
next few weeks the Procuracy and Military Collegium quickly went to work, and both 
ruled that Nutsa’s sentence constituted “an act of reprisal against a member of the family 
of an individual from whom Beriia and his accomplices feared denunciations,” and the 
case was vacated by May 5.279 The justice of the Military Collegium who signed off on 
the notification order for Nutsa Gogoberidze’s rehabilitation was none other than Ivan 
Matulevich, the same man who imposed Levan Davydovich’s death sentence.280 While 
the surviving Gogoberidzes may have struggled to dispel the lingering aftereffects of 
repression even once Levan Davydovich was officially exculpated, at the same time they 
managed to induce the Procuracy to embark upon an altogether different mission: to 
prove that Levan Davydovich did not die in Rostov, but instead lived out the height of the 
Terror in the (relative) safety of a series of prison camps.  
                                                
277 While Nutsa’s predicament appears to have been the rule at this time, rather than the exception, there 
were several notable instances in which living wives were rehabilitated before their more prominent 
executed husbands; such cases included those of Naneishvili-Kosareva, Chizhova, and Elena Bogoraz, who 
had been married to RSFSR Sovnarkom head Daniil Sulimov. 
278 GARF f. 8131, op. 32, d. 3304, ll. 44, 82ob. Though the vast majority of posthumous rehabilitation 
appeals appear to have come from wives, children, siblings, and other relatives, there do not appear to have 
been any official restrictions in place on who could apply for any given individual’s rehabilitation. 
Tsetseliia Isaakovna Kin, the widow of writer Viktor Pavlovich Kin, wrote in to the Procuracy in April 
1956 on behalf of Marsel’ Izrailevich Rozenberg, the USSR’s representative in Spain during the Spanish 
Civil War, who did not have any surviving family to advocate on his behalf. See Rossiiskii gosudarstvennyi 
arkhiv literatury i isskustva (RGALI) f. 2803, op. 1, d. 174. 
279 GARF 5. 8131, op. 32, d. 3304, ll. 45-46, 53-55, 62-62ob.  
280 GARF f. 8131, op. 32, d. 3304, ll. 61, 120. Matulevich did not remain in his post long after this; in late 
August 1954 he was removed from the bench along with two of his colleagues at the Military Collegium, 
and a year later all three were expelled from the Party for having participated in the illegal repression of 
innocent Soviet notables; Gogoberidze was not mentioned among those in whose deaths Matulevich was 
implicated, though. See Artizov et al, Reabilitatsiia, vol. 1, 239-243. 
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Dredging the Archipelago: The Search for Specters in the Gulag  
 Despite all available evidence indicating that Elena Davydovna was mistaken 
regarding her brother’s survival, Procurator General Rudenko treated her insistence that 
Levan Davydovich did not die in Rostov-on-Don with all attendant seriousness, if not 
quite credulity.281 In a letter to Minister of Internal Affairs Sergei Nikiforovich Kruglov 
written two days after Elena Davydovna’s audience at the Procuracy in February 1954, 
Rudenko conceded that it was “evident” from the materials in Gogoberidze’s file that the 
Military Collegium condemned him to death and that the sentence had been carried out 
almost immediately, which he “announced […] to [Gogoberidze’s] sister.”282 Undeterred 
by this stark admission, “E. Gogoberidze maintains that she allegedly has information 
from reliable sources that her brother was alive in 1942-43,” citing Liusia Petrosian’s 
account that she “supposedly encountered L. Gogoberidze in Magadan.”283 Forwarding a 
copy of Elena Davydovna’s “Material on L. D. Gogoberidze,” Rudenko requested that 
                                                
281 The Gogoberidze’s refusal to entertain the possibility that Levan had been shot in 1937 was echoed in 
the struggles of another Georgian Old Bolshevik family, the Alliluevs. Anna Allilueva, the younger sister 
of Stalin’s second wife Nadezhda and wife of secret policeman Stanislav Redens, balked at the notion that 
her husband had been executed as an enemy of the people, even when confirmation came from Stalin 
himself. As Svetlana Allilueva wrote, her aunt was “convinced her husband is still alive, although she’s had 
word of his posthumous rehabilitation. She thinks he has a new wife and family somewhere in the Far 
North like Kolyma or Magadan (‘After so many years, why not?’ she’ll ask) and that he just doesn’t want 
to come home. From time to time she’ll insist after one of her dreams or hallucinations that she’s seen her 
husband and had a talk with him.” Svetlana Allilueva attributed this certitude to the schizophrenia that ran 
in her mother’s side of the family, and tellingly, unlike the Gogoberidzes, the Alliluevs made no apparent 
attempt to officially corroborate Anna’s delusions regarding Redens. See Svetlana Allilueva, Twenty 
Letters to a Friend: A Memoir, trans. Priscilla Johnson McMillan (Harper Perennial: New York, 2016), 54-
58. 
282 GARF f. 8131, op. 32, d. 3304, l. 4. That Rudenko was so forthright with Elena Davydovna about the 
facts of Levan Davydovich’s death was remarkable in and of itself and a reflection of the early juncture at 
which their exchange occurred; it appears that Naneishvili-Kosareva was one of the only other survivors to 
be directly informed of the actual circumstances of her husband’s execution in 1954. See Elena Kosareva, 
“Zvezda i smert’ genseka,” Moskovskii komsomolets, October 29, 2003, available at 
http://www.mk.ru/editions/daily/article/2003/10/29/124768-zvezda-i-smert-genseka.html (accessed March 
11, 2018). On the official practice of fabricating causes and dates of death, and the resulting controversies, 
see Chapter 3.  
283 GARF f. 8131, op. 32, d. 3304, l. 4. 
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Kruglov “give suggestions on the verification of her petition and notify the Procuracy of 
the USSR of the results.”284 As the MVD began the process of combing its own files to 
ascertain whether there existed any possibility that Levan Davydovich had survived his 
captivity, Elena Davydovna was aggressively soliciting the testimony of others who 
purportedly saw him alive in the hopes of bolstering her case to the authorities.  
The first such witness to come forward – in mid-February – was Teimuraz 
Iraklievich Vashklevich, the Tbilisi denizen to whom Elena Davydovna alluded in her 
note to Rudenko as having recently returned from the “remote camps.” Vashklevich 
confirmed for Rudenko, “[a]t the insistence of the relatives of the relatives of the former 
secretary of the TsK of Georgia,” that he “encountered [him] in the summer of 1952 in 
the Iagodnoe settlement […] in Kolyma. I was working in the settlement mess hall as a 
watchman […] he told me that after the end of his sentence he had to remain in exile and 
would soon be leaving for the Pevek settlement.”285 While the Procuracy apparently sat 
on this statement for several weeks, Elena Davydovna continued to barrage the 
Procurator General and his subordinates with evidence to foster her fact-finding 
campaign. 
 Liusia Petrosian telegrammed Elena Davydovna on February 14 from exile in the 
Eniseisk settlement to describe her passing encounter with the individual she recognized 
as Levan Davydovich. She claimed to have run into Gogoberidze in summer 1939 at a 
“transit point” in Vladivostok from which she was sent to Magadan; she confessed to 
being unaware of Levan’s “further movements,” but “suppose[d] [he] went to 
                                                
284 Ibid. 
285 GARF f. 8131, op. 32, d. 3304, l. 8. 
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Kolyma.”286 This scanty information prompted Elena Davydovna to write to Rudenko the 
following day, this time with almost triumphant conviction: “It has thus been made clear 
with absolute certitude that the sentence handed down in L. D. Gogoberidze’s case on 21 
March 19X7 [sic] was NOT carried out: in the summer of 1939 my brother was alive and 
found in Vladivostok.”287 Elena also invoked Vashklevich’s account as further proof that 
Levan was seen alive less than two years prior some 700-800 kilometers from Magadan, 
urging Rudenko to corroborate this data with the Main Camps Administration: “The 
GULAG can easily verify this upon request, and furthermore, at the very least the 
GULAG must have its own lists, its own registries, its own filing system, if the latest 
information proves to be not quite accurate.”288 Elena Davydovna’s letter – which up to 
that point had maintained a largely impersonal tone – suddenly took a dramatically more 
emotional tack, as she lamented, “[i]f only I could communicate with Eniseisk myself, 
but otherwise we are completely helpless! (Esli ia mogla snestis’ s Eniseiskom sama, to 
dal’she ved’ my sovershenno bespomoshchny!)”289 On behalf of the entire Gogoberidze 
clan, Elena Davydovna “implore[d]” the Procurator General “to say nothing of Levan’s 
terrible fate, take into consideration the fact that our family endured these 17-18 years 
having lost a father, husband and only brother! – And help us with your power and your 
authority.”290 This expression of unchecked pathos marked a distinct shift in the grounds 
that Levan Davydovich’s relatives employed to justify the continued search for his 
possible whereabouts. While Elena Davydovna initially emphasized the pragmatic value 
of retrieving Levan Davydovich from exile, as her hopes for a swift resolution to this 
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287 GARF f. 8131, op. 32, d. 3304, l. 2. 
288 Ibid. 
289 Ibid. 
290 Ibid.  
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mystery proved fleeting both she and her sister-in-law came to rely on a combination of 
irreverent effrontery and sentiment in order to ensure the authorities’ continued vigilance, 
even in the face of overwhelming evidence that disputed their claims, reflecting their 
determination to keep the investigation going by any means necessary. 
 Within days of Liusia Petrosian’s inflammatory telegram reaching Elena 
Gogoberidze, Rudenko received confirmation from the First Special Department of the 
MVD that the Gogoberidze family’s hopes were entirely misplaced; the First Special 
Department’s archive held a copy of Matulevich’s verdict from March 21, 1937, as well 
as a certificate verifying the execution of the sentence. Both the verdict and the certificate 
pertained to “a single individual – GOGOBERIDZE L. D.”291 The chief of the First 
Special Department additionally insisted that there existed “no information to suggest 
that GOGOBERIDZE Levon [sic] Davydovich is supposedly located in exile in 
Department “P” [for special settlers] of the MVD of the USSR.”292 There is no indication 
in the Procuracy’s file as to when, how, or even whether Rudenko confronted Elena 
Davydovna with this material, but based on her responses to similar discouragement, in 
all likelihood whatever Rudenko might have told her would have done little to shake her 
convictions. Bolstered by Petrosian and Vashklevich’s respective reports, Elena 
Davydovna could not be persuaded by mere documents alone that Levan had died an 
ignominious death in Rostov-on-Don. This is unsurprising in light of the emotional 
turmoil to which the Gogoberidze family had been subjected since Levan’s arrest; to 
abandon their faith after such a prospect materialized would have been unbearable. What 
is more remarkable, however, is that rather than curtailing its inquiries once Levan 
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Davydovich’s execution had been established, the Procuracy continued in its attempts to 
untangle the mystery of Levan Davydovich’s location, devoting considerable time and 
manpower to this tenacious quandary at a point when its resources were already stretched 
razor-thin by the influx of complaints and inquiries to its various departments.293 The 
continued allocation of state resources to what increasingly appeared to be a wild goose 
chase can be best accounted for through Mikoian’s repeated exertion of his influence on 
the Gogoberidze’s behalf. 
 Frustrated by the Procurator General and MVD’s apparent lack of zeal in pursuing 
her brother’s case, in late February Elena Davydovna proposed to Mikoian “a very 
simple, easy, and quick way to ascertain, finally, Levan’s fate: you might make 
arrangements for Liusia Arkad’evna Petrosian to be summoned to Moscow from 
Eniseisk, where she is living in a settlement after completing her camp term.”294 Elena 
maintained that “[t]alking with [Petrosian] will be sufficient to cause all doubts 
concerning the execution of the sentence in 1937 to fall away, and then the MVD will be 
able, finally, to begin real inquiries for L. D. Gogoberidze in the camps, colonies, and so 
on.”295 She closed by “beg[ging]” Mikoian to inform her if this scheme was “feasible”; 
while it is again unclear if this missive elicited a direct response, by early March, when 
Mikoian instructed Rudenko with a memo designated “SPECIAL SUPERVISION” to 
“familiarize” himself with Petrosian’s file, the latter had already had his subordinates 
take steps to shed light on the situation.296 
                                                
293 On the Procuracy’s inability to keep pace with citizens petitions, see Chapter 3. 
294 GARF f. 8131, op. 32, d. 3304, l. 21. 
295 Ibid. 
296 Ibid.; GARF f. 8131, op. 32, d. 3304, l. 20. Mikoian described Liusia Petrosian to Rudenko as “the sister 
of the renowned Kamo.” 
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 Smirnov’s first action as the lead investigator into Levan Gogoberidze’s purported 
survival in the Gulag was to instruct the Military Procurator of the Transcaucasian 
Military District and the Procurator of the Krasnoiarsk krai to bring in Vashklevich and 
Petrosian, respectively, for questioning. Vashklevich was to be confronted with a copy of 
the statement he sent to the Procurator General, and then interrogated regarding the 
circumstances under which he encountered Gogoberidze, whether he was “sure that the 
person with whom he supposedly spoke in the Iagodnoe settlement was in actuality 
Gogoberidze,” his level of familiarity with Gogoberidze, and – most pointedly – “[w]ho 
requested that Vashklevich affirm that he supposedly encountered Gogoberidze at 
Kolyma.”297 Smirnov acknowledged in his orders that the MVD possessed a copy of 
Gogoberidze’s death certificate, but his “relatives insist that in actuality he was not shot” 
thanks in part to Vashklevich, and although “Vashklevich’s statement contradicts an 
official certificate, it needs to be verified” through a “close interrogation.”298 Likewise, 
the Krasnoiarsk Procurator was told to establish “where precisely in 1939” Petrosian 
“supposedly” saw Gogoberidze, “under what conditions did this encounter take place, 
and is Petrosian not mistaken in asserting that the man who she encountered in 1939 was 
indeed Gogoberidze,” and – again – at whose request she “confirm[ed]” this meeting.299 
Both regional procurators were urged to do their “utmost (maksimal’no)” to “expedite the 
execution of this order,” and before the month was out the transcripts of both 
interrogations were on Smirnov’s desk in Moscow.300 
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 Because Vashklevich had no interactions with Gogoberidze prior to his 
imprisonment he could not say definitely whether the individual with whom he spoke 
was indeed the former Party Secretary of Georgia. In response to the Military 
Procurator’s queries, Vashklevich described a Georgian, “by appearance was roughly 48-
50 years old, the hair on his head was entirely grey, his face was large, his forehead broad 
and prominent, his eyes were blue…lean”; this man “supposedly called himself 
Gogoberidze Levan Davydovich and reported that he had served out his sentence and was 
due to leave soon for settlement in the Chain-Chukotskoe administration of Dal’stroi.”301 
Based on their handful of exchanges, Vashklevich had no reason to doubt the veracity of 
this “Gogoberidze’s” account, and upon his return to Tbilisi he contacted the latter’s 
surviving sisters. Vashklevich’s lack of a personal history with Gogoberidze did not 
necessarily cast his testimony into doubt, but he had no basis upon which to judge 
whether his interlocutor was indeed who he purported to be. This was far less of an issue 
for Liusia Petrosian, though, as she repeatedly emphasized her close, longstanding ties 
with the man she insisted she saw through a fence at the Vladivostok transit prison in 
1939. 
 During her interrogation in Krasnoiarsk, Petrosian reported that she and 
Gogoberidze first became acquainted “in 1921 in Tbilisi after I was freed from prison in 
Batumi, where I was held by order of the Menshevik authorities, apparently as a 
hostage.”302 From that point through 1929 she came to know him “very well,” seeing him 
“repeatedly while working at the Georgia Sovnarkom, at friends’ and comrades’ 
                                                                                                                                            
transcript, which suggests that either he retracted the statements he made, or the Noril’sk procurator found 
his account unreliable. See GARF f. 8131, op. 32, d. 3304, ll. 18, 40.    
301 GARF f. 8131, op. 32, d. 3304, l. 50. 
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apartments, meetings, conferences, in the street, theaters, the cinema, etc. In general we 
were comrades and knew each other very well.”303 This close familiarity with 
Gogoberidze – coupled with her own family’s close ties to the halls of power – afforded 
Petrosian’s statements an authoritative quality, and also allowed her to redirect the thrust 
of the interrogation toward her own experience of wrongful imprisonment and unrealized 
exoneration. When asked about the circumstances of her encounter with Levan 
Davydovich in 1939, Liusia Petrosian first insisted on relating the story of how she came 
to pass through Vladivostok in the first place: in September 1937 she was sentenced to a 
ten-year prison term, the first two years of which were spent in solitary confinement in 
Iaroslavl’. Having taken “violently ill” and become “seriously swollen,” she was 
transferred to Kolyma, and the first leg of her journey brought her to Vladivostok’s 
transit prison via sealed freight car. Petrosian claimed that she spent no more than two to 
three days in Vladivostok, and while taking a “stroll” in the prison yard one of these days 
“someone called out to [her] from the fence that separated the men’s zone from the 
women’s.”304 Having been “called […] by name,” Petrosian “came close to the fence,” 
and there “saw Gogoberidze Levon Davidovich [sic] through a slit.”305 Liusia Petrosian 
was able to recount this unlikely reunion in some detail almost 15 years later. 
 Petrosian told the Transcaucasian Military Procurator that she immediately 
recognized Levan Davydovich, “called him by name, and he responded.”306 Although 
Gogoberidze’s “appearance was poor, thin, pallid,” Petrosian noted that he retained his 
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“cheerful” humor, and “smiling he tried to joke about my appearance.”307 When she 
inquired after his own well-being, “Gogoberidze answered in Georgian: ‘so far, I’m still 
alive.’”308 Based on Petrosian’s interrogation this was the total extent of their exchange, 
as a warning shouted from a guard tower curtailed their conversation and drove both 
away from the dividing fence. Despite the fleeting nature of their meeting, Petrosian was 
unequivocal regarding the accuracy of her recollections. When challenged that she might 
have been mistaken about the identity of her partner in conversation Petrosian bristled, 
and “categorically maintain[ed] that it was indeed Gogoberidze,” as she “knew him very 
well” and therefore “could not have been mistaken.”309 At least one of the other female 
convicts who had been transferred from Iaroslavl’ alongside Petrosian, Zina Rinberg, was 
said to have been familiar with Levan Davydovich from Taganrog, and apparently saw 
the two of them speaking together.310 Petrosian was also pointedly asked about who 
induced her to come forward after so much time having passed. She explained that upon 
returning to Tbilisi from the camps in 1947 she met with one of Levan Davydovich’s 
sisters and described what she had experienced in Vladivostok; it was not until February 
1954, amidst the anti-Beriia tide, that she received Elena Davydovna’s telegram 
requesting that she attest to having seen Levan.311 When Petrosian’s interrogation 
transcript arrived in Moscow it apparently elicited far more questions than it answered, 
and instead of resolving the question of Levan Davydovich’s fate it prompted its own 
series of side investigations. 




310 Ibid. Petrosian was subsequently asked whether she knew where Rinberg and Babulia Gvakhariia-
Chachibaia – the other prisoner she mentioned by name – could be found; when she replied in the negative, 
the Procuracy made it a priority to locate them. 
311 Ibid. 
 116 
  While Nutsa Gogoberidze’s rehabilitation wound its way through the Soviet 
judicial system the Procuracy traced multiple leads in the quest to disentangle the 
contradictions between the MVD’s official records and Liusia Petrosian’s eyewitness 
testimony. An essential element of this effort involved corroborating Petrosian’s claims 
by cross-examining the women she identified as having been with her in Vladivostok, 
Zina Rinberg and Babulia Gvakhariia-Chachibaia. In order to track them down Smirnov 
turned to the Primorskii krai Procurator F. D. Kononenko. Forwarding him a copy of 
Petrosian’s interrogation, Smirnov assigned the regional procurator to “to take urgent and 
thorough measures to verify the information contained” therein regarding Gogoberidze’s 
fate.312 Smirnov deemed it particularly “essential to obtain background information on 
[the two women] referred to in the interrogation transcript, to ascertain where they were 
sent and, in the event that they are located in Primorskii krai, to interrogate them, having 
clarified whether they encountered Levan Gogoberidze with Petrosian at the Vladivostok 
transit prison”; were they no longer found in or around Vladivostok Kononenko was 
instructed to inform Smirnov via special telegram of where they were ultimately sent.313 
Independent of locating Rinberg and Gvakhariia-Chachibaia, Kononenko was to establish 
whether Gogoberidze was registered among the detainees who passed through 
Vladivostok in summer 1939, whether it was possible at the time for male and female 
prisoners to establish contact, and where Gogoberidze was sent if he was indeed in transit 
through Vladivostok.314 Smirnov made his own skepticism regarding Levan 
Davydovich’s prospects for survival evident, citing the MVD’s death certificate, but he 
                                                





explained that “in relation” to Gogoberidze’s rehabilitation it was “necessary to 
thoroughly verify Petrosian’s information.”315 Despite Smirnov’s orders, his inquiries 
ground to a halt in Vladivostok thanks to a paucity of available information. 
 At the end of April the chief of MVD Prison Number 1 in Vladivostok, a Major 
Volkov, wrote to Kononenko’s assistant, Deputy Procurator Nesterov, to inform him that 
“in view of the absence of registration information it is not possible to establish whether 
GOGOBERIDZE Levan Davydovich, GVAKHARIIA-CHACHIBAIA Babul’ and 
RINBERG Zina passed through the prison.”316 Volkov was able to confirm, however, 
that in 1939 it was technically possible for male and female inmates to speak to one 
another, “as the exercise yards were separated by single-board fences and there were slits 
in the fences through which the prisoners could observe each other and exchange words 
(men and women). In 1952 the exercise yards were re-divided with two boards and the 
possibility for discussions was eliminated.”317 What little credence the fact that Petrosian 
and Levan Davydovich’s exchange was technically feasible leant to the former’s account 
was undone by the unavailability of any sort of documentation that attested to 
Gogoberidze’s, or even Petrosian’s presence in Vladivostok. Kononenko explained in his 
brief report to Smirnov, which included Volkov’s memorandum, that prior to 1940 the 
registration of prisoners in transit through Vladivostok was carried out in logbooks 
separate from those used for the general population; according to the prison personnel’s 
“assertions,” these registries were destroyed sometime between 1941 and 1945.318 Yet 
even in the face of this investigative dead end Smirnov was not prepared – or perhaps not 
                                                
315 GARF f. 8131, op. 32, d. 3304, l. 48. 
316 GARF f. 8131, op. 32, d. 3304, l. 60. 
317 Ibid. 
318 GARF f. 8131, op. 32, d. 3304, l. 56. 
 118 
empowered – to close the Gogoberidze case. Written in the margins of Kononenko’s 
dispatch in Smirnov’s hand was the instruction to “[w]ait for a response from Kruglov”; 
while Smirnov pursued the Vladivostok leads, Rudenko had updated MVD head Kruglov 
on the most recent developments in the Gogoberidze inquest and requested that he direct 
“a careful additional verification” of Petrosian and Vashklevich’s testimonies.319  
When this review was completed in mid-June, it too revealed very little in the 
way of actionable evidence: Kruglov reaffirmed the details of Levan Davydovich’s 
execution in Rostov-on-Don, and noted that upon repeat interrogation Petrosian “did not 
provide any further information” about him.320 Kruglov’s findings also closed off at least 
one avenue of exploration, as he announced that Zinadia Markovna Rinberg, Petrosian’s 
“Zina,” had died the previous April in Sevvostlag while serving out her sentence; 
presumably the MVD was unable to determine what became of Gvakhariia-
Chachibaia.321 Without any additional materials or witnesses to draw upon, and with no 
clear resolution to the case in sight, the Procuracy curtailed the hunt for traces of Levan 
Davydovich; the Gogoberidze women, however, would not be dissuaded from their 
chosen course of action, nor would they allow the Soviet authorities to abandon their 
commitments unchallenged. 
Before her own rehabilitation was completed Nutsa Gogoberidze wrote to 
Smirnov to persuade him to remain vigilant in tracking down Levan Davydovich. 
Acknowledging “how important [Smirnov’s] moral conviction that it has real 
significance is to the search for Levan Davydovich Gogoberidze,” Nutsa confessed to 
having “considered coming to Moscow and personally sharing […] the facts that confirm 
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that the sentence in Gogoberidze’s case of March 21, 1937 was not carried out,” but she 
was prevented from doing so by “illness and domestic conditions” and was therefore 
“compelled to confine [her]self to a letter.”322 After relating the conflicting reports that 
she received regarding Levan Davydovich’s sentence (treated above), Nutsa justified her 
persistence by setting herself apart from “the category of people who prefer either 
consciously or unconsciously to engage in self-deception and are deluded by illusions”; 
that being said, she insisted that there could be “no doubt that neither in March nor in 
April 1937 was L. Gogoberidze executed.”323 She conceded that she was unsure of “what 
his fate was afterwards,” but in her eyes the issue of Levan’s possible survival to the 
present day was largely tertiary.324 Her major concern was the apparent inability of the 
combined efforts of the Procuracy and Soviet state security to locate any trace of Levan 
Davydovich post-1937, and she defiantly pointed out that “even if he is not among the 
living today, it is not possible for a person to vanish, such that it is impossible even to 
ascertain where, when and under what circumstances he passed away,” a significant 
overestimation on her part of the state’s ability to monitor the fate of everyone it took into 
custody during the Terror.325 This challenge marked the return of a far more 
confrontational tenor to the interactions between the Gogoberidze family and the state 
authorities. Long gone were the appeals predicated on Levan Davydovich’s utility to the 
Party’s revisionist history; rather, the matter at hand was one of the state’s obligations to 
a family that it had repeatedly wronged, and the insufficient care with which the 
government had handled their dossier. 
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In late July 1954 Smirnov received a letter from Elena Davydovna, this time via 
Lana Gogoberidze, requesting an additional meeting and announcing the unlikely 
discovery of yet another Gogoberidze family friend who crossed paths with Levan 
Davydovich during his time in exile. Elena Davydovna managed to track down Gerasim 
Iasonovich Amashukeli to the Estonian village of Kohtla-Järve, and after speaking with 
him in person she decided to forward his information to the Procuracy. According to 
Elena Davydovna, Amashukeli “knew my brother since their school days (so shkol’noi 
skam’i),” and wrote to his own family about encountering Levan around Vorkuta in 
1940.326 Elena Davydovna explicitly refused to provide Smirnov with any further 
information gleaned from her interview with Amashukeli, demanding that he “be 
officially interrogated, as was done in the other cases,” though she could seemingly not 
resist mentioning two details that “especially struck” her.327 Firstly, Smirnov had 
apparently told Elena Davydovna in the past that – in his words – Levan Davydovich’s 
name “turned up” in the region of Vorkuta, which she took to be a portentous 
coincidence; secondly, Elena Davydovna claimed that Pavel Petrovich Postyshev, the 
former Secretary of the Central Committee of Ukraine, was in the same camp as her 
brother in Vorkuta, and might provide confirmation of Levan’s “stay in these places” 
were he still alive.328 While Elena Davynovna was confident that this latter point would 
afford her further credibility, in retrospect it underscored the false nature of the hopes that 
animated her relentless searching. 
Although Postyshev was arrested a year and a half after Gogoberidze, like his 
fellow Party secretary he was subjected to extended imprisonment before being tried and 
                                                




executed in February 1939.329 Given that Postyshev’s entire time in captivity was most 
likely divided between Kuibyshev, where he was arrested, and Moscow, where he was 
shot, it is highly unlikely that he ever passed through the gates of one of the far northern 
camps in the vicinity of Vorkuta. Postyshev was not the only example of a supposedly 
dead Party official being spotted in the Gulag that Elena Davydovna marshaled to 
substantiate her convictions. In an April 1955 letter to Mikoian – written after the 
Procuracy had closed its investigation into Gogoberidze’s location – she brought up “the 
incredible story of Misha Kakhiani” – one of Levan Davydovich’s predecessors as head 
of the Georgian Party – which had become the talk of Tbilisi.330 As with her brother, a 
death sentence had been handed down against Kakhiani, and there existed confirmation 
of its implementation, but the Georgian capital was inundated with scuttlebutt to the 
effect that he was “alive and [had] been found,” leaving the surviving Gogoberidzes 
“stunned (potriaseny) by this analogy.”331 While Gogoberidze and Kakhiani did share 
similar fates, neither involved a premortem stint in labor camps, a fact that did little to 
dampen the Soviet populace’s apparent enthusiasm for accounts of the improbable 
survival of prominent figures in Stalin’s penal system.332 
Elena Davydovna’s invocations of Postyshev and Kakhiani suggest that the 
various Gogoberidze sightings across the expanse of the Gulag were not as anomalous as 
they might initially have seemed; rather, the “appearance” of various dead Party notables 
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to friends, acquaintances, and admirers may have helped them to make sense of the 
calamitous events that had befallen them, in that they provided a familiar and sympathetic 
figure with whom they could “share” their experiences.333 While confined to the Gulag 
archipelago those who experienced these supposed sightings circulated their stories 
within a closed world that offered little to no access to outside information, which 
allowed such rumors to crystallize and proliferate. Yet the mass return of zeks from the 
“zone” brought these whispered tales to the attention of the larger Soviet populace, which 
served to further muddy the already opaque waters of public knowledge about the Terror, 
fostered by decades of official misinformation.334 The Procuracy and other investigative 
organs were thereby forced to wade into a situation that pitted flawed, and perhaps even 
fabricated recollections against their own imperfect knowledge of the largely untold, 
devastating extent of Stalin’s repressions.    
Regardless of whether Smirnov was at the time aware of Postyshev’s or later 
Kakhiani’s demise, it is evident from the manner in which this new evidence was handled 
that he was not eager to pursue any new leads in Levan Davydovich’s disappearance, and 
Elena Davydovna was indignant in anticipation of this dismissiveness, which so starkly 
diverged from the attentive treatment she had received early in the year. Assuming a tone 
that both castigated and cajoled the Procurator General’s assistant, she echoed Nutsa’s 
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incredulity at the authorities’ inability to pinpoint Levan Davydovich’s whereabouts: “As 
before, and now, it remains unclear to me: is it really possible for a person to so 
thoroughly disappear without a trace that the mighty state apparat cannot uncover a trace 
of him, even if he is not alive!”335 This bold sendoff reflected the inflated vision of the 
Soviet government’s capacity to pinpoint individuals that Elena Davydovna held, and 
marked an unofficial close to the most active period of the hunt for Levan Gogoberidze, 
and it would be another five months before his family would once again reach out to the 
Procuracy.    
By the time Lana Gogoberidze delivered Elena Davydovna’s penultimate letter to 
Smirnov at the end of December 1954 almost all of the momentum that drove the 
investigation in March and April had dissipated: over the preceding months the flurry of 
communications between various state bodies relating to the Gogoberidzes’ cases had 
ground to a halt, and the Procuracy’s attentions diverted to Liusia Petrosian’s (failed) 
appeal for rehabilitation.336 With no further information from Rudenko, Smirnov, or other 
state representatives forthcoming, and developments on her own end mounting, Elena 
Davydovna attempted to resuscitate her brother’s moribund case, informing Smirnov that 
she had learned through one of Kamo’s other sisters that Liusia Petrosian would be 
traveling to Moscow in December, and would therefore be available for questioning. 
Regardless of what Smirnov might have thought of Petrosian’s testimony, in light of the 
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failure to locate Levan Davydovich Elena Davydovna “implore[d] (Ochen’, ochen’ Vas 
proshu)” him, “pursuant to the promise you gave, that you speak to her personally.”337  
Although there is no indication that Smirnov entertained this entreaty, he was 
apparently reminded of Amashukeli’s existence by Elena Davydovna’s request for 
confirmation that the latter’s information had been checked, and he eventually did order 
the Estonian Procuracy to follow up with him.338 Skeptical of Smirnov’s continued 
commitment to chasing down leads on her behalf, Elena Davydovna admitted that she 
herself had begun to walk the “‘interrogator’s’ path,” and planned to visit Kakhetiia and 
Central Asia in order to vet at least two purported witnesses.339 Apparently conscious of 
how her unflagging determination must have appeared to a legal veteran like Smirnov, 
Elena Davydovna signed off with a plaintive appeal for understanding devoid of the 
brashness and daring that distinguished her prior missives, and that seemingly conceded 
the strong likelihood that Levan Davydovich was no longer among the living: 
Lev Nikolaevich, do not condemn us for our persistence. We – L. 
D.’s entire family – are all deeply convinced that my brother escaped 
execution in 1937, but beyond that? Further, if he is not alive, it is 
extremely important for us to know where, when, and why he died. 
In the past you have personally devoted so much truly human 
attention to this case, help us see it through to the end. I want to hope that 
the Procuracy will continue its inquiries until it receives exact and 
irrefutable information about L. D.’s death in one of the remote camps.340 
 
                                                
337 GARF f. 8131, op. 32, d. 3304, l. 97. 
338 Smirnov issued the interrogation order on March 25, 1955, and received a response from the Estonian 
Procuracy on April 4. By that time Amashukeli’s story had changed somewhat: though he “categorically 
maintain[ed]” that he had seen Gogoberidze at the special security sector of the Pechora camp, he now 
stated that the meeting took place in 1938. He first informed the Gogoberidze family of this encounter 
following Beriia’s denunciation in 1953, when another of Levan’s sisters, Lili, wrote to him bemoaning 
Levan’s untimely death. At the close of his interrogation Amashukeli “expressed regret that he had 
interfered in this case” out of fear that he would be held accountable for providing inaccurate information, 
though the interrogator noted in his report that he did not have any doubts regarding Amashukeli’s 
credibility as a witness. See GARF f. 8131, op. 32, d. 3304, ll. 98-99. 
339 GARF f. 8131, op. 32, d. 3304, l. 97. 
340 Ibid. 
 125 
Although it is impossible to be certain without outside confirmation from the 
Gogoberidze family itself, it is highly unlikely that Elena Davydovna’s impassioned 
entreaty elicited any response from Smirnov. This underscores a fundamental 
discrepancy in the objectives of the Gogoberidze family versus those of the Procuracy 
and its representatives.  
In the eyes of Smirnov and his subordinates, the search for Levan Davydovich 
was complete when it became evident that the conflicting, and in many instances 
unreliable accounts of those who “encountered” him at various camps could not be 
verified through official documentation. Only the MVD had been able to produce 
conclusive evidence of what exactly befell Levan Gogoberidze following his arrest, and 
though his relatives rejected the possibility of execution in March 1937 out of hand, it 
remained the most feasible explanation for the Georgian Party Secretary’s nearly twenty-
year absence, and without any further grounds for prolonging the investigation Smirnov 
chose to close the case. Given their deep emotional investment in the hunt for traces of 
Levan Davydovich, the Gogoberidzes could not accept such an abrupt and grim 
conclusion to this affair. Elena Davydovna articulated the family’s dissatisfaction with 
the inquiry’s denouement in her final letter to Smirnov, sent in May 1956 and inserted 
into the Procuracy’s file without receiving page numbers. Requesting that Smirnov 
“make one more effort” and check the claims of the noted tenor Nikolai Konstantinovich 
Pechkovskii, who purportedly saw Levan Davydovich while on tour at a camp near 
Vorkuta, Elena Davydovna admitted that she and the rest of the family had “almost no 
hope that L.D. is alive, but it is extremely important for us to know when, where, and 
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under what circumstances he perished.”341 She fervently believed that “[i]t would be all 
the easier for us to know that L.D. was not killed on 21/III at 4:20 in the morning [sic], 
but lived until some year, not losing hope, and died his death among normal, unfortunate 
people like him”; until Smirnov provided her with information to that effect, Elena 
Davydovna would continue the futile quest for signs of her brother among Stalin’s 
exiles.342 Smirnov, no longer inclined to indulge the Gogoberidzes and their theories, 
dismissively scrawled across the top of the letter: “The question of the execution of 
Levan Gogoberidze’s sentence has been thoroughly checked. There is no basis to believe 
reports that he is alive.”343 It was in this manner that the Procuracy put an end to a case 
that illustrated the perils of attempting to pin down the truth through the fractured 
accounts of Gulag returnees, and the Gogoberidze women, their hopes all but dashed 
against the brutal reality of Stalin’s extermination of the Old Bolsheviks, were forced to 
concede that even the mighty Soviet state could not raise the dead. 
 
Conclusion 
Posthumous rehabilitation in the post-Stalin Soviet Union was a process that 
compelled the families and friends of the “unlawfully repressed” to closely engage with a 
judiciary and state security apparatus that were themselves deeply implicated in the 
abuses of the Terror. As the Gogoberidzes’ case trenchantly demonstrates, the most 
effective avenue for achieving meaningful redress was through patronage networks 
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forged in the crucible of revolution and civil war that had lain dormant for decades, but 
even such ties could only initiate a legal review; the substantive work of rehabilitation 
was handled by the Procuracy, in concert with the MVD and the Military Collegium of 
the Supreme Court. As a legal procedure underpinned with distinctly political aims, 
rehabilitation – in its earliest years – invited the families of the disappeared to collaborate 
with the Party-state in fashioning accounts of the recent past that implicated approved 
targets, but often left the actual architects of the Terror unmentioned.  
At the same time as the post-Stalin judiciary was assembling its own selective 
history of the first decades of Soviet power in the form of internally circulated 
rehabilitation materials, as well as the reports it submitted to the Central Committee and 
courts, it had to confront the legacy of systematic misinformation sown by its 
predecessors in the form of variegated and contradictory reports emerging from the Gulag 
on what actually became of many “enemies of the people.” These two trends converged 
around Levan Gogoberidze’s utterly remarkable case, for as his sister and wife endorsed 
and helped to substantiate the anti-Beriia interpretation of Levan’s downfall, they pressed 
the Soviet authorities on his whereabouts and were able to spur an investigation that, 
though ultimately fruitless, revealed the intense staying power of Gulag rumors in a 
society starved for news of its former leading figures. Regardless of the tenor or 
frustrations of their interactions, the Gogoberidzes were deeply engaged with, and utterly 
reliant upon, representatives of the Procuracy to see through the redemption of Levan 
Davydovich’s reputation and, as they hoped, his person. For its part, the Soviet 
government would continue to grapple over the following decade with the manner in 
which it handled inquiries into the fates of those supposedly sentenced to “10 years 
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without the right of correspondence” – though never again would it allocate so many men 
and so much time to tracking down a single individual. In subsequent years the 
authorities would expand the mandate of posthumous rehabilitation, allowing cases of 
even greater political sensitivity to be reopened and further raising the stakes of the 
disclosures that were made.   
  
   
 129 
Chapter Three – “No Statute of Limitations on the Restoration of a Good 
Name”: The Shaping Role of the Judiciary  
 
The firmness of a verdict that is final and binding 
serves the common good. The review of verdicts that 
are res judicata would turn “all Moscow justice  
upside down” and would give birth to a “bona fide  
revolution among those who have been tried.”344   
 
On June 23, 1955, USSR Procurator General Roman Rudenko addressed the All-
Union Meeting of Leading Procuracy Workers in Moscow. Before his assembled 
subordinates, Rudenko articulated his vision of the Procuracy’s place within the Soviet 
Union’s new political landscape. Though prosecutions for counterrevolutionary crimes 
had fallen markedly over the previous two years – a trend that Rudenko attributed to the 
“moral-political unity of the Soviet people” and the dismantling of Beriia’s network 
within the state security organs – the Procuracy’s activities in that sphere showed no sign 
of abating.345 As compared to 1952 levels, Rudenko reported, the number of requests for 
criminal case reviews addressed to the central Procuracy apparat had increased 45-fold; 
for regional offices, this figure was as high as 50-times.346 This surge in appeals 
demanded “political maturity and special attention” from the engaged functionaries, who 
were liable to make “errors.”347 The main pitfall faced by reviewers of sensitive cases 
involved the credulity of “ so-called ‘confessions’ (tak nazyvaemykh ‘priznatel’nykh’ 
pokazanii) from prisoners” and “denunciations of these individuals” issued by others “in 
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the absence of objective evidence of guilt.”348 Such liabilities had been avoided in 
previously reexamined cases including the Leningrad Affair and that of Aleksandr 
Kosarev through “a thorough and objective review of the evidence of guilt, carried out at 
the behest of the Central Committee,” which resulted in the full rehabilitation of the 
wrongfully convicted.349 
The nature of the system Rudenko described, in which the Procuracy professed 
itself to be engaged in “objective” work while under the watchful eye and mandate of the 
Party’s highest body, has not escaped outside observers, who have often depicted the 
Procuracy, and the judiciary writ large, as entirely subordinate to the Communist Party. 
While the juridical aspect of rehabilitation was certainly embedded in – and in many 
instances subservient to – the political demands of the post-Stalin power struggle, it was 
primarily representatives of the Procuracy and courts – as well as some state bodies like 
the KGB and Supreme Soviet – whose work determined the way rehabilitation took 
shape over the course of the 1950s and early 1960s. It was these officials’ attempts to 
extract useable narratives of a redemptive past from the mire of forced confessions and 
overlapping denunciations generated during the purges that defined the substantive work 
of posthumous rehabilitation. In attempting to efface the Terror’s elimination of 
successive cadres of Party faithful, rehabilitation came to operate as a process that, much 
like the Terror itself, was self-reinforcing; just as one individual’s forced confession 
could be employed to implicate dozens of others, each rehabilitee could potentially be 
cited in support of other former comrades’ innocence. This logic created chains or webs 
of rehabilitation, wherein individuals who were tied together by past experiences or 




affiliations were exonerated in rapid sequence. Yet rehabilitation remained, at its core, a 
fundamentally individual-focused endeavor, and even as the ranks of potential 
rehabilitees swelled, the prospect of mass legal rehabilitation for those charged with 
counterrevolutionary crimes was never given serious consideration, lest an actual enemy 
of the people inadvertently be reprieved.  
Although the previous chapters attest to the fact that the Soviet Union was by no 
means a Rechtsstaat, and that the wheels of justice often turned based on the imprimatur 
of influential Party figures, legal reformism was a crowning objective of the Khrushchev 
period. While the notion of “socialist legality” was publicly championed during the last 
months of Beriia’s tenure in office, it was most fully embraced as an operating principle 
in the months and years following his deposal. This attempt to bind the conduct of both 
individuals and state bodies to the law clearly favored certain institutions, and came at a 
profound cost to others.350 The organs of state security saw their purview diminish 
markedly, as they were no longer afforded a free hand in matters of criminal justice and 
penal policy. As Jeffrey Hardy observes, though the legal reformism of the 1950s and 
1960s never resolved “the fundamental tension between the rule of law and the extralegal 
nature of the Communist Party, this campaign resulted in a host of new legal codes, a 
better-educated corps of judges and lawyers, renewed academic study into the nature of 
crime and punishment,” and, critically, increased procuratorial oversight in many 
segments of Soviet society.351 Though Hardy focuses primarily on the role of procurators 
within the Gulag system, he aptly notes that the power and prestige of the General 
Procuracy rose in proportion to the institutional decline of both the All-Union Ministry of 
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Justice, which was abolished in 1956, and the All-Union MVD, which was dissolved in 
1960.352 This new constellation of legal power afforded the Procuracy and courts a 
greater degree of authority than they had previously known under Soviet socialism, and 
among their key responsibilities was to bring legal order to a system of state violence that 
overwhelmingly had operated extrajudicially.353  
     
Bringing the Terror under Judicial Scrutiny   
Much of the Soviet public first became acquainted with the concept of 
rehabilitation through the quashing of the investigation into the “doctor-saboteurs” that 
made the front page of Pravda on April 6, 1953.354 Yet this widely-discussed disclosure, 
as well as the more clandestine, state security-directed reversals enacted between late 
March and June 1953 that comprised what Gennadii Kostyrchenko has termed “Beriia’s 
micro-rehabilitation,” differed considerably from the procedures adopted following 
Beriia’s ouster, in that Beriia’s primary intent appears to have been ingratiating himself 
with other members of the collective leadership and garnering favor with institutions like 
the armed forces through acts of remission.355 The first such revision was accomplished 
within weeks of Stalin’s death, when Beriia arranged for the release of Molotov’s ex-
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wife, Polina Zhemchuzhina, whose Party membership was restored immediately 
thereafter.356 The Doctors’ Plot was particularly straightforward for Beriia to unravel, as 
the accused parties had yet to be formally convicted on any charges, and therefore it was 
only a matter of the Presidium endorsing the Ministry of Internal Affairs’ (MVD) 
recommendation that the case be closed and everyone involved exonerated.357 Having 
nipped Stalin’s final exercise in terror in the bud, Beriia turned his attention to his own 
imprisoned clients and consolidating influence in critical sectors. 
In rapid sequence, between late March and early April, Beriia secured the release 
of his allies detained as part of the antisemitic “anti-cosmopolitan” campaign, as well as 
all those implicated in the Mingrelian Affair, which specifically targeted many of his 
Georgian subordinates.358 The following month saw Mikhail Moiseevich Kaganovich, 
Lazar’s younger brother, cleared of the accusation of membership in a Rightist-Trotskyite 
organization that precipitated his 1941 suicide, in another move designed to curry favor 
with a more senior figure in the Presidium. As with the Doctor’s Plot, by dint of the fact 
that no sentence had been passed on Mikhail Kaganovich, his rehabilitation could be 
accomplished via MVD fiat, with the Party’s assent.359 More ambitious in this arena – 
and consequently of greater concern for the rest of the Presidium – were Beriia’s attempts 
to cultivate ties with the military through the selective rehabilitation of recently purged 
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officers and figures from the armaments and aviation industries.360 Beriia’s maneuvers – 
which appear to have been a source of consternation among the rest of the Presidium, and 
may have helped convince them that it was necessary to check his ambitions – kept the 
judiciary at arm’s length from the rehabilitation process.361 Although the Military 
Collegium of the USSR Supreme Court was involved in officially dismissing the 
“aviation affair,” the MVD issued all of the relevant recommendations to the court, and 
retained control over the case review process along with the evidence necessary to 
complete such processes. Were Beriia to be disarmed, and the larger state security 
apparat brought to heel, the MVD’s control over politically sensitive criminal cases 
would have to be curtailed, and Beriia’s tactic of selective exoneration turned against 
him.362 Khrushchev and his allies settled on the judiciary, and specifically the Procuracy, 
as the vehicle for this reordering of the balance of power within the Soviet state.   
The man entrusted with overseeing both Beriia’s prosecution and the 
revitalization of the Procuracy, Roman Rudenko, had proven himself a capable jurist and 
someone amenable to placing himself at the disposal of the Party, and Khrushchev 
specifically. Khrushchev first encountered Rudenko as the procurator of the Lugansk 
region while he was the Party secretary of Ukraine. At some point during the late-1930s 
Procurator General Andrei Vyshinskii approached Khrushchev about the possibility of 
transferring Rudenko to Moscow to serve as his deputy; Khrushchev, wanting to keep 
Rudenko within his sphere, demurred, mentioning that a great deal of kompromat had 
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been collected on the Lugansk procurator, and that it might appear improper for him to 
assume such an influential post. Vyshinskii relented, and Rudenko was eventually 
promoted to chief procurator of the Ukrainian SSR “with the qualification that since 
evidence had been given against him, it had to be looked into.”363 Khrushchev thus had 
control over Rudenko in two key respects: he had knowledge of black marks on 
Rudenko’s record, but could also claim credit for having saved Rudenko from the meat 
grinder of Moscow politics during the Terror. These factors – compounded by Rudenko’s 
star turn as the Soviet delegation’s lead prosecutor at the Nuremberg trials – made him an 
ideal replacement for Stalin’s last Procurator General, Grigorii Nikolaevich Safonov, who 
was perceived as incapable of standing up to Beriia.364 Under Rudenko’s leadership the 
Procuracy would go on to assert its prerogatives with renewed vigor, and assume direct 
responsibility for overseeing the review of counterrevolutionary cases that had previously 
been in the hands of state security.365  
The key development that unleashed the torrent of rehabilitations and placed the 
USSR Procuracy and Supreme Court at the center of this process was the Supreme Soviet 
Presidium’s September 1, 1953 decree “On the Abolition of the Special Board of the 
USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs.” This proclamation dissolved the extrajudicial body 
that since 1934 had sentenced nearly 450,000 Soviet citizens to various terms in prison 
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camps, special settlements, and – in the case of some 10,000 individuals – death.366 
Going forward, all criminal cases were to be “considered only by judicial organs,” and 
the Procurator General and Minister of Internal Affairs were to report to the Central 
Committee Presidium on any “important investigative cases in advance” of rendering 
decisions.367 In addition to keeping the Party’s highest body closely apprised of major 
criminal decisions, the decree established the protocol by which previous decisions of the 
Special Board and related bodies would be reviewed beyond the MVD’s purview. All 
complaints and petitions relating to verdicts rendered by the OGPU Collegium, NKVD 
troikas, and the Special Board were henceforth to be handled by the All-Union 
Procuracy, which would then submit its protests to the Supreme Court; the MVD was 
relegated to a consultative role, providing the Procuracy “with preliminary 
conclusion[s].”368 This provision bore major implications for the course of the 
rehabilitation process, as NKVD troikas were responsible for most of the sentences 
handed down during the height of the repressions of 1937 and 1938.369 Summary, 
extrajudicial rulings that had previously been the secret police’s exclusive province were 
opened to scrutiny, and the Procuracy would be among the main points of contact 
between Soviet citizens demanding the reexamination of politically sensitive cases and a 
state that had hidden its citizens’ fates with impunity for decades. 
Procuracy offices were quickly inundated with appeals and petitions, and found 
themselves shorthanded. The Department for Special Cases, reporting to Rudenko in 
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April 1954, noted that between June 1953 and March 1954 it had received nearly 36,000 
letters of complaint, a figure that its barebones staff of 17 functionaries and six assistants 
(referentov) dispatched from other departments could not even begin to effectively 
process. In order to handle the influx, the Department for Special Cases would require at 
least twice as many permanent employees and temporary assistants.370 Yet additional 
manpower was not forthcoming, and in April and May of that year over 7,000 more 
petitions arrived per month, leading to a backlog of nearly 5,000 cases.371 As D. E. Salin 
made clear in his report from March of the following year, the situation had only 
worsened with time: even though the Department for Special Cases managed to 
recommend more than 5,000 counterrevolutionary cases for rehabilitation over the 
previous three months, and had examined some 13,000 altogether over the past seven, 
there were still 10,000 files on hand awaiting review, and over 30,000 complaints that 
had yet to be addressed.372 Yet as the Procuracy’s workers clamored for more support, the 
government slashed its rolls in the name of cutting costs, placing the remaining staff 
under even greater strain.373 As Marc Elie notes, between 1956 and 1957 the Procuracy 
and Supreme Court introduced no fewer than three proposals designed to substantively 
expedite the rehabilitation process by streamlining review procedures and transferring 
unheard cases to specially formed commissions or local courts; the Central Committee 
declined to entertain any of these suggestions, and the backlog of petitions and files 
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continued to grow apace.374 This refusal on the part of the Party to take decisions that 
would simplify and rationalize matters relating to rehabilitation found its analogue in the 
government’s handling of death notifications for the families of executed persons, a 
critical issue that underscored the regime’s inability to fully free itself from Stalinist 
methods of misinformation.  
 
The Duty to Deceive: Official Death Dates and the Toll of Stalinist Repression 
  
The myth of “ten years without the right of correspondence” indelibly marked 
Soviet citizens expectations for repressed relatives’ return from the Gulag.375 As 
cognizant as they might have been of mass executions during the Terror, many expected 
that it was only a matter of time before they were reunited with their loved ones. When 
confronted with hundreds of thousands of relatives fearing the worst for their disappeared 
loved ones, the post-Stalin Soviet leadership was forced to somehow account for the 
absence of persons supposedly serving sentences in the Gulag archipelago without 
unveiling the full destructive extent of the purges.376 In seeking to avoid exposing the 
repressions’ true toll, the judiciary and state security organs ultimately engendered a 
credibility gap in the eyes of the survivors of the repressed, rehabilitated and 
unrehabilitated alike. Rather than countering past lies with accurate information, they 
opted to promulgate new, often-contradictory deceptions, and as these falsehoods 
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compounded they revealed the Soviet government’s struggle to manage its own narrative 
of the 1930s and 1940s. 
The difficulties authorities faced in sustaining the “ten years without the right of 
correspondence” ruse were manifest even as Stalin’s purges began to wind down. During 
the spring of 1939 Margarita Aleksandrovna Smol’ianinova, the second wife of Lenin’s 
former personal secretary and member of the USSR Academy of Sciences Nikolai 
Petrovich Gorbunov, addressed the Procuracy to demand her husband’s release over a 
year after he had been taken into custody.377 Smol’ianinova herself had been held in 
Butyrka prison for eight months without charges, and though she still trusted that her 
husband was alive – due to the NKVD’s assurances – an exchange she had while under 
interrogation gave her pause. Smol’ianinova was brought before an investigator – after 
six months of neglectful imprisonment – who attempted to cajole her into signing a 
denunciation of Gorbunov, insisting that she would never see her husband again: “Why 
would I never see my husband (Pochemu nikogda ne vstrechus’ s muzhem)? Had he 
really (neuzheli) died or been shot and the NKVD falsely informed me that he had been 
sentenced and was in the far camps? Whom to believe?”378 Smol’ianinova repeated this 
same query the following December, indicating that her solicitation had gone 
unanswered, but only received final confirmation of Gorbunov’s status in 1946. She was 
then told he had expired from heart failure in October 1944, though she had been 
informed the previous year that he was still serving out his sentence; her local registry 
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office (organy zapisi aktov grazhdanskogo sostoianiia, or ZAGS) refused to provide any 
indication of where he had died.379 
During the waning years of Stalin’s reign Soviet state security acknowledged that 
previous decades’ duplicities were generating significant concerns among the citizenry. 
In a memorandum to the Politburo dated October 30, 1951, MGB chairman Semen 
Denisovich Ignat’ev outlined the practical challenges that had resulted from the policy of 
concealing the Terror’s grim extent, and proposed stopgap measures to satisfy citizens’ 
curiosity and help see to their material needs. As Ignat’ev observed, by 1951 more than 
ten years had elapsed since most of the relevant death sentences had been handed down, 
and the rote answers delivered by MGB functionaries could no longer “satisfy the 
relatives of the condemned, all the more so because many of them cannot resolve their 
legal issues, such as, for example, the registration of a new marriage, claiming 
inheritance, establishing custody, and others, without a death certificate for the 
condemned.”380 Stymied in their attempts to perform these important tasks, relatives of 
the disappeared began “approaching central Party and government organs, and Party and 
government leaders, with numerous complaints persistently seeking (dobivaias’) the 
receipt of a comprehensive answer about the fate of the condemned,” which in turn had to 
go unanswered, as the authorities in question were not permitted to provide them with 
answers, assuming that they knew what had become of the individuals in question.381 
To ameliorate this situation and dispel the pressure exerted on Party and state 
representatives, Ignat’ev deemed it “advisable to amend” the existing protocol in a 
number of key regards. Under his proposed schema, immediate relatives of the repressed 
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– including parents, spouses, and children – were to be informed “orally” that their loved 
one had “died in detention”; to “maintain strict secrecy (strogoi konspiratsii) in this 
work” all aspects were to be handled in-house at the MGB, including the drafting of 
death certificates at the central apparat and their dissemination in various localities.382 
The one exception to this arrangement related to cases that had been heard by the 
Military Collegium of the USSR Supreme Court, which would be held responsible for 
managing the fallout from its past sessions.383 Although Ignat’ev’s recommendations 
were not adopted at the time, most were replicated in subsequent plans introduced 
following the vozhd’s death, at which point the number of those seeking information 
about missing intimates swelled dramatically.  
A more modest proposal for handling questions related to death sentences was put 
to Malenkov by Minister of Justice Konstantin Petrovich Gorshenin, Procurator General 
Grigorii Nikolaevich Safonov, and Supreme Court Chairman Volin in May 1953. 
Reacting to a wave of petitions regarding Soviet citizens executed within the USSR as 
well as foreigners in the Soviet zones of occupation in Germany and Austria, the three 
jurists noted that under existing convention these entreaties went “without answer.”384 
Though no sweeping suggestions were made vis-à-vis the protocol for transmitting 
notifications, the panel did endorse orally informing relations of death sentences, but only 
after the Supreme Soviet certified the verdicts and all appeals had been exhausted.385 As 
with Ignat’ev’s memorandum, there is no indication that this joint approach found 
meaningful consideration among Party higher-ups. A year later, following the shakeup in 
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the judiciary occasioned by Beriia’s deposal, acting Chief Military Procurator Evgenii 
Ivanovich Varskoi contacted Rudenko with a schema for addressing inquiries about the 
fate of people who vanished in past decades, which had begun to pile up.386 Pointing to 
the fact that the answers supplicants received depended entirely on the organ to which 
they addressed themselves – the KGB continued to maintain that missing persons were 
located in “special camps,” while the Military Collegium indicated that they died serving 
out their sentences, but provided their actual execution dates – and because these 
inventions were accepted “as truth (za istinu),” Varskoi urged the Procurator General to 
weigh in on the situation.387  
For his own part, Varskoi floated dividing responsibility for replying to such 
queries between the KGB for all sentences handed down extrajudicially, and the USSR 
Supreme Court for those imposed by the justice system. Although his description of the 
status quo implied that Varskoi took exception to the systematic deception currently in 
practice, his pitch kept one of its key provisions intact: for individuals convicted from 
1950 onward, survivors were to be informed of the actual circumstances of death, 
whereas anyone executed prior to May 1947 – when the USSR briefly abolished capital 
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punishment – would still be reported as having died in a camp or prison.388 Varskoi’s 
pressing concern for the truth apparently extended only to families of the recently 
deceased, and made no provision for resolving the uproar that would inevitably arise 
among people who had been told for years that their relatives were isolated – but alive – 
in the far reaches of the Soviet Union. There is no indication that Rudenko pursued 
Varskoi’s bid any further, and the piecemeal approach that had been in place since the 
1930s continued to predominate as the rehabilitation process began to gather steam. 
From the moment of Isaak Babel’s arrest in May 1939, his second wife, Antonina 
Pirozhkova, worked assiduously to determine his whereabouts and condition. Despite the 
fact that Babel’ was put to death in January 1940, beginning in 1944 through the early 
1950s Pirozhkova received “annual” reassurances from the state security information 
office at 24 Kuznetskii most that Babel’ was alive and confined to one of the “far 
camps.”389 In August 1952 a certain Zavadskii, who presented himself as a former zek, 
approached Pirozhkova with a letter from “Middle Kolyma” that included the sentence, 
“How disappointed Babel’ will be after leaving the hospital, that he missed an 
opportunity to send a message home,” which appeared to confirm the authorities’ claims 
that Babel’ was still among the living.390 Likewise, Boris Efimov, the famed caricaturist 
and brother of the purged journalist Mikhail Kol’tsov, maintained that rumors of the 
latter’s survival reached him during the 1940s through anonymous phone calls, one of 
which included a supposed sighting in the area of Nizhnii Tagil that he attempted to trace 
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while on a lecture tour of the Urals.391 However, in both cases the hopes of the parties 
involved, fostered by seemingly deliberate inventions on the part of the Soviet 
government, proved illusory.  
Upon Babel’s posthumous rehabilitation in December 1954 Pirozhkova was 
summoned to the Military Collegium to receive his spravka. The document listed the date 
of Babel’s conviction – January 26, 1940 – but it neither specified the sentence, nor 
provided any further details as to his status. Pirozhkova inquired about Babel’s fate, and 
the bureaucrat who had handed her the certificate “took a pen and in the margin of a 
newspaper lying on the table wrote: ‘Died March 17, 1941 of heart failure’ – and gave it 
to me to read. And then he tore this entry out of the newspaper and ripped it up, having 
said that I will receive a death certificate from my district ZAGS.”392 Pirozhkova 
struggled to reconcile this blunt admission of Babel’s death – the date and cause of which 
were fabricated – with the previous decade’s repeated guarantees of his survival. She 
contacted Cheptsov and Serov at the Military Collegium and KGB, respectively, to 
express her incredulity and seek clarification:  
This sequence of responses from year to year attesting that Babel’ is still 
alive totally rules out the credibility of the report made to me on 
December 23 of this year on Babel’ I.E.’s death in 1941.  
 In addition, in summer 1952 a man freed from a camp in Middle 
Kolyma found me and informed me that Babel’ is alive and healthy.  
Thus for me there is absolutely no doubt that through summer 
1952 Babel’ was alive and the report of his death in 1941 is erroneous.  
I ask you to take all the measures contingent upon you to search 
for Babel’ Isaak Emmanuilovich and, having informed me of where he is 
staying, allow me to follow after him (vyekhat’ za nim).393 
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These missives went unanswered, and it was not until Pirozhkova took a call from 
Kliment Voroshilov’s receptionist urging her on behalf of the Supreme Soviet chairman 
to “believe in Babel’s death,” that she visited her local ZAGS branch to collect his death 
certificate; “Were he alive,” the receptionist noted, “he would have been home long 
ago.”394   
 Mikhail Kol’tsov was posthumously rehabilitated at the same time as Babel’ – 
somewhat fittingly, as they had been shot mere days apart in January and February 1940 
– and Boris Efimov received explanations of his brother’s demise that were as perplexing 
as those Pirozhkova described. Likely due to his high profile, Efimov managed to secure 
a meeting with Cheptsov after getting word of Kol’tsov’s vindication, at which point he 
was told that his brother had been dead since 1939 – a rare instance in which fabricated 
death date predated the actual one.395 Efimov, balking at this admission given all the 
indications he had to the contrary, was urged to return to the Military Collegium after a 
month to allow its officials time to verify all the relevant details. During the second 
encounter Efimov was again assured that Kol’tsov had died in 1939, and he again 
demurred. Finally, two days after this exchange Efimov was summoned back to the same 
office at the Military Collegium and furnished with a death certificate listing 1942 as the 
year of Kol’tsov’s death. As Efimov’s son recounts, at the time the cartoonist recognized 
the revision as yet another “pack of lies (vran’e).”396 
 The extended Babel’ and Kol’tsov-Efimov families were far from the only ones to 
confront contradictory reports about their relatives’ untimely passing. Survivors of the 
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“wrongfully repressed,” desperate for any scrap of information, appealed to a host of 
state and Party bodies in the course of their inquiries. As there was little if any 
coordination among these entities with regard to falsifying vital statistics, petitioners 
received myriad responses from different institutions. Rita Kornblium sent a letter in late 
1954 to the head of the Soviet Writers’ Union Aleksandr Aleksandrovich Fadeev 
complaining that the KGB had previously notified her verbally of Vladimir Kirshon’s 
death on July 28, 1948, but despite her repeated entreaties refused to authorize the 
issuance of a death certificate for him.397 Unbeknownst to Kornblium, the KGB had 
already changed course in the matter; apparently unaware of the initial date that 
Kornblium had been provided by word-of-mouth, as early as August 1954 the KGB 
pinned Kirshon’s death date at July 27, 1942, and that November Cheptsov authorized 
ZAGS to release a death certificate featuring the new date and listing pneumonia as the 
cause of death.398  
Even those at the top of the party-state leadership looked askance at some of the 
falsehoods that proliferated during this period. In his October 1954 letter to Voroshilov, 
Zakhar Pertsovskii’s son related that his father had purportedly passed away in 1943, but 
the KGB had yet to indicate the circumstances or location. A reader – either Voroshilov 
himself or a member of his staff – annotated the year “1943” with a large question mark 
in blue pencil as a clear expression of his skepticism.399 The regularity with which such 
statements crossed the desks of the elite convinced them that a more permanent, less 
haphazard mechanism for notifying relatives of the repressed was in order, though an 
enduring solution eluded the Soviet authorities for years to come. 
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As chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet Voroshilov was personally 
responsible for overseeing the body that reviewed decisions on capital punishment, to 
which most Soviet citizens directed their complaints and concerns. In late October 1954 
the head of the Supreme Soviet’s letters department notified Voroshilov of the new 
reality his staff faced: every day they received between 10 and 15 letters from individuals 
whose husbands, fathers, and sons had been taken away in 1937 and 1938. Many 
remained trapped in a legal limbo of sorts: the missing men were in most instances the 
official owners of the homes in which their families resided, and without proof of death 
the survivors were powerless to sell or otherwise dispose of this property.400 Others 
complained of their inability to obtain official recognition for longstanding relationships. 
One man wrote of how “as a Communist and father of five children” he could “no longer 
stand to look at himself because of [his] juridical helplessness,” resulting from the fact 
that his common-law wife of 12 years’ was still technically married to her first husband, 
arrested in 1937, and all of their children bore the latter’s family name.401 The bulk of the 
16 representative letters forwarded to Voroshilov, though, centered on the authors’ 
frustration at the KGB’s refusal to release any information regarding prisoners’ 
whereabouts. Upon receipt, the Supreme Soviet’s letters department dutifully relayed 
these petitions to the KGB for follow-up, where they joined a growing mass of 
unresolved supplications.402 The examples brought before him evidently moved 
Voroshilov to charge the ministers of Internal Affairs and Justice, along with the 
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Procurator General and the chairmen of the KGB and Supreme Court with devising a 
solution.403 
The following month Kruglov, Gorshenin, Rudenko, Volin, and Serov responded 
to Voroshilov and submitted their report on the existing procedure for handling inquiries 
about executed individuals. Largely echoing Ignat’ev’s dispatch of over three years prior, 
the assembled judicial and state security representatives noted the insufficiency of the 
“ten years without the right of correspondence” reply, given citizens’ need to resolve 
property and legal matters, but considered it “inadvisable to inform petitioners about their 
relatives’ actual punishment, as they were previously issued spravki on the latter being 
sentenced to 10 years of incarceration.”404 Their proposal mirrored the substantive points 
of Ignat’ev’s recommendations, including giving oral death notices only to immediate 
relatives “as a general rule,” the role of ZAGS in cases involving outstanding rights and 
estate issues, and the reaffirmation of state security’s control over the issuance of death 
certificates. Verdicts issued by state security organs were to remain within the KGB’s 
purview, while those originating with the police were referred to the MVD, save cases 
heard by the Military Collegium.405 Despite the apparent consensus among the various 
bodies involved in compiling this report, the Supreme Soviet failed to adopt its 
suggestions, and nearly another year would elapse before the question was settled. 
 The August 24, 1955 order from KGB head Serov to his regional subordinates 
that dictated the official line for handling questions about executed persons diverged little 
from the 1951 and 1954 iterations, although by this juncture the Soviet judiciary had been 
removed from the decision-making process. In an ostensible effort to rein in the 
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miscommunication and inconsistencies that had plagued earlier reporting, Serov asserted 
the KGB’s preeminence over all critical aspects of communication with relatives of those 
sentenced to capital punishment, except for individuals convicted by the Military 
Collegium. Any disclosures were to be made at the discretion of local KGB branches, and 
in areas without a KGB presence the police were obligated to solicit the KGB’s written 
sanction before proceeding.406 This is not to suggest, however, that Serov’s instructions 
were without innovation. For the first time, KGB officers were furnished with explicit 
parameters for fabricating death details: dates communicated to ZAGS were to fall within 
ten years of the individual’s actual sentencing, and “provisional” causes of death were 
likewise to be included in materials sent to ZAGS.407 
Furthermore, Serov specified that the “deaths of those sentenced to capital 
punishment will be registered according to the same procedure if they have subsequently 
been rehabilitated.”408 This indicated that although the posthumously rehabilitated were 
officially blameless in the eyes of the regime, this status did not confer upon their 
relatives any more right to the truth – or some approximation thereof – than those who 
were still viewed as “family members of betrayers of the Motherland.” Finally, Serov 
mandated that the dates and causes of death concocted by KGB functionaries be passed 
on to the MVD’s First Special Department, which was responsible for recordkeeping, to 
ensure that they were preserved in a state repository and could be referenced for later 
use.409  
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As definitive as Serov’s directive was, its erratic execution ultimately stoked 
further confusion and mistrust of the central authorities on the part of its target 
population. Agnessa Mironovna-Korol’, the onetime wife of notorious chekist Sergei 
Mironov, remembered the experience of claiming her husband’s death certificate at 
ZAGS with unveiled bitterness: 
After my rehabilitation in 1958, I needed a document verifying Mirosha’s 
death. I was told to go to the regional ZAGS. The young girl at the 
reception asks, “What is this about? Has someone been born into the 
family?” 
 “No,” I said, “I need a death certificate.” 
 She gave me a form to fill out. These were the questions: surname, 
name, patronymic, date of birth, date of death, cause of death. 
 “But,” I said, “I don’t know when and why he died.” 
 She was astonished. “How could you not know?” 
 Another employee, somewhat older, quiet, said pointedly, “Katya, 
this one…” And he pulled a list. 
 “Ah.” Katya guessed. She looks down the list and finds what she’s 
looking for. I see that she writes the date of death. She writes it down, and 
I already know that she is writing “February 22, 1940.” Where it asks for 
the cause of death, she leaves it blank. 
 Then she asks for fifty kopeks. 
 The older employee takes the document from her and writes at the 
top “no charge.” 
 “Oh, I see. They’re paying me fifty kopeks for my murdered 
husband. He didn’t die, he was shot.” 
 Speechless, they averted their eyes.410 
 
When the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR “informed the relatives 
of Borovskii E. S., sentenced to capital punishment, that he died May 7, 1938 in 
detention” its credibility was undercut by the fact that Izvestiia had already reported 
Borovskii’s execution on July 24, 1934. The Party’s separate procedure for adjudicating 
posthumous readmissions into its ranks also proved problematic in this regard, as Party 
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Control Committee workers announced death sentences without compunction, contrary to 
the Military Collegium. In the case of one K. F. Litvinenko, the Military Collegium 
insisted that he had died in prison in March 1939, but the Karaganda Party obkom 
informed his wife of her husband’s execution nearly a year prior in April 1938.411 
These embarrassing contradictory moments were highlighted in a unique mid-
1959 memorandum from Cheptsov’s replacement as Chairman of the Military Collegium, 
Viktor Valer’ianovich Borisoglebskii, to Supreme Court Chairman Aleksandr Fedorovich 
Gorkin. Writing with remarkable candor, Borisoglebskii enumerated the failings of the 
death notification process in place since Stalin’s death and the liabilities it held for the 
legitimacy of the Soviet judiciary as well as state institutions at large. Though the 
Military Collegium maintained independence from the KGB in these matters, it largely 
adhered to the same protocol, which Borisoglebskii denounced as “inherently flawed 
(porochnyi)” in that it caused a great deal of “bewilderment among individuals who 
address themselves to us, engenders in them distrust of state organs, and in particular of 
the USSR Supreme Court, and misinforms a number of state organs, as giving fictitious 
dates of death to relatives, we are obliged to give the same information to these 
organs.”412 The existing practice eroded public trust and the state’s own ability to control 
information, necessitating “an immediate change in the current situation.”413  
In many instances the party-state’s organs did not have to work at cross-purposes 
for Soviet citizens to “raise their eyebrows” at the discrepancies in accounts promulgated 
by the judiciary. Petitioners found it particularly difficult to swallow the notion that all of 
the arrested men and women from one locality or enterprise happened to die within a year 
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or two of their arrest, as articulated by R. M. Itkova, who wrote in search of her husband 
M. I. Iktov: “100 people were arrested from the stanitsa and all ended up in the 
grave…did they all really (neuzheli) die [of natural causes]?”414 In other trials only some 
of the defendants were sentenced to death, and those who survived captivity returned 
home to recount what had actually become of their friends, neighbors, and coworkers. 
Such confounding accounts were additionally complicated by the fact that – despite 
Serov’s instructions – many death dates devised by local state security representatives 
were never transmitted to the MVD’s records division, which led the Military Collegium 
to invent new dates distinct from the ones relatives had already received.415  
The government’s insistence that executed persons had died while serving their 
sentences in camps gave rise to a host of persistent complications in the realm of property 
rights. In keeping with the established pension regime, some relatives of the 
posthumously rehabilitated attempted to calculate the state’s financial obligations to them 
based on the time their loved ones purportedly served out in the Far North, while others 
insisted that they be granted permission to travel to the camps in order to claim the 
savings that their relatives must have accumulated while incarcerated. The “arbitrary 
dates of death” that officials selected also spawned what Borisoglebskii described as “a 
whole range of material misunderstandings” that precluded individuals from obtaining 
what they were rightfully owed.416 The wife of one S. I. Sverdlov remarried after her 
husband’s actual death in April 1938, but before the September 1943 date that the 
Military Collegium fraudulently registered: “As a result she was denied compensation for 
their confiscated property and the receipt of two-months’ salary” that was her due as the 
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survivor of a posthumously exonerated person.417 Galled as Borisoglebskii was by this 
situation, he appeared to be equally or even more concerned by the disservice that the 
death notification policy had done to posterity. He recalled that institutions such as 
Glavlit, the Institute of Marx-Engels-Lenin, and the Museum of the Revolution had 
approached the Military Collegium 
with lists of individuals who in the past rendered great service to the 
people, with the request to report whether they had been rehabilitated and 
what were their fates. We are obliged to provide the same fictitious date of 
death that we gave the condemned’s relatives, and this date appears in 
official documents, journals, and autobiographies that are published in our 
press.418  
 
As a result of this practice falsified biographical details had been disseminated about 
Georgii Lomov-Oppokov, Osip Piatnitskii, Iakov Iakovlev, and Aleksandr Egorov, 
among other luminaries.419 
 Borisoglebskii reported that the Military Collegium’s protocol had recently 
“changed slightly,” insofar as citizens were now notified of their relatives’ actual death 
date rather than one made from whole cloth, but this generated its own set of problems, as 
it was impossible to “coherently explain” the coincidence between people’s sentencing 
and their death dates “without revealing the truth (istiny),” which was that there was 
usually little to no delay between a death sentence’s passage and its implementation.420 
To help resolve this issue, Borisoglebskii endorsed a proposal forwarded by the RSFSR 
Ministry of Justice, which entailed orally informing surviving relatives of individuals’ 
executions, but issuing them death certificates on which the column for “cause of death” 
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was struck through with a dash.421 Although the extent to which such ongoing 
evasiveness about the fate of the repressed satisfied citizens’ curiosity is unclear, the 
KGB apparently opted to emulate it when state security decided to revise its own 
procedure for notifying next of kin. 
 By early 1963 the KGB’s new chairman, Vladimir Efimovich Semichastnyi, had 
come to acknowledge that the protocol on the books since 1955 was entirely divorced 
from realities in the Soviet Union. Framing the 1955 policy in a decidedly benevolent 
light, Semichastnyi suggested that it had been established due to the state’s concern that 
“notification of the repressed’s actual fate could adversely affect their families’ 
standing,” and the belief that such revelations could have been picked up “by certain 
hostile elements to the detriment of the Soviet state’s interests.”422 Thanks to the work of 
the Central Committee “in exposing the illegalities that were authorized during the period 
of Stalin’s personality cult,” Soviet citizens had become “aware of mass violations of 
socialist legality”; therefore, the rationale for the 1955 order had been rendered 
“irrelevant.”423 In light of these factors, Semichastnyi deemed it appropriate to afford 
cases within the KGB’s remit – concerning individuals sentenced by extra-judicial bodies 
like NKVD troikas – the same consideration as those sentenced by the Military 
Collegium and other courts by allowing relatives to be made aware of their deaths, 
though not registering this information with ZAGS. However Semichastnyi’s proposal 
bore an important caveat: it was intended to apply exclusively to those whose inquiries 
were left unanswered under the 1955 protocol. Given that as of 1963 approximately half 
of the people extra-judicially sentenced to death had already been posthumously 
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rehabilitated, and with each passing year the number of new inquiries declined, 
Semichastnyi realized that this new, ostensibly more humane approach would only 
encompass a relatively small percentage of the families affected by the purges.424  
 Although they were portrayed as correctives to the harsh measures adopted in the 
aftermath of Stalin’s death, neither Borisoglebskii nor Semichastnyi’s schemes addressed 
one of the lingering aftereffects of the Soviet government’s deceptions, that being 
suspicion of the system that had become engrained in citizens like Pirozhkova, Efimov, 
Kornblium, and Itkova, among hundreds of thousands of others. The ways in which the 
party-state mismanaged inquiries into the status of the disappeared reveal that, for all 
their ambitions to control the dissemination of information about the Bolshevik 
experiment’s formative years, the judiciary and other Soviet state bodies were ill-
equipped to coordinate such a concerted undertaking; ultimately hamstrung by the 
obligation to conceal the extent of Stalinist state-sanctioned killing, the institutions 
involved in formulating death notification policies signaled the Soviet regime’s 
unwillingness to reckon fully with the recent past to those who had fervently awaited 
answers for the better part of two decades.425  
 
Dethroning the “Queen of Evidence”: Confessions and Chains of Rehabilitation 
Procurator General Andrei Vyshinskii, who oversaw the Moscow show trials and 
provided much of the Terror with a legal gloss, is notorious for having described 
confessions as the “queen of evidence (tsaritsa dokazatel’stv),” a principle that held sway 
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for the remainder of the Stalin years.426 The imperative to extract confessions from 
prisoners defined the work of the NKVD’s investigative units, and judicial bodies, such 
as the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court, imposed tens of thousands of death 
sentences predicated solely on individuals’ putative admissions, without a since piece of 
material evidence. Rudenko made his disdain for this order of affairs clear to Khrushchev 
even before his address to the assembly of Procuracy workers. Khrushchev asked 
Rudenko of his opinion of the accusations against “Bukharin, Rykov, Syrtsov, 
Lominadze, Krestinsky, and many other people who were well known to the Central 
Committee […] To what extent was that all well founded?”427 Rudenko replied that 
according to “ordinary legal standards there had been no evidence for condemning these 
people. Everything was based solely on their personal confessions obtained through 
physical and moral torture. Confessions could not serve as the basis for condemning 
anyone.”428 While this was a striking condemnation of the Stalinist legal system, what is 
perhaps most telling is that of the figures Khrushchev specifically mentioned, only two – 
Syrtsov and Krestinskii – were legally rehabilitated during his tenure, in 1957 and 1963, 
respectively. Thus, even though the Procurator General was aware that all of the verdicts 
against major Party figures from the Great Terror were legally unsound, he allowed them 
to stand unchallenged. This is extremely informative when considering the interplay 
between judicial norms and political concerns at work in posthumous rehabilitation, for 
as the Procuracy dismantled case after case predicated exclusively on forced confessions, 
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it did so in accordance with the political demands – such as tarring Beriia’s reputation, or 
redeeming Khrushchev’s erstwhile colleagues – and prohibitions of the moment.429      
In the opening months of posthumous rehabilitation procurators faced the 
imperative to link the subjects of their investigations to the newly minted public enemy 
number one, Beriia.430 This task was fairly straightforward in instances where Beriia’s 
interactions with the individuals in question were documented, or in which he oversaw 
arrests and prosecutions, as was the case with two of the very first individuals to receive 
posthumous rehabilitation, Sergo Ordzhonikidze’s older brother Papuliia (also known as 
Pavel) and his wife Nina Davydovna. Papuliia’s arrest was widely seen as a retaliatory 
move by Beriia against his former mentor, and Rudenko challenged him on the subject 
during questionings in August and November 1953.431 In early November Rudenko 
introduced protests before the Supreme Court on behalf of Papuliia and Nina 
Ordzhonikidze, and over the following weeks both of their convictions were vacated.  In 
January 1954 – after Beriia’s execution – Rudenko circulated notifications to the couple’s 
three daughters and one son informing them of their parents’ exonerations.432 In sharp 
contradistinction to the terse spravki that almost all relatives of posthumous rehabilitees 
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would receive in later years, Rudenko provided the Ordzhonikidze children with a clear 
indication of the rationale for and broader significance of their parents’ exoneration. 
Rudenko explicated that Papuliia and his wife had been “fully posthumously rehabilitated 
of the charges slanderously brought against them by the enemies of the people Beriia, 
Kobulov, and Goglidze,” as a part of the “betrayer of the Motherland and agent of foreign 
intelligence” Beriia’s campaign against their uncle.433   
However, judiciary functionaries were also evidently encouraged to lay cases at 
the feet of Beriia and his cohorts in which the latter played no demonstrable role. This 
approach was on full display in the Procuracy’s approach to Nikolai Gorbunov’s 
exculpation, completed in March 1954. The precedence that Gorbunov’s case was 
granted was likely due in no small part to his service during the first three years of Soviet 
power as Lenin’s personal secretary; with the Party’s renewed emphasis on “Leninist 
norms” such a direct connection to the Bolshevik founder may have afforded Gorbunov 
particular consideration. At the moment of his arrest in February 1938 Gorbunov was 
permanent secretary of the USSR Academy of Sciences, which purportedly was host to a 
“National Center” run by German intelligence. Accused of espionage and terrorism, 
Gorbunov and his fellow chemist Petr Ivanovich Dubov received death sentences in 
September 1938, while their two co-defendants were given labor camp terms of 15 and 
20 years.434 
 Major General of Justice N. Khokhlov’s report to the Military Collegium from 
March 12, 1954 foregrounded many points that would become staples of later 
                                                
433 GARF f. 8131, op. 23, d. 2232, l. 179. Sergo Ordzhonikidze’s surviving brothers, Konstantin and Ivan, 
and their families were also rehabilitated of the charges against them at this same time. 
434 GARF f. 8131, op. 31, d. 918, ll. 71-73; for Dubov’s Procuracy file, which surprisingly includes only 
one mention of Gorbunov, despite the fact that the same procurator endorsed both men’s rehabilitations on 
the same day, see GARF f. 8131, op. 31, d. 58630.  
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rehabilitation materials: Gorbunov’s arrest “by enemies of the people” had been carried 
out “without a procurator’s sanction,” and the ensuing investigation was “conducted with 
gross violations of [procedural] norms,” such as the omission of the initial transcripts of 
Gorbunov’s interrogations and his reactions to the charges pressed against him from the 
case file.435 Aside from Gorbunov’s own pretrial testimony – which he retracted in court 
– and statements from other arrestees, the Procuracy could not uncover any “objective 
information” supporting the existence of a “National Center” within the Academy of 
Sciences or ties to German spies.436 Khokhlov contended that materials from the file of 
Gorbunov’s surviving codefendant Pavel Alekseevich Chekin made it “evident that 
knowingly false testimony on the fabricated case of the Russian illegal national-fascist 
organization (the “national center”) that supposedly existed within the USSR Academy of 
Sciences was collected at the order of the now unmasked enemies of the people Beriia 
and Kobulov” through “forbidden investigative methods.”437 Claiming that these 
constituted the “genuine reasons (istinnykh prichinakh)” that Gorbunov and his 
colleagues perjured themselves, Khokhlov successfully pressed the Military Collegium to 
rescind its verdict from September 1938.438  
However, the causality Khokhlov outlined before the court was itself dubious, if 
not entirely impossible. Beriia was only summoned to Moscow to serve as Ezhov’s 
deputy – and eventual replacement – at the NKVD in late August 1938; Kobulov, one of 
his most trusted associates, remained in Georgia until the middle of the following month, 
                                                
435 GARF f. 8131, op. 31, d. 918, l. 71. Khokhlov, as with those who composed subsequent dispatches, 
failed to note that on August 7, 1937 then-Procurator General Andrei Vyshinskii issued a telegram to all 
Soviet procurators informing them that they were no longer required to sign off on arrests. See Viola, 
Stalinist Perpetrators on Trial, 16. 
436 GARF f. 8131, op. 31, d. 918, l. 72. 
437 GARF f. 8131, op. 31, d. 918, ll. 72-73. 
438 GARF f. 8131, op. 31, d. 918, l. 73. 
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when he assumed control of the NKVD’s secret-political department.439 It therefore is 
doubtful that Beriia or his proxies would have taken any interest in Gorbunov’s case, as 
he had already been imprisoned for some six months prior to Beriia’s arrival in the 
capital, and was condemned within weeks of the latter’s appointment to the central 
security apparat. Yet by invoking the disgraced secret police chief Khokhlov and his 
fellow procurators situated Gorbunov’s persecution within the narrative that at the time 
held the most currency for the Party leadership. This point was driven home by the fact 
that, in his brief summary of the “National Center” members’ rehabilitation prepared for 
Khrushchev, Rudenko went so far as to allege that the entire case had been fabricated at 
Beriia and Kobulov’s impetus, decisively dismissing chronology in the interest of 
implicating the new authorities’ foremost public enemy.440              
Aleksandr Kosarev’s rehabilitation report – one of the earliest submitted to the 
Central Committee Presidium for approval, on August 4, 1954 – is indicative of the 
material the Procuracy avidly seized upon as the anti-Beriia furor reached its apex. As 
early as 1934 Kosarev had aired reservations about Beriia’s leadership style in the 
Caucasus before a “narrow circle of Komsomol and Party workers,” which made their 
way back to Beriia and caused Kosarev considerable concern.441 Even more worrying, 
though, was when Beriia challenged Kosarev regarding the content of the toast delivered 
in Bagirov’s presence referenced by Mariia Naneishvili-Kosareva. While giving evidence 
against Bagirov, Naneishvili-Kosareva recalled that at a political meeting Kosarev 
“encountered Beriia, who in an accusatory tone began to demand why my husband did 
                                                
439 For the relevant dates from Beriia and Kobulov’s career trajectories, see Petrov and Skorkin, Kto 
rukovodil NKVD, 107, 234 
440 Artizov et al, Reabilitatsiia, vol. 1, 112. 
441 Ibid., 166. 
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not consider him, Beriia, a true Party leader […] Beriia explained that he had the whole 
story from Bagirov (emu vse izvestno so slov Bagirova).”442  
 In Rudenko’s retelling, Beriia went to great lengths in order to avenge himself on 
Kosarev. The procurator general noted with clear approbation that upon his first 
interrogation and during in-person confrontations with other prisoners Kosarev 
“categorically denied” the “treasonous” and “treacherous” actions that had been imputed 
to him, conceding only that he had erred in recruiting some members of the Komsomol 
leadership. When apprised of this resistance, Beriia ordered NKVD Investigative Section 
Deputy Chief Lev Leonidovich Shvartsman – whose testimony from July 1954 provided 
the basis for much of Rudenko’s reconstruction of Kosarev’s time in prison – to “employ 
measures of physical coercion against Kosarev and extract a confession from him.” 
Kosarev was worked over “savagely” until, as Shvartsman attested, “having grasped the 
hopelessness (bezvykhodnost’) of his situation, [he] agreed to testify about his hostile 
work,” which supposedly included preparations for “open, armed struggle against Soviet 
power.”443 At Beriia’s insistence this confession was then grafted onto the transcript of 
the earlier interrogation in which Kosarev maintained his innocence, and the resulting 
document was circulated widely within the NKVD so that, as Beriia allegedly told 
Shvartsman, the “echelons” could see “the process of Kosarev’s active incrimination.”444  
 Kosarev ultimately confessed to the charges against him before the Military 
Collegium, and his death sentence was carried out on February 23, 1939. That Kosarev 
                                                
442 Ibid. 
443 Ibid., 167. 
444 The significance that Beriia assigned to undoing Kosarev was further indicated by the NKVD’s strong-
arming of Komsomol secretary Valentina Pikina; not only was Pikina herself beaten at Beriia’s behest, but 
her parents and child were detained to secure her cooperation, a tactic that nevertheless failed to elicit the 
desired kompromat. See ibid., 168. 
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failed to denounce “the false confession (samoogovore), beatings, and tortures can only 
be explained,” Rudenko concluded, “by the fact that Beriia and Shvartsman resorted to 
deception, that is they promised to spare Kosarev’s life if he confirmed his fictitious 
testimony in court.”445 Rudenko presented this uncorroborated contention, alongside the 
evidence from Kosarev’s dossier, and the reprisals against Mariia Naneishvili-Kosareva 
and Elena Kosareva – both of whom had already been cleared of all charges against them 
– as confirmation of Beriia’s determination to “[do] away with Kosarev as a person who 
was inconvenient and dangerous to him (s neugodnym i opasnym dlia nego 
chelovekom).”446  
Beriia’s involvement in individuals’ prosecution, or even the mere mention of his 
name in relation to the charges pressed, was in many instances taken as proof positive of 
innocence. Ruben Gusakovich Rubenov (born Mkrtchian) served in a variety of Party 
positions throughout the 1930s, including as Bagirov’s direct predecessor within 
Azerbaijan’s Central Committee; his arrest in September 1937 and execution that 
November were put down to his affiliation with Lomanidze’s alleged Trotskyite terrorist 
group. Yet Baranov’s October 1954 ex post facto briefing to Khrushchev on the case – 
which was reopened at the latter’s behest after he received a petition from Rubenov’s 
daughter – made only fleeting reference to Rubenov’s supposed allegiance to Lominadze. 
Instead, it dealt in bulk with a pair of written declarations Rubenov wrote within a week 
or so of being taken into custody, in which he admitted to belonging to a group of former 
                                                
445 Ibid. In his own defense, Shvartsman maintained that he had risked Beriia’s ire by furnishing Kosarev 
with paper to draft an appeal for clemency, but the Commisar for Internal Affairs rejected it out of hand. 
446 Ibid. Curiously, despite the fact that Kosarev was one of the first Party headmen to obtain legal 
rehabilitation, his Party membership was not restored until April 1989. This nearly 35-year delay can 
probably be attributed to reservations on the part of Party functionaries, as it is highly unlikely that 
Kosarev’s relatives failed to officially request his reinstatement, and ultimately it was the Moscow City 
Party Committee, rather than the central KPK, that returned Kosarev to the rolls. See ibid., 436.  
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Transcaucasian leaders who “spoke openly about Beriia’s ties to the Musavat secret 
police” and “through various avenues, including by using their close relations with Sergo 
Orzhonikidze, sought to remove Beriia from the leadership of Transcaucasia and 
Georgia.”447 Although it is not entirely clear whether Baranov intended to endorse the 
existence of such a plot, his tight focus on this aspect of Rubenov’s file – and relative 
disinterest in other particulars thereof – is strongly indicative of the exculpatory 
significance with which past resistance to Beriia – either actual or alleged – was imbued. 
Not only was resistance to Beriia taken as evidence of individual rectitude, it further 
obviated the need to substantively engage other charges with which the posthumously 
rehabilitated had been impugned. 
Baranov recommended that Levan Gogoberidze’s immediate predecessor as Party 
Secretary of Georgia, Mikhail Kakhiani – who finished his career at the Party Control 
Commission – be rehabilitated in March 1955. As a Georgian Party leader whose tenure 
predated Beriia’s rise, and who maintained a continuous relationship with Sergo 
Ordzhonikidze, Kakhiani conformed perfectly to the profile the Procuracy had drawn 
over the previous year of those Beriia found “disagreeable to him (neugodnymi emu).”448 
While under questioning conducted by Beriia and members of his retinue from the 
Georgian NKVD, Kakhiani divulged that he had disseminated “counterrevolutionary 
calumnies” about Beriia and conspired alongside Mamiia Orakhelashvili to perpetrate an 
                                                
447 Ibid., 181-182. 
448 Ibid., 195. Amy Knight notes that prior to their falling out, Kakhiani and Beriia collaborated closely in 
suppressing the 1924 Georgian Menshevik uprising and hounding accused leftists in the Transcaucasian 
Party apparat. However, by 1929 Kakhiani had taken to making jibes at Beriia’s Mingrelian background, 
and Beriia complained to Orakhelashvili about Kakhiani’s father, who owned a hotel and other major 
property in Batumi. See Knight, Beria, 34, 37-38, 43. 
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act of terrorism against his person.449 Yet by dint of the fact that the Supreme Court had 
officially recognized Orakhelashvili as innocent of all the charges leveled against him, 
Baranov was able to discount this aspect of Kakhiani’s confession out of hand. He 
observed that the Procuracy’s scrutiny of “analogous cases” to Kakhiani’s – including 
those of Orakhelashvili, Gogoberidze, and Papuliia Orzhonikidze – had revealed “that 
Beriia, in doing away with individuals tied to S. Ordzhonikidze, falsified criminal cases 
against them and, while eliciting false testimony from arrestees, was executing 
(rasstrelival) people who were known to be innocent.”450 Kakhiani’s rehabilitation report 
thus gave expression to the emerging self-reinforcing logic of the Procuracy’s work: as 
more and more individuals’ cases were deemed eligible for judicial review the Procuracy 
acquired a growing stable of individuals whose example could be invoked to provide 
justification for subsequent exculpations. This pool of already-rehabilitated Old 
Bolsheivks provided investigators with a new, ever-expanding avenue through which to 
reassess past miscarriages of justice.       
Despite the anti-Beriia wave that animated much of the Procuracy’s early 
rehabilitation work, there were notable instances in which Beriia’s involvement in 
prosecutions went largely unexploited. Writing to Malenkov and Khrushchev in January 
1954, Sergei Kas’ian’s widow Sof’ia Aleksandrovna was sure to note in her opening 
sentence that the Soviet media had brought to her attention the “vile atrocities of the 
archenemy of the people, the betrayer of the Motherland Beriia and his accomplices.”451 
                                                
449 Artizov et al, Reabilitatsiia, vol. 1, 195. Kakhiani was further induced to admit that Sergo 
Ordzhonikidze was aware of the content of the seditious exchanges that he, Orakhelashvili, and others held. 
At the time of the report’s composition, several of these former state security officials – Khazan, Krimian, 
Savitskii, and Paramonov – were in custody awaiting trial for their violations of socialist legality. For more 
on these proceedings, see the following chapter. 
450 Ibid., 196. 
451 GARF f. 8131, op. 31, d. 46019, l. 3. 
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Having provided an exhaustive summary of Kas’ian’s revolutionary bona fides dating 
back to 1905, Sof’ia Aleksandrovna explained that it was precisely Beriia who dragged 
her husband before the Georgian Party Collegium in July 1936 and engineered his 
expulsion for Trotskyism. Kas’ian stood accused of translating the “Platform of the 83” – 
the same document for which Liusia Petrosian was imprisoned – into Armenian, although 
no copy was produced as evidence.452 After over a year of fruitless protests to both the 
local Party apparat and the center, Kas’ian was informed on September 15, 1937 of his 
readmission to the Party and instructed to report the following morning at 10 am to 
collect his Party card; the Georgian NKVD appeared at the Kas’ian family apartment at 5 
am.453 Sof’ia Aleksandrovna concluded that this action – which directly contravened the 
spirit of the Party Control Commission’s ruling – could only been orchestrated personally 
by Beriia.454  
   By the time the judiciary got around to hearing Kas’ian’s case it had begun to 
gradually shift away from explanations for the Terror predicated on personal enmity, and 
for all of Sof’ia Kas’ian’s insistence that her husband was undone by Beriia’s 
machinations, the late secret police chief’s name surprisingly appeared only twice in the 
Procuracy’s protest before the USSR Supreme Court’s Judicial Collegium of February 
28, 1955. Beriia was mentioned solely in reference to the alleged objectives of Kas’ian’s 
counterrevolutionary organization, which sought to separate Armenia from the USSR and 
plotted a terrorist attack against the then-face of Soviet power in Transcaucasia.455 No 
                                                
452 GARF f. 8131, op. 31, d. 46019, l. 5. 
453 GARF f. 8131, op. 31, d. 46019, l. 6. 
454 If at any point Kas’ian entertained the notion that the announcement of her husband’s reinstatement was 
itself a ruse designed to put him off guard, she did not indicate this in her letter to the party-state’s leaders.   
455 GARF f. 8131, op. 31, d. 46019, l. 27. Salin included these salient details from Kas’ian’s case in his 
report to the Central Committee on the work of the Department for Special Cases covering the latter half of 
1954 through the beginning of 1955; of the broad range of individuals sentenced for counterrevolutionary 
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allusion was made to Beriia’s supposed role in Kas’ian’s removal from the Party, or the 
suspicious timing of the latter’s arrest. The vast majority of Deputy Procurator General 
Salin’s text instead concerned itself with the web of contradictory accounts that Kas’ian 
and his accused cohorts generated while in detention. Four other Caucasian Old 
Bolsheviks – A. Kh. Khumarian, A. S. Kakhoian, A. S. Minasian, and A. I. Melikian – 
were supposed to have joined Kas’ian in his endeavor to undermine Bolshevik rule.456 
Yet when the Procuracy’s investigators compared the timelines that each man presented 
for the initial formation and expansion of their circle glaring inconsistencies began to 
emerge: Khumarian maintained that no one actively recruited him into the organization, 
at the head of which stood Kas’ian, but Kas’ian was on the record as having said that 
Khumarian inducted him. Kakhoian first suggested that Minasian had turned him to 
Trotskyism as early as 1928, but later averred that it was not until a 1935 meeting at 
Kas’ian’s apartment that their seditious company took shape.457 [Such lack of consensus 
on the very circumstances under which the group was formed sparked questions within 
the Procuracy over whether it existed at all, and disqualified all of the cited testimony as 
proof of Kas’ian’s criminality.458 
 Even though it was never raised during the Georgian NKVD’s investigation of 
Kas’ian, the Procuracy’s Department for Special Cases also weighed in on the issue of 
the purported translation of the “Platform of the 83” into Armenian that cost him his 
Party membership. An investigator from the Georgian Party Collegium acknowledged 
that he never saw a version of the disputed document among the materials presented 
                                                                                                                                            
crimes that Salin discussed, Kas’ian was one of only two who faced execution. See Artizov et al, 
Reabilitatsiia, vol. 1, 196-203. 
456 For Kakhoian’s children’s dealings with Mikoian see Chapter One. 
457 GARF f. 8131, op. 31, d. 46019, ll. 27-28. 
458 GARF f. 8131, op. 31, d. 46019, l. 28.  
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against Kas’ian. Likewise, the republican MVDs of both Georgia and Armenia possessed 
no “compromising materials” on Kas’ian, and the Armenian archives offered no 
indication that any such translation existed in their holdings. Salin therefore found it 
impossible to establish – authorship notwithstanding – whether an Armenian text of the 
“Platform of the 83” had in actuality ever been produced.459 Given the paucity of credible 
evidence against Kas’ian, Salin called for the ruling of the NKVD troika against him to 
be expunged, and, as he reported to Mikoian, the USSR Supreme Court endorsed his 
conclusions in late March 1955.460 The following summer Melikian, Khumarian, and 
Kakhoian were in turn cleared of all charges against them; Kas’ian’s exoneration was 
duly invoked in each of their files, marking one of the earliest instances of “chain” 
rehabilitation, whereby the exoneration of one member of a fictitious 
counterrevolutionary circle served as a wedge by which the Procuracy and Supreme 
Court could “break open” the associated cases.461    
At first glance Aleksandr Svanidze’s case appeared to fit neatly into the dominant 
anti-Beriia narrative, but it took on a decidedly different hue when placed in the 
judiciary’s hands. Prompted by Bogdan Kobulov’s admission under interrogation that he 
had a “personal interest in the fate” of the Svanidze family, and Dzhonrid Svanidze’s 
protestations about his father’s innocence – likely forwarded by Mikoian – the Procuracy 
approached the Svanidze dossier in December 1955 with little to no outward concern for 
the delicate issues of Beriia and Stalin’s personal culpability that the case raised. 
Rudenko’s report dating December 21 to the Plenum of the Supreme Court – which, as 
the body that both rescinded and reinstated Svanidze’s capital punishment in 1941, was 
                                                
459 GARF f. 8131, op. 31, d. 46019, ll. 28-29. 
460 GARF f. 8131, op. 31, d. 46019, l. 30. 
461 See GARF f. 8131, op. 31, dd. 48920, 49089, 50450. 
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authorized to clear his record – acknowledged the issue of the multiple judgments against 
Svanidze, yet no effort was made to extrapolate that this was somehow indicative of the 
case’s compromised nature.462 Instead, as with other posthumous rehabilitations, the 
Procurator General honed in on the testimony that Svanidze’s peers had been induced to 
give against him, as well as the offences to which Svanidze himself had confessed. 
 Rudenko’s task was complicated by the fact that while under interrogation 
Svanidze acknowledged having worked on behalf of German intelligence, belonging to a 
Rightist organization, and wrecking. The Procurator General therefore emphasized 
Svanidze’s repeated denials as the initial investigation against him progressed. When 
pressed by his jailers, Svanidze attributed his false statements to “being overcome by 
weakness, a ‘mental blackout (zatemnenie mozgov),’ that only cleared up after some 
time”; once Svanidze regained his senses “he was shocked that he could tell so many 
falsehoods about himself.”463 As Kosarev and others’ rehabilitations attest, the Procuracy 
did not shy away from recognizing instances of chekist brutality, but with no concrete 
evidence to that effect Rudenko allowed Svanidze’s words to stand as an indication of the 
coercion to which he was most likely subjected. Rudenko cast further doubt on the 
veracity of Svanidze’s admission of guilt by noting that in the interrogation transcripts of 
those he named as his Rightist co-conspirators – including Avel’ Enukidze, and Grigorii 
Sokol’nikov – “one does not come across Svanidze (po pokazaniiam etikh lits SVANIDZE 
ne prokhodit).”464 In the absence of independent corroboration, Rudenko dismissed 
                                                
462 GARF f. 9474, op. 1a, d. 13846, l. 1. 
463 GARF f. 9474, op. 1a, d. 13846, ll. 3-4. The “blackout” that Svanidze cited as the reason for his self-
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464 GARF f. 9474, op. 1a, d. 13846, l. 4. 
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Svanidze’s disputed testimony outright, but he still had to contend with the declarations 
the latter’s contemporaries made under questioning. 
   In the years immediately preceding and following Svanidze’s disappearance from 
the Government House many of his Transcaucasian revolutionary peers also found 
themselves in state custody and under heavy pressure to implicate the onetime Gosbank 
deputy chairman. Among those coerced into pointing fingers at Svanidze were Mariia 
Orakhelashvili (Mamiia’s wife), Shalva Eliava, Shamshe Lezhava, and Levan 
Gogoberidze. Rudenko operated within the self-reinforcing logic of rehabilitation to 
discredit each of these (involuntary) accusers in turn. Given that the Military Collegium 
had already cleared Mariia Orakhelashvili of any wrongdoing, the knowledge she 
claimed to have had of Svanidze’s counterrevolutionary activities was immediately 
rendered suspect: what could an innocent woman know of such nefarious deeds? 
Lezhava’s statements were likewise gainsaid by the mention of Mamiia Orakhelashvili 
among “Svanidze’s accomplices in anti-Soviet work,” because all the charges against 
Mamiia had previously been dismissed, and thus there could not have been any 
conspiracy in which he had a hand.465 
 Eliava’s supposed statements were rendered suspect by their implausible timing. 
The Georgian NKVD conducted its final interrogation of Eliava on July 17, 1937, nearly 
five months prior to Svanidze’s arrest, and according to Rudenko, the latter did not figure 
at all in Eliava’s last round of testimony. On December 3 of that year an NKVD troika 
handed down a death sentence against Eliava, which, in keeping with standing protocol, 
was carried out almost immediately. Yet the Eliava transcript that found its way into 
                                                
465 GARF f. 9474, op. 1a, d. 13846, ll. 4-5. Lezhava was also said to have implicated Avel’ Enukidze – who 
was not rehabilitated until 1959 – as one of Svanidze’s fellow counterrevolutionaries, but according to 
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Svanidze’s file –certified by Bogdan Kobulov – was dated December 4, suggesting that 
the statements therein had been made postmortem.466 Though Rudenko could not 
similarly question the veracity of Gogoberidze’s disclosures, the fact that they were 
“imprecise and contradictory” and that Gogoberidze had disavowed them before the 
Military Collegium was taken as a clear indication that neither he nor Svanidze had been 
involved in any demonstrable wrongdoing. After establishing the speciousness of the 
charges against Svanidze of financial dereliction and Georgian nationalism, Rudenko 
pushed for all three of the Supreme Court’s rulings against Svanidze to be suppressed.467   
 Strikingly absent from this précis was any intimation of personal animus on 
Beriia’s part as a factor in Svanidze’s ultimate fate; despite Khrushchev’s eventual 
embrace of the narrative that Beriia turned Stalin against Svanidze, the Procuracy and 
Supreme Court made little effort to implicate the state security leader in Svainidze’s 
untimely death.468 Beriia only appeared twice in Rudenko’s account of Svanidze’s 
persecution: it was evidently “at the enemy of the people Beriia’s order” that Svanidze 
was executed immediately following the reversal of his commutation, and he was 
mentioned as the target of an assassination plot into which Eliava purportedly enlisted 
Svanidze.469 In its January 19, 1956 ruling, the Plenum of the USSR Supreme Court – 
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chaired by Cheptsov – reiterated Rudenko’s findings nearly verbatim.470 Such stinting use 
of Beriia as justification for Svanidze’s exculpation stood as a far cry from previous 
efforts that liberally invoked his name as a means of demonstrating select Communists’ 
innocence. This strongly suggests that as the posthumous rehabilitation process came into 
its own, within the judiciary the task of excoriating Beriia for his trespasses against 
Soviet legality assumed less urgency in favor of a new operating logic predicated on the 
existence of a critical mass of prior exonerations that could be drawn upon to help clear 
the names of the as-yet unrehabilitated. This rationale began to manifest itself in a cluster 
of rehabilitations of those who had close working and personal ties to First Secretary 
Khrushchev.   
Khrushchev began his career in Khar’kov – then the seat of the Ukrainian SSR’s 
government – working directly under Nikolai Nesterovich Demchenko, the chairman of 
the local Central Committee’s organizational department. Recalling his early days in the 
Party apparat Khrushchev professed his great respect for Demchenko, who, he was sure 
to note, “deserved it.”471 When Demchenko was transferred to the Kiev district 
committee Khrushchev followed, and was willing to continue to serve alongside him 
“indefinitely,” had Khrushchev not decided to pursue studies at the Industrial Academy 
in Moscow.472 Yet after 1929 the two men’s paths diverged dramatically, and while 
Khrushchev’s took him to the Kremlin, Demchenko’s ultimately led to an execution 
chamber. Convicted on October 29, 1937 of participation in an “anti-Soviet conspiratorial 
                                                                                                                                            
of January – included these two references to Beriia. It further mentioned that the Military Collegium had 
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470 GARF f. 9474, op. 1a, d. 13846, ll. 8-11. 
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center in Ukraine” after a five-minute hearing before the Military Collegium, Demchenko 
was shot the following day.473 In his comparatively brief treatment of the materials 
against Demchenko from November 10, 1954, Rudenko made much of the fact that 
Ul’rikh and his subordinates ploughed forward with proceedings despite the fact that in 
court Demchenko recanted the self-incriminatory statements he made under interrogation. 
The transcript from the Military Collegium session stated that testimony from Red Army 
Commander Iona Emmanuilovich Iakir had been “entered into the record (oglasheny)” – 
presumably as a counterweight to Demchenko’s denials – but the Procuracy’s probe 
found no copy appended to Demchenko’s file; when investigators subsequently revisited 
materials on Iakir they discovered that at no point did he give any testimony relating to 
Demchenko.474 Rudenko dismissed the allegations from other Party officials that made 
their way into Demchenko’s file with the popular formulation of being “vague and 
contradictory,” and thereby cleared the way for the first of Khrushchev’s mentors to be 
posthumously vindicated. 
An even more pronounced connection to Iakir – and, by extension, Khrushchev – 
was on display in the communiqué Rudenko prepared regarding Semen Zakharovich 
Korytnyi. Korytnyi was married to Iakir’s sister, Izabella, and had become acquainted 
with Khrushchev while living in Kiev; eventually he served as Khrushchev’s subordinate 
in Moscow’s Krasnaia Presnaia district. Khrushchev professed to have admired Korytnyi 
as “a practical and efficient man, a good organizer, and a good speaker,” and their 
camaraderie apparently extended beyond the professional.475 The two men were 
neighbors at the storied Government House on ulitsa Serafimovicha, sharing a balcony 
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between their apartments, and both had dachas at Ogarevo – the tsarist-era estate – where 
their families would socialize. When in the capital, Iakir would join in these gatherings; 
shortly before his arrest he and Khrushchev took a long walk together around the grounds 
of Ogarevo, an encounter that Khrushchev feared would come back to haunt him.476 
Evidently stricken by the implications of his brother-in-law’s detention, Korytnyi 
suffered a heart attack, only to be plucked out of his hospital bed by NKVD agents 
several months later, the evening after Khrushchev paid him a visit. Dismayed that “an 
entirely honorable and irreproachable person” could fall under suspicion, Khrushchev 
assured himself that Korytnyi had fallen under Iakir’s pernicious influence, and his trust 
had been misplaced.477        
Whatever doubts Khrushchev may have harbored regarding Korytnyi’s reliability 
apparently did not long survive Stalin’s demise, and he endorsed the findings of 
Korytnyi’s case review on December 11, 1954. The document assigned particular 
significance to the fact that for the first two months of his captivity the physically 
diminished Korytnyi managed to resist exhortations to confess to state crimes, before 
succumbing to pressure from Viktor Abakumov. During his hearing before the Military 
Collegium held in August 1939 – some two years after he first gave testimony – Korytnyi 
disavowed his previous admissions, which provided the Procuracy with a pretext to shunt 
them aside without addressing their substance. Despite Korytnyi and Iakir’s familial ties, 
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none of the members of the putative “Trotskyite Anti-Soviet Military Organization” 
identified Korytnyi as a fellow conspirator.478 Another purported Trotskyite within 
Moscow’s Party organization to whom Korytnyi had been tied, Evgeniia Solomonovna 
Kogan, had herself been posthumously rehabilitated the previous month, further 
contributing to the conclusion that Korytnyi had been “unjustly convicted based on 
unverified and falsified materials.”479  
Before long, Korytnyi himself was being invoked to substantiate the exculpation 
of another one of the figures who followed Khrushchev from Kiev to Moscow, Natan 
Veniaminovich Margolin. Margolin had been a protégé of Kaganovich’s in the Ukrainian 
underground, and worked alongside Khrushchev in Kiev before both matriculated at the 
Industrial Academy in Moscow. While Khrushchev was in charge of Krasnaia Presnaia, 
Margolin was entrusted with the Bauman district; knowing Margolin as a “tried and 
tested comrade,” Khrushchev could not “accept the idea that [he] was an enemy of the 
people.”480 Baranov’s summary of the case against Margolin from late March 1955 noted 
that the major grounds for his conviction were his own self-incriminatory statements as 
well as “notes appended to [his] file” drawn from Korytnyi and another Moscow Party 
leader’s testimony.481 In the face of such a paucity of evidence, the fact of Korytnyi’s 
prior rehabilitation helped to expedite the redemption of one of his fellow Muscovite 
party secretaries.  
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The Procuracy and KGB’s joint report on Grigorii Naumovich Kaminskii – who 
at the time of his arrest in June 1937 held the post of USSR People’s Commissar of 
Health – spanned the divide between the memoranda foregrounding Beriia’s personal 
grudges and ones that drew upon Khrushchev’s network of affiliates from Ukraine and 
Moscow. Kaminskii and Beriia had a longstanding acquaintance dating back – like so 
many of Beriia’s associations – to Civil War-era Baku, where Kaminskii held multiple 
responsible posts.482 Apparently it was Kaminskii who in 1920 first received allegations 
of Beriia having served in the Musavat counterintelligence, prompting the special Party 
inquiry that ultimately “rehabilitated” Beriia.483 This incident seems to have rankled 
Kaminskii, though, and some 17 years later, at the June 1937 Central Committee Plenum, 
he directed his ire at the ascendant Transcaucasian Party head. Khrushchev was present 
for this oration, and in his memoirs related what this “forthright, sincere person, loyally 
devoted to the party, a man of uncompromising truthfulness” stated: 
All those speaking here have told everything they know about others. I 
would also like to say something, so that it will be known to the party. 
When I was sent to Baku in 1920 and worked there as a secretary of the 
Central Committee of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan and chairman of 
the Baku Soviet, persistent rumors were circulating that Comrade Beria, 
who is present here, during the occupation of Baku [by the British] 
collaborated with the counterintelligence services of the Musavat and even 
that somewhat earlier he had collaborated with British 
counterintelligence.484 
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In Khrushchev’s telling, this broadside was met with silence among those in attendance, 
and he implied that Kaminskii was subsequently taken into custody on the third day of 
the plenum in retaliation for having challenged the NKVD leadership.485  
 Even in the face of the documented animosity between Kaminskii and Beriia – of 
which Rudenko was certainly aware, given that he conducted Beriia and Bagirov’s 
interrogations – the Procuracy did not seize upon Kaminskii’s case as eagerly as those of 
other old Party fighters from the Caucasus. On February 12, 1955 Kaminskii’s daughter 
complained to Bulganin that her appeal on behalf of her parents had been languishing at 
the Chief Military Procuracy since May 1954 without any apparent progress or 
resolution; Bulganin shortly thereafter dashed off an order for Rudenko, Baranov, and 
Serov to “promptly present a proposal,” and within four days Baranov and Serov’s 
findings were put to the Presidium.486 This tight timeframe may account for the relative 
brevity of Kaminskii’s report, as well as the absence of any detail relating to his hostile 
interactions with Beriia, but the fact that Baranov and Serov chose to highlight the 
glaring contradictions between the various depositions that supposedly incriminated 
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Kaminskii shows how much proof for posthumous rehabilitation could be found in 
simply reading the evidence that the NKVD cited to make its own cases.   
 While under interrogation Kaminskii admitted to membership in a “diversionary-
terrorist organization,” but when brought before the Military Collegium – which heard 
the case, as Baranov and Serov portentously noted, for all of fifteen minutes, including 
the pronouncement of the death sentence – he maintained that he did not “feel himself to 
be an enemy of the people.”487 Placing considerable stock in Kaminskii’s professed 
loyalty to the Soviet cause, the Procuracy and KGB denigrated the evidence against him 
as “contradictory and unconfirmed in court.”488 In particular, Kaminskii was alleged to 
have been inducted into the Rightist conspiracy by Bukharin himself in 1929, and 
thereafter thrown in with Rykov, Aleksandr Petrovich Smirnov, and Daniil Egorovich 
Sulimov, the former RSFSR Sovnarkom chairman. Yet state functionaries’ renewed 
scrutiny of materials from Bukharin, Rykov, and Smirnov’s investigative files revealed 
that none of the three mentioned Kaminskii among their confederates; only Sulimov 
claimed knowledge of Kaminskii’s Rightism, but he purportedly learned of it second-
hand, via Rykov. This assertion flew in the face of Kaminskii’s pre-trial testimony, 
wherein he identified direct orders from Sulimov and Nikolai Antipov as the impetus for 
his creation of a “wrecking organization (vreditel’skaia organizatsiia)” within the 
People’s Commissariat of Health.489 These inconsistencies were sufficiently glaring – in 
the eyes of the Procuracy and KGB – to constitute grounds for the reversal of 
Kaminskii’s conviction from February 1938.       
                                                




 The aftereffects of Kaminskii’s rehabilitation – which the Military Collegium 
finalized on March 2, 1955 – manifested themselves with remarkable rapidity. That 
month at least two of his putative cohorts, Mark Belen’kii – Mikoian’s onetime deputy – 
and Zhosef Isaakovich Meerzon, were deemed deserving of rehabilitation by the 
Procuracy.490 In his assessments submitted to the Central Committee, Baranov 
foregrounded Kaminskii’s central role in both men’s condemnations: Kaminskii was the 
first of several plotters listed with whom Belen’kii acknowledged being “closely 
associated,” while Meerzon identified Kaminskii as the party responsible for initiating 
him into anti-Soviet activities.491 Yet as Baranov observed, neither Belen’kii nor 
Meerzon appeared in the statements extorted from Kaminskii, and due to the latter’s 
recent exculpation any allegations of criminality on his part could not anchor charges 
against others. With no further “compromising materials” forthcoming, Baranov 
motioned to have Belen’kii and Meerzon’s cases dismissed. Another effect of 
Kaminskii’s rehabilitation –one that was perhaps of even greater consequence – was its 
tentative breaching of the until-that-point impermeable barrier that placed all cases linked 
to the Moscow Show Trials beyond the judiciary’s scrutiny. 
 
From Liability to Asset: The Transformation of Nikolai Antipov  
Perhaps best known today as one of the figures excised from the photograph that 
appears in various iterations on the cover of David King’s study of image manipulation 
under Stalin, The Commissar Vanishes, Nikolai Kirillovich Antipov was a leading 
Leningrad Bolshevik (and rival of Kirov’s) who held a series of key positions within the 
Party and government beginning in 1923; at the time of his arrest in June 1937 he was a 
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member of the Central Committee, as well as both chairman of the Soviet Control 
Commission and deputy chairman of the USSR Sovnarkom. The authorities briefly 
mooted trying him alongside Bukharin and Rykov in open court, and though they 
ultimately opted to sentence him in camera, references to Antipov as an organizer and 
accomplice of the “Anti-Soviet Bloc of Rightists and Trotskyites” proliferated throughout 
the draft indictment and transcripts of the Third Moscow Trial.492 As rehabilitation 
materials and first-hand accounts indicate, over the thirteen months that Antipov spent in 
state custody he denounced dozens of fellow Old Bolsheviks as would-be spies, 
saboteurs, and assassins.493 During a jailhouse confrontation with longtime friend and 
colleague Vlas Iakovlevich Chubar’ at which Molotov – their former superior – was 
present, Antipov produced a litany of seditious utterances that Chubar’ had supposedly 
voiced in his presence.494 Chubar’, who had not yet been officially detained, indignantly 
assailed Antipov as “such a snake” that Chubar’ had “held to [his] breast,” and a 
“provocateur”; though Molotov left the scene unconvinced of the veracity of Antipov’s 
allegations, he was certain that neither man could be trusted further.495  
Khrushchev also reported that Stalin leveraged Antipov’s volubility as a means of 
testing his subordinates. He recalled receiving an urgent summons to join Stalin and 
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Molotov for a stroll around the Kremlin, when the vozhd’ suddenly turned to him and 
announced – in what Khrushchev characterized as “the kind of joke that could turn your 
hair gray” – “Antipov is giving testimony against you.”496 Incredulous, Khrushchev 
insisted that this was impossible, because Antipov had nothing on him; he surmised that 
Stalin was closely watching for any telltale reaction to the allegation, and, refusing to be 
unmanned by this feint, Khrushchev claimed to have withstood Stalin’s “psychological 
provocation.”497 Eventually Antipov’s utility as a means of testing other apparatchiks’ 
loyalty waned, and on July 26, 1938 both Stalin and Molotov signed off on a list of over 
130 Party and state notables whose cases were set to be heard before the Military 
Collegium under the “first category” – meaning the death penalty – which included 
Antipov’s name.498 Two days later sentence was passed and carried out on Antipov, and 
as the images King features so aptly demonstrate, he was quickly and thoroughly excised 
from the official depictions of the triumphant march to socialism.        
 Antipov first reemerged in the Procuracy’s December 1954 rehabilitation 
proposal for Izrail’ Mikhailovich Kleiner, a onetime chairman of Sovnarkom’s 
Procurement Committee whose case was brought to the judiciary’s attention by 
Mikoian.499 While under NKVD questioning Kleiner identified Antipov as the head of 
the alternate Rightist center from whom he took his marching orders, and although he 
eventually insisted in court that he had “worked honestly through the years,” Rudenko’s 
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deputy Pavel Vladimirovich Baranov pointed out that Kleiner failed to disassociate 
himself from Antipov.500 It was therefore incumbent upon Baranov to demonstrate that 
any dealings that might have existed between Antipov and Kleiner did not constitute 
“incontrovertible proof” of criminality on the latter’s part.501 
 Antipov testified during his own interrogation that he had become acquainted 
with Kleiner in late 1935 through Rykov, and for the next two years he delegated acts of 
sabotage to Kleiner on behalf of the Rightist movement. Baranov cast doubt upon these 
statements because no corresponding testimony from Rykov could be located, and they 
were contradicted by the conclusions of a “special expert examination (spetsial’noi 
ekspertizy)” of Kleiner’s file and other archival documents, though he declined to 
indicate how precisely these materials diverged from one another. Most telling, though, 
was a select quotation from State Security Major Zinovii Naumovich Glebov-Iufa, 
Antipov’s lead interrogator, who described his subject as “the type of prisoner who is 
ready to give any testimony in any direction.”502 Baranov thereby predicated his 
argument for Kleiner’s innocence on the fundamental unsoundness of Antipov’s 
testimony. At no point did he appear to suggest that this should occasion the reopening of 
other dossiers in which Antipov was cited as a material witness, and in the year and a half 
interval between Kleiner and Antipov’s rehabilitations the operating protocol for 
addressing the latter’s appearances in others’ case files remained fairly consistent, 
foregrounding Antipov’s unreliability as a witness. 
 Under NKVD inducement some Party and state officials, such as Kaminskii and 
Nikolai Vasil’evich Krylenko, declared that Antipov and his confederate Sulimov had 
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inducted them into the Right Opposition, but neither of the supposed ringleaders 
confirmed this testimony, making it all the easier for the Procuracy to discount it when 
the former Commissars of Health and Justice, respectively, came up for consideration.503 
Of those Antipov actually incriminated while in custody, over a dozen had their cases 
posthumously dismissed in the three years following Stalin’s death. In each of these 
instances, procurators were compelled to find grounds upon which to write off Antipov’s 
statements without explicitly suggesting that he was no more an “enemy of the people” 
than those currently undergoing rehabilitation, as for the time being his legal standing 
remained beyond their mandate. In Nikolai Gikalo’s case, this entailed emphasizing the 
questionable timing of Antipov and others’ avowals. Rudenko, writing with Vladimir 
Luk’ianov from the Party Control Committee, intimated that Antipov’s words “[did] not 
inspire confidence” by virtue of the fact that they were “obtained […] only after Gikalo’s 
arrest,” implying that Gikalo’s imprisonment could possibly have prejudiced this 
evidence, and because they were contradicted or entirely refuted by other witness 
testimony.504 A three-year discrepancy in the dates that Antipov provided for when he 
and RSFSR Commissar for Light Industry Konstantin Vasil’evich Ukhanov purportedly 
founded their “reserve center” was likewise zeroed in on to give lie to the notion of 
Ukhanov’s guilt.505 Chubar’s Rightist-Trotskyite activities were called into question 
because Antipov’s “circumstantial” testimony was predicated entirely on allusions to 
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other Party figures, who made no reference to Chubar’ in their own confessions.506 The 
frequency with which Antipov appeared in the investigative files of his fellow Old 
Bolsheviks led the Procuracy to issue serious challenges to his personal integrity in the 
interest of redeeming others’ reputations, a tack that its functionaries were obliged to 
reverse when they were called upon to find cause for his rehabilitation.507 
 In Antipov’s case the investigators’ task was simplified considerably by the fact 
that nearly twenty of his nominal cohorts in counterrevolutionary activity – including 
Ukhanov, Sulimov, Rudzutak, Kaminskii, and Vladimir Ivanovich Polonskii – had been 
cleared of all the charges against them. Many of these men had also been listed by Rykov 
and Bukharin as participants, alongside Antipov, in their organization; therefore any 
attempt to implicate Antipov in Rightism through its leaders’ own words was rendered 
immediately suspect, given that they had denounced demonstrably innocent Party 
cadres.508 
 Baranov also took the opportunity to revisit and reframe the statement behind the 
damning portrayal of Antipov that surfaced in Kleiner’s earlier rehabilitation. Now 
attributing the depiction in question to one of Glebov-Iufa’s fellow chekisty, Baranov 
substantively altered its connotation: “The former USSR NKVD operative Tserpento 
(convicted), who participated in the investigation of the Right-Trotskyite center case, 
under questioning in his own case testified that through illegal investigative methods 
Antipov was driven to the point that he was ready to give any sort of testimony in any 
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direction.”509 This new perspective on the account that had been circulating since late 
1954 was evidently intended to absolve Antipov of responsibility for the fates that had 
befallen the Communists he implicated; indeed, it was all the more difficult to argue that 
Antipov merited rehabilitation while the image of him as a fabulist continued to hold 
currency.510 Yet even in light of this remarkable reversal, the prospect of Antipov’s 
exoneration was met with raised eyebrows on the part of some within the Presidium. 
 Molotov annotated his copy of Antipov’s report with the following admonition: 
“It would be a good idea to have more detailed information.”511 Such reservations are 
unsurprising coming from one so deeply implicated in Antipov’s repression – having 
witnessed his confrontation with Chubar’, authorized his death warrant, and remained an 
avowed skeptic of rehabilitation through his final years – though requests from the top for 
additional material as issued by Molotov appear to have been vanishingly rare.512 
Baranov dutifully acceded to this directive, supplementing his initial, somewhat brief 
two-page summary with a more in depth discussion of the factors that supported his 
conclusions. As the Deputy Procurator General noted, though Antipov pled guilty to a 
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a third NKVD operative, Litvin, that Rykov instructed him to form the reserve center in September 1936; 
Rykov insisted that he had only met with Antipov in 1932, but was pressured into confirming the 1936 
date. In the meantime, Antipov composed an entirely new statement, in which he wrote that he had indeed 
received orders from Rykov in 1932. When Tserpento marveled at the fact that Antipov had so deceived 
Litvin, Glebov-Iufa remarked that it came as no surprise to him, given Antipov’s willingness to change his 
tune. Glebov-Iufa did not allude to any sort of physical pressure being applied to Antipov, though this does 
not rule out the possibility that he was tortured. Artamonova and Petrov, eds., Protsess Bukharina, 854.  
511 Artizov et al, Reabilitatsiia, vol. 2, 83. 
512 Molotov was of the conviction that rehabilitation went too far, and exonerated people who were 
committed enemies of the state; Tukhachevskii seems to have been a particular target of his ire. See 
“Zapiska (G.M.) po probleme kul’ta lichnosti I. V. Stalina i o programme KPSS. (Pis’mo V. M. Molotova 
v TsK KPSS (1965g.)),” Voprosy istorii, issues 1-6, 8-11 (2011), 1,3 (2012); see also Feliks Chuev, Sto 
sorok besed s Molotovym. Iz dnevnika F. Chueva (Moskva: “Terra”-“Terra,” 1991), 412-413, 427. 
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host of offenses during his hearing – including participation in Rightist organizations, 
collaboration with Germany and Poland, and having served as an agent provocateur for 
the pre-Revolutionary police – the charges filed against him were predicated entirely on 
his and others’ testimony, which was “contradictory and refuted by objective 
materials.”513 Having studied the archival-investigative files of the Party figures at whom 
Antipov pointed fingers, Baranov discovered that all but one of them, Syrtsov – whose 
case was under review – had already been rehabilitated. He likewise found no substantive 
basis for the allegations of pre-Revolutionary treachery against Antipov beyond the 
latter’s own statements, which ran contrary to archival documents that had been “hidden 
by the investigative organs.”514 Antipov claimed responsibility for betraying a Party 
meeting and underground press in Saint Petersburg while working for the tsarist Okhrana 
under the codename “Youngster (Molodoi).” The materials Baranov uncovered suggested 
that Antipov had not been implicated in either incident, and the policeman that he 
identified as his handler did not have an informant known as “Youngster” on his roster. 
Regarding Antipov’s more recent malfeasance, Baranov put aside both Rykov and 
Smirnov’s testimony, as the chekisty Tserpento, Tsesarskii, and Zhurbenko all stated that 
names had been inserted arbitrarily at investigators’ discretion.515 Evidently persuaded by 
these additional facts, Molotov retracted his initial misgivings, and deemed it “advisable 
to hear [Antipov’s case] before the Presidium.”516     
 Antipov’s rehabilitation, which the Military Collegium certified at the end of June 
1956, marked a sea change not only in his individual legal standing, but also the 
                                                
513 GARF f. 8131, op. 32, d. 4578, l. 1. 
514 GARF f. 8131, op. 32, d. 4578, l. 2. 
515 Ibid. 
516 Artizov et al, Reabilitatsiia, vol. 1, 83. 
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judiciary’s approach to others who were linked – either directly or indirectly – to the 
defendants in the trial of Bukharin, Rykov, and other members of the “Anti-Soviet Bloc 
of Rightists and Trotskyites.”517 Suren Konstantinovich Shadunts – a former Party 
Secretary in Tajikistan – had been incriminated as a counterrevolutionary by his onetime 
Uzbek counterpart Akmal’ Ikramovich Ikramov, who was among those put on display 
during the final Moscow show trial. In one of the closing points of his case summary 
before the Central Committee, Baranov explained that Ikramov had only heard about 
Shadunts’ purported misdeeds second-hand through Antipov, who had since been 
rehabilitated. The unarticulated assumption underlying this point was that no honest 
Bolshevik, such as Antipov, could have possessed material knowledge of anti-Soviet 
plans in the making, and therefore any claims that he passed on such knowledge were 
automatically rendered suspect.518 Antipov’s status as a source thereby assumed an 
entirely different hue from that of his first invocation in Kleiner’s case, as by virtue of 
having been rehabilitated his mention in the case against an individual could be used to 
help call the conviction into question. 
Although it was most likely Serov’s determination in July 1956 that “the majority 
of those convicted” in the Third Moscow Trial – regardless of their actual stance on the 
Party line – “merited rehabilitation,” figures like Antipov played a critical role in 
providing justifications for accused Oppositionists’ legal redemption. Ikramov was the 
                                                
517 For the Chief Military Procuracy’s findings, prepared in late April 1956 and submitted to the Supreme 
Court Military Collegium in June, see GARF f. 8131, op. 32, d. 4578, ll. 5-8. 
518 GARF f. 8131, op. 32, d. 4580, l. 19. A similar logic that also invokes Antipov and Ikramov is on 
display in the rehabilitation report for Aron Abramovich Tsekher – the Party’s second in command in 
Uzbekistan – in GARF f. 8131, op. 32, d. 4579, ll. 298-299. 
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first of those tried alongside Bukharin and Rykov to have his case come up for review.519 
In their joint briefing to the Presidium of May 18, 1957, Rudenko and Serov rejected the 
self-incriminatory statements that Ikramov made under interrogation and in court as “at 
variance with facts.”520 Ikramov testified at various times to the Uzbek NKVD and the 
USSR NKVD and Procuracy that he had been initiated into Rightism in 1935 “through 
Antipov, from whom he received all instructions on rolling out anti-Soviet activities in 
Uzbekistan,” yet as the investigation was wrapping up Ikramov suddenly amended his 
account, suggesting that it was Bukharin who inducted him into the conspiracy in 1933, 
and that Antipov was responsible for overseeing Ikramov’s subversive schemes. Rudenko 
and Serov concluded that this narrative was not feasible, as Antipov’s expiation obviated 
the possibility of his involvement in counterrevolutionary endeavors; in the absence of 
any other conclusive evidence of wrongdoing on Ikramov’s part, they proposed 
expunging his criminal record, thereby marring the façade of the Third Moscow Trial.521  
Over the coming months and years more tertiary figures in the “Anti-Soviet Bloc 
of Rightists and Trotskyites” were haltingly exonerated, including Belorussian First 
Secretary Vasilii Fomich Sharangovich in December 1957, People’s Commissar of 
Finance Grigorii Fedorovich Grin’ko and Ikramov’s predecessor in Uzbekistan Isaak 
Abramovich Zelenskii in April 1959, and former ambassador to Germany Nikolai 
Nikolaevich Krestinskii in July 1963.522 Antipov’s presence in each of these men’s 
criminal investigative files – alongside other rehabilitees – was cited as grounds for 
                                                
519 Citing Ikramov’s son Kamal’s novelistic memoir, Kathleen Smith mistakenly maintains that Ikramov 
was the sole show trial defendant to obtain rehabilitation under Khrushchev. See Smith, Remembering 
Stalin’s Victims, 135; and K. A. Ikramov, Delo moego ottsa (Moskva: Sovetskii pisatel’, 1991), 56-60. 
520 Artizov et al, Reabilitatsiia, vol. 2, 271. 
521 Ibid., 271-272. 
522 Ibid., 296-298, 334-337, 462-465. Like Grin’ko and Zelenskii, former light industry commissar 
Vladimir Ivanovich Ivanov was also put forward for rehabilitation on April 28, 1957, but the materials in 
his case made no mention of Antipov; see ibid., 337-338. 
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challenging aspects of the widely trumpeted verdict from March 13, 1938, though in none 
of the reports was the question of Bukharin, Rykov, or Iagoda’s innocence broached.523 
The manner in which the Procuracy handled the issue of Antipov’s testimony and the 
question of his innocence at various times is reflective of the balance its functionaries 
were obliged to strike between making the case for those already cleared for 
rehabilitation and treading upon the still-unassailable myth of a heretical Opposition 
committed to undermining Soviet power in the 1930s.   
 
The NKVD as Information Source and Scapegoat  
An unacknowledged debt loomed over much of the Procuracy’s work in the 
decade following Stalin’s death. Though blackening Beriia’s reputation remained a top 
priority throughout the period, the rehabilitation process came to rely extensively on 
investigative materials generated during the post-Great Terror “purge of the purgers,” 
which Beriia personally oversaw. Charged with reining in the excesses of the 
Ezhovshchina upon his ascent at the central NVKD, Beriia rounded up many of the 
Terror’s most prolific agents, capitalizing on the opportunity to stack the ranks of the 
security apparat with his own loyalists. To imbue this violent changing of the guard with 
a legalistic veneer, new NKVD cadres subjected their predecessors to coercive 
interrogations over their role in the repressions, then convened secret tribunals that often 
resulted in death sentences; most frequently, the accused chekisty were charged with 
abuse of office.524 The confessions produced during these sessions later proved 
invaluable to Rudenko and his colleagues as they both sought information for the 
                                                
523 On the fraught question of Bukharin’s rehabilitation, which with Khrushchev-era authorities flirted, see 
Mark Junge, Strakh pered proshlym: Reabilitatsiia N. I. Bukharina ot Khrushcheva do Gorbacheva 
(Moskva: AIRO-XX, 2003). 
524 On the course and character of this round of purges in Ukraine, see Viola, Stalinist Perpetrators. 
 189 
purposes of rehabilitation and attempted to ascribe responsibility for the violent excesses 
of the past.525 Yet in exploiting this evidence base, Khrushchev-era investigators made no 
apparent effort to dispel – or even acknowledge – the tension inherent in predicating their 
claims on sources furnished by a professed “enemy of the people,” who employed the 
very methods of brute force and torture that the judiciary decried vis-à-vis those who 
drove the violence of the Great Terror.526   
 A relatively small coterie of prolific NKVD interrogators emerged in the 
Procuracy reports as bearing particular responsibility for contriving charges against the 
party-state’s “outstanding figures.” Glebov-Iufa, who served in the GUGB’s secret-
political department, was first mentioned to the Central Committee as one of Moscow 
obkom Secretary Mikhail Efimovich Mikhailov’s tormentors. Glebov-Iufa and his fellow 
chekist Moisei L’vovich Gatov had been entrusted with building the case against 
Mikhailov, but found themselves under arrest within mere months of his sentencing in 
August 1938.527 Under interrogation by his former collaborators, Glebov-Iufa admitted 
“that while seeking testimony from Mikhailov investigators beat him and employed other 
illegal investigative methods”; Glebov-Iufa recounted the confrontation between 
Mikhailov and one A. A. Levin at Lefortovo, during which Ezhov himself, his deputy and 
GUGB head Mikhail Petrovich Frinovskii, and other ranking NKVD officers took turns 
                                                
525 On the scale of these reprieves versus the wider scale of the Terror, see Shearer, Policing Stalin’s 
Socialism, 369. 
526 This suggests that for the Soviet judiciary there was no notion of “fruit of the poisonous tree.” My 
thanks to David Brandenberger for highlighting this point. 
527 Military Procurator Mikhail Sergeevich Gromov, who was responsible for compiling Mikhailov’s 
rehabilitation materials, recalled in a laudatory article from 1988 that all of the NKVD operatives involved 
in Mikhailov’s abuse had in turn been purged save one, a junior officer by the name of Nemov, who he was 
able to track down and interrogate. See Nikolai Popkov, “Tikhaia rabota: Tri siuzheta iz zhizni 
sledovatelia,” Literaturnaia gazeta, June 1, 1988, 12.   
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battering Mikhailov.528 Alongside Beriia’s lieutenants Abakumov and Vlodzimirskii, 
Glebov-Iufa also helped to formulate the indictment against Margolin, who – according 
to Baranov – tried to take his own life to avoid further torture: “In the course of the 
investigation illegal investigative methods and force were used on Margolin, because of 
which on November 27, 1937 he attempted suicide in his cell by fashioning a noose out 
of two handkerchiefs.”529 In light of all three chekisty’s convictions, Margolin’s suicide 
attempt – which could easily have been construed as a bid to elude justice – was reframed 
as an act on the part of an honest Party worker desperate to preserve his honor in the face 
of unremitting brutality.  
    The tactic of burnishing arrestees’ reputations by censuring their persecutors’ 
violent conduct and personal origins was on full display in Postyshev and Ukhanov’s 
rehabilitations. Both had been placed in the hands of secret-political operatives Grigorii 
Nikolaevich Lulov and Petr Iustinovich Tserpento during their imprisonments. Rudenko 
devoted much of his defense of Ukhanov to castigating Lulov and Tserpento, who had 
been “unmasked as criminals who insinuated themselves into the organs of state security 
and were sentenced to execution for a number of crimes including the falsification of 
investigative files”; Beriia’s purge had exposed the skeletons within each chekist’s 
closet.530 Lulov, the superior officer, was originally from “a socially alien milieu (iz 
sotsial’no-chuzhdoi sredy),” sullied by ties to the twin heresies of commerce and Zionism 
through his brother, “a major capitalist living in Palestine.” He was further guilty of 
opposing the Party line during the 14th Party Congress, and on at least one occasion had 
                                                
528 Artizov et al, Reabilitatsiia, 176. Glebov-Iufa’s testimony from the late 1930s was confirmed by two 
former GUGB special investigators questioned in 1954, one of whom was Boris Rodos, whose own trial is 
addressed at length in the following chapter.   
529 Ibid., 209. 
530 Ibid., 234. 
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written approvingly to Zinov’ev regarding a speech of his.531 Tserpento owed his entire 
career in state security to a politically suspect past, as in 1934 he had been recruited to 
inform on fellow members of a supposed Trotskyite cell within Saratov’s pedagogical 
institute, and was subsequently promoted to a central NKVD staff position.532 Given the 
precariousness of their positions, “Tserpento and Lulov did not shrink from extorting 
false testimony regarding specific Party and government leaders” in order to build the 
cases their superiors demanded of them, as evinced by their treatment of Postyshev. 
Throughout Postyshev’s rehabilitation report Rudenko assiduously offset 
references to the former’s “testimony” with quotation marks, an expression of unreserved 
skepticism that was not on display in any similar such documents. Rudenko decisively 
dismissed Postyshev’s statements as counterfeit based on a report Tserpento submitted to 
the NKVD brass following his own arrest, but prior to Postyshev’s sentencing. Tserpento 
maintained that at Lulov’s behest he and another NKVD officer doctored the 
interrogation transcript “without Postyshev’s participation and without his confession of 
guilt. Postyshev first became aware of the contents of ‘his testimony’ when it was given 
to him to sign.”533 Similarly, Rudenko made Frinovskii’s written description of his 
subordinates’ methods for efficiently extracting confessions a centerpiece of Ukhanov’s 
vindication, though he did not specify whether Frinovskii provided this information 
freely. Frinovskii – who signed Ukhanov’s arrest warrant – admitted that as part of their 
duties “[i]nvestigators beat prisoners uncontrollably and in the shortest time possible 
                                                
531 Ibid. 
532 Ibid. 
533 Ibid., 219. Tserpento admitted that Andrei Sergeevich Bubnov, one of Postyshev’s pre-Revolutionary 
comrades, had been placed in the same cell as him with instructions to “prepare” Postyshev to sign the 
investigative materials.   
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obtained ‘testimony,’ and knew how to skillfully, colorfully compile transcripts.”534 
These interrogations records did not in practice relate verbatim statements made in the 
NKVD’s cells, but were instead artfully stitched together from notes taken during 
repeated interrogations. The resulting collage would then be forwarded to the chief of the 
relevant department for “correction” before making their way to Ezhov or occasionally 
Frinovskii’s desks, where they would receive final approval.535 Unsurprisingly, most 
prisoners balked at the creations placed before them that supposedly represented their 
words, but were dissuaded from taking any moral stands by their wardens and would 
become pliant, affix their signatures to the cobbled-together texts, and the names of other 
conspirators “suggested themselves (podskazyvalis’ familii).”536 In Frinovskii’s 
estimation, it was “very often investigators [who] gave the testimony, not the 
suspects.”537 It is telling that although Frinovskii’s statement referred to NKVD 
interrogators’ modus operandi across the board, this stark admission was cited only in 
reference to Ukhanov’s case, in which Frinovskii had a direct hand.    
The judiciary’s practice of rehabilitation also advanced a distinctly retributive 
agenda. Beyond their mandate to recommend dismissal of charges against the wrongfully 
accused, the Procuracy and courts sought to identify the individuals responsible for 
wresting confessions and denunciations out of suspects. In a special codicil to its ruling 
                                                
534 Ibid., 234. 
535 Ibid. 
536 Ibid. Igal Halfin captures the logic that drove this mechanism of falsification: “Now that criminals were 
believed to have lived up to their potential, the enemy’s course of action became predictable – acts of 
oppositionism, wrecking, and espionage could be foretold. So why should confessions not be prepared by 
NKVD investigators themselves? The prospective traitor became identical with the real traitor – and it was 
not that important whether he was caught before or after the act. What mattered was that he had fully 
exposed the wicked creature he had always been. His counterrevolutionary essence (kontrrevoliutsionnaia 
sushchnost/) had to be urgently drawn out so that additional culprits could be disarmed – hence the 
exponential growth in the number of files, one person implicating several others.” See Halfin, Stalinist 
Confessions, 9.    
537 Artizov et al, Reabilitatsiia, vol. 1, 234. 
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on Kas’ian’s case from March 23, 1955, the Supreme Court Judicial Collegium for 
Criminal Cases noted that based on the “case materials it appears that the investigation 
[…] was conducted tendentiously (tendentsiozno) and a number of documents appended 
to the file were falsified”; Kas’ian’s daughter further attested to having been physically 
coerced into defaming her father and signing a pre-prepared interrogation transcript.538 
Evidently scandalized that such underhanded methods had been applied against a Party 
member since 1905 who had endured repression under the Tsarist authorities, Georgian 
Mensheviks, and Armenian Dashnaks, the court deemed it “necessary to conduct a 
review and establish who falsified the abovementioned materials, and also identify all the 
individuals who had an interest in the biased (neob’’ektivnom) conduct of the 
investigation into Kas’ian’s case, and resolve the question of their accountability.”539 
Rudenko’s deputy D. E. Salin tasked his Department for Special Cases with tracking 
down the responsible parties; in a June 1955 directive the department instructed 
Georgia’s procurator to assist in ensuring that the guilty were “brought to justice,” as per 
the Judicial Collegium’s special ruling.540 After several months’ delay, the Georgian 
Procuracy identified Kas’ian’s tormentor as Gurgen Aivazov, the former chief of the 7th 
Section of the Georgian NKVD’s Secret-Political Department.541 Aivazov was already 
                                                
538 GARF f. 8131, op. 31, d. 46019, l. 45. 
539 GARF f. 8131, op. 31, d. 46019, l. 46. 
540 GARF f. 8131, op. 31, d. 46019, l. 50. 
541 The  Department for Special Cases reminded the Procurator of the Georgian SSR M. E. Topuridze in 
September of his obligation to provide an answer to the Judicial Collegium’s query in a timely manner; the 
Georgian Procuracy responded at the end of the month that the question had been forwarded to the KGB 
for further clarification, and it was not until October 27 that the All-Union Procuracy was informed of 
Aivazov’s identity. GARF f. 8131, op. 31, d. 46019, ll. 51-52.   
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beyond the judiciary’s reach, though, as he had fallen in combat during the Great 
Patriotic War.542  
While Vladimir Kirshon’s rehabilitation was still in progress – in June 1955 – the 
Chief Military Procuracy tried to track down a pair of state security officers involved in 
his interrogation. Citing “demands that have arisen (voznikshei nadobnosti),” 
investigators inquired with the KGB’s personnel department after the current 
whereabouts of Aleksandr Spiridonovich Zhurbenko and Vladimir Izrailevich Rusinov, 
taking pains not to mention the ultimate subject of their research.543 If the two were no 
longer employed within the “organs,” the military procurators wanted to know when and 
under what circumstances they had been removed from their posts. The KGB’s reply the 
following month made clear that neither man remained on state security’s payroll: 
Zhurbenko had been drummed out in December 1938, while Rusinov remained at his 
post until late 1950.544 No indication was given of their ultimate fates – which for 
Zhurbenko entailed capital punishment in February 1940 – and the Chief Military 
Procuracy evidently opted against following up on Rusinov, suggesting that either his 
potential testimony was not deemed essential, or there was no further interest in pursuing 
charges against him.545  
                                                
542 GARF f. 8131, op. 31, d. 46019, l. 54. Aivazov appears to have been one of some 1,600 imprisoned 
chekisty who Beriia requested be released from imprisonment and allowed to redeem themselves at the 
front in December 1941; see Viola, Stalinist Perpetrators, xii. 
543 GARF f. 8131, op. 31, d. 98739, l. 48. It is possible that investigators sought only to question Zhurbenko 
and Rusinov about the circumstances surrounding Kirshon’s repression, but given the atmosphere at the 
time and Zhurbenko’s ranking position within state security it seems unlikely that they would not have 
been called to account for their actions.  
544 GARF f. 8131, op. 31, d. 98739, l. 56. 
545 On Zhurbenko’s career, see Petrov and Skorkin, Kto rukovodil NKVD, 195. Ezhov purportedly entrusted 
Zhurbenko with secreting materials relating to Beriia’s Civil War-era activities from the Central State 
Archive of the October Revolution (today’s GARF) for use as kompromat; Beriia subsequently oversaw 
Zhurbenko’s arrest. See Nikita Petrov and Marc Jansen, “Stalinskii pitomets” – Nikolai Ezhov (Moskva: 
ROSSPEN, 2009), 164-165, 182-183. 
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Although the putative conspiracies for which NKVD officers were repressed 
rarely had any connection with their actual offenses against Soviet citizens, the Procuracy 
and the Party frequently upheld their sentences as retroactive punishment for the 
“violations of socialist legality” that transpired under Stalin. This logic emerged in a 
memorandum that Baranov prepared at Mikoian’s request on April 29, 1956, listing 
purged 17th Party Congress attendees according to their current legal status. Of the 195 
repressed individuals recorded, 123 had already been rehabilitated, 28 awaited final 
decisions on already completed investigations, 25 had cases currently under review, and 
15 had been defendants at the Moscow show trials and were therefore ineligible – at the 
time – for rehabilitation.546 The remaining four men – Vsevolod Appolonovich Balitskii, 
Terentii Dmitrievich Deribas, Iakov Saulovich Agranov, and Stanislav Redens – were 
identified as having permitted or carried out “mass arrests, falsification of cases, and 
other gross violations of legality” while holding senior positions in the NKVD, which 
also exempted them from exoneration.547 Despite this insistence on the part of the 
Procuracy, within several years two of the four, Redens and Deribas, had been officially 
exculpated, further blurring the tenuous distinction between victims and perpetrators that 
Baranov and his colleagues attempted to draw. Yet their pariah status, along with that of 
their fellow secret policemen, remained a source of contention within the Soviet 
government.  
                                                
546 GARF f. 8131, op. 32, d. 4575, l. 119. The report divided repressed attendees into six categories: those 
who were already rehabilitated, those whose case reviews had been completed, but a decision on their 
rehabilitation had not yet been issued, those whose case reviews were underway, those who were convicted 
in public trials (“Osuzhdennye po otkrytym sudebnym protsessam”), which, based on the figures listed 
referred to the three Moscow show trials, those who had committed suicide, and those whose cases were 
not reopened (Proverka ne proizvodilas’). All of those included in the last category, save Avel’ Enukidze, 
who was tied to the show trial defendants, were ranking senior policemen. 
547 GARF f. 8131, op. 32, d. 4575, ll. 115-118. 
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 Rudenko overruled his deputy on Deribas’ case just over a year and a half after 
Baranov issued his memorandum to Mikoian, and in their report to the Central 
Committee, he and Serov sidestepped the issue of Deribas’ culpability in the outrages of 
the purges entirely. The duo even went so far as to attribute Deribas’ repression to his 
principled stance against the NKVD’s resort to illegal tactics. Only after Deribas 
“attempted to obstruct (vosprepiatstvovat’) the baseless arrests and illegal investigative 
methods” that had become standard recourse for NKVD officers in the Far Eastern krai 
was he removed from his post and arrested.548 Thus in Rudenko and Serov’s depiction 
Deribas emerged not only as innocent of the crimes that Baranov had ascribed to him, but 
also as a martyr for Soviet state security’s founding values of discipline and vigilance. 
Viktorov appears to have internalized this narrative, extolling Deribas in his memoir as 
having been among the “genuine, stalwart, principled chekisty” who “[stood] up for 
Leninist principles.”549 However, he did not extend this assessment to Deribas’ fellow 
secret policeman Redens, whose rehabilitation both he and the Party Control Committee 
regarded as a grave error.         
In conversation with journalist Evgeniia Al’bats, Viktorov acknowledged his 
participation in Redens’ rehabilitation as a “sin” that weighed particularly heavily on his 
conscience.550 According to Viktorov, the Chief Military Procuracy received a petition 
from the Redens family requesting that his file be reexamined in 1956; familiar with 
Redens’ career within the Moscow branch of the NKVD, Viktorov refused it 
immediately. Sometime thereafter – Viktorov provided no indication as to when – he 
                                                
548 Artizov et al, Reabilitatsiia, vol. 2, 296. 
549 Viktorov, Bez grifa “Sekretno,” 267-268. 
550 Evgeniia Al’bats, Mina zamedlennogo deistviia (Politicheskii portret KGB) (Moskva: Russlit, 1992), 
116. 
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took delivery of a terse admonition from Khrushchev: “I strongly urge you to sort this out 
(Nastoiatel’no proshu razobrat’sia).”551 Khrushchev had signaled his openness to 
reassessing Redens’ reputation as early as May 1954, when he suggested at the close of a 
speech to the Leningrad Party aktiv that Beriia had masterminded Redens’ downfall 
within the Georgian NKVD, and in this instance he did not hesitate to exert direct 
influence over the course of justice.552 The military procurator surmised the General 
Secretary’s wishes, and in due course grounds were found to recommend Redens’ 
rehabilitation. In its ruling from November 10, 1961, the Military Collegium 
acknowledged Redens’ participation in mass arrests, application of physical force against 
detainees, and falsification of investigative materials, any one of which under ordinary 
circumstances would have constituted “official misconduct,” but deemed it “inadvisable” 
to weigh in on the question of Redens’ liability, and instead went forward with the 
controversial vindication.553 In keeping with a pattern identified by historian Edward 
Cohn, the Party’s deliberative bodies maintained a hard line in the face of Khrushchev 
and the judiciary’s more conciliatory position on Redens, dredging up his extensive 
history of misdeeds to substantiate the repeated denial of requests to restore his 
membership.554 The Party Control Committee’s (KPK) refusal to allow the ranks of the 
                                                
551 Ibid. Khrushchev’s intervention in the Redens case might have been out of concern for Anna Allilueva’s 
wellbeing, though he also admitted in his memoirs to having “liked [Redens] a lot” based on their 
interactions around Stalin’s table. They also came close to sitting together on the Moscow-region NKVD 
troika, but Khrushchev’s spot was taken by his deputy. For Khrushchev’s recollections of Redens, see 
Khrushchev, Memoirs, vol. 1, 46, 78.    
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Georgian secret police after being found drunk on the streets of Tbilisi. Khrushchev maintained that Beriia 
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553 Artizov et al, Reabilitatsiia, vol. 2, 393-394. Redens’ son, Vladimir Alliluev, evocatively conflated the 
“incredible year 1961 of Gagarin’s flight” with the timing of his father’s posthumous rehabilitation; see 
Vladimir Alliluev, Stalin-Alliluevy: khronika odnoi sem’i (Moskva: Algoritm, 2014), 308. 
554 Artizov et al, Reabilitatsiia, vol. 2, 392-394. Anna Allilueva first approached the Moscow City Party 
Committee in February 1962 seeking Redens’ reinstatement into the CPSU, and the following summer she 
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Party to be sullied by a figure as compromised as Redens speaks to its willingness to 
defend its prerogatives against intrusion even by the First Secretary, as well as a distinct 
tension over the direction that rehabilitation would assume in the aftermath of the 22nd 
Party Congress.555 
 Given the large number of ranking NKVD operatives who to this day remain 
unrehabilitated, the judiciary and Party’s handling of Izrail’ Iakovlevich Dagin’s dossier 
appears far more typical than that of Deribas or Redens’ files.556 For much of the 1930s 
Dagin was one of Ezhov’s most trusted lieutenants; at the time of his arrest in November 
1938 he was in charge of the Soviet leadership’s security detail.557 Some 18 years later 
his brother addressed himself to Mikhail Suslov at the Central Committee, calling for 
Dagin’s conviction to be vacated, and his Party membership restored. Although the Chief 
Military Procuracy’s review found nothing to support the accusation of membership in a 
Rightist terrorist organization for which Dagin was condemned in January 1940, it did 
uncover his extensive involvement in purging the North Caucasus and Ordzhonikidze 
krais between 1933 and 1937, which was marked by the widespread use of “illegal 
                                                                                                                                            
pressed her luck again, appealing to the Party Control Committee in the name of the 22nd Party Congress. 
On similar rejections and the KPK’s approach to secret police perpetrators, see Cohn, High Title of a 
Communist, 103-104, 109-114. 
555 The Redens case was one of several in which daylight seems to have existed between the upper 
leadership, the judiciary, and the Party’s deliberative bodies over which figures merited rehabilitation. 
Boris Viktorov maintained that between 1956 and 1961 the Procuracy submitted protests to the Plenum of 
the USSR Supreme Court on behalf of several show trial defendants, including Piatakov, Sokol’nikov, 
Radek, and Livshits, but none of these cases were reopened until the Gorbachev years. Likewise, in one of 
the latest rehabilitation reports uncovered for this study, from February 1962, Rudenko recommended the 
dismissal of all charges against Left Oppositionist Evgenii Alekseevich Preobrazhenskii to KPK Deputy 
Chairman Zinovii Timofeevich Serdiuk, arguing that there was no evidence of him diverging from the 
Party line following his readmission in 1933; Rudenko’s recommendations appear to have gone unheeded, 
though, as Preobrazhenskii was not legally cleared until December 1988. See Viktorov, Bez grifa 
“Sekretno,” 211; GARF f. 8131, op. 32, d. 6748, ll. 46-47.      
556 The vast majority of chekisty put to death who are mentioned in Petrov and Skorkin, Kto rukovodil 
NKVD are listed as “not rehabilitated.” To this day, the rehabilitation of leading secret policemen remains a 
highly controversial issue, as evinced by the fact that within the past five years both Iakov Agranov and 
Genrikh Iagoda, among many others, were put forward for and subsequently denied legal absolution. 
557 Iakovlev, Lubianka, 66, 193; Petrov and Skorkin, Kto rukovodil NKVD, 165; Jansen and Petrov, Stalin’s 
Loyal Executioner, 155. 
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investigative methods” to induce suspects to “slander themselves and others,” and 
thereby saw “innocent people sentenced to execution and other serious punishments.”558 
Those targeted included the head of the Ordzhonikidze railroad I. I. Maevskii – whose 
case Dagin personally oversaw – and his staff, as well as over 300 Party, industrial, and 
agricultural figures shot as conspirators in a putative “Circassian Bourgeois-Nationalist 
Organization”; the KPK found that recent investigations had resulted in the overturning 
of all of the convictions in the North Caucasus affairs.559 For such “egregious perversions 
(grubeishie izvrashcheniia) of Soviet legality” the Chief Military Procuracy allowed the 
verdict against Dagin to stand, which marked a wholly different tack than the one 
adopted with Redens, who was acknowledged to be politically and morally compromised, 
but still found deserving of absolution.560 
 
Conclusion 
 The Khrushchev years were marked by the reassertion of legal norms that had 
either been suppressed by Kremlin fiat or were openly flouted during the period of High 
Stalinism. Beyond the disbandment of the MVD Special Board, judges began to sour on 
the use of many of the provisions of Article 58 of the criminal code, which concerned 
counterrevolutionary crimes, with Cheptsov at the Military Collegium deeming a 
                                                
558 RGANI f. 6, op. 6, d. 1716, l. 11.  
559 Ibid. Toward the end of his memoirs Mikoian noted that in 1972 he aided Maevskii’s son in restoring his 
father’s Order of Lenin, and suggested that the order for Maevskii’s arrest had originated with Kaganovich, 
who demanded a preemptive purge of his commissariat. See Mikoian, Tak bylo, 630. 
560 RGANI f. 6, op. 6, d. 1716, l.12. Agnessa Mironovna reported that her attempts to secure rehabilitation 
for Sergei Mironov – who was part of the same chekist clique from which Dagin emerged – were similarly 
rebuffed on the grounds that he “exceeded his powers in Mongolia,” where as a plenipotentiary of the 
Soviet regime he helped organize purges in the fledgling people’s republic. She considered the fact that 
Mironov went without a grave where he could be properly mourned as part of his “posthumous 
punishment.” See Mironova-Korol, Agnessa, 203-205. 
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directive on the application of 58-8 against suspected terrorists “outdated.”561 In April 
1956 the emergency law of December 1, 1934, which had allowed for the summary 
execution of counterrevolutionaries, was repealed, and the 1958 Fundamental Principles 
of Criminal Law ruled out confessions as constituting the sole grounds for conviction.562 
As the Soviet state sought to eliminate the conditions that facilitated mass terror, the 
judiciary – and the Procuracy in particular – did the substantive work of exonerating 
those for whom such reforms came too late. Well before the principle was recognized as 
law, the Procuracy’s investigations provided incontrovertible proof of the unviability of 
relying exclusively upon confessions to secure convictions, and furnished the Party with 
material that bolstered Khrushchev and his contemporaries’ drive to bring the organs of 
state security to heel.  
Through successive, interlinked rehabilitations that reinforced one another the 
Procuracy was gradually able to transition from a model of posthumous exoneration that 
was predicated on attacking Beriia and his subordinates’ roles in individuals’ repressions 
to one that emphasized the prevalence of already-rehabilitated figures within the 
investigative file of a person under consideration. While the Procuracy’s functionaries 
gradually moved away from predicating individual rehabilitations on Beriia’s malign 
influence, as the following chapter reveals throughout the Khrushchev years the former 
head of state security was never far from the judiciary’s consciousness, as he and his 
subordinates were held exclusively responsible for the destruction of Bolshevism’s best 
and brightest. In keeping with their generally hostile and exclusionary attitude toward 
                                                
561 Yoram Gorlizki, “De-Stalinization and the Politics of Russian Criminal Justice, 1953-1964,” (D. Phil. 
Thesis, University of Oxford, 1992), 57.  
562 Harold J. Berman, Soviet Criminal Law and Procedure: The RSFSR Codes, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1972), 51, 57-58; Gordon B. Smith, Reforming the Russian Legal System (Cambridge and 
New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 55. 
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secret policemen, and in the interest of shielding the Party from any hint of complicity in 
the Terror, the Procuracy and Supreme Court mobilized the posthumously rehabilitated to 
force a reckoning with the former headmen of the NKVD. 
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Chapter Four – Chastening Chekisty, Redeeming the Party: The Anti-Beriia 
Trials of 1955-1956 
 
[…] after the trial of Beria we found ourselves prisoners 
of this version that we had created in the interests of  
clearing Stalin’s name. It was not God who was to blame 
but one of the lower-ranking “saints” who reported to 
God. They didn’t report accurately, and therefore God 
sent down hailstorms, thunder and lightning, and other 
calamities. The people had suffered not because God 
wanted that to happen but because “Saint Nicholas,” 
“Elijah the Prophet,” Beria, and others had been bad. 
We tried to whitewash Stalin, to clean him up. We acted 
contrary to the Russian proverb that says: “You can’t 
keep washing a black cat till it turns white.”563    
 
In April 1956 Mir Dzhafar Bagirov, the onetime Communist Party satrap of 
Azerbaijan, candidate member of the Central Committee’s Presidium, and close 
confederate of Lavrentii Beriia, addressed the visiting session of the USSR Supreme 
Court’s Military Collegium convened to try him and five subordinates from the republic’s 
organs of state security at Baku’s Dzerzhinskii Palace of Culture. Upon hearing the 
allegations leveled against his codefendants, Bagirov hyperbolically declared: “I believed 
them, I entrusted them with the organs of the People’s Commissariat of Internal Affairs. 
Therefore, the wrong I have done to the people is so great that it is not enough to shoot 
me, not enough to hang me, I should be quartered and ripped into pieces.”564 Though 
likely intended as a self-preservationist gambit, Bagirov’s outburst failed to stay the hand 
of socialist justice, and on May 26 that year, having exhausted all of his appeals for 
clemency, he became the final Party secretary to face execution in the USSR.  
                                                
563 Khrushchev, Memoirs, vol. 2, 212. 
564 Dzhamil’ Gasanly (Jamil Hasanli), Khrushchevskaia “ottepel’” i natsional’nyi vopros v Azerbaidzhane 
(1954-1959) (Moskva: Flinta, 2009), 125. On the role of trust and kompromat within Bagirov’s patronage 
network, see Yoram Gorlizki, “Structures of Trust after Stalin,” The Slavonic and East European Review 
91, 1 (January 2013): 132-138. 
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The deaths of Bagirov and most of his lieutenants dealt a decisive blow in a 
campaign engineered by the post-Stalin Party leadership to root out the remnants of what 
Timothy Blauvelt has termed Lavrentii Beriia’s “secret police patronage network,” which 
was launched with Beriia’s own ambush-style arrest in June 1953.565 Between the 
September 7-19, 1955 show trial in Tbilisi against Avksentii Narikievich Rapava, the 
former Georgian Minister of State Control, Nikolai Maksimovich Rukhadze, Georgia’s 
Minister for State Security until he was toppled during the Mingrelian Affair, and other 
accused lipachi (serial fabricators) from Georgian state security and the Baku 
proceedings – which took two weeks beginning April 12 – the Soviet judiciary 
prosecuted fourteen of Beriia’s principal clients in open court; all but four were 
condemned to die.566 A third trial, held during the interval between the Caucasian public 
spectacles and concurrently with the 20th Party Congress in late February 1956, was 
convened in camera in Moscow to pass judgment on Boris Veniaminovich Rodos, likely 
Soviet state security’s single most notorious interrogator, given the number of high-
profile individuals in whose questioning he participated.567 As with most of the Tbilisi 
and Baku defendants, Rodos was sentenced to capital punishment.  
As previous chapters have demonstrated, at its very inception posthumous 
rehabilitation in the Soviet Union was bound up with ascribing responsibility for the mass 
                                                
565 See Blauvelt, “March of the chekists.” 
566 For an exhaustive account of all the personages involved in the show trials, see N. G. Smirnov, Rapava, 
Bagirov i drugie: antistalinskie protsessy 1950-kh gg. (Moskva: AIRO-XXI, 2014). A young Procuracy 
functionary at the time of the Tbilisi and Baku proceedings, Smirnov was present for both as acting 
secretary. The defendants in Tbilisi were Rapava, Rukhadze, Shalva Otarovich Tsereteli, Nikita 
Arkad’evich Krimian, Aleksandr Samoilovich Khazan, Konstantin Sergeevich Savitskii, Georgii Iovich 
Paramonov, and Sardon Nikolaevich Nadaraia; in Baku, Bagirov, Aga Salim Atakishiev, Ruben 
Ambartsumovich Markarian, Khoren Ivanovich Grigorian, Timofei Mikhailovich Borshchev, and Stepan 
Fedorovich Emel’ianov were in the dock. 
567 Rodos is one of the few NKVD interrogators to have cameos in at least two works of fiction, including 
Simon Sebag Montifiore’s pastiche on the life of Ezhov’s wife, Evgeniia Feigenburg, Sashenka, and Travis 
Holland’s The Archivist’s Story, both of which draw on his part in the investigation against Isaak Babel’. 
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violence that the state had unleashed against its earliest acolytes. From Beriia’s initial 
questionings following his arrest, when he was confronted with the names of individuals 
who would shortly be returned to posterity, to the judiciary’s efforts to track down 
specific operatives involved in fabricating materials against innocents, the NKVD and its 
successor agencies were consistently identified as the source of the rot that had perverted 
healthy Bolshevik vigilance into self-destructive paranoia. Yet in the first two years 
following posthumous rehabilitation’s inauguration, the findings it generated regarding 
the organs of state security remained predominantly under wraps, broached only during 
high-level Party meetings or discussions within the judiciary. With the decision to hold 
proceedings against Beriia’s accomplices, the post-Stalin government exploited an 
opportunity to instrumentalize the investigations that had come to occupy so much of the 
Procuracy’s energies, and make public certain details about the purges that had been 
uncovered over the opening two years of the rehabilitation process.  
Though the proceedings against Rukhadze, Rapava, Rodos, and Bagirov remained 
well within the vein of earlier prosecutions of secret police perpetrators, in that the 
defendants’ convictions were foregone conclusions and they were found guilty of 
offences that had been authorized at the highest level, the trials also served as something 
of a turning point in the Soviet regime’s relationship to the internal implementation of 
violence. By confronting the mass repressions of the recent past through selective 
rehabilitations of purged Party members, and deploying the records of their persecution 
to excise those within the secret police who had been called to account, the party-state’s 
leadership managed to foist responsibility for the Terror onto newly designated “enemies 
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of the people.”568 Once these elements had been dealt with, instead of initiating a new 
wave of purges, the members of the post-Stalin ruling circle renounced the threat of lethal 
force as a means of conducting domestic politics, and instead embraced a form of 
collective security, even amidst mutual distrust and suspicion.    
Although these trials are largely absent from recent accounts of the Khrushchev 
era, beginning in the early 1960s Russia-watchers in the West seized upon the Tbilisi and 
Baku actions both because of the implications they bore for Soviet power politics, and the 
fact that they occasioned the first widespread mention of posthumously rehabilitated 
individuals since Beriia’s prosecution. Though the only materials made available on the 
trials consisted of two short press releases, Sovietologists were eager to extract whatever 
information they could, and made much of the long-disappeared figures who merited 
exposure in connection with the verdicts.569 However, given the widespread impulse to 
question the official Soviet account of major developments, some scholars were quick to 
discount the received version of events, going so far as to express skepticism over 
whether they were open to the public or even held at all.570 This incredulity, compounded 
by the paucity of information in circulation regarding the visiting sessions of the Military 
Collegium, has led many to disregard these important proceedings.571 
Writing about Beriia’s deposal and elimination, historian Mark Kramer contends 
that it “marked the last time that violence was used in power struggles in the USSR,” 
                                                
568 On the notion of “excision” in the postwar Soviet Union, see Amir Weiner, Making Sense of War: The 
Second World War and the Fate of the Bolshevik Revolution (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001), 
Chapters 3 and 4. 
569 See Robert Conquest, Power and Policy in the U.S.S.R.: The Study of Soviet Dynastics (New York: St. 
Martin’s Press, 1961), 269, 289; Labedz, “Resurrection–and Perdition,” 50; Shapiro, “Rehabilitation 
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570 Vladimir Gsovski, “The Soviet Union,” in Government, Law and Courts in the Soviet Union and 
Eastern Europe, eds. Vladimir Gsovski and Kazimerz Grzybowski (New York: Praeger, 1960), 584-585. 
571 A notable exception is Michael Parrish, The Lesser Terror: Soviet State Security, 1939-1953 (Westport, 
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eliding the slow-moving purge that targeted Beriia’s clients in his power bases of the 
Caucasus and Moscow.572 On the subject of trials against purge perpetrators, Roy 
Medvedev has altogether denied their existence, writing that in the aftermath of the 20th 
Party Congress “[n]o one was brought to justice – neither the NKVD investigators who 
used torture on their victims nor the heads or warders of camps and prisons.”573 Likewise, 
Stephen Cohen has broadly generalized about the trajectory and objectives of the anti-
Beriia campaign: “When Stalin’s other successors put on trial and executed ‘Beria’s 
gang’ in 1953, 1954, and 1955, they attempted to obscure any larger implications. The 
proceedings were closed, Beria was falsely convicted of treason and espionage, and his 
misdeeds were disassociated from Stalin’s remaining heirs.”574 While the assertion that 
the trials were intended to divert accountability away from the new ruling clique is indeed 
correct, the claim that all were “closed” is belied by the presence of hundreds of carefully 
selected spectators in both Tbilisi and Baku. Though the trials fell far short of present-day 
notions of judicial independence and openness, as tent poles of the larger campaign to 
discredit Beriia, rein in state security, and ultimately eliminate internecine violence as a 
means of conducting Soviet politics, they cannot be discounted. 
 By virtue of the fact that Khrushchev stridently disparaged him in the Secret 
Speech, Rodos has been guaranteed a place in Soviet historiography, but few works have 
probed his life beyond his brief audience with the Presidium on February 1, 1956 and its 
description in “On the Cult of Personality and Its Consequences.”575 As with many 
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matters related to Soviet state security, the best account of Rodos’ career comes courtesy 
of Nikita Petrov, who reconstructs the notorious inquisitor’s methods and assignments 
largely through evidence assembled for his trial, though he does not delve into the court 
case itself.576 Petrov is among the pioneers of the field of perpetrator studies in the Soviet 
context, a rapidly developing discipline with which this chapter engages.   
Historian Lynne Viola has posited the participation of citizens at all levels of 
Soviet society in mass repressions “against mainly innocent people” as the “question of 
questions in our effort to fathom the mass violence of the Stalin era.”577 Drawing upon 
interrogation transcripts and court materials generated during the trials of NKVD 
perpetrators – largely in the Soviet periphery – over the course of Beriia’s “purge of the 
purgers” between 1939 and 1942, which was meant to rein in the excesses of the 
Ezhovshchina, Viola and her collaborators have attempted to reconstruct the methods and 
motivations of state security operatives working far from the Kremlin’s watchful eye.578 
Addressing the political calculus behind this round of bloodletting directed against the 
group Paul Gregory has termed “Stalin’s Praetorians,” Viola aptly notes that the trials 
                                                                                                                                            
Khrushchev and De-Stalinization in the Soviet Union 1953-1964,” in The Cambridge History of 
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were not carried out in the spirit of “justice for the real victims” – meaning the vast 
majority of those arrested during the Terror, who were non-Party members – nor did they 
represent “a change of heart on the part of Stalin.”579 Rather, they were conceived as a 
means of asserting the Party’s status as innocent victim of a state security apparatus run 
amok, “ignoring the central role of the leadership of the Party in the Great Terror. The 
trials were Stalin’s gift to the Party, serving to relegitimize its authority and its power 
following two years of terror.”580  
Though the hearings against NKVD officers during the Stalin years were held in 
secret and scant details made public, in many respects they were the direct antecedents of 
the trials that this chapter explores. By foisting all responsibility for the destruction of 
loyal Party and Soviet cadres on Beriia and his band of malefactors, the Khrushchev-era 
authorities reaffirmed the Party’s status as the primary target of the Terror’s devastation, 
and insulated its leadership – Stalin included – from further scrutiny.581 Within this 
equation, the posthumously rehabilitated functioned both as icons of the Party’s righteous 
past, and as physical embodiments of the irreparable devastation that Beriia’s attempts to 
conceal his transgressions and settle old scores wrought.582  
 
Striking the First Blow: Early Trials and Investigations 
 
When Beriia and his closest lieutenants Goglidze, Kobulov, Vlodzimirskii, 
Meshik, Dekanozov, and Merkulov went before a special session of the USSR Supreme 
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Court chaired by Marshal Ivan Konev – who, like most of the panel’s members, had no 
judicial experience – on December 18, 1953, they faced charges of treason, terrorism, and 
counter-revolutionary activities, relating to their chief’s supposed ties to British 
intelligence, the purge of the Red Army in the fall of 1941 following the Nazi invasion of 
the USSR, and Beriia’s service in Azerbaijan’s pan-Islamic Musavat government during 
the Russian Civil War, respectively. These accusations suggested a longstanding pattern 
of treachery that supposedly culminated with Beriia’s design to wrest control of the 
USSR from the Party and place it in the hands of the security organs. After six days in 
session, all the defendants were found guilty and summarily executed.583  
In passing judgment on their former collaborators at the Ministries of Internal 
Affairs and State Security, the Soviet judicial organs were confronted with a set of 
challenges engendered by the new political environment. Having reconsolidated the 
MVD and MGB under his purview following Stalin’s death, Beriia embarked on an 
ambitious, unilateral program of carceral reform.584 Among these changes was an April 4 
ban on the implementation of “any measures of coercion or physical force” against 
prisoners.585 While the impetus for this decision is unclear, given Beriia’s extensive, 
career-long reliance on torture, it brought the remaining members of the Presidium up 
against a stark dilemma in building the case against Beriia and those that followed: would 
they revert back to the practices that were widespread under their predecessors by 
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extracting confessions under duress, or would they turn to new means of substantiating 
the charges they leveled? The question of whether torture was employed during 
chekisty’s interrogations in the 1950s is a thorny one that cannot be conclusively resolved 
with currently available materials. That said, Viola has discerned certain telltale signs of 
torture in interrogation transcripts from Beriia’s purge of the NKVD, such as a sudden 
shift to “stilted, sometimes monosyllabic” responses on the defendants’ part; accused 
state security operatives also showed little reticence in claiming to have been tortured 
when professing their innocence.586 No such caesuras are present in the records of 
interrogations from the period under study – though they may well have been doctored 
accordingly – and at no point either in open court or in their various appeals for clemency 
did the members of Beriia’s coterie claim that their testimony was in any way coerced.587    
The more outlandish accusations contrived against Beriia and his cohort – 
particularly those relating to his supposed collaboration with British agents to reestablish 
capitalism in the Soviet Union, and the sordid focus on Beriia’s sex life – resulted in a 
verdict that remains under a pall of doubt to this day.588 Were the cases against Beriia’s 
allies to proceed at least semi-transparently, new grounds would have to be found to 
substantiate the state’s allegations. The solution that the Party and judiciary devised 
would have major ramifications not only for the trajectory of the proceedings themselves, 
but also for the Soviet polity’s understanding of its own troubled past.  
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 Beriia and Bogdan Kobulov were interrogated at length in August and September 
1953, respectively, about their dealings with former Georgian Party Secretary Samson 
Andreevich Mamuliia, who had been arrested and executed in the fall of 1937. Pressed 
about testimony that Mamuliia faced abuse during his imprisonment, Kobulov 
prevaricated, first insisting that he knew nothing of such activities, then suddenly 
recalling that he and Goglidze once went to speak to Mamuliia and found him “saddled 
with a table” across his shoulders, which “obviously the investigators did without 
authorization (samovol’nichali).”589 When the newly-promoted Rudenko interrogated 
Beriia a month later, his queries were met with matter-of-fact denials, as had been the 
case with his questions regarding Papuliia Ordzhonikidze: Beriia claimed not to know 
why Mamuliia was arrested, nor could he recall what sort of statements he made to 
investigators. He asserted that no specific order was given to beat Mamuliia, though “in 
general prisoners were beaten.”590 Beriia was equally stoic when challenged over his 
conduct toward Mamiia Orakhelashvili, who Rudenko alleged had been arrested at the 
end of 1937 and transferred from Moscow to Tbilisi for the explicit purpose of coercing 
him to make defamatory statements against Sergo Ordzhonikidze. Even when confronted 
with testimony from Nadaraia, Savitskii, and Goglidze that directly contradicted his 
statements, Beriia categorically rejected Rudenko’s allegations.591 Rudenko’s attempt to 
make use of the example of Mamuliia and Orakhelashvili was further hampered by the 
fact that in the eyes of the Soviet authorities they remained enemies of Soviet power. It 
should come as little surprise, then, that these particular charges were not revealed during 
                                                
589 Khaustov, Delo Beriia, 280. 
590 Ibid., 315. 
591 Ibid., 315-317. Beriia was similary unfazed in early November when he was confronted with a transcript 
he had signed from one of Orakhelashvili’s interrogations detailing Ordzhonikidze’s supposed role in the 
Georgian counterrevolutionary center; see ibid., 399-402. 
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the course of the proceedings against Beriia or his closest lieutenants, but they were 
clearly never far from the minds of Rudenko and others at the Procuracy.592   
 Bagirov’s expulsion from the Communist Party occasioned one of the first 
instances in which posthumously rehabilitated figures were mentioned outside of internal 
judiciary, Party, or KGB documents. Bagirov remained at liberty following Beriia’s 
downfall – though he was removed from the Central Committee and all positions of 
influence by July 1953 and transferred to a menial role at the Ministry of Oil Production 
– but in March 1954 he was summoned before the Party Control Committee and 
castigated for his cozy relationship with Beriia and their joint criminal ventures. The 
KPK detailed Bagirov’s feud with Osval’d Ianovich Nodev, the Latvian deputy chief of 
the Azerbaijan NKVD who had the temerity to cast aspersions on Beriia’s record as a 
secret policeman, and also brought to light Bagirov’s arrest at the hands of Gogoberidze, 
who seized him in 1918 after he rampaged through Azerbaijan as part of a “flying 
squad.”593 Although neither Nodev nor Gogoberidze were described as having been 
posthumously rehabilitated, the fact that they were officially acknowledged as loyal 
exponents of Soviet power marked a major shift in the Party’s relationship with 
wrongfully executed notables, and demonstrated the value of these individuals’ stories for 
the purposes of the anti-Beriia purge.  
This is not to suggest, though, that the Soviet judiciary immediately embraced 
rehabilitation cases as sources of incriminating evidence. Between the fall of 1954 and 
                                                
592 Amy Knight conjectures that the anti-Beriia plotters might have initially planned on bringing Beriia to 
account in a public forum, which would help account for the reams of unused investigative materials 
assembled against him; though this is a intriguing possibility, as Rodos’ case indicates, the Procuracy did 
not hesitate to compile testimony and archival evidence that were not necessarily intended for public 
consumption. See Knight, Beriia, 222. 
593 Ibid., 435, 440. 
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February 1955 two of Beriia’s trusted adjutants, Bogdan Kobulov’s younger brother, 
Amaiak, and Solomon Rafailovich Mil’shtein, were tried for their roles in Beriia’s 
organization and put to death. In both instances the bills of indictment made explicit 
mention of the chekisty’s participation in beatings intended to extract testimony from 
prisoners implicating themselves and others, but few individual targets were mentioned; 
Mil’shtein admitted that he knew of Beriia’s conspiring against Gogoberidze, Kakhiani, 
and other Georgian politicians, but he took no part in their repression and was accused 
only of having helped Beriia to conceal evidence of their mistreatment.594 Lev 
Shvartsman, who collaborated closely with Rodos on “special assignments” and claimed 
to have purposefully undermined the case against Kosarev, was eventually shot in April 
1955; the Military Collegium ruled that Shvartsman had tortured detainees because he 
was “in outlook a bourgeois nationalist” who had been “raised in the spirit of 
Zionism.”595 This verdict was far more in line with the anti-cosmopolitan campaign of the 
closing years of Stalin’s rule – when Shvartsman was first taken into state custody – than 
the sort of legalism that Khrushchev-era courts professed. Even as the judiciary exploited 
preexisting prejudices to secure Shvartsman’s conviction, it had already initiated a wave 
of prosecutions that drew directly upon recent strides that had been made in the campaign 
for posthumous rehabilitation.596 
                                                
594 For the indictments against Amaiak Kobulov and Mil’shtein, see ibid., 501-529; for the Military 
Collegium’s sentences, see GARF f. 8131, op. 32, d. 3286, ll. 175-180, 315-323. 
595 Quoted in Petrov, Palachi, 164. Shvartsman’s wife and two children were expelled from Moscow 
following his conviction; see Mozokhin, Politbiuro i delo Beriia, 829. 
596 Other ranking NKVD officers sentenced to various camp or prison terms at this time included Efim 
Mikhailovich Libenson, accused of gathering kompromat on Mikhail Kaganovich and extensive 
involvement in the repression of the Kedrovs, and Arkadii Iakovlevich Gertsovskii, who purportedly 
intercepted prisoners’ letters meant for Party and government leaders and helped conceal the extent of the 
mass shootings carried out in October 1941 at Beriia’s order. See Mozokhin, Poliburo i delo Beriia, 816-
826.  
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Already in early May 1954 Rudenko and Khrushchev delivered speeches about 
the unraveling of the Leningrad Affair to the city’s Party aktiv, depicting its organizer, 
Viktor Abakumov, as an intriguer who alongside Beriia fabricated cases against honest 
Party workers and openly flouted Stalin’s will.597 During his freewheeling address, 
Khrushchev – in trademark style – floated an idea that the audience met enthusiastically: 
“Apparently in the near future there will be a trial against Abakumov. I was of the 
opinion, we exchanged opinions, I don’t know how feasible it is: maybe Abakumov’s 
trial ought be organized here, in Leningrad.”598 Regardless of whether this proposal was 
off-the-cuff or reflected preexisting plans, on December 14 that year the Military 
Collegium convened a public session to try Abakumov and five of his former associates 
from the MGB in the same building where the hearings on the Leningrad Affair had 
taken place. Four lawyers were brought in from Moscow to represent the accused, but the 
proceedings were not held in a spirit of openness: when Abakumov and his codefendants 
attempted to point out Stalin’s initiating role in the Leningrad Affair, Rudenko, acting as 
public prosecutor, stripped the men of their right to speak.599 The announcement of the 
verdict in Pravda on December 24, 1954 – exactly a year after news of Beriia’s execution 
was made public – included mention of Abakumov having run the case against 
Leningrad’s Party leadership, and described the affair’s casualties as “fully rehabilitated,” 
but provided no names and gave few specifics about the nature of Abakumov’s 
offenses.600 Though the Leningrad tribunal proved somewhat tentative in its handling of 
                                                
597 Artizov, Reabilitatsiia, vol. 1, 117-142; this was the same meeting at which Khrushchev blamed Beriia 
for Stanislav Redens’ downfall. 
598 Ibid., 135. 
599 Naumov, “Repression and Rehabilitation,” 98. Khrushchev had previously expressed concern that 
Abakumov would attempt to implicate “the old man.”  
600 “V verkhovnom sude SSSR,” Pravda, December 24, 1954, 2. The political fallout from the Abakumov 
conviction was rather swift: by February 1955 Georgii Malenkov – who had actively taken part in the 
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the issue of rehabilitation, the Procuracy at this time was already well into its 
preparations for the Tbilisi trial, which would marshal copious evidence relating to the 
posthumously rehabilitated and provide survivors with a forum in which to confront their 
tormentors in the name of restoring Soviet legality on Beriia’s home turf.   
       
 “The Foul Death of a Pack of Scoundrels”: Rapava and Rukhadze in the Dock 
 Initially – as attested to by communications between the Procuracy and the 
Central Committee Presidium – the authorities intended to try Konstantin Savitskii, 
Nikita Krimian, Aleksandr Khazan, and Georgii Paramonov as a quartet, without Rapava, 
Rukhadze, Tsereteli, or Sardon Nadaria. On May 25, 1954 Rudenko forwarded a draft 
indictment against the four Georgian operatives to the Presidium and requested that the 
case be put before the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court. The document dwelled 
on the accused’s social backgrounds, but also dealt extensively with Beriia’s antagonism 
toward Sergo Ordzhonikidze and his eventual persecution of Orzhonikidze’s intimates, 
including Mamuliia and Orakhelashvili, which would ultimately become a major feature 
of the Tbilisi show trial.601 Whether the decision to postpone Savitskii, Krimian, Khazan, 
and Paramonov’s case and widen its scope originated with the Party or the Procuracy 
remains unclear, as does the reasoning behind this move, which carried significant 
implications for the proceedings in Tbilisi. One potential dilemma engendered by this 
choice was the fact that although Rapava and Rukhadze had both worked under Beriia for 
extended periods of time, they made for odd dock-mates, as their struggle for 
preeminence within Georgian state security culminated with the former’s arrest at the 
                                                                                                                                            
Leningrad Affair and exploited it to improve his own standing – was ousted from the chairmanship of the 
Council of Ministers and demoted to Minister of Electrification; see Taubman, Khrushchev, 264-265. 
601 Khaustov, Delo Beriia, 461-485. 
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latter’s hands during the Mingrelian Affair. This inconvenient reality caused little to no 
concern within the Procuracy’s headquarters, though, and by January 10, 1955 Rudenko 
and Serov at the KGB presented the Central Committee with an expanded indictment that 
incorporated materials on all eight defendants.  
In their introduction to the document, Rudenko and Serov noted for the first time 
that the case would be heard “in open court in Tbilisi with the participation of the 
prosecution and defense,” rather than a more secretive venue.602 On July 23 Rudenko 
provided Vasilii Pavlovich Mzhavanadze, the Party boss of Georgia, with a copy of the 
final indictment, and informed him that the case would be heard the following month, 
though in reality the proceedings did not open until September.603 It is striking that even 
though the judiciary resolved in January to hold the trial in Tbilisi, it was only in July that 
the local leadership was fully apprised of the plan; this points to the degree of control that 
Moscow maintained over preparations for the case, which may have been geographically 
“peripheral,” but resonated deeply within the Kremlin.      
The defendants faced charges of having abused their positions in order to abet 
Beriia’s nefarious aims under articles 58-1b, 58-8, and 58-11 – treason by service 
members, terrorist acts against representatives of Soviet power, and conspiracy – of the 
RSFSR penal code (unlike the more commonly applied article 58-10, 
counterrevolutionary agitation, the first two statutes carried the death penalty, even in 
peacetime).604 As articulated in the press release that announced the trial’s verdict, 
                                                
602 Ibid., 550. 
603 GARF f. 8131, op. 32, d. 4002, l. 104. 
604 Even though the hearing took place in Georgia, the Russian penal code was employed on the grounds 
that Beriia’s criminal activities had begun in the Caucasus, but he had continued them once in the Soviet 
metropole. See Smirnov, Anti-stalinskie protsessy, 144. These same three articles would be invoked to try 
Rodos in Moscow and Bagirov et al. in Baku. 
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“[while] helping Beriia to hide his criminal past and basely deceiving the Party and state” 
Rukhadze, Rapava, and company “used their official positions within the system of the 
NKVD, and then the MVD and MGB of the Georgian SSR for hostile ends.”605 The 
Tbilisi indictment located the accused’s readiness to serve as Beriia’s willing 
executioners in their own past misdeeds and socially alien backgrounds. While still a 
youth Rapava purportedly joined the Georgian Socialist-Federalist Revolutionary Party, 
which sought to establish an independent, “bourgeois” Georgia under the aegis of Great 
Britain, and remained a member between 1917 and 1920.606 Although this information 
made its way into Rapava’s personal file, it did not prevent him from rising to the top of 
state security of the Georgian SSR. Likewise, Rapava’s wife was a cousin of the 
Georgian Menshevik leader Noi Zhordania, and her brother had fled to Turkey and from 
there made his way to Paris.607 Savitskii, it was noted, was the son of noble who held the 
rank of colonel in the Tsarist Army and was an “organizer of White Guard detachments 
for the struggle against Soviet power.”608  
Most damning in this regard was Tsereteli’s personal trajectory. Born into the 
family of a hereditary prince, he was denounced by the soon-to-be-executed Bogdan 
Kobulov as “nearly illiterate,” which apparently did not prevent him from eventually 
being promoted to head the NKVD’s infamous Fourth Special Department, responsible 
for running the sharashka program of forced research and development within Gulag 
camps.609 Having risen to the junior-most officer’s rank in the Imperial Army 
(praporshchik), in 1915 Tsereteli was taken prisoner by German forces and subsequently 
                                                
605 GARF f. 8131, op. 32, d. 4002, l. 239. 
606 Khaustov, Delo Beriia, 598. 
607 Ibid. 
608 Ibid., 603. 
609 Ibid, 601. 
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enlisted in their “Georgian Legion,” which served on the Turkish front. Upon his return 
to Georgia in 1918 Tsereteli supposedly took up arms alongside the Mensheviks, and 
found himself on the wrong side of Soviet power after the Bolshevik takeover when he 
was arrested for the murder of a policeman.610 Beriia, fully aware of this wrongdoing, 
still opted to entrust Tsereteli with some of the most sensitive assignments he could 
delegate as GPU chief of the Transcaucasian Federation, and as his fortunes rose so too 
did Tsereteli’s. The image that emerged of Beriia’s extended network was of one 
predicated on negative trust that saw the complete eradication of competing (and, in the 
eyes of the judiciary, loyal Soviet) cadres as the only means of assuring its continued 
existence. This, then, furnished the motive for the Tbilisi defendants’ avid participation in 
Beriia’s machinations. 
The narrative of the Terror that the Procuracy devised for the purposes of the anti-
Beriia trials distilled the complex factors that led the revolution to devour its own into a 
more palatable, familiar chronicle of a Caucasian vendetta that pitted faithful Party cadres 
against a criminal clan of bandits, sadists, and “alien elements.” In Tbilisi, the elimination 
of the better part of Georgia’s revolutionary elite was attributed to Beriia’s feud with his 
former mentor, Sergo Ordzhonikidze, whose family and inner circle served as the locus 
around which many of the Procuracy’s most effective arguments coalesced. In the 
preamble to the draft indictment against Rapava and Rukhadze, Rudenko and Serov 
identified the discrediting of Ordzhonikidze as among “the most important criminal 
tasks” for Beriia:  
Thus the accused Rapava, Rukhadze, Krimian, Khazan, Savitskii and 
Paramonov directly participated in Beriia’s devious struggle (intriganskoi 
bor’be) against the prominent figure of the Communist Party and Soviet 
                                                
610 Ibid. 
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government Sergo Ordzhonikidze, gathering slanderous materials against 
S. Ordzhonikidze, extorting false testimony, to this end subjecting 
prisoners to torture, falsifying criminal cases against Ordzhonikidze’s 
relatives and friends, and then destroying these individuals under the guise 
of repressing counter-revolutionary activities.611 
 
Ordzhonikidze’s family was particularly devastated by the Georgian NKVD. As the court 
heard, it was Rapava who opened the case against Sergo’s brother Papuliia and signed his 
cousin Dmitrii’s arrest warrant, which was carried out by Khazan. Dmitrii Ordzhonikidze 
was subsequently interrogated by both Savitskii and Paramonov; Tsereteli, in his capacity 
as head of the local branch of the security police, sat on the troiki convened on August 
11, 1937 and July 13, 1938, respectively, that sentenced both Papuliia and Dmitrii to 
death.612 
Beriia’s animus toward Ordzhonikidze was allegedly so great that even after the 
latter’s suicide he “gave his accomplices the task of finding incriminating testimony 
relating to” him, which was to be “extorted from prisoners through beatings and 
torture.”613 Samson Mamuliia – whom Beriia replaced as Georgian Party Secretary – was 
arrested “[o]n Beriia’s direct order,” after which “deliberately (zavedomo) false testimony 
about S. Ordzhonikidze was extracted [from him] with the help of criminal methods of 
interrogation.”614 As commandant of the Georgian NKVD’s internal prison Nadaraia 
witnessed Mamuliia’s torture and recounted the process to investigators:  
“During the investigation Mamuliia was severely beaten. I 
remember that for 7-8 days he was forced to stand while tied to a weighted 
table (ego zastavliali stoiat’ s priviazannym stolom s gruzom). When he 
fell they picked him up and again forced him to stand. 
                                                
611 Khaustov, Delo Beriia, 552. 
612 Ibid., 569-570, 562. 
613 Ibid., 567. 
614 Ibid. 
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While Mamuliia stood in the investigative office for several days 
tied to the table Kobulov and Goglidze visited him almost every day.”615 
 
In addition to extracting slanderous statements against Ordzhonikidze, Savitskii and 
Paramonov reportedly induced Mamuliia to denounce persons who had “close relations 
with Ordzhonikidze,” eventually leading to former Zakkraikom (Transcaucasian Regional 
Committee) head Mamiia Orakhelashvili’s implication as a member of a Rightist 
conspiracy in Georgia.616  
 A former medical assistant at the Georgian NKVD’s internal prison by the name 
of Aroian testified to the conditions Mamiia Orakhelashvili endured while in Bogdan 
Kobulov and Krimian’s custody. Having treated Orakhelashvili prior to his execution, 
Aroian vividly recalled the “gaping bleeding wounds” on his back, which she smeared 
with iodine, and the bruises that covered his feet.617 Even confined in his cell 
Orakhlashvili was afforded no respite from abuse, as “there was another prisoner in the 
cell with [him] who was either insane or feigned insanity. He systematically tormented 
Orakhelashvili in the cell, clawed at him, beat him, never gave him a moment’s peace”; 
while receiving care for his wounds Orakhelashvili confided his suspicion that his captors 
purposefully “planted” the crazed man in his cell.618  
 Rukhadze, who had just begun his career in state security when Orakhelashvili 
was arrested in summer 1937, was serving under Kobulov that fall and recalled:  
Kobulov ordered Krimian or Khazan to help me in conducting the 
confrontation between the Vardzieli [a former procurator of the GSSR] 
and Orakhelashvili. This confrontation was purely formal in nature and 
lasted no more than 5-10 minutes, and although at the time Orakhelashvili 
named Vardzieli as a participant in an anti-Soviet organization, I 
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nonetheless came to the conclusion that Orakhelashvili slandered 
Vardzieli as a result of the application of measures of physical force 
against him… 
There was an interruption during the confrontation, and afterward 
Vardzieli was beaten by Khazan, who approached him in the course of the 
confrontation. Khazan beat Vardzieli on the heels with a special metallic, 
nickel-plated rod with an extended rubber tip. Subsequently 
Orakhelashvili and Vardzieli were shot.619       
 
As in Papuliia’s and Dmitrii Ordzhonikidze’s executions, Tsereteli was a member of the 
troika that issued Orakhelashvili’s death sentence. The draft indictment pointedly noted 
that the USSR Supreme Court had since “fully posthumously rehabilitated” 
Orakhelashvili “in the absence of a corpus delicti.”620 Although the preliminary 
accusation against Rapava, Rukhadze, and the other representatives of Georgian state 
security only singled out a handful of figures as having been rehabilitated, during the 
interval between the document’s composition and the actual trial the Procuracy 
marshaled additional examples to reinforce its case, and made posthumous rehabilitees’ 
comrades and relatives centerpieces of its in-court strategy.  
A rare firsthand account of the Tbilisi proceedings comes from the memoirs of 
Suren Ovanesovich Gazarian, a deputy head of the Georgian NKVD’s economic 
department who ran afoul of Beriia in 1937 and spent ten years in various labor camps. 
Following his return to Georgia and subsequent rehabilitation, Gazarian was summoned 
to serve as a witness for the prosecution.621 Gazarian placed a heavy emphasis on the 
degree of public spectacle involved in the hearing; in his retelling, the trial’s venue, the 
Railroad Worker’s Club, “was always packed to capacity. If the hall held ten times more 
                                                
619 Ibid., 558. 
620 Ibid., 569. 
621 Many of the witnesses that the prosecution called were, like Gazarian, either rehabilitees themselves or 
relatives of the repressed. Nanci Adler discusses Gazarian’s internal struggle with his continued allegiance 
to the Communist Party during and following his imprisonment, but inexplicably describes this occurring 
“[in] the absence of judicial or other proceedings,” despite Gazarian’s extensive description of his 
involvement in the Tbilisi case. See Adler, Keeping Faith, 89-90. 
 222 
people, even then all those who wanted to would not have been able to get in.” The street 
outside the building, Plekhanovskii prospekt, was similarly “thronged with people” for 
the duration.622 To gain admission to the gallery spectators required tickets, which were 
primarily distributed by factories, enterprises, and agencies in the Georgian capital and 
other regions of the republic, although according to Gazarian rehabilitees also received 
tickets “on a priority basis.”623 This combination of carefully screened loyalists selected 
by their local Party organizations and employers and recently exonerated individuals who 
harbored deep resentment toward Beriia and his servitors ensured that the defendants 
would be facing an audience suitably hostile for the state’s purposes. 
Though the end result of the tribunal was predetermined and the hall stacked with 
attendees eager to see the chekisty punished, Gazarian stressed that the hearings 
themselves were conducted in strict accordance with Soviet legal precepts. Each of the 
eight accused was represented by his own counsel, “[a]s the law demand[ed],” and at the 
opening of the first hearing the defendants were asked if they had any objections to the 
court’s composition and whether they wished to file any motions.624 Most came forward 
with requests for various exculpatory documents to be appended to the case, which would 
(rightfully) have shown them to have been cogs in an expansive system of repression 
directed from above; based on the trial’s outcome it is evident that if included they did 
nothing to mitigate the sentences passed.625 
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According to Nikolai Smirnov, in his opening statement before the visiting 
session of the Military Collegium under Cheptsov’s chairmanship, Rudenko justified the 
charges that the defendants faced under article 58-8 on the grounds that “a significant 
portion of the accused’s criminal acts (prestupnykh deianii) represent[ed] terroristic 
reprisals against those disagreeable to Beriia and his close accomplices or people who 
were dangerous to them, who impeded the implementation of the conspirators’ 
treasonous plans or were able to expose Beriia’s criminal past.”626 In light of the 
mortality rate among this cohort, Rudenko characterized Gazarian’s presence in the 
courtroom as “a stroke of luck. One could say that a person emerged from the world 
beyond (chelovek iavilsia s togo sveta). But how many people who were expelled from 
the Party on [Hazan’s] report (po vashemu dokladu) unfortunately cannot take the witness 
stand at this court hearing. Behind Gazarian stand many silent witnesses.”627 After his 
time on the stand, Gazarian took the opportunity to deliver a scathing set of closing 
remarks, in which he railed against the defendants’ defilement the “church of the 
Revolution,” as the Cheka hailed itself, and the insult and pain they caused “to those 
noble lives that they ruined. Gone are the glorious revolutionaries Mamiia Orakhelashvili 
and Mikhail Kakhiani, Saak Ter-Gabrielian and Agasi Khandzhian, [Usein] Rakhmanov 
and Gazanfar Musabekov.”628 Though Gazarian was confident that the “just court will 
                                                
626 Smirnov, Anti-stalinskie protsessy, 145. The inclusion of this article in the bill of indictment apparently 
proved controversial with Soviet judicial circles, as the Military Collegium’s judges did not believe that the 
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628 Ibid., 135. While Kakhiani had been posthumously rehabilitated in the interval between the completion 
of the draft indictment and the trial’s opening, neither Rakhmanov nor Musabekov were officially 
exonerated by September 1955. The cases against both of them were closed, though, in time for the Baku 
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sweep away all this vermin, all this strife from the face of the earth,” he regretted that 
“the foul death of a pack of scoundrels will not return the many thousands of noble lives 
of the best and most needed people.”629  
This candid eulogy for Transcaucaisa’s destroyed Party cadres garnered the 
attention of many in attendance at the Railroad Workers’ Club. During a recess between 
sessions, Gazarian found himself thronged by the wives and children of vanished Old 
Bolsheviks. They expressed their appreciation for Gazarian’s acclamation of their 
husbands and fathers, many of whom had not been mentioned publicly for nearly two 
decades, and implored him for any scrap of information on the off chance that he had 
encountered them in prison. Gazarian was struck by how time, physical hardship, and 
emotional turmoil had rendered most of these women unrecognizable; only the “dear” 
Ketevan Orakhelashvili-Mikeladze, who thanked him for the “kind words about [her] 
father,” retained her youthful appearance.630 Some of these women were also called upon 
to provide testimony, though the strain of reliving the horrors of the 1930s could prove 
too much to bear. Dmitrii Orzhonikidze’s widow Mariia Minaeva Ordzhonikidze, looking 
“white, like the moon […] broke down in sobs and left the stand,” unable to finish her 
testimony.631 Such moments attest to the Tbilisi trial’s function as a site of intense 
                                                                                                                                            
trial. Khandzhian, who was Party Secretary of Armenia for most of the 1930s, died in July 1936 in Tbilisi 
under suspicious circumstances; at the time it was claimed that he committed suicide, though rumors 
quickly spread that Beriia had shot him in his own office. See Artizov et al, Reabilitatsiia, vol. 1, 314-316. 
629 Gazarian, “O Berii i sude,” 134-135. 
630 Ibid., 135-136. The wife of one Kobiashvili encapsulated this approach, “For the first time in 18 years I 
heard a living word about my husband, tell me, please, what else you know of him?” The name Kobiashvili 
appeared in the preliminary indictment against the four lower-ranking operatives among the arrestees from 
whom they extracted fabricated denunciations. See Khaustov, Delo Beriia, 480. Even after the proceedings 
concluded, the wives of fallen Communists “flocked to” Gazarian, tracking him down to his 
accommodations in Tbilisi to ask “a single question. Did I meet their husbands in prison?” Gazarian, “O 
Berii i sude,” 146. For more on Ketevan Orakhelashvili-Mikeladze, see Chapter 5. 
631 Gazarian, “O Berii i sude,” 141. While there is no reason to doubt the sincerity of Mariia Minaeva’s 
sentiments, it is also possible that the prosecution encouraged this emotional outburst to inspire further 
resentment against the defendants.  
 225 
catharsis for survivors of the posthumously rehabilitated. After years of denigration and 
oblivion, executed Old Bolsheviks were finally being recognized as loyal adherents of the 
Bolshevik project in the Caucasus, and for the first time their relatives were able to 
express grief over their loss in a public forum.  
 As Rudenko and Supreme Court Chairman Volin reported to the Central 
Committee at the end of September, the more than six hundred members of Georgia’s 
party aktiv, laborers, office workers, and intelligentsia who filled the court venue for 
thirteen days reacted with “indignation and anger” to the accounts of the human costs of 
Beriia and his “accomplices’” criminality, and subsequently met the announcement of 
Rapava, Rukhadze, Tsereteli, Krimian, Khazan, and Savitskii’s death sentences with 
“tumultuous applause.”632 By Rudenko and Volin’s finally tally, the Tbilisi defendants 
were implicated in the repression of at least 21 Party, state, military, and cultural figures 
who had since been rehabilitated.633 Even though the law of December 1, 1934 
concerning the immediate implementation of capital punishment in terrorism cases would 
still be in effect until April of the following year, the six men who faced execution were 
allowed to issue appeals for clemency, which the judiciary vigorously disputed.634 To 
refute these pleas for mercy, Rudenko and Volin outlined for Voroshilov – in his capacity 
as Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet – the supplicants’ roles in the arrest, 
torture, and execution of Papuliia and Dmitrii Ordzhonikidze, Orakhelashvili, Kakhiani, 
and Gogoberidze, among many others.635 All the sentences were upheld, and by the time 
Zaria vostoka – the official Russian-language organ of the Georgian SSR – announced 
                                                
632 GARF f. 8131, op. 32, d. 4002, ll. 237-238. Paramonov and Nadaria received sentences of 25 and 10 
years, respectively. 
633 GARF f. 8131, op. 32, d. 4002, l. 236. 
634 Berman, Soviet Criminal Law, 51.  
635 GARF f. 8131, op. 32, d. 4002, ll. 245-259. 
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the results of the Tbilisi trial on November 22 – over two months after the proceedings’ 
conclusion – the principle six defendants had already been dead for a week.636 This 
bulletin discussed Mamiia Orakhelashvili and his wife Mariia, as well as two other 
former Georgian officials, as having been subjected to “terrorist reprisals” on the part of 
the defendants, occasioning the first mention of posthumously rehabilitated figures in the 
Soviet mass media. The decision to publicize the trial exclusively in the Georgian press 
suggests further intent on the part of the authorities to paint the entire affair as a purely 
regional phenomenon, though its ramifications would be felt throughout the Union as the 
Soviet state continued to seek to assign guilt for the deaths of those it had posthumously 
exonerated.637  
 
Questioning the Inquisitor: Boris Rodos and the Secret Speech 
For one so practiced in the art of eliciting statements from unwilling subjects, 
many of them top Communist Party members, Boris Rodos’ position on February 1, 1956 
must have made for a striking, if not poetic reversal: the NKVD’s expert interrogator, 
who had been languishing in prison for two and a half years, was called to account for 
himself before the Central Committee Presidium. Already in a suspicious mood, Molotov 
                                                
636 “V verkhovnom sude SSSR,” Zaria vostoka, November 22, 1955, 1. For a draft version of the 
pronouncement, presented by Rudneko and Volin to the Central Committee, see GARF f. 8131, op. 32, d. 
4002, ll. 239-241; for an English translation of the final document, see Conquest, Power and Policy, 449-
451. Smirnov asserts that Rapava, Rukhadze, Tsereteli, Savitskii, Krimian, and Khazan were shot on 
November 15; see Smirnov, Anti-stalinskie protsessy, 150.  
637 Procurators subsequently appropriated the findings from the Tbilisi tribunal to justify the posthumous 
rehabilitation of additional Transcaucasian Bolsheviks. In its rehabilitation reports before the Military 
Collegium regarding Budu Mdivani  (Stalin’s adversary in the 1922 Georgian Affair), Mikhail Okudzhava 
(uncle of the bard Bulat), and Semen Chikhladze from June 1956, the Chief Military Procuracy listed 
Savitskii, Krimian, and Khazan among the participants in the “preliminary investigation” conducted against 
the trio. The proceedings from the previous September had revealed how these three “through the 
application of torture […] against people who were honest and loyal to the Communist Party and Soviet 
Motherland, exterminated them,” thereby clearing the way for Mdivani, Okudzhava, and Chikhladze’s 
absolution. GARF f. 8131, op. 31, dd. 72185, 72186, 72188, l. 3 (the opening pages of all three dela are 
identical).  
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opened the unprecedented and utterly unique audience by asking whether Rodos was 
behaving himself, alluding to the fact that he had been uncooperative in the past; 
Khrushchev, for his part, inquired as to what Rodos knew of the ongoing rehabilitation of 
repressed persons, and demanded that he explain how Party luminaries had been 
incriminated while in his custody.638 The ensuing exchange would prove to be among the 
most consequential of the decade following Stalin’s death, as it marked the first 
documented airing of the dictator’s complicity in the destruction of his comrades and 
subordinates, thereby providing partial impetus for the monumental disclosures of the 
Secret Speech, delivered less than a month later. However, the materials assembled 
against Rodos both before and after his closed trial – held concurrently with the 20th Party 
Congress – made no allusion to Stalin, and continued to point to Beriia and his closest 
aides as the parties ultimately responsible for the Terror, demonstrating that while 
judicial proceedings against ranking chekisty remained embedded within the framework 
established in June 1953, Khrushchev had far more ambitious plans for information 
uncovered through rehabilitation investigations.  
Born in 1905 into the family of a tailor in Melitopol’, unlike most of the 
defendants in Tbilisi Rodos was too young to have made any suspect allegiances during 
the Civil War, though he entered the ranks of state security under a different sort of 
cloud. He joined the Komsomol in 1926, only to be expelled four years later and 
sentenced to six months’ hard labor for the attempted rape of one of his female coworkers 
at a nature preserve.”639 During his incarceration Rodos placed himself at the disposal of 
the GPU, and upon his release he began working as an informant in Kherson province. 
                                                
638 Artizov et al, Reabilitatsiia, vol. 1, 308. 
639 GARF f. 8131, op. 32, d. 4575, l. 38; Petrov, Palachi, 141. Rodos claimed to have simply “hugged the 
woman around the waist (obnial zhenshchinu za taliiu) 
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From such compromised beginnings Rodos rose steadily through the ranks of the GPU 
and its successor organizations, working in Odessa oblast’ for several years before being 
transferred to Moscow in 1937.640 Although he was brought to the capital under Ezhov’s 
tutelage, when it became apparent that the former’s days were numbered Rodos quickly 
sought to commend himself to the ascendant Beriia.  
That Rodos and his partner, Anatolii Aleksandrovich Esaulov, were among those 
selected to personally question Ezhov was a testament to the regard in which he was held 
by his superiors; his subsequent assignments involved, as Amy Knight put it, “cleaning 
up loose ends left dangling by Ezhov,” which included investigations against notables 
like Chubar’, Kosior, and Postyshev.641 In August 1941 Rodos and his close cohort Lev 
Shvartsman were made Vlodzimirskii’s deputies at the NKVD and later MGB’s 
investigative unit, where he remained until 1946, when he was transferred to Crimea.642 
Accusations of sexual impropriety and moral turpitude continued to stalk Rodos, though 
it was not until 1952 – likely in connection with the antisemitic “Abakumov-Shvartsman 
                                                
640 Petrov, Palachi, 142. This trajectory – from felon to state security operative – seems to have been fairly 
typical in the 1930s, as it gave local NKVD bosses considerable leverage over their underlings; see Vatlin, 
Agents of Terror, 12-13, and Gregory, Terror by Quota, 61. In his eventual appeal for clemency, as cited by 
Petrov, Rodos maintained that he never witnessed physical violence as a chekist before a 1937 
confrontation during which Ezhov and Frinovskii beat the recalcitrant M. E. Mikhailov; as Petrov notes, 
Rodos proved to be a quick study. See Khaustov, Delo Beriia, 642.  
641 On Rodos’ role in interrogating Ezhov, see Halfin, Stalinist Confessions, 359, and Jansen and Petrov, 
Stalin’s Loyal Executioner, 183; Knight, Beria, 98. The three Ukrainian chiefs, along with fellow Rodos 
charge Aleksandr Kosarev, were all mentioned in a March 1939 memorandum from Military Collegium 
Chairman Ulrikh to Stalin, in which the former crowed that from the end of February through mid-March 
436 individuals had come before him and his colleagues, all but 17 of whom had been sentenced to be shot, 
though some recanted the testimony they gave under interrogation; see Dmitri Volkogonov, Stalin: 
Triumph and Tragedy, ed. and trans. Harold Shukman (Rocklin, CA: Forum, 1996), 336-337. Esaulov died 
in June 1954, before he could be arrested and tried for his offenses. 
642 Petrov, Palachi, 145-147. In recognition of his work purging L’vov’s Polish population in March 1940, 
Rodos was awarded an engraved watch by none other than then-head of Ukrainian state security Ivan 
Serov; unsurprisingly, this aspect of his career went unmentioned in materials assembled against Rodos in 
the 1950s, though Rodos brought it up in his appeal for clemency. 
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plot” – that he was dismissed from the Crimean MGB.643 At the time of his October 1953 
arrest in Kiev, Rodos was responsible for the Simferopol’ telegraph’s anti-aircraft 
defenses, a relatively menial position, though his fall up to that point had not been nearly 
precipitous as that suffered by many of his fellow secret policemen.644  
Despite Rodos’ refusal to cooperate with investigators, the Procuracy had little 
trouble collecting evidence against him, thanks to the willingness of many of his former 
colleagues – including Shvartsman – to denounce him, and the reams of archival 
materials uncovered during rehabilitations.645 By January 5, 1956 the Procuracy had 
completed its investigation, gathered sufficient evidence to press charges, and apprised 
the Party’s innermost circle of its findings, which centered around the accusation that 
Rodos, as a leading accomplice of Beriia’s, “[falsified] investigative cases against honest 
Soviet, Party, and military workers, and also against scientific and cultural figures.”646 
Among the high-profile individuals Rudenko singled out whom Rodos “brutally beat and 
inhumanely tormented,” were Vlas Chubar’, Pavel Postyshev, Aleksandr Kosarev, Betal 
Kalmykov, Rukhulla Akhundov, Iakov Smushkevich, Viacheslav Meierkhol’d, and Isaak 
Babel’; all told, some 38 individuals who passed through Rodos’ hands had been 
                                                
643 GARF f. 8131, op. 32, d. 4575, l. 50-51; while working in Crimea, Rodos “struck up an intimate 
relationship” with a repatriated woman suspected of spying, attempted to coerce a woman sentenced to 17 
years for serving as a Gestapo translator into “cohabitation,” and harassed an Investigative Department 
stenographer to the point that she requested to be released from the MGB or transferred to a different 
department. On Abakumov and Shvartsman’s arrests, see Gennadii Kostyrchenko, “The Abakumov-
Shvartsman Case: A ‘Zionist Plot’ in the Ministry of State Security,” Russian Studies in History 43, 2 (Fall 
2004): 85-94.  
644 GARF f. 8131, op. 32, d. 4575, l. 42. Shortly following Stalin’s death Rodos made an abortive plea to 
Bogdan Kobulov for his old position in state security, but Beriia and his circle’s arrest appears to have 
nipped any such plans in the bud. 
645 GARF f. 8131, op. 32, d. 4575, l. 43. 
646 GARF f. 8131, op. 32, d. 4575, l. 1. 
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posthumously rehabilitated by January 1956.647 Materials the Procuracy uncovered, 
which drew upon interviews with former prisoners and NKVD officers and documents 
from cases Rodos helped to fabricate, distinguished him as “as a deeply morally rotten 
person, who won ‘glory’ as a torturer and sadist both among prisoners and officials of the 
organs of state security.”648 To substantiate this depiction Rudenko compiled a 
supplementary report for the Party leadership’s consumption several days later that 
included additional details on Rodos’ mistreatment of Chubar’ and Postyshev, 
Khrushchev’s predecessors in Ukraine, likely piquing the First Secretary’s curiosity.649 
 By the time Khrushchev dictated his memoirs, at least ten years after Rodos’ 
questioning, the inquisitor’s name had slipped his mind, but he was quick to claim credit 
for bringing Rodos before the Presidium.650 Khrushchev stated that, having taken an 
interest in Chubar’s fate following Stalin’s death, he “asked the Chekists to find the 
person who had interrogated Chubar, who had been in charge of the investigation. I was 
curious to know exactly what they had accused him of”; at no point, however, does 
Chubar’s name appear to have been mentioned during the extraordinary summons. 651 
According to the handwritten record of the meeting, Khrushchev demanded that Rodos 
explain how Postyshev and Kosior came to be “declared enemies.”652 Although Rodos’ 
answer was not noted, in Khrushchev’s account of the exchange, as presented in the 
                                                
647 GARF f. 8131, op. 32, d. 4575, l. 1-2. Compared to the figure of 20-odd rehabilitees from the Tbilisi 
trial, this number is a testament both to Rodos’ grim efficiency as well as the degree to which posthumous 
rehabilitations had advanced from the autumn of 1955 to the year’s end.  
648 GARF f. 8131, op. 32, d. 4575, l. 3.  
649 GARF f. 8131, op. 32, d. 4575, ll. 38-43. 
650 In an early draft of “On the Cult of Personality and Its Consequences,” Khrushchev and his staff 
rendered Rodos’ name as “Rodes”; see K. Aimermakher et al, eds., Doklad N. S. Khrushcheva o kul’te 
lichnosti Stalina na XX s’’ezde KPSS: dokumenty (Moskva: ROSSPEN, 2002), 138. Kathleen Smith 
suggests that Khrushchev stage-managed the audience with Rodos to “[raise] the heat” on his fellow 
Presidium members, though there is no indication in the archival record of who actually proposed bringing 
Rodos in to speak to the Party bigwigs; see Smith, Moscow 1956, 37. 
651 Khrushchev, Memoirs, vol. 1, 119. 
652 Artizov et al, Reabilitatsiia, vol. 1, 308. 
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Secret Speech, he replied that he received his orders directly from the Party – meaning 
Stalin – and upon being told the two Ukrainian leaders were enemies, his duty as an 
investigator was “to collect facts, to extract admissions, that they were enemies.”653  
In response to this candor Khrushchev declared that the “guilty are higher up. 
Semi-criminal elements were involved in the conduct of such cases. Stalin is guilty,” 
prompting Central Committee secretary Averkii Borisovich Aristov to wonder aloud 
whether the assembled Party leadership “possess[ed] the courage to tell the truth?”654 
While the ensuing debate failed to resolve what could or would be revealed about Stalin’s 
role in initiating and guiding the destruction of much of the Old Bolshevik elite, once 
broached the issue would not easily be laid to rest.655 The Presidium was able to agree, 
though, that Rodos should not be allowed to issue the kind of allegations he had just 
made to a wider audience. That same day it resolved that his case would be heard in a 
closed session of the Military Collegium, denying Rodos the opportunity that Rapava and 
Rukhadze had – and that Bagirov would have – to publicly defend himself against 
charges of having been one of Beriia’s most prolific collaborators.656 
 While Khrushchev denounced Rodos as a “small person, who even with a primary 
education had the mental outlook of a chicken (kurinym krugozorom)” and bemoaned the 
                                                
653 Ibid., 369. 
654 Ibid. Both Naumov and Taubman incorrectly attribute this pointed question to Khrushchev himself, 
likely confusing it with his enjoinder following the release of Petr Pospelov’s report that the Presidium 
needed to “show the courage to tell the truth”; see Naumov, “Repression and Rehabilitation,” 100; 
Taubman, Khrushchev, 279; Artizov et al, Reabilitatsiia, vol. 1, 349.  
655 It acquired even greater urgency a week later following the release of the “Pospelov Report” on mass 
repressions against Central Committee members and candidates elected at the 17th Party Congress; for the 
text of the report, see Artizov et al, Reabilitatsiia, 317-348; for the ensuing debate, see idem., 349-351. 
656 Ibid., 310. Khrushchev described his reaction to Rodos’ statement as follows: “it made me angry and at 
the same time filled me with sorrow. I didn’t even know how to react. We [meaning the Presidium] decided 
to carry out an investigation of this investigator and to sentence him for having conducted such an 
investigation.” Though this characterization distorts the actual timeline of events, as Rudenko’s reports 
make it clear that the inquiry into Rodos had been largely completed prior to his being brought before the 
Presidium, it provides further confirmation that the verdicts in the trials under consideration were the 
product of political edicts rather than jurisprudence; see Khrushchev, Memoirs, vol. 1, 119-120.  
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fates of the recently-rehabilitated Kosior, Chubar’, Postyshev, and Kosarev to the after-
hours gathering of Soviet delegates of the 20th Party Congress on February 24, 1956, 
Rodos was on trial for his life.657 From February 21 to 26 Lev Smirnov – fresh off of the 
Gogoberidze investigation – argued the government’s case before a session of the 
Military Collegium chaired by Viktor Borisoglebskii. Although neither the bill of 
indictment nor any firsthand account of the hearing have been made available to 
researchers, witness testimony, Smirnov’s notes, the verdict, as well as documents 
relating to Rodos’ request for clemency provide sufficient detail to reconstruct the salient 
points of what transpired within the Military Collegium’s building, situated between Red 
Square and the Lubianka. 
 In a memorandum composed prior to the trial, Smirnov outlined Rodos’ 
enthusiastic participation in the criminal conspiracy at the heart of Soviet state security 
that had cost the lives of dozens of valued Bolsheviks whose reputations had since been 
redeemed. Rodos’ conduct was said to have been “especially severe and sadistic” during 
investigations into “cases that were of the greatest importance to Beriia,” a trait that 
earned him Bogdan Kobulov’s admiration.658 Kobulov frequently called upon Rodos to 
“correct” interrogation transcripts – spinning fully-formed intrigues from the smallest 
shreds of information – and instruct junior NKVD operatives in the art of so-called 
“French wrestling,” meaning grappling with prisoners and placing them in various stress 
                                                
657 Artizov et al, Reabilitatsiia, vol. 1, 369. Rodos was the only member of Beriia’s putative “gang,” 
besides Beriia himself and Abakumov, to warrant specific mention in the Secret Speech. On the topic of 
Rodos’ intellect, one of the judges in his trial, D. A. Rybkin, was reputed to have asked the defendant if he 
knew the occupation of the “certain Babel’” he was accused of beating; Rodos replied, “I was told he’s a 
writer.” Asked if he had read a single line of Babel’, Rodos answered with his own question: “What for?” 
See Arkadii Vaksberg, “Protsessy,” Literaturnaia gazeta, May 4, 1988, 12. 
658 GARF f. 8131, op. 32, d. 4575, l. 52. 
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positions until they confessed.659 The full array of Rodos’ handiwork was on display in 
the handling of Kosarev’s case, as described by KGB colonel Anatolii Sergeevich 
Kozlov, who was present during multiple questioning sessions.660  
As Kosarev’s rehabilitation report maintained, his undoing was a top priority of 
Beriia’s, and Rodos’ presence in the interrogation chamber was therefore taken as proof 
positive of the trust that the NKVD chief vested in him. When Kozlov first saw the 
onetime Komsomol leader he “was laying on the floor upside down (lezhal na polu vniz 
golovoi) and wheezing. Makarov held him by the legs, Rodos – by the head, and 
Shvartsman beat him with a rubber strap… That time Kosarev did not give evidence, 
which I learned about a few days later from Rodos.”661 Kosarev later confided in Kozlov 
that immediately after his arrest he was brought before Beriia, Kobulov, and Shvartsman, 
and instructed to confess to belonging to a Rightist-Trotskyite organization; were he to 
“to recant this during the investigation,” Beriia warned, he would be “dealt with as an 
enemy and beaten.”662 Kosarev was then turned over to Shvartsman, who, along with 
Rodos and Makarov, proceeded to “soundly beat him, though they failed to elicit a 
                                                
659 GARF f. 8131, op. 32, d. 4575, l. 53. The passage referring to “French wrestling” (the Russian term for 
Greco-Roman wrestling) originally appeared in a report Rudenko assembled in which he alleged that Beriia 
first introduced illegal investigative methods into the All-Union NKVD’s repertoire when he came to 
Moscow from Georgia; see GARF f. 8131, op. 32, d. 3289, ll. 117, 121. I am grateful to David 
Brandenberger for providing me with a copy of this document.    
660 Kozlov had been a member of the task force Kobulov assembled to liquidate the Komsomol leadership; 
Valentina Pikina, the only Komsomol official to survive the Terror years, recalled Kozlov to Boris 
Viktorov as one of the operatives who threatened her with mock execution. Over the course of 1955 
Kozlov was repeatedly questioned regarding the Komsomol case, and at the end of the year he wrote a 
lengthy letter to Chief Military Procurator E. I. Varskoi – likely as a means of getting ahead of any 
potential charges against him – outlining everything he knew about the affair. He went on to enjoy a career 
in the KGB lasting well into the 1960s. See Viktorov, Bez grifa “Sekretno,” 12; GARF f. 8131, op. 32, d. 
4575, ll. 62-68; Nikita Petrov, Kto rukovodil organami gosbezopasnosti, 1941-1954: Spravochik (Moskva: 
“Zven’ia,” 2010), 472-473. 
661 GARF f. 8131, op. 32, d. 4575, l. 55.  
662 Ibid. 
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confession.663 Another of Rodos’ former comrades further accused him of having 
“corrected” the resulting testimony from these ordeals alongside Shvartsman.664 In the 
words of the Military Collegium’s verdict, by persecuting Kosarev, Rodos played a 
critical role in “realizing Beriia and his accomplices criminal designs,” reinforcing the 
notion that the purge of the Komsomol leadership was concocted purely at the whim of 
the vindictive secret police chief.665  
Chubar’ and Postyshev’s cases were also counted among those “against 
prominent Communist Party figures in whose destruction Beriia was interested” that were 
entrusted to Rodos.666 While Chubar’ was being held at Lefortovo prison, Rodos “applied 
systematic beatings” to him and synthesized the results of 35 separate interrogations into 
two typed transcripts, giving the false impression that Chubar’ was only questioned 
twice.667 I. V. Ivliev, who Rodos cross-examined during a confrontation alongside 
Chubar’ weeks before the latter’s execution in February 1939, described the outward 
effects of this prolonged torment: “Upon entering the office, I did not immediately 
recognize Chubar’. He completely changed his appearance. Before me sat a thin and pale 
man with a haggard face and a drooping stare, and only when I closely considered him 
(vnimatel’no k nemu prismotrelsia) did I see that before me sat Chubar’ himself.”668 
Rodos officially ordered that Postyshev “be remanded into custody” over a year after his 
actual arrest on the grounds that he had been a longtime member of the Rightist-
Trotskyite Center in Ukraine, and an agent of Japanese intelligence since 1920.669  
                                                
663 Ibid. 
664 GARF f. 8131, op. 32, d. 4575, l. 56. 
665 Mozokhin, Politbiuro i delo Beriia, 861. 
666 Ibid., 860. 
667 Ibid., 860-861. 
668 GARF f. 8131, op. 32, d. 4575, ll. 54-55. 
669 GARF f. 8131, op. 32, d. 4575, l. 54. 
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Smirnov asserted in court – and the verdict reiterated – that at this time Rodos was 
cognizant of the fact that Postyshev’s confession was extracted via physical force, as he 
was supposedly aware of Tserpento’s admission, cited in Postyshev’s rehabilitation 
report, that he and another NKVD agent had written the document entirely themselves.670  
 In his appeal for clemency addressed to the Supreme Soviet, Rodos prominently 
and repeatedly rejected responsibility for Postyshev, Chubar’, and other Party officials’ 
persecution, reflecting both the centrality of the posthumously rehabilitated to the state’s 
case against him and his own recognition of how accounts of their abuse factored into his 
death sentence. As strenuously as he refuted the charges pressed against him, Rodos 
tellingly diverged from the account he previously gave the Presidium.671 Rather than an 
executor of the Party and Stalin’s will, Rodos depicted himself as merely a “blind 
instrument” in the hands of the former NKVD leadership.672 The man who, in sullen 
defiance of his captors, had articulated what was previously inadmissible and 
inadvertently provided Khrushchev with the fodder to begin dethroning Stalin, had 
retreated to the relative safety of the dominant line on Beriia as the architect of the Terror 
in the vain hope that he could spare himself the fate to which he had consigned dozens of 
others. Yet Rodos’ (outward) recognition of the acceptable narrative did nothing to 
diminish the severity of his transgressions against loyal Party cadres in the eyes of the 
                                                
670 Mozokhin, Politbiuro i delo Beriia, 861. Rodos complained that Smirnov “repeatedly stressed” the point 
that he was supposedly aware of the false nature of Postyshev, Chubar’, and others’ confessions. Rodos 
also resented being held uniquely responsible for failsifying Chubar’ and Postyshev’s cases, as Ezhov, 
Frinovskii, Tsesarskii, Zhurbenko, and Glebov had interrogated Chubar’ before him, though he failed to 
note that all these men had in turn been executed. See idem., 869-870.    
671 Rodos took particular issue with the allegation made by retired MGB Major General Leonid Fokeevich 
Bashtakov that in Sukhanovo prison at Beriia’s urging he brutalized former Siberian Party head Robert 
Indrikovich Eikhe – who Khrushchev lionized extensively in the Secret Speech – to the point that one of 
Eikhe’s eyes was gouged out; Rodos denied having ever been at Sukhanovo with Beriia, and – in a poor 
choice of phrase – insisted that he “never laid eyes on Eikhe.” See Mozokhin, Politbiuro i delo Beriia, 871. 
672 Ibid., 863, 869. 
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Supreme Soviet. His plea was rejected, and on April 20 he was shot and subsequently 
buried in obscurity at Donskoi Cemetery alongside the remains of Kosarev, Postyshev, 
Chubar’, and Babel’.673  
 
 “I Demand the Execution of All the Accused, To a Man”: Judgment in Baku 
The Baku trial represented the apotheosis of the post-Stalin Communist Party’s 
retribution efforts against the organs of state security, and information relating to the 
posthumously rehabilitated rested at the heart of the case against Bagirov and his 
confederates. Building off of strategies first employed in the Tbilisi and Moscow 
tribunals, the Baku indictment undertook to demonstrate that Bagirov – working both on 
Beriia’s and his own behalf – misdirected the state’s repressive capacities against 
perceived threats not only within Beriia and his fiefdoms of Georgia and Azerbaijan, but 
also union-wide. As rehabilitated Old Bolsheviks featured ever more prominently in the 
judiciary’s arsenal targeting remnants of Beriia’s network, the Procuracy began to 
advocate the exoneration of the onetime Party faithful by explicitly connecting them to 
perpetrators’ forthcoming prosecution. Thus Rudenko’s deputy Pavel Baranov opened his 
October 4, 1955 recommendation to the Central Committee on behalf of Rukhulla 
Akhundov by noting that the charges against the Azeri Party activist and translator had 
been unraveled “in the course of investigating the case against Bagirov and others”; 
Bagirov was portrayed in the report as having orchestrated of a campaign of personal 
                                                
673 Petrov, Palachi, 148. The same day as Rodos’ execution, the Ukrainian Central Committee compiled a 
list of questions from those who had been acquainted with “On the Cult of Personality and Its 
Consequences,” and one of the inquires concerned what was to be done with “Rodom [sic]; see 
Aimermakher et al, Doklad N. S. Khruscheva, 478. So little was known of Rodos until glasnost’ that Robert 
Conquest conjectured that Khrushchev had actually intended to refer to Stanislav Redens; see 
“Correspondence,” Problems of Communism 12, 2 (March-April 1963): 107. 
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animus against Akhundov that ensnared other Party stalwarts.674 The following month 
Baranov and Rudenko similarly endorsed the posthumous rehabilitations of Ali Geidar 
Karaev, Levon Mirzoian, Sultan-Medzhid Efendiev, and Usein Rakhmanov, all of whom 
would figure heavily in the Baku hearing; some of the excerpted documents Baranov 
cited in support of Akhundov and Efendiev eventually reappeared in the Baku 
indictment.675 Thereby the judiciary transitioned from re-appropriating materials 
unearthed in previously concluded investigations to actively putting forward candidates 
for rehabilitation in the interest of bolstering its prosecution of the former Azerbaijani 
leader and his secret police retinue.676     
Rehabilitation also provided a point of entry for certain members of the Soviet 
leadership onto the preparations for Bagirov’s trial. The day after Rodos’ fateful audience 
before the Presidium Mikoian received a unique personal briefing from Rudenko, during 
which the Procurator General apprised him of developments relating to one of Bagirov’s 
foes, Ivan Ivanovich Anashkin, whose rehabilitation Mikoian had thrown his weight 
behind. In response to a mid-1955 appeal from Anashkin’s children, Mikoian recalled his 
                                                
674 Artizov et al, Reabilitatsiia, vol. 1, 267-270. 
675 Ibid., 276-278, 280-283; GARF f. 8131, op. 32, d. 4001, 235-237. Although Akhundov was the first of 
this group to be put forward for rehabilitation, the Central Committee perplexingly did not sign off on his 
case until November 29, several days after it approved the other proposals. See RGANI f. 3, op. 8, d. 345, l. 
43.   
676 A figure who figured prominently in Akhundov’s rehabilitation report and received prominent mention 
in those of Mirzoian and Efendiev was Iuvelian Davidovich Sumbatov-Topuridze, People’s Commissar for 
Internal Affairs of Azerbaijan during the height of the Terror, and in many respects Bagirov’s right-hand 
man. Sumbatov (as he was commonly known) was supposed to have been indicted alongside Bagirov, but 
in the lead-up to the trial Sumbatov began to manifest signs of mental instability, and rather than proceed 
with his prosecution the Procuracy opted to “suspend the case against the accused in light of his illness,” 
and he was subsequently confined to a psychiatric facility, where he died in 1960. It is unclear whether the 
authorities actually took his mental state into consideration when making this decision, or if they were 
foisting a compos mentis but uncooperative and potentially disruptive individual onto the psychiatric 
system, which was common practice at the time. See GARF f. 8131, op. 32, d. 4576, l. 5; Alter Litvin and 
John Keep, Stalinism: Russian and Western Views at the Turn of the Millennium (London and New York: 
Routledge, 2005), 68.  
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erstwhile comrade to Rudenko as having been a “good Communist.”677 Rudenko in turn 
revealed the calumnies that his subordinates had uncovered, including Anashkin’s arrest 
by Iuvelian Sumbatov-Topuridze in October 1937, his decision to confess to 
counterrevolutionary crimes after Isai Dovlatov – another Baku Old Bolshevik – 
persuaded him that they would be spared, and his ultimate execution that December. 
Rudenko was sure to point out that “Bagirov’s accomplice [Timofei] Borshchev” signed 
off on Anashkin’s indictment, as well as his wife’s, under which she was sentenced to 
eight years of corrective labor.678 Both Anashkin and his wife had been “fully” 
rehabilitated by the time of the report, and Rudenko assured Mikoian that the “terroristic 
reprisals against Anashkin are described at length in the indictment against Bagirov and 
others.”679 Despite this pledge Anashkin’s name appeared only twice in the expansive 
document, though the Baku indictment used Bagirov’s own Civil War record as a 
window onto his extensive history of anti-Soviet affiliations. 
In keeping with his status as Beriia’s closest ally, Bagirov faced a host of 
incriminatory accusations regarding his activities during the heady days of the Baku 
Commune in the spring and summer of 1918, which cast him into disrepute and tarnished 
his self-presentation as an early and faithful adherent of Soviet power. Under 
interrogation, Bagirov admitted that along with four compatriots he had joined the 
Armenian brigade led by Amazasp, and while a member thereof had been a “passive 
                                                
677 GARF f. 5446, op. 120, d. 1168, l. 21.  
678 GARF f. 8131, op. 32, d. 4001, ll. 243-244. Information regarding the effects of torture on Anashkin and 
his belief that he would be allowed to live once he confessed apparently came from one of his former 
cellmates who was interviewed during the course of the investigation. 
679 GARF f. 8131, op. 32, d. 4001, l. 245.  
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witness to butchery and plunder (rezni i grabazhei).”680 Similarly to Beriia, Bagirov 
maintained that he did not volunteer for the unit, but was instead “dispatched to this 
detachment by the Old Bolshevik Naneishvili […] as a Communist to see to it that there 
were fewer atrocities.681 However, investigators in the 1950s established that Bagirov 
was not a Party member at the time, “and therefore could not have been sent to the 
Amazasp detachment in the capacity of a representative of the Party organization.”682 As 
mentioned during Bagirov’s 1954 hearing before the KPK, he and his four associates 
were arrested and imprisoned by none other than Levan Gogoberidze; why and how they 
were released remained unclear, but Bagirov allegedly admitted his “mistake” to 
Gogoberidze, and in July was freed by a “company of Russians (rota iz russkikh).”683 
Such an early run-in with an individual who would figure so heavily into the 
government’s efforts to discredit Beriia and his entourage stood out as a particularly 
black mark on Bagirov’s record, speaking not only to his counterrevolutionary affiliations 
and actions, but also to his vested interest in ensuring that individuals like Gogoberidze 
were prevented from disseminating what they knew of his Civil War-era activities. In this 
way, Bagirov perfectly fit the profile for membership in Beriia’s negative trust 
conspiracy: bound to his patron by past indiscretions and offences, Bagirov was 
subsequently invested with responsibility for compiling and destroying materials that 
incriminated Beriia, as well as individuals who could attest to the inconvenient details of 
his and others’ biographies. 
                                                
680 GARF f. 8131, op. 32, d. 4576, l. 12. As with Beriia’s service in the pan-Turkic Musavat government, 
no mention was made of the apparent contradiction inherent in Bagirov, an Azeri, taking up arms with a 
band of Armenians engaged in the ethnic cleansing of Baku and the surrounding region.   
681 Ibid. Here Bagirov was likely referring to Victor Naneishvili, father of Pavel and Mariia. 
682 GARF f. 8131, op. 32, d. 4576, ll. 12-13. 
683 GARF f. 8131, op. 32, d. 4576, l. 13. 
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Over 90 pages of the 300-page Baku indictment were dedicated to the issue of the 
defendants’ persecution of innocent Party and government figures.684 In the section given 
over to illustrating the “criminal ties of the accused Bagirov with Beriia,” the 
revolutionary old guard in Baku – including Mikoian’s friends Anashkin and Dovlatov – 
was presented as having threatened the pair’s larger aspirations through first-hand 
knowledge of their Civil War-era activities. The Procuracy “[e]stablished that Bagirov 
disposed of (raspravilsia) certain old Communists who knew about Beriia’s service in the 
Musavat counterintelligence and expressed their political mistrust of him.”685 One 
veteran of the Baku underground, M.Ts. Manucharov, who survived to serve as a witness 
in Baku, voiced his conviction that “all of the arrests of old Party members carried out by 
the Azerbaijan NKVD were done at Beriia and Bagirov’s direct order to eliminate 
witnesses to their sordid past.”686 Another witness, a former Azeri NKVD officer named 
Klimenchich, recalled “in my presence Bagirov instructed that the prisoner Dovlatov Isai 
be beaten…Bagirov ordered the investigator at his side Gabrielian, who headed 
Dovlatov’s case, to beat Dovlatov, and in Bagirov’s presence Gabrielian began to beat 
Dovlatov”; Dovlatov was subsequently shot based on “falsified materials,” but the 
Supreme Court had since restored his good name.687 This settling of scores with Baku’s 
tight-knit community of Old Bolsheviks was depicted as a precursor to Beriia and 
Bagirov’s more ambitious and destructive joint campaign against Ordzhonikidze’s 
kinship and patronage network.  
                                                
684 For purposes of comparison, the entire bill of indictment in Tbilisi ran to about 120 pages. 
685 GARF f. 8131, op. 32, d. 4576, l. 20. 
686 GARF f. 8131, op. 32, d. 4576, l. 21. 
687 GARF f. 8131, op. 32, d. 4576, ll. 24-26. 
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Based on its experiences from Tbilisi, the Soviet judiciary found the stories of the 
Georgian Old Bolsheviks sufficiently compelling to repackage them for use against 
Bagirov and his co-defendants. Detailing Beriia and Bagriov’s joint subversive dealings, 
the Procuracy “established that Bagirov and the other defendants in the present case took 
direct part in the collection of slanderous materials relating to the prominent figure of the 
Communist Party and Soviet state Sergo Ordzonikidze undertaken by Beriia and his 
accomplices.”688 Following his death,  
participants in the conspiracy carried out a series of terroristic reprisals 
against Sergo Ordzhonikidze’s family members and friends. Thus the 
former Secretary of the Zakkraikom of the Communist Party Mamiia 
Orakhelashvili, Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist 
Party of Georgia Mikhail Kakhiani, Secretary of the Central Committee of 
the Communist Party of Georgia Levon [sic] Gogoberidze, Sergo 
Ordzhonikidze’s brothers Papuliia and Dmitrii and other individuals were 
killed.689    
 
Having demonstrated that Bagirov was actively involved in collecting prejudicial 
materials against those who could frustrate his and Beriia’s ambitions, the indictment 
turned to the case of Kosarev – also employed to apparent effect against Rodos – and his 
extended family, which was presented as a “a typical example, indicative of the close 
criminal ties between Beriia and Bagirov,” illustrative of their ability to inflict suffering 
beyond the periphery.690  
                                                
688 GARF f. 8131, op. 32, d. 4576, l. 26. 
689 GARF f. 8131, op. 32, d. 4576, ll. 26-27. Sergo’s “brother Dmitrii” was in actuality his cousin, whose 
wife broke down on the stand in Tbilisi. Bagirov had his own sharp confrontations with members of the 
Georgian Old Bolshevik group early in his career when he clashed with the Zakkraikom leadership. 
According to witness V. I. Sokhatskii, who had worked alongside Bagirov for an extended period, the latter 
purportedly complained that “Mamiia Orakhelashvili did not love him” before denouncing the entire 
committee as “bastards” and vowing that “he would make short work of them.” See GARF f. 8131, op. 32, 
d. 4576, l. 97 
690 GARF f. 8131, op. 32, d. 4576, l. 31. 
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Called to serve as a witness for the prosecution, in her deposition Mariia 
Naneishvili-Kosareva recounted the most detailed version yet of the story she had been 
expressly flown out of Noril’sk to recount to Cheptsov and Kitaev nearly two years prior: 
Bagirov came with my husband to our apartment or rather to the dacha in 
Volynskoe (near Moscow on the Mozhaiskoe highway), which was, as I 
recall, the only time that Bagirov came to our house. I don’t know what 
the occasion for this visit was…And that evening over dinner in Bagirov’s 
presence my husband proposed the following toast: “To true leadership in 
Transcaucasia, which does not currently exist there.” Bagirov said 
nothing, clinked glasses and drank. After dinner Bagirov quickly left. 
After this incident some time passed and one day my husband came home 
from work upset, and told me that Bagirov informed Beriia of the contents 
of the toast that he proposed at our place over dinner.691 
 
Bagirov’s involvement in Kosarev’s undoing did not end with his betrayal of his host’s 
confidence. His codefendant Borshchev testified that in the course of interrogations 
Azerbaijani NKVD operatives obtained compromising statements about “a number of 
leading workers in the center, including Kosarev. Before long Sumbatov was dispatched 
to Beriia in Tbilisi with all these materials […] For what purpose Sumbatov brought all 
these materials to Beriia Borshchev supposedly does not know, as all of this was kept in 
strict secrecy.”692 Given his position, Borshchev deemed it impossible for Bagirov to 
have been unaware of the collecting of kompromat on Kosarev, or of Sumbatov’s mission 
to Tbilisi. In the indictment’s terms, the aid that Bagirov rendered Beriia in dealing with 
such “problematic” persons as members of Ordzhonikidze’s circle and Kosarev did not 
represent simple tributes owed by a client to a patron: “If Bagirov, knowing about 
                                                
691 GARF f. 8131, op. 32, d. 4576, l. 32. The journey of Naneishvili-Kosareva’s account of this 
inauspicious gathering, from a recollection penned in exile to a component of her husband’s rehabilitation 
to featured testimony in the state’s case against a former Party secretary, demonstrates the avidness with 
which the Soviet government seized upon and legitimized narratives that vilified the final batch of 
“enemies of the people.” 
692 GARF f. 8131, op. 32, d. 4576, l. 33. 
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Beriia’s Musavat past, helped Beriia in every way to hide his crimes,” the Procuracy 
observed, “then Beriia, in turn, covered Bagirov’s crimes.”693  
 The Procuracy sought to demonstrate that personal enmity existed between 
Bagirov and many of the figures he targeted, further casting the Terror in the Caucasus as 
the product of clannish feuds and individual resentments. During his tenures as both chief 
of state security and Party Secretary of Azerbaijan Bagirov accumulated a host of 
adversaries, including many of those who had preceded and succeeded him in his various 
posts. Upon being dismissed from the position of chairman of the Azerbaijan GPU in 
1927 as an “intriguer and troublemaker (sklochnik)” at the initiative of the then-Party 
Secretary, Karaev, Bagirov complained to the Azeri Central Committee and the 
Zakkraikom about his replacement, Novruz Rizaev, and Karaev.694 In the spring of the 
following year the Presidium of the Azeri Central Committee, chaired by Karaev, 
rejected Bagirov’s insinuations as “in tone and content unacceptable and totally 
unfounded,” and urged him to put an end to “the squabbling surrounding the Azeri 
GPU.695 However, rather than acceding to the Party’s demands, Bagirov instead 
forwarded his grievances to Beriia, through whom they presumably made their way to 
Moscow; at the time Beriia also wrote a “special letter” in support of Bagirov to 
Ordzhonikidze, in which he alleged that Orakhelashvili and the rest of the Zakkraikom 
were conducting a campaign of “provocation” against Bagirov.696 The Procuracy 
pointedly observed that within a decade all of the major players in this controversy, 
                                                
693 GARF f. 8131, op. 32, d. 4576, l. 35. Rudenko also detailed Bagirov’s efforts to bring down Osval’d 
Nodev. See GARF f. 8131, op. 32, d. 4576, ll. 33-35. 
694 Karaev is perhaps best known today for his pronouncement at the 9th Party Congress in 1919 that “the 
enemy is everywhere (vrag est’ vezde),” which provided the title for Jörg Baberowski’s monograph on 
Bolshevism in the Caucasus. 
695 GARF f. 8131, op. 32, d. 4576, l. 95. 
696 GARF f. 8131, op. 32, d. 4576, l. 37. 
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including Orakhelashvili, Karaev, and Zakkraikom members Levon Mirzoian and Dadash 
Buniat-Zade, had been arrested and executed at Beriia and Bagirov’s directive.697 
 The animus that Bagirov harbored for Buniat-Zade purportedly dated back to 
1918 or 1919, when, according to Markarian, the two first encountered each other in 
Astrakhan: “Some sort of dispute transpired between them there, and afterward Bagirov 
grew to hate Buniat-Zade.”698 From that point on Bagirov considered Buniat-Zade “his 
personal enemy,” something that he made no effort to conceal.699 A rivalry of more 
recent vintage was to be found in Bagirov’s dealings with Sultan Medzhid Efendiev, the 
chairman of the Central Executive Committee of Azerbaijan, whom he also openly 
reviled. Bagirov chose the 13th Congress of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan in June 
1937 as the venue to go public with his threats against Efendiev, exclaiming that 
“Efendiev wants us to allow him to openly take the floor while armed (chtoby my 
pozvolili emu otkryto s oruzhiem vystupit’). You’ll croak (sdokhnesh’), but we won’t 
tolerate it, we’ll be done with you then and make short work of you.”700 Bagirov was 
apparently offended that Efendiev had sent his “so-called relatives, in quotation marks,” 
to Moscow, “having giving them applications for the leadership of the Central Committee 
of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan, to bait (na travliu) us.”701 The indictment treated 
Bagirov’s promises to settle accounts with his adversaries as far more than idle chatter, 
                                                
697 Ibid. By 1961, the Party Control Committee was laying blame for Mirzoian’s arrest at the feet of 
Beriia’s rival Stanislav Redens, though there does exist concrete evidence tying Redens to Mirzoian’s 
persecution in the form of a telegram he sent to Ezhov, which was forwarded to Stalin, accusing Mirzoian 
of leading the Rightist-Trotskyites in Kazakhstan. See Artizov et al, Reabilitatsiia, vol. 2, 393; Khaustov et 
al, Lubianka, 513-515. 
698 GARF f. 8131, op. 32, d. 4576, l. 117. 
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700 GARF f. 8131, op. 32, d. 4576, l. 100. 
701 Ibid. 
 245 
claiming that he deployed the forces at his disposal to harass and ultimately liquidate the 
cadres that stood against him.702 
 In a lengthy section of the indictment entitled “Criminal Cases against Innocent 
People Falsified by the Accused,” Rudenko foregrounded some 17 Party and state figures 
from Azerbaijan whose clashes with Bagirov had precipitated their downfalls. Drawing 
extensively upon the same materials that were cited in rehabilitation reports submitted to 
the Central Committed, Rudenko assiduously noted at the end of each man’s profile that 
he had been “fully posthumously rehabilitated.” Just as Akhundov’s rehabilitation 
constituted the nucleus of the vindication of Azerbaijan’s early Soviet leadership, the 
Procuracy depicted him in court as the linchpin for the repressions in Azerbaijan. Taken 
into custody on December 17, 1936 and expelled from the Party at Bagirov’s initiative 
for Trotskyism and introducing “personal Arabism and Ottomanism” into his translations 
of Lenin and Stalin, Akhundov’s forced confessions implicated dozens of individuals at 
all levels of the republic’s political, governmental, cultural, and agricultural sectors.703 
One former NKVD officer testified that Akhundov had the unfortunate distinction 
of being the first person upon whom the rubber truncheon was employed “as an 
instrument of torture”; another provided the following recollection of Akundov’s physical 
condition: “R. Akhundov was beaten to the point that after interrogations he was literally 
carried out of Sumbatov’s office on a stretcher…We even wondered how he, a sickly 
man, endured all the torments to which he was subjected.”704 The indictment made it 
clear that Bagirov was behind Akhundov’s arrest and had a particular interest in seeing 
                                                
702 On the course of the Terror in Azerbaijan, see El’dar Ismailov, Istoriia bol’shogo terrora” v 
Azerbaidzhane (Moskva: ROSSPEN, 2015). 
703 GARF f. 8131, op. 32, d. 4576, ll. 85-86. 
704 GARF f. 8131, op. 32, d. 4576, ll. 86-87. 
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his resolve broken by citing a third onetime local NKVD officer, who maintained that at a 
daily briefing in the summer of 1937 the investigators handling Akhundov’s case “gave 
the following instructions word-for-word: ‘an order came from the boss (i.e. Bagirov) to 
obtain a confession of membership in a counterrevolutionary organization from R. 
Akhundov over the course of the next 24 hours by any means.’”705 Bagirov’s ultimatum 
yielded the intended effect, as it was “precisely in summer 1937 [that] Akhundov 
confessed and named many workers from Transcaucasia as members of 
counterrevolutionary organizations while under interrogation by Sumbatov, Gerasimov 
and Tsinman.”706 Though Akhundov quickly attempted to recant, the authorities in Baku 
had the evidence they required to initiate a wide-ranging purge that swept up the 
republic’s elites and regular workers alike.  
 Most of the accused counterrevolutionaries were rounded up in the aftermath of 
the 13th Azeri Party Congress during the early summer of 1937. Taken into NKVD 
custody on July 1, Karaev stood accused of having plotted “on Rukhulla Akhundov’s 
orders […] a terroristic act against Bagirov.”707 Karaev assiduously denied these charges 
for five months, until he, in the words of former special investigator G. G. Sarkisov, “was 
beaten senseless (do pocherti soznaniia). Not confessing to anything, Karaev was forced 
under the influence of beatings to state: ‘Write what you want. I will sign.’”708 When 
pressed to account for such actions, Borshchev recounted his work with seemingly 
clinical detachment: “I beat Buniat-Zade with one of the field officers, perhaps 
Meshcheriakov. I personally hit him with my hands, while the field officer struck him 
                                                
705 GARF f. 8131, op. 32, d. 4576, l. 89. 
706 Ibid. 
707 GARF f. 8131, op. 32, d. 4576, l. 99. 
708 GARF f. 8131, op. 32, d. 4576, l. 98. 
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with a rubber truncheon. Sumbatov, who was in attendance, also beat Buniat-Zade.”709 
Efendiev, arrested a week before Karaev and shortly after Buniat-Zade, was subjected to 
a particularly harsh regime of physical coercion and derision – he was said to have been 
beaten “so severely that after interrogations he could only lie down,” and was “doused 
[…] with water to bring him back to his senses.”710 Compounding the humiliation – as 
two NKVD agents attested – during such ordeals “Tsinman insulted Efendiev, 
contemptuously calling him ‘president’ […] when Efendiev filed a complaint with 
Sumbatov against the investigators’ malicious insults Sumbatov punched Efendiev in the 
face and left, and the beatings continued.”711 The indictment catalogued the litany of 
indignities to which these men were subjected as a means of illustrating the depravity of 
Azerbaijani state security, as well as the Bagirov’s personal vindictiveness toward those 
who challenged his unchecked authority.  
Bagirov insisted he knew nothing of the plan to detain Usein Rakhmanov– the 
Komsomol leader-turned chairman of the Sovnarkom of Azerbaijan – at a Moscow 
hospital while both men were on assignment in the capital, but the Procuracy claimed to 
have evidence revealing that in addition to arranging Rakhmanov’s abduction Bagirov 
“took direct part” in beatings.712 Following interrogations administered by Sumbatov, 
Tsinman, and Bagirov, Rakhmanov and his fellow prisoners “could not walk themselves 
out of the office, they were dragged out by their arms (ikh uvodili pod ruki).”713 A former 
Azerbaijani NKVD operative spoke of efforts to stifle Rakhmanov’s cries during one 
particular session: “Usein Rakhmanov lay on the floor in one of the offices of the secret-
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political department and was brutally beaten by 3-4 field officers […] in order to ensure 
that Rakhmanov didn’t scream, one of the field officers present held a pillow over his 
head while the rest beat him.”714 Although Rakhmanov eventually capitulated and began 
detailing his associations with Akhundov, he attempted to explain that the “center” into 
which he was recruited was dedicated to changing Azerbaijan’s leadership within the 
framework of the Party, a distinction that did nothing to shield him, given that Akhundov, 
Karaev, and Efendiev had already named Rakhmanov a principal participant in their 
conspiracy.715  
Akhundov and Karaev, along with the Old Bolsheviks Pleshakov and Dovlatov, 
also implicated Levon Mirzoian under duress, which the indictment alleged brought 
about his arrest in May 1938; he then, in turn, confirmed after being tortured that he had 
been aware since 1926 or 1927 of the existence of a “counterrevolutionary nationalist 
organization” within Azerbaijan comprised of his accusers.716 The Procuracy suggested 
that Bagirov’s animus toward Mirzoian survived the latter’s death in February 1939, as 
Novruz Rizaev’s second arrest in January 1940 was attributed to his close association 
with Mirzoian.717 Markarian testified “[of] course I know well that Bagirov hated Rizaev, 
for the very least because in 1927 upon Mirzoian’s recommendation and with his support 
Rizaev was assigned to the post of chairman of the Azeri Cheka in Bagirov’s place, and 
afterward Bagirov had to leave Azerbaijan and go to Tbilisi.”718 Borshchev seconded 
                                                
714 GARF f. 8131, op. 32, d. 4576, l. 120. 
715 GARF f. 8131, op. 32,d. 4576, ll. 120-121. 
716 GARF f. 8131, op. 32, d. 4576, l. 113.  
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Makarian’s impressions, noting that when Rizaev was first arrested Bagirov “wanted to 
deal with Rizaev personally, as a supporter of Levon Mirzoian […] Bagirov obviously 
decided to take vengeance (otomstit’) on [Rizaev] and Mirzoian.”719  
When Bagirov became aware of Rizaev’s return to Baku after being acquitted of 
charges in Kazakhstan he “was very indignant that Rizaev, being one of Mirzoian’s 
people, would turn up in Baku,” and ordered him taken in.720 Rizaev resisted attempts to 
induce him to incriminate himself or others through the usual repertoire of what he called 
in May 1940 “cursing with the most vulgar words, threats of arresting my family and, 
finally, beating of the most inhumane and brutal manner (with a rubber truncheon),” so 
Grigorian, Markarian, and Emelianov enlisted the Military Collegium to overrule 
Rizaev’s acquittal.721 Rizaev’s execution in early July 1941 made him one of the last of 
Bagirov’s adversaries to face the firing squad. Thus the indictment laid out how the 
handful of cases fabricated at Bagirov’s behest spun out to encompass and ultimately 
devastate the first generation of Azerbaijan’s Party faithful, portraying the extreme 
violence unleashed against these men as the product of personal enmity, rather than 
Stalin’s systemic drive to destroy the vestiges of the Party that forged the Soviet state. 
When the Baku hearing opened on April 12, 1956 it brought back together many 
of the principal actors from seven months prior: Cheptsov chaired the visiting session of 
the Military Collegium, Rudenko stepped back into the role of public prosecutor, Nikolai 
Smirnov again served as acting secretary, and even the lead defense attorney, V. N. 
Gavrilov, repeated his role from Tbilisi. In his opening remarks, Rudenko drew direct 
parallels between the proceedings against Rapava and Rukhadze and the case he was 
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about to argue, noting that all the defendants were bound together through their 
complicity in Beriia’s criminal conspiracy. In the early 1920s, he pointed out, Bagirov 
had been Beriia’s immediate superior in the Azerbaijani Cheka, and it was only through 
gross violations of legal and political norms – abetted by Beriia – that he had managed to 
hold on to power for so long. Rudenko further emphasized Bagirov’s subordinates’ 
willingness to falsify at their boss’ behest investigations against “prominent” Party and 
Soviet figures and Old Bolsheviks who could oppose his machinations. In line with the 
baleful consequences of their actions, Rudenko closed his speech by “demand[ing] the 
execution of all the accused, to a man.”722 It is difficult to determine whether this was 
intended as a genuine call for all of the defendants to receive capital punishment or a 
rhetorical flourish, as the two junior-most chekisty, Atakishiev and Emel’ianov, received 
camp terms of 25 years, but given the Party Central Committee’s degree of involvement 
in plotting out the judicial spectacles in Tbilisi and Baku it seems highly doubtful that 
Cheptsov and the other two justices of the Military Collegium would have so openly 
defied the Party’s will in the matter. That said, there was discord within the Kremlin 
regarding the wisdom of carrying out Bagirov’s and his fellows’ death sentences.   
 Though Deputy Procurator Baranov and Cheptsov claimed in their report to the 
Central Committee from May 4, 1956 that the “over seven hundred” people in attendance 
at the Dzerzhinskii Palace of Culture met witness testimony, Rudenko’s speech, and the 
reading of the sentences with “unanimous approval,” at least one member of the 
                                                
722 Smirnov, Anti-stalinskie protsessy, 268-270. For his part, Gavrilov argued that repressions were 
common to the entire Soviet Union in 1937 and 1938, and it was therefore unjust to hold his client, 
Bagirov, singularly responsible for such widespread abuses; see idem., 270-271.  
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Presidium was not convinced of the need to do away with Bagirov.723 During a meeting 
three days later to confirm Bagirov’s sentence, Mikoian – who of all the leaders present 
counted the most friends among those repressed at Bagirov’s sanction – averred that “the 
current international situation is such that we should wait two years” before proceeding 
with the execution.724 While it is not entirely clear whether Mikoian was referring to the 
political fallout from the Secret Speech or the potential optics of putting to death the only 
leader from a Muslim-majority republic to rise to the heights of the Party’s inner circle, 
his caution was not groundless, as Bagirov’s arrest had already roiled non-Muslim 
Georgia. Among the demands read out during the so-called “March Events” in Tbilisi, 
when Georgian nationalist students took to the streets in protest against the new anti-
Stalin Party line and the perceived marginalization of Caucasians at the center, was a call 
for Bagirov to be released and restored to his previous position.725 
Mikoian may also have been disquieted at the prospect of further bloodshed in the 
name of restoring the Party’s primacy, and harbored the vain hope that with the passage 
of time, Bagirov’s death sentence might be quietly commuted. The likelihood of such a 
reprieve was exceedingly slim, however, given the lengths to which the Procuracy went 
to demonstrate that the defendants had been intractable foes of Soviet power both before 
                                                
723 GARF f. 8131, op. 32, d. 4577, l. 205. Baranov and Cheptsov noted that the convicts’ guilt had been 
proven through documentary evidence as well as the testimony of many witnesses, including “victims of 
crimes (poterpevshikh ot prestuplenii) who are now rehabilitated,” drawing a sharp distinction between the 
judiciary’s methods of investigation and the chekisty’s reliance on forced confessions.  
724 A. A. Fursenko, et al, eds., Prezidium TsK KPSS 1954-1964, tom 1: Chernovye protokol’nye zapisi 
zasedanii. Stenogrammy (Moskva: ROSSPEN, 2015), 145. 
725 Timothy Blauvelt, “Status Shift and Ethnic Mobilisation in the March 1956 Events in Georgia,” Europe-
Asia Studies 61, 4 (June 2009): 656. See also Timothy Blauvelt and Jeremy Smith, eds., Georgia after 
Stalin: Nationalism and Soviet Power (London and New York: Routledge, 2016), 6, 43. As Yoram Gorlizki 
has shown, Bagirov and Emel’ianov proved extremely popular in the South Caucasus thanks to their ability 
to shrug off representatives from the center’s attempts to interfere in Azerbaijani affairs through the 
systematic exploitation of kompromat, rendering any threats to their person a major liability for the new 
authorities, whose legitimacy could easily have been undercut by open revolt in the restive region; see 
Gorlizki, “Structures of Trust after Stalin,” 137-138. 
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and after their induction into Beriia’s criminal conspiracy. The Presidium 
overwhelmingly approved Bagirov’s punishment and resolved that the trial’s verdict be 
announced in the Azerbaijani press, and later that month the Supreme Soviet duly denied 
all four defendants’ requests for clemency. The announcement of the results of the 
hearing, published in Bakinskii rabochii on May 27, listed over twenty individuals from 
Azerbaijan’s Party and state elite – including Akhundov, Mirzoian, Karaev, and 
Mikoian’s comrade Anashkin – who had been killed under Bagirov’s watch and since 
judicially rehabilitated.726 This dramatic expansion of the discussion of posthumous 
rehabilitees’ in the press – albeit in Azerbaijan’s official Russian-language newspaper – 
represented the Soviet government’s increasing reliance upon exonerated figures from the 
past to incriminate elements from the organs of state security while ensuring that the 
Party and its leadership remained entirely insulated from any hint of culpability, even 
following Khrushchev’s denunciation of Stalin’s legacy.727      
 
Aftermath: A Farewell to Terror 
Though the Tbilisi and Baku proceedings were only publicized within their 
respective republics, their results attracted the attention of foreign press outlets, which 
wasted little time in speculating about the wider implications of these affairs that 
                                                
726 “V verkhovnom sude SSSR,” Bakinskii rabochii, May 27, 1956, 1. For the draft version, see Mozokhin, 
Politbiuro i delo Beriia, 900-902; an English translation appears in Conquest, Power and Policy, 451-453. 
The press release used the somewhat euphemistic term “umershchvlenye,” meaning “killed,” to describe the 
rehabilitees’ fate, rather than the more direct “rasstreliany,” meaning “executed,” reflecting the fact that the 
government was still not completely forthright about the nature of these individuals’ deaths.    
727 For examples of post-Baku cases in which the posthumously rehabilitated were extensively referenced 
to discredit former secret policemen, see the Procuracy’s materials from June 1956 related to I. I. Dolgikh, 
the onetime head of the investigative department of the Southern Railway’s NKVD, and those from August 
1957 regarding NKVD operative V. M. Kazakevich, who had been questioned in connection with M. E. 
Mikhailov’s rehabilition. Although Rudenko floated the idea of trying Dolgikh in court, neither of the two 
men were judicially sanctioned, but both were stripped of their military rank and all attendant privileges. 
See GARF f. 8131, op. 32, d. 4578, ll. 201-211; GARF f. 8131, op. 32, d. 5067, ll. 129-132. 
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bookended the more dramatic revelations of the 20th Party Congress. The Tbilisi trial 
appeared to be, in the words of a New York Times editorial, “a means of warning potential 
dissenters of the consequences of opposition”; the same publication described the 
“Bloodshed in Baku” the following year as yet another instance of “white [becoming] 
black by fiat of the Kremlin rulers” in reference to Bagirov’s precipitous fall from 
grace.728 With these ominous turns of phrase the Times sought to situate the 
developments in Tbilisi and Baku within the Soviet purge paradigm, preparing its 
readership for further upheaval at the highest levels of power. Similarly, The Spectator 
labeled Bagirov’s execution “a striking actuality to set against the torrent of fine words 
which has led some people to imagine that the Soviet Union is being liberalised,” and 
suggested that “there are signs that the purge might spread.”729 
Despite the Western media’s prognostications, no new spate of killings directed 
against suspect elites materialized in the months and years following the 20th Party 
Congress, and even amidst serious challenges to Khrushchev’s authority from factions 
within the Party, Bagirov remained the final former member of the ruling clique to face 
the firing squad. This development was not purely circumstantial – the lessons that 
Khrushchev and his supporters gleaned from the trials against Beriia’s accused 
collaborators were used to mediate power struggles in the years that followed. Perhaps 
the clearest example of this new mode of politics can be found in the struggle with the so-
called “Anti-Party Group” composed of Molotov, Malenkov, and Kaganovich, which 
unsuccessfully attempted to unseat Khrushchev in June 1957. Khrushchev parried by 
calling a Party plenum – stacked with his appointees to the Central Committee – at which 
                                                
728 “Soviet Executions,” New York Times, November 24, 1955, 28; “Bloodshed in Baku,” New York Times, 
May 31, 1956, 26. 
729 “A Spectator’s Notebook,” The Spectator, June 1, 1956, 752. 
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the plotters were assailed for their complicity in the purges, including a particularly 
ferocious speech on the part of Minister of Defense Georgii Zhukov, in which he 
revealed that between February 27, 1937 and November 12, 1938, Molotov and 
Kaganovich signed off on lists of nearly 39,000 people to be sentenced to death by the 
Military Collegium.730 In his address to the gathering, Komsomol First Secretary and 
soon-to-be KGB Chairman Aleksandr Nikolaevich Shelepin laid into the Stalinist trio for 
having “done away” with his predecessor, Kosarev, explaining the latter’s demise 
through the narrative introduced to the wider public in Baku: “Why was this case cooked 
up (sostriapali)? Only because Kosarev, while resting in the South, badmouthed Beriia in 
Bagirov’s presence.”731 Tellingly, by moving the action from the western Moscow 
suburbs to the nondescript “South” – presumably meaning the Caucasus – Shelepin 
reinforced the perception of Kosarev’s repression as the product of a regional vendetta, 
even as he attempted to implicate figures from the center in the commission of the crime. 
Rudenko managed to incorporate a direct allusion to the Tbilisi proceedings into 
his denunciation of the Anti-Party Group. Opening his attack upon Khrushchev’s rivals, 
Rudenko described an exchange between himself and Kaganovich from September 1955, 
when the latter chaired the Presidium while Khrushchev was vacationing. The question of 
amnesties and the reopening of old cases was raised, to which Kaganovich “tossed out” 
the following “remark (brosili repliku)”: “You are now bringing to account those who 
previously arrested [others], but we will bring you in for those you are freeing, if you do 
                                                
730 Taubman, Khrushchev, 314-324; N. Kovaleva et al, eds., Molotov, Malenkov, Kaganovich. 1957: 
Stenogramma iun’skogo plenuma TsK KPSS i drugie dokumenty (Moskva: Mezhdunarodnyi fond 
“Demokratiia,” 1998), 33-41. 
731 Kovaleva et al, Molotov, Malenkov, Kaganovich, 342. 
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free them.”732 Rudenko took exception to this characterization of the Procuracy’s work, 
but opted to wait until the following day to call Kaganovich, just prior to his scheduled 
departure for Tbilisi; Kaganovich explained to the Procurator General that he did not 
“blame [him] personally.”733 Regarding this exchange, Khrushchev interjected that 
Kaganovich had raised such objections in order to prevent the “disclosure of all the 
crimes [the Anti-Party Group] committed against innocent people who must be 
rehabilitated.”734 Rudenko’s pointed reference to his role in the prosecution of Rapava 
and Rukhadze in the context of his dispute with Kaganovich underscored the putative 
parallels between Beriia’s confederates and the Anti-Party Group: all had reason to fear 
revelations emerging from the rehabilitation process. 
The constructed affinity between the executed cheksity and the Anti-Party Group 
was made even more explicit during the 22nd Party Congress in October 1961. In his 
remarks before the assembly, Nuritdin Mukhitdinov, a Presidium member from 
Uzbekistan, decried the lawlessness that had previously been allowed to proliferate in the 
outlying republics: 
In some republics bankrupt people of Bagirov’s type, riding the coattails 
of Malenkov, Kaganovich and Molotov, and occasionally at their direct 
order, perpetrated despotism and lawlessness. The representatives of 
Central Asian, Transcaucasian and other republics present here at the 
congress remember well how many senior officials and representatives of 
the intelligentsia were undone in the republics at that time.735  
 
Employing Bagirov as a synecdoche for all the Stalinist potentates who ruled the 
southern and eastern reaches of the Soviet Union with impunity, Mukhitdinov portrayed 
                                                
732 Ibid., 417-418. 
733 Ibid., 418. 
734 Ibid. 
735 XXII s’’ezd kommunisticheskoi partii sovetskogo soiuza. 17-31 oktiabria 1961 goda. Stenograficheskii 
otchet, vol. 2 (Moskva: Gosudarstvenoe izdatel’stvo politicheskoi literatury, 1962), 149. 
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the Anti-Party Group’s members as their enablers in Moscow. Despite such attempts to 
link Molotov, Malenkov, and Kaganovich to the parties held legally accountable for 
much of the Terror, there was no corresponding call for them to face similar 
punishment.736 All of the participants in the Anti-Party Group were expelled from their 
posts, but continued to live freely, albeit far from Moscow. This pattern held in 
subsequent years: after Khrushchev’s ouster in October 1964, he too was permitted to 
live out his days in relatively comfortable exile. Although no guarantees of mutual 
security were ever officially given, following the excision of a relatively small number of 
secret policemen, having used the example of posthumously rehabilitated Bolsheviks as 
the grounds for conviction, the post-Stalin rulers of the Soviet Union set aside lethal force 
as a means of deciding conflicts within the halls of power. 
 
Conclusion  
 The palace coup against Lavrentii Beriia and his closest confederates is generally 
depicted as marking the beginning of – in Anna Akhmatova’s terms – one of the Soviet 
Union’s “vegetarian periods,” during which domestic disputes were not resolved through 
killing and mass repression.737 Yet as this chapter has demonstrated, even as state terror 
was reined in during the early post-Stalin years, the party-state maintained a decidedly 
carnivorous approach toward certain state security officers who were made to answer for 
the decimation of the Party’s old guard during the latter Terror years. The peace that 
Khrushchev and his contemporaries forged at the top levels of the government was not 
the product of a single, decisive strike against Beriia, but rather of judicially-sanctioned 
                                                
736 Aleksei Kosygin explained that he supported Khrushchev in June 1957 because, had Molotov come out 
on top, “blood would have flowed again.” Quoted from Taubman, Khrushchev, 324.  
737 My thanks to David Brandenberger for suggesting this particular framing device. 
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violent retribution that took the form of several trials against designated scapegoats. 
Mobilizing the information it had gathered through the rehabilitation process, the 
Procuracy used the posthumously exonerated to substantiate the narrative that Beriia had 
perverted the organs of state security to enact revenge on his adversaries and conceal his 
perfidious past, crimes in which the Party remained blameless. Even following 
Khrushchev’s decision to air Rodos’ admission that his orders came directly from Stalin, 
the takeaway message from the trials of chekisty in Tbilisi, Moscow, and Baku was that 
the Party, embodied by posthumously rehabilitated figures, was the victim of Beriia’s 
lawlessness. As the Party and judiciary made use of their husbands’ and fathers’ stories 
of martyrdom to justify the execution of a new cohort of “enemies of the people,” the 
survivors of several of the Old Bolsheviks invoked during the trials found themselves 
among the earliest beneficiaries of policies designed to make restitution for housing, 
property, and other privileges that had been denied them in connection with their 
families’ repression.        
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Chapter Five – The Commissars’ Upright Piano: Restitution of Elite 
Housing, Property, and Privileges 
 
Property restitution is therefore, like Kundera’s 
proverbial struggle of memory against forgetting, 
a struggle of certain groups and persons to tie property  
down against others who would keep its edges flexible, 
uncertain, amorphous. It is a struggle of particularization 
against abstraction […] and of particular individuals 
and families, reasserting thereby their specificity 
against a collectivist order that had sought to efface it.738 
 
In December 1957 Soviet cyberneticist Mikhail – born “Melik” – Samuilovich 
Agurskii telephoned the Party Control Committee in Moscow to complain about the 
handling of an appeal he filed that September. Agurskii had requested that he and his 
family be assigned a larger apartment in Moscow than the 16 square meter space they 
currently occupied, which had replaced the one of 30 square meters they lost while in 
evacuation between 1941 and 1951. Agurskii pointed to the fact that his father – former 
Evsektsiia (the Jewish section of the early Communist Party) historian Samuil 
Khaimovich Agurskii – had been posthumously rehabilitated the previous year to argue 
that his family deserved priority consideration in their housing assignment. Yet as the 
KPK determined, in conjunction with the Moscow City Council, the case was not as 
straightforward as Agurskii initially suggested: at the time of his arrest, Samuil Agurskii 
had been working and living in Minsk, while most his family remained in Moscow. It 
was only Agurskii’s Minsk residence that was seized in connection with his repression, 
and the party-state refused to assume any responsibility for replacing an apartment that 
the surviving Agurskiis were deprived of thanks to their wartime flight.739 This 
                                                
738 Katherine Verdery, What Was Socialism, and What Comes Next? (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1996), 135. 
739 RGANI, f. 6, op. 6, d. 1721, l. 24. Throughout the cited report the KPK mistakenly referred to Mikhail 
Agurskii by his father’s name. Samuil Agurskii is distinct from the other figures discussed in this 
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distinction reflects the opaque hierarchy of needs and obligations constructed by Soviet 
authorities as they grappled with the persistent aftereffects of the purges that ravaged the 
ranks of early Communist stalwarts.    
For early Soviet elite families, whose material comforts distinguished them from 
the rest of society, the property confiscations they incurred as “enemies of the people” 
loomed large in their reactions to and recollections of Stalinist repression.740 Property 
restitution consequently emerged as a pressing concern when the post-Stalin government 
began posthumously exonerating high-ranking figures purged in the late-1930s and early-
1940s. Having lost the most – in material terms – at the hands of Stalin-era courts and 
NKVD investigators members of Soviet leading cadres and their relatives stood to regain 
the most once the party-state assumed responsibility for compensating survivors of the 
Terror.  
To date, the issue of such reparations in the Soviet Union has attracted 
comparatively little scholarly attention; recent works on property rights in the postwar 
USSR have obliquely touched upon the challenges of providing housing to rehabilitees, 
while those dealing with former political prisoners have either elided or deemphasized 
their subjects’ ability to reclaim seized possessions.741 Through documents generated by 
                                                                                                                                            
dissertation in that he survived his prison sentence only to die in exile in 1948. On his career and demise 
see A. S. Makhnach, ed., Vozvrashchennye imena: Sotrudniki AN Belarusi postradavshie v period 
stalinskikh repressii (Minsk: Navuka i Tekhnika, 1992), 15-16; see also Mikhail Agursky, “My Father and 
the Great Terror,” Soviet Jewish Affairs 5, 2 (1975): 90-93. On housing dilemmas engendered by wartime 
evacuations, see Rebecca Manley, “‘Where should we resettle the comrades next?’: The adjudication of 
housing claims and the construction of the post-war order,” in Late Stalinist Russia, 233-246.  
740 A common codicil to sentences of capital punishment and long camp terms was “with confiscation of all 
owned property (s konfiskatsiei vsego prinadlezhashchego imushchestva),” which included personal 
belongings, from clothing and jewelry to typewriters, as well as state-owned resources like apartments, 
dachas, and chauffeured automobiles that were distributed to individuals commensurate to their 
contributions to Soviet power. 
741 For discussions of property issues in established works on Gulag returnees, see Adler, The Gulag 
Survivor, 152-155, 186-190, and Cohen, The Victims Return, 74-76. A notable exception to this trend is 
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the Soviet judiciary, administrative bodies of the USSR Council of Ministers (Sovmin), as 
well as citizens’ appeals, this chapter considers efforts on the part of the families of the 
posthumously rehabilitated to attain restitution of and compensation for their confiscated 
housing and property alongside measures that authorities pursued in granting – or 
denying – them redress. By engaging in this early form of restorative justice for the 
families of the posthumously rehabilitated the Soviet government afforded them the 
opportunity to dramatically improve their material standing while reconstructing a 
semblance of the privileged identities that had been shattered by state violence. 
 The drive to restore the trappings of their former status to rehabilitated families 
coincided with a singular moment in the Soviet experiment with individual property 
rights and mass housing. On the one hand, the Soviet Union of the immediate post-Stalin 
period was a polity still wracked by endemic shortages due to the triple ravages of rapid 
industrialization, existential war, and repeated famine; on the other, the “consensus” 
among the new leadership, according to Sheila Fitzpatrick, was that “living standards had 
to be radically and swiftly increased.”742 Though the regime aspired to promote this 
objective through collective ownership of consumer goods, in keeping with the mission 
of building Communism, in practice Khrushchev and his circle “put an ever increasing 
quantity and array of goods into individual or household hands.”743  
This trend was exemplified by the massive housing construction initiatives 
undertaken in the mid-1950s through the 1960s, which enabled tens of millions of 
                                                                                                                                            
Christine Varga-Harris, Stories of House and Home: Soviet Apartment Life during the Khrushchev Years 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2015), Chapter 6. 
742 Sheila Fitzpatrick, “Things Under Socialism: The Soviet Experience,” in The Oxford Handbook of the 
History of Consumption, ed. Frank Trentmann (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 460. On the dismal 
sanitary conditions in most postwar Soviet cities, see Donald Filtzer, The Hazards of Urban Life in Late 
Stalinist Russia: Health, Hygiene, and Living Standards, 1943-1953 (Cambridge and New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2010). 
743 Ibid. 
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urbanites to escape the crowded conditions of Stalinist kommunalki in favor of single-
family units.744 The transition from living cheek by jowl with one’s neighbors to having a 
modicum of seclusion engendered the well documented and widely studied emergence of 
a private sphere under mature socialism.745 As revolutionary as these developments may 
have been for the vast majority of Soviet citizens, to former elites allowed back into their 
previous cities of residence for the first time in decades it marked a broader dissemination 
of the conditions to which they had grown accustomed prior to their falls from grace and 
their attendant loss of status.746 
 As historian Yuri Slezkine writes, the “extraordinary thing about the living 
conditions of high Soviet officials in the 1920s was how extraordinary they were by 
Soviet standards.”747 The single edifice that perhaps best encapsulates this remove of 
early “builders of socialism” from those over whom they ruled – and a space that lies at 
the heart of this chapter, as well as Slezkine’s work – is the complex at 2 ulitsa 
Serafimovicha, directly across the Moskva River from the Kremlin, which at the time of 
                                                
744 On housing under Stalin and afterward, see Mark B. Smith, Property of Communists: The Urban 
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its construction was the largest apartment building in Europe. Built to house the Party, 
state, and cultural elite, provide them with day-to-day essentials and recreation, and keep 
them under close watch, it was officially dubbed both the Government House and First 
House of the Soviets, but is today known popularly as the “House on the Embankment” 
thanks to Iurii Trifonov’s autobiographical 1978 novella. At a time when the average 
Muscovite had between 4 and 5.5 square meters of living space to him or herself in either 
a dormitory or kommunalka, the families selected to take up residence in the Government 
House enjoyed multi-room apartments that often afforded individuals two to four times 
the typical amount of space.748 Yet in their recollections of the Government House and 
similarly luxurious environs, some surviving spouses and children of repressed cadre 
members insisted that they did not harbor any proprietary feelings toward these abodes 
and the objects that filled them, as everything “belonged to the state”; apartments were 
disbursed by official bodies, and most pieces of furniture came from state warehouses 
with “brass tags with inventory numbers on them.”749 
Sheila Fitzpatrick, citing Pierre Bourdieu, characterizes such assertions as clear 
expressions of “misrecognition” of privilege on the part of Soviet elites. To avoid 
acknowledging that they constituted a new nobility of sorts, members of the 
nomenklatura abjured any interest in material concerns; that they did not technically own 
                                                
748 Fitzpatrick, Everyday Stalinism, 46. The immense pride of many of the building’s longtime residents, 
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the apartments, furnishings, and vehicles they were assigned or that were placed at their 
disposal made such distancing all the easier.750 While memoirs of Stalin-era elite life may 
tell one story about their authors’ indifference to material possessions and other 
perquisites, archival documents from the post-Stalin years reveal that this cohort related 
to its belongings – mourning their loss and actively seeking their return – in ways that run 
counter to the ascetic image that they cultivated. The appeals to Anastas Mikoian and the 
Housing Directorate of the USSR Council of Ministers’ Administrative Department 
(Khoziastvennoe upravlenie Upravleniia delami Soveta Ministrov SSSR) – which 
managed official residences such as the Government House – that constitute the source 
base for much of this chapter evince clear attachment to certain buildings and personally-
owned items that the state seized from purported counterrevolutionaries.751 The Stalinist 
regime’s leveraging of property rights as a reward for service to the state and a cudgel 
against those accused of disloyalty put it well within the vein of its tsarist and early 
Bolshevik forebears;752 what distinguished the post-Stalin authorities from their 
predecessors was their willingness to make significant restitution to those who were 
wrongfully targeted in the past. 
 In his study of the various mechanisms by which states have acknowledged and 
attempted to make amends for mass atrocities and injustices since the Second World War, 
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Elazar Barkan distinguishes between two leading models of redress: restitution and 
reparations. The latter “refers to some form of material recompense for that which cannot 
be returned, such as human life, a flourishing culture and economy, and identity,” and 
therefore serves as a type of indemnity, providing compensation – almost always to 
groups – for intangible losses, irrespective of the recipients’ former socio-economic 
standing.753 The leading example of this approach that Barkan highlights is West 
Germany’s payments to Jewish survivors of the Nazi Final Solution, which he deems a 
“Faustian predicament” due to the Federal Republic’s need to rehabilitate its image, 
particularly in the United States, and some Jews’ reluctance to see their communal 
aspirations financed with German “blood money.”754 Conversely, restitution occurs in 
response to individual demands for the “return of the specific actual belongings that were 
confiscated, seized, or stolen,” and is therefore predicated on restoring a violated, but 
recognized property regime.755  
For most of the Khrushchev and early Brezhnev years, the Soviet government’s 
approach to providing rehabilitees and their survivors recompense remained largely 
within Barkan’s mode of restitution: financial and material assistance was predominantly 
calculated based not on the length or severity of one’s sentence, nor the urgency of one’s 
need, but on one’s prior salary and standing, as well as the amount and quality of 
confiscated articles. By dint of their exceptional service to the state, leading Soviet cadres 
were afforded access to a far broader variety of goods than most of the populace; such 
luxury items were appropriated almost without exception upon an “enemy of the 
                                                
753 Elazer Barkan, The Guilt of Nations: Restitution and Negotiating Historical Injustices (Baltimore: The 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001), xix. 
754 Ibid., Chapter 1. 
755 Ibid., xix. 
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people’s” conviction. This put them in a position to make extensive restitution claims on 
the government, provided that they could document their ownership of the items in 
question, which at times proved impossible, as NKVD operatives frequently put together 
incomplete and falsified inventories during apartment searches.756 Posthumous 
rehabilitation engendered its own array of complications in the realm of property 
reclamation. Because service to the state was the primary criterion for determining an 
individual’s standard of living, it was not immediately evident that the wives and children 
of men who were long-dead and no longer fulfilling any official function could expect, 
post-rehabilitation, to resume living in the manner to which they had become accustomed 
while the heads of their households were still alive. By taking considerable pains to 
ensure the material comfort of select elite survivors, whose deceased breadwinners could 
no longer directly contribute to the cause of Soviet power, the party-state reinforced an 
understanding of social status that, like the property that came with it, was inheritable 
across generations.757  
Although posthumous rehabilitation in the Soviet Union was in many respects a 
prime example of restorative justice, it has yet to be meaningfully incorporated into the 
literature on this subject. This can be attributed – to some extent – to the lack of scholarly 
familiarity with conditions in the USSR, but also largely stems from the supposition that 
                                                
756 The question of these inventories is discussed at length later in the chapter. 
757 As Marcie Crowley has shown through her study of inherteance disputes under Stalin, as early as the 
1930s, “family members of privileged individuals felt entitled to inherit property even though the wealth 
they inherited had been accumulated by someone else (a husband, for the most part).” What distinguishes 
the source base of this chapter from the cases that Crowley studies is that the property in question had been 
seized by the state before the question of its inheritance could be raised. On the enshrinement of inheritance 
law under Stalin, see Marcie K. Cowley, “The Right of Inheritance and the Stalin Revolution,” Kritika: 
Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History 15, 1 (Winter 2014): 103-123. 
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only democratizing states engage in such practices.758 Yet as the present chapter 
demonstrates, the comparative lessons of restorative justice are immediately applicable to 
the Soviet case, which in turn shows that such studies need not exclude illiberal, 
authoritarian states from their frameworks. Barkan observes that by “accepting a policy 
of restitution, governments implicitly or explicitly accept a mechanism by which [victim] 
group identity receives growing recognition.”759 Based on this understanding, one can 
argue that the Soviet government’s indulgence of rehabilitees’ demands transformed 
them, over the course of the 1950s and 1960s, into what Mark Edele has termed, in 
reference to veterans of the Great Patriotic War, an “entitlement community,” defined by 
its “claim to the right to special treatment by the wider community.”760  
Perhaps the most important perspective here, however, is drawn from the work of 
the historian of European material culture Leora Auslander. In a seminal article, 
Auslander analyzes the importance for French Jews returning to Paris of compiling 
inventories of property seized by the Nazis as a means of articulating a sense of “home” 
and belonging in the postwar Republic.761 While the circumstances surrounding the 
homecomings Auslander discusses are quite distinct from those that the survivors of 
purged Old Bolsheviks faced, and the nature of property ownership in these two cases 
was utterly dissimilar, the roles that specific places and objects played in reconstituting 
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traumatized selves in both cases are readily evident from the available sources. The post-
Stalin authorities contributed significant resources – in terms of housing stock, moveable 
property, funds, and manpower – to ameliorating the material condition of the families of 
posthumously rehabilitated luminaries; in doing so, they reconfirmed the elite identities 
of individuals who over the past two decades had been ostracized and penalized for the 
putative transgressions of their husbands, fathers, and brothers. Yet, as with other efforts 
associated with the expansion of the Soviet welfare state under Khrushchev, the state’s 
professed goals for providing relief to the rehabilitated ultimately outstripped its capacity 
for – or commitment to – meeting citizens’ demands and expectations, leaving many 
without recourse in resolving socio-economic issues that were rooted in Stalin-era 
repressions.   
 
Kith and Clan: The Paternalistic Genesis of Posthumous Restitution 
When the Presidium took up the resolution endorsing Mikhail Kaganovich’s full 
rehabilitation on May 7, 1953, two of the decree’s three articles concerned financial 
arrangements for Mikhail’s widow, Tsitsiliia Iul’evna. The Party’s inner circle granted 
her a one-time payment of 50,000 rubles – an amount unmatched by any subsequent 
rehabilitation-related single disbursement – as well as an additional lifetime pension of 
2,000 rubles per month.762 While as previously noted this extremely early instance of 
posthumous rehabilitation was remarkable in that its subject had never faced formal legal 
charges, and could therefore be officially cleared by Party fiat, with the collusion of 
Beriia’s MVD, it was also emblematic of the vein in which instances of restitution would 
operate over the next two-odd years. Though the Soviet government’s internal discourse 
                                                
762 Artizov et al, Reabilitatsiia, vol. 1, 38-39. An earlier, unadopted version of this text was less generous in 
its provisions; see RGANI f. 3, op. 8, d. 25, l. 123. 
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surrounding rehabilitation shifted dramatically once Beriia and his “accomplices” within 
the Party and organs of state security were deposed, the informal mechanism in place for 
making compensation to survivors of the “unlawfully repressed” remained largely 
unchanged through the autumn of 1955.  
It stands to reason that the families of Beriia’s adversaries – who were some of 
the first to undergo posthumous rehabilitation – were also among the initial beneficiaries 
of the Soviet government’s largesse; as the new ruling clique embraced stories of their 
martyrdom at the hands of Beriia’s band, it began to entertain requests for material 
assistance on a case-by-case basis.763 Sergo’s cousin Dmitrii Georgievich Ordzhonikidze 
was officially exonerated on April 24, 1954 after his daughter, Meri, appealed to 
Malenkov in February – a remarkably quick turnaround, even at that early juncture – and 
that December Procurator General Rudenko addressed himself to the Council of 
Ministers on behalf of Dmitrii Georgievich’s widow – the same Mariia Minaeva whom 
Gazarian later recalled breaking down on the stand in Tbilisi:  
Following D. G. Ordzhonikidze’s conviction the organs of the NKVD of 
Georgia confiscated his personally-owned property. Moreover, D. G. 
Ordzhonikidze’s family was moved from the good apartment they 
occupied into a damp apartment located in a basement room […] 
Ordzhonikidze D. G.’s family has presently returned to their previous 
apartment and taken measures toward compensation for the value of the 
confiscated property.764   
 
Despite these developments, hardship continued to stalk the family; as a result of their 
dire living conditions after 1937, the eldest son was “absolutely deaf,” while the youngest 
                                                
763 Mariia Dmitievna Vasina was a Russian-language editor and censor in Georgia who, having crossed 
Beriia, spent 17 years in camps and exile. In March 1954, following her rehabilitation, Rudenko proposed 
to Malenkov that she be paid 10,000 rubles in assistance. It is unclear why Vasina warranted such largess in 
Rudenko’s eyes, or whether she ultimately received any state funds. See GARF f. 8131, op. 32, d. 3287, l. 
89. 
764 GARF f. 8131, op. 32, d. 3288, l. 253. 
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suffered from tuberculosis of the vertebrae, and they all, including Dmitrii Georgievich’s 
91-year-old mother, subsisted solely on the eldest son’s salary of 700 rubles a month. 
Having enumerated these challenges in a letter to Rudenko, Mariia Minaeva “request[ed] 
that material help be rendered and a pension allocated for her and her husband’s mother,” 
which he considered “possible to support.”765 Although the Procuracy’s files do not 
indicate what, if any response was proposed by the Council of Ministers – which 
controlled the Committee for the Establishment of Personal Pensions – given the high 
premium placed on the Ordzhonikidze name at the time it seems unlikely that the 
authorities would allow any members of the extended clan to continue to languish 
without aid.766 Other cases of restitution to the survivors of Beriia’s opponents from this 
period further evince the piecemeal, and in some instances quite informal channels 
through which such measures were enacted, along with the importance of highly-placed 
patronage ties. 
Rehabilitated and summoned back to Moscow from her Noril’sk exile in the 
spring of 1954, Mariia Naneishvili-Kosareva quickly reached out to Mikoian. She 
informed him on July 16 that although the Administrative Department of the USSR 
Council of Ministers had apportioned her a room in a kommunalka near Sokolniki Park 
on the capital’s outskirts, as a rehabilitated individual she was “entitled to the living 
space [she] previously occupied,” which she had not seen since November 1938 when 
Beriia appeared in person at the Government House to oversee the Kosarevs’ arrest.767 In 
support her claim Naneishvili-Kosareva cited Resolution 1 of the USSR Supreme Court 
Plenum from January 22, 1954, which abrogated key articles of the body’s December 12, 
                                                
765 GARF f. 8131, op. 32, d. 3288, l. 254. 
766 On material assistance to other Ordzhonikidze relatives, see Artizov et al, Reabilitatsiia, vol. 1, 78. 
767 GARF f. 5446, op. 120, d. 1100, l. 162.  
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1940 decree that allowed for tenants who received housing through their places of work 
to be evicted upon termination of employment; she presumably deduced that, having 
been exonerated, her status as a worker in good standing had been restored and therefore 
the grounds for both her dismissal and dislodgment were null and void.768 Naneishvili-
Kosareva’s situation was further complicated by the fact that she was living with her 
daughter and son-in-law, and she contended that – barring the return of their former home 
– the trio would be “more comfortable in a space of at least the same area,” as their 
current lodgings, “but divided into two rooms.”769 Mikoian’s instruction to I. I. Makarov 
at the Council of Ministers’ Administrative Department – sent only five days later – to 
“fulfill Naneishvili-Kosareva’s request” helped to guarantee that her family’s 
accommodations improved, as such a direct order from the Sovmin’s deputy chairman 
would not go unfulfilled by one of the body’s functionaries, though there is no indication 
that they were able to further press their claim to reoccupy their erstwhile apartment.770 
The direct manner in which Naneishvili-Kosareva attempted to mobilize her 
rehabilitation stands in stark contrast to the dynamic that historian Christine Varga-Harris 
has observed among rehabilitees in Leningrad, who were reluctant to foreground their 
legal status.771 This distinction could be attributed to Naneishvili-Kosareva’s 
                                                
768 See N. K. Morozov, Sbornik deistvuiushchikh postanovlenii plenuma Verkhovnogo Suda SSSR, 1924-
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revolutionary pedigree, or the fact that she was writing to Mikoian, a sympathetic family 
friend, rather than an anonymous bureaucrat, though local political realities may also help 
to account for this apparent disparity. Varga-Harris’ research is drawn from Leningrad, 
where much of the city’s apparat proved openly hostile to former political prisoners’ 
interests: the oblast’ Party boss, Frol Romanovich Kozlov, stated “outright” that his 
committee would not consider pension claims from the rehabilitated, while housing 
officials viewed former political prisoners as interlopers and “opportunists,” and 
conspired to keep them off waiting lists for apartments.772 While such suspicion toward 
returnees was undoubtedly present in other municipalities, it does not appear to have been 
sufficiently prevalent in the capital to dissuade housing-seekers from prominently 
identifying themselves as rehabilitees, as Naneishvili-Kosareva was by no means 
anomalous in her readiness to cite her exoneration as grounds for improving her living 
situation. 
Once he was fully rehabilitated in October 1954, Mariia Naneishvili-Kosareva’s 
brother Pavel similarly ventured to Moscow in an attempt to claim an apartment 
comparable to the 33-square-meter room he had occupied between 1926 and 1936 at the 
27th House of the Soviets – formerly the Hotel International at the corner of ulitsa 
Gor’kogo (today’s Tverskaia) and Otkhotnyi riad, which was demolished to make way 
for the Council of Ministers building, presently the home of the State Duma. Yet 
Naneishvili was rebuffed the following month by both the Administrative Department of 
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the Council of Ministers and the Moscow City Council for lack of formal proof that he 
had ever been a resident of the building in question. Like his sister he pointed to the 
January 22 ruling by the Supreme Court Plenum as grounds for his claim, yet in the 
absence of the requisite documentation the Administrative Department informed him that 
all the former denizens of the “International” had been transferred to the purview of other 
organizations, demonstrating that property restitution remained compartmentalized from 
the legal work of rehabilitation.773 Although Pavel Naneishvili had lost his home due to 
decisions enforced by the Soviet judiciary, the courts were under no apparent obligation 
to aid his resettlement efforts, and without hard evidence of his having been a leaseholder 
at the 27th House of the Soviets, the Administrative Department was similarly free to pass 
on his case. Thwarted by official avenues of redress, Naneishvili also drew upon his 
family’s relationship with Mikoian.  
In a letter dated December 21, Pavel bemoaned the loss of his apartment and his 
inability to secure a replacement because “during my 18 years of forced absence from 
Moscow I didn’t preserve, and was unable to preserve formal proof that I had a room in 
this building.”774 He requested that Mikoian intercede in the matter, provided that it was 
“not a hindrance” for him, as it would “allow [him] the opportunity to leave Noril’sk in 
the future.”775 Mikoian once again reached out to Makarov and instructed him to 
“consider Naneishvili P. V.’s petition and call me” on January 12, 1955; less than two 
weeks later he was informed that “the Moscow City Executive Committee 
(Mosgorispolkom) plans in January of this year to provide Comrade Naneishvili with an 
apartment of 16-18 square meters,” twice the sanitary norm of nine square meters per 
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person set by the authorities.776 These cases’ swift resolution testified not only to 
Mikoian’s ability to procure resources for his clients, but also to the Soviet state’s 
willingness to divert scarce resources to those whose experiences dovetailed with the 
Party’s new anti-Beriia narrative.  
A month prior to Pavel Naneishvili’s legal exoneration, the Gogoberidzes 
attempted a similar gambit to lay claim to the apartment in the Government House where 
Levan and Lana had lived for the first half of the 1930s, with little apparent success. The 
family enlisted two intimates – former Deputy Foreign Commissar Sergei Kavtaradze 
and Elena Davydovna’s husband, noted author and translator Evgenii Germanovich 
Lundberg – to attest before the People’s Court of the Leningradskii district that Levan 
and Lana were registered in apartment 112 at 2 ulitsa Serafimovicha until the former’s 
arrest; the family also appended a copy of Levan’s rehabilitation certificate and a rough 
diagram of the apartment’s layout, presumably to demonstrate their familiarity with the 
space in question.777 However, at such an early juncture in the post-Stalin period the 
official channels that mediated such demands were ill-disposed – or ill-prepared – toward 
the ghosts of the old nomenklatura, as indicated by the response Pavel Naneishvili 
received, and based on the lack of subsequent documentation it appears that in this regard 
the Gogoberidzes also failed to gain traction with the responsible parties. 
Lana Gogoberidze did not go homeless in Moscow for long, however. “One 
splendid day (odin prekrasnyi den’),” as she recalled, Mikoian’s secretariat telephoned 
her and reported that she had been granted, at Mikoian’s “initiative,” a one-room 
apartment in the Council of Ministers’ new building on Frunzenskaia naberezhnaia in 
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place of her previous home at the Government House.778 Furthermore, Mikoian 
dispatched an official car to ferry Lana around Moscow, and, according to his son Stepan, 
secured her a position at the Institute of Cinematography.779 Lana attributed this 
attentiveness to Mikoian’s feelings of “guilt” toward the family of his fallen “comrade,” 
sentiments that evidently were not shared by the new raft of Party heads in Tbilisi around 
this time.780 In an irate letter from August 1955 – the same one in which she discussed the 
possibility of Kakhiani having survived his captivity – Elena Gogoberidze wrote to 
lament “yet again” about the state in which Levan’s widow, Nutsa, found herself: “Our 
officials have done absolutely nothing for her (Nashi nichego, nichego ne sdelali dlia 
neë), and she is helpless and morally depressed following her exile, because of judicial 
humiliations (truly!) in housing issues, and above all, because of her shattered personal 
life.”781 Without an apartment to call her own years after having returned to Tbilisi from 
the distant camps, Nutsa was living, unofficially, with her sister, and given her frequent 
illness and the “tone of relations that has arisen here (po sozdavshemusia zdes’ tonu 
otnoshenii), she is hesitant to pursue anything.”782 As the Georgian leadership had 
gathered in Moscow for the Party plenum, Elena urged Mikoian – if he happened to see 
them – to “remember” Nutsa.783 This stark reminder of the dire conditions faced by the 
majority of former political prisoners also underscores one of the underlying reasons that 
rehabilitees from outlying republics directed their appeals to the Soviet center, besides 
Moscow’s ultimate control over resource allocations: local elites, who had risen to 
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prominence during late Stalinism, had little to no incentive to advocate for the interests of 
the survivors of those whom they had supplanted.            
One of the most prevalent themes across requests for improved housing and 
material assistance was the desperate need of formerly repressed family units to 
reestablish “normal” conditions of existence.784 What went unarticulated in these appeals, 
however, was what precisely constituted “normality.” This question was particularly 
pronounced for survivors of posthumously rehabilitated elites, as over the previous two 
decades they had experienced vertiginous shifts in their standard of living. Many went 
from occupying elaborately furnished multi-room apartments to confinement in unheated 
Gulag barracks, and upon their release and return to Soviet urban centers often found 
themselves in squalid kommunalki, crammed alongside ordinary workers and their 
families. In bemoaning their housing arrangements, petitioners to Mikoian implied that 
living conditions that were the quotidian reality for most Soviet city-dwellers were not 
only unacceptable, but posed a direct hindrance to the resumption of the life trajectories 
that they had been on prior to their relatives’ illegal arrest and execution. This suggests 
that even in the wake of extraordinary privation, elite returnees’ sense of entitlement 
remained largely unshaken.            
Pavla Galkina, who originally contacted Mikoian in February 1954 regarding her 
late husband Artak Stamboltsian, reached out to him again in late November of that same 
year with a litany of complaints regarding her current living arrangements. In Galkina’s 
words, “extreme necessity” compelled her to seek Mikoian’s aid “in obtaining housing 
                                                
784 As Fitzpatrick notes, the demand for “normal living conditions” was a staple of requests addressed to 
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suitable for normal existence.”785 At the time, Galkina was working as an assistant 
director at a research institute while writing her doctoral dissertation, and was living 
along with her university student daughter and septuagenarian mother in “an old wooden 
building that lacks the most basic amenities – running water, plumbing, or a separate or 
shared kitchen. The three of us occupy one fifteen square-meter room, which serves as a 
living space, kitchen, pantry, and a study space.”786 The discomfort of these cramped 
quarters was compounded by the fact that their room was “entirely pervious to sound 
(zvukopronitsaema) because it is separated from neighboring apartments and the shared 
corridor only by plank partitions; the daughter’s efforts to practice violin were met by the 
neighbors turning up their radios “to drown [her] out,” forcing her to stop, “sobbing in 
despair.”787 Similarly, the constant noise in the building hindered Galkina’s scholarship, 
and her mother was “denied repose” by the “light and rustling” resulting from Galkina 
and her daughter’s need to work at home “every day until at least 1 am.”788 Galkina 
expressed dismay as to why she, who “never sullied [herself] in social-political life, being 
a member of the Komsomol since 1919 and in the Party since 1927,” the wife of an Old 
Bolshevik who had been “undone (pogublen) by enemies of the people in 1937” and had 
since “been fully posthumously rehabilitated,” could not “obtain normal conditions of 
existence.”789 
The desire for a “normal existence” was the most prominent recurring theme in 
Galkina’s appeal, as she insisted to Mikoian – somewhat hyperbolically – that she and 
her family were not after material “comfort (we’ve never known it), but the opportunity 
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to live and work normally, as intellectual work can never be confined by the limits of 
work hours and facilities.”790 However, in light of the living conditions described by 
Galkina, which would have been immediately familiar to denizens of Moscow’s postwar 
kommunalki, and the privileged position that she had enjoyed as member of 
Stamboltsian’s family, it appears that comfort – at least relative to the living standards 
enjoyed by most Soviet urbanites – is precisely what she was seeking. Her notion of what 
constituted “normal” life was indelibly informed by the perquisites she enjoyed prior to 
her husband’s repression, and she was determined to leverage his rehabilitation as a 
means of securing the concessions to which she had been accustomed.  
Galkina’s previous requests to city and regional housing authorities, filed under 
the aegis of the Ministry of Culture, had all been denied because her current space’s 
meterage was regarded as “around the norms” assigned to a three-person family unit, and 
for the “hackneyed (trafaretnyi)” reason of “lack of available housing.”791 Galkina – 
confident of Mikoian’s ability to circumvent such bureaucratic obstacles based on his 
handling of Stamboltsian’s rehabilitation – approached him with the request to resolve 
her domestic dilemma, and, in keeping with his past conduct, Mikoian took notice. At the 
end of December Moscow City Executive Committee Chairman Mikhail Alekseevich 
Iasnov received a directive to “satisfy Comrade Galkina’s request,” Mikoian’s 
imprimatur signaling that that her expectations were not out of line with what the state – 
or at least one of its most powerful representatives – considered reasonable.792 The issue 
of restoring normality – and the tension over what that term constituted for the families of 
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repressed elites – would be articulated in subsequent appeals to the authorities from 
others in Galkina’s position. 
At the time of her appeal to Mikoian in April 1955 both Ketevan Mamievna 
Orakhelashvili-Mikeladze and her parents, Mamiia and Mariia Orakhelashvili, had been 
legally rehabilitated, but she had not seen her native city of Tbilisi for nearly eighteen 
years. In early November 1937, shortly after her parents’ arrests, Ketevan and her 
husband – the artistic director of the Georgian State Opera and Ballet Theater Evgenii 
Semenovich Mikeladze – were also taken into custody by the Georgian NKVD, leaving 
behind their three-year-old daughter and infant son. The children were promptly evicted 
from the family apartment and their belongings seized without any provision being made 
for their future housing. Orakhelashvili-Mikeladze’s sister-in-law, Tamara Mikeladze, 
sheltered them for the next fifteen years, until the adolescents were reunited with their 
mother in Kazakh exile.793 Though the Mikeladze children and their aunt returned to 
Tbilisi in 1954, the exonerated Orakhelashvili-Mikeladze was prevented from doing so 
by the fact that the charges against her second husband – whom she married while in 
exile – had yet to be dismissed.794 
Writing from the settlement of Taincha in Northern Kazakhstan, Orakhelashvili-
Mikeladze’s primary concern was for the welfare of her immediate family in the 
                                                
793 GARF f. 5446, op. 120, d. 1170, l. 67. Ketevan Orakhelashvili-Mikeladze led one of the more star-
crossed lives of early Soviet history: a renowned Kremlin beauty in the 1920s, she was intended – 
according to Miklós Kun – to marry Stalin’s son from his first marriage, Iakov Dzhugashvili, but tired of 
the shy, retiring Iakov and married Mikeladze instead. Later in life she appeared in Lana Gogoberidze’s 
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glasnost’ film Repentance. See Miklós Kun, Stalin: An Unknown Portrait (Budapest and New York: 
Central European University Press, 2003), 346-348. 
794 Orlando Figes mistakenly claims that while imprisoned at ALZhIR Orakhelashvili-Mikeladze entered 
into a relationship and began a family with a camp guard, when in actuality her second husband was a 
fellow prisoner and former agronomist – one of her reasons for writing to Mikoian was to help secure his 
rehabilitation. See Orlando Figes, The Whisperers: Private Life in Stalin’s Russia (New York: Metropolitan 
Books, 2007), 364-365. 
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Georgian capital, who were living “in a small room that belongs to [Tamara Mikeladze] 
with no daylight or heating, without even basic necessities (predmetov pervoi 
neobkhodimosti), seeing as when they were deported from Georgia on December 26, 
1951 all of their ‘property’ was inventoried and valued at 3,600 rubles.”795 To ameliorate 
this dire situation, Orakhelashvili-Mikeladze requested the restoration of her family’s 
“illegally seized” apartment in Tbilisi and their “illegally confiscated property and 
valuables, or suitable compensation,” and that the state “provide financial help to my 
children […] until the completion of their educations, taking into account the fact that 
their father, whom they lost as a result of the criminal actions of Beriia’s gang, 
undoubtedly would have provided them a normal life and good upbringing, as would 
have my parents Orakhelashvili M. D. and Orakhelashvili M. O., had they not suffered 
the same fate.”796 
Here Orakhelashvili-Mikeladze made explicit the paternalistic rationale behind 
restitution with the contention that her children would have enjoyed a certain standard of 
living and cultivation had their family not been subjected to repression that “already 
extended to the third generation of [her] family”797; it therefore fell to the authorities to 
set this disruption to rights. Orakhelashvili-Mikeladze signed off by explaining that she 
had turned specifically to Mikoian “in the hope that in the past you knew my parents 
better than others and that you must have warm memories of them (ne mozhete ne imet’ o 
nikh teplykh vospominanii) as honest people who were dedicated to the Party,” a 
trenchant reminder of the ties of obligation that bound Mikoian to the fate of the 
                                                
795 GARF f. 5446, op. 120, d. 1170, l. 68. 
796 GARF f. 5446, op. 120, d. 1170, ll. 68-69. 
797 GARF f. 5446, op. 120, d. 1170, l. 67. 
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remaining Orakhelashvilis.798 After meeting with Orakhelashvili-Mikeladze in person, 
Mikoian drafted an order to the Georgian Council of Ministers’ chairman requesting that 
he “consider K. M. Orakhelashvili-Mikeladze’s petition to grant Mikeladze’s children 
pensions until they complete university.”799 In this way the Soviet government assumed 
responsibility for the uplift and education of a select few whose lives had been derailed 
by the Terror.  
Although Mikhail and Igor’ Kedrov were two of the first individuals to be 
posthumously exculpated for having stood against Beriia, their survivors – including 
Mikhail’s eldest son, the philosopher Bonifatii Kedrov, Igor’s wife Raisa Fedorovna 
Melikhova, and their children Boris and Natal’ia – still acutely felt the effects of the 
privations to which they had been subjected as part of Beriia’s “reprisals.” In a secret 
memorandum from August 1, 1955 to Petr Georgievich Moskatov, Chairman of the 
Council of Ministers’ Personal Pension Committee, Rudenko outlined the dire conditions 
in which Melikhova and her teenage children found themselves and proposed a remedy:  
Melikhova R F. is in a difficult financial situation, as she underwent breast 
cancer surgery, after which [she] was declared an invalid of the second 
group […] Given Melikhova’s difficult financial situation, her practical 
inability to work, and also the special role of Kedrov M. S. and Kedrov I. 
M. in exposing the enemy of the people Beriia, I am petitioning that 
Melikhova R. F. be allocated a pension for life, and Kedrov B. I. and 
Kedrova N. I. until they complete their higher education.800 
 
The pension committee took up Rudenko’s recommendation four days later and 
resolved “to establish from August 1, 1955 a Union-level personal pension for the family 
of the deceased Kedrov I. M. in the amount” of 600 rubles per month for Melikhova “for 
                                                
798 GARF f. 5446, op. 120, d. 1170, l. 69. 
799 GARF f. 5446, op. 120, d. 1170, ll. 72, 66. Presumably the funds for these pensions were to be provided 
by the Georgian Sovmin, though Mikoian did not specify the source.  
800 GARF f. 8131, op. 32, d. 4001, l. 45. 
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the duration of her disability” and 400 rubles per month each for Boris and Natal’ia until 
they either finished their educations or reached the age of 23.801 In the absence of a 
paterfamilias whose personal contribution to the Soviet project should have guaranteed 
his family financial security and comfort, the state took it upon itself to provide for the 
needs of Igor’s wife and children for as long as they would have been dependent on him, 
had he survived Beriia’s wrath. This was entirely in keeping with established Soviet 
practice, as beginning in July 1920 individuals who “rendered particular services” to the 
Bolshevik cause were entitled to retirement pensions in the event of illness or infirmity; 
these benefits would go “to their families in case of their death.”802 Though the financial 
provisions of such pensions were modified extensively over the following decades, the 
grounds remained consistent. In Igor’ Kedrov’s case, it was only after his innocence had 
been established, years following his death, that his “particular service” to the state in the 
form of the “special role” he played in documenting Beriia’s crimes came to be 
appreciated, thereby obliging the Soviet government to make provisions for his family’s 
welfare.   
 
Sanitary Norms: Luxury Housing as the Site of Recuperation 
The acute medical crisis that Rudenko cited to secure financial aid for Raisa 
Melikhova found analogous expression in Mikoian’s clients’ demands for the restoration 
of their erstwhile abodes. As Polly Jones has aptly described, the public culture of 
Khrushchev’s “Thaw” was suffused with concern for healing the psychic wounds and 
                                                
801 GARF f. 8131, op. 32, d. 4001, l. 46. 
802 Mervyn Matthews, Privilege in the Soviet Union: A Study of Elite Life-Styles under Communism 
(Florence, US: Routledge, 2013), 86. It should be noted that the rate Melikova received of 600 rubles per 
month was the maximum under regulations introduced in 1949; see idem., 104.  
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other traumas of the Terror years.803 Christine Varga-Harris has built upon Jones’ 
analysis, which is primarily concerned with the literary world, and extended it to the 
housing sphere, noting that for housing-seekers in Leningrad “the opportunity to ‘settle 
down’ would enable them, as well as their family members, to restore or create the sense 
of place they needed to ‘move forward’ with their lives.”804 For a large number of those 
who had been driven out of the desirable homes during the Terror and since returned to 
Moscow, one of the most enduring holdovers of their repression was continued physical 
infirmity, and the clearest path to recovery lay behind the walls of Sovmin-administered 
apartment buildings, with financial security assured through government payouts.         
On January 20, 1955 the daughter of Mark Levitin, a former deputy of Mikoian’s 
at the People’s Commissariat of the Food Industry, expressed concern about the 
wellbeing of her mother, F. A. Dorfman, who had only recently returned to Moscow after 
her own exoneration and was “completely unable to work (nerabotosposobna),” 
requiring “long periods of bed rest.”805 According to Levitina, the only way to restore her 
mother’s health was through “a significant improvement in our living conditions,” which 
at the time consisted of a single room for the whole family; Dorfman had already 
solicited “the return of our apartment in the Government House” or the provision of “a 
different apartment in exchange” from Makarov at the Housing Directorate, but no 
response was forthcoming.806 In late February Mikoian brought Levitina’s case to the 
attention of Dmitrii Vasil’evich Krupin and Anatolii Vasil’evich Korobov, the chief 
administrators (upravliaiushchii delami) of the Central Committee and USSR Council of 
                                                
803 Polly Jones, “Memories of Terror or Terrorizing Memories? Terror, Trauma and Survival in Soviet 
Culture of the Thaw,” The Slavonic and East European Review 86, 2 (April 2008): 346-371. 
804 Varga-Harris, Stories of House and Home, 162. 
805 GARF f. 5446, op. 120, d. 1169, l. 79. 
806 Ibid. 
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Ministers, respectively, as they were best positioned to effect immediate change in 
Dorfman and Levitina’s domestic arrangements. Though there is no immediate indication 
of how Krupin and Korobov responded to this mandate, Levitina’s conflation of her 
mother’s wellbeing with the resumption of their residence at the Government House or a 
suitable replacement exemplifies the presumption common to former members of the 
nomenklatura that they would most readily be restored to full health in the peace and 
solitude of their apartment.   
 In a lengthy letter from May 17, 1955, Mariia Abramovna Maksimova related 
how the arrest of her husband, Konstantin Gordeevich Maksimov – another Mikoian 
comrade – resulted in her and her daughter being deprived of their health and any 
semblance of security. The Maksimov’s daughter, Zinaida, was left in the care of a nanny 
after her parents’ were arrested in late 1937, at which point she fell ill with pulmonary 
tuberculosis, was evicted from the family apartment, and “denied her effects, furniture, 
and any sort (kakoi-libo) of material or emotional aid.”807 Mother and daughter were 
reunited upon the former’s release from a camp in 1940, and Mariia Abramovna, a doctor 
by training, was able to secure treatment for Zinaida, who at the time was “dying of 
tuberculosis”; in 1953 she had an operation to remove her left lung, which allowed her 
health to improve to the point that she was later able to enroll in the Institute of Foreign 
Languages, but that same year heart disease forced Mariia Abramovna to retire her 
commission as a military medical officer and she went on pension as a second-category 
invalid.808 Maksimova made it clear to Mikoian that inactivity did not suit her: “My 
illness oppresses me – before I was never weak and always worked. I understand that my 
                                                
807 GARF f. 9542, op. 1, d. 155, l. 54. 
808 GARF f. 9542, op. 1, d. 155, l. 54-55. 
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ailment (nedug) is tied to suffering (perezhitim), and upon being cured I could once again 
be useful, as I have thirty years’ experience in medical and scientific work.”809 For 
Maksimova, her ability to transcend the lingering effects of the Terror and once again 
become a contributing member of society was intimately bound up with reoccupying a 
familiar space in Moscow.   
Following Maksimovs’ rehabilitations (posthumous in Konstantin Gordeevich’s 
case, though this was still unknown to his wife), Mariia Abramovna was “advised to 
apply (vozbudit’ khodataistvo) for the return of our former apartment,” which was 
occupied by one Ryzhenkov, an employee of the Sovmin’s Administrative Department.810 
The Sovetskii district people’s judge summoned Maksimova and Ryzhenkov to make 
them both aware of her right to the apartment, and the Party Control Committee reiterated 
these instructions. With evident discomfort Mariia Abramovna reported that despite 
Ryzhenkov’s “warm” treatment of her and his assurance that he would “take care of 
everything,” he had yet to take “energetic measures because he is otherwise occupied (iz-
za zaniatnosti).”811 Maksimova found it “somewhat awkward (nelovko)” to “hurry” 
Ryzhenkov out of the apartment, but she cast his inactivity as a direct impediment to her 
and her daughter’s recovery: “the housing conditions in which we’re currently living are 
very difficult (tiazhely) and our installation at our former hearth and home (pepelishche) 
will help us, to a certain extent, to physically and emotionally recuperate (okrepnut’).”812 
This sentiment is directly in line with Auslander’s observation that Jewish returnees to 
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dead nearly eighteen years. Ryzhenkov’s presence in a presumably desirable apartment previously assigned 
to an Old Bolshevik family suggests that Housing Directorate workers reserved some of the most coveted 




Paris “cited the trauma of flight and the intense desire and need to reclaim their homes in 
order to both mourn past lost lives and imagine future ones.”813 With this in mind 
Maksimova pressed Mikoian “to instruct Comrade Ryzhenkov to expedite our move 
‘home,’” the strategically placed quotation marks suggesting that she herself understood 
that in this context the term implied far more than a physical space.814 
 To further speed along their convalescence, Maksimova bade Mikoian to arrange 
for her and Zinaida to receive treatment in a sanatorium, which her “meager means and 
limited opportunities [did] not permit,” reminding him that Zinaida had “been on the edge 
of life and death because of extensive (obshirnogo) lung disease.”815 Maksimova’s final 
request involved her daughter’s education: Zinaida had only been well enough to enroll at 
an institute in 1954, and required four more years of study to receive her diploma. 
However, her academic pursuits had been disrupted by “the presence in our family of yet 
another dependent – a profoundly aged (glubokoi starushki)” 85-year-old female relative, 
which obliged Zinaida to “work, and as a teacher at that” to support the entire 
household.816 Operating within the paternalistic logic of the moment, Maksimova made 
the “major request” of Mikoian to arrange a pension for Zinaida, “the daughter of an Old 
Bolshevik […] even for the period of her study at the Institute, so she can complete her 
education and feel solid ground under her feet.”817 Once again, in the absence of a father 
figure, it was hoped that the party-state would serve as a surrogate source of stability. 
                                                
813 Auslander, “Coming Home?,” 258. Varga-Harris makes a similar observation: “in addition to 
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Late that July Mikoian forwarded Maksimova’s petition to Moskatov at the Personal 
Pension Committee, recalling Maksimov as “a good worker from the USSR People’s 
Commissariat of Internal and Foreign Trade,” and recommending that Moskatov consider 
providing Zinaida a pension; at the beginning of the following month a Union-level 
pension was established in Maksimov’s name.818 That a copy of Maksimova’s letter was 
found in the Administrative Department’s files suggests that Mikoian also sought to 
ameliorate their housing situation, and though there is no indication of how, or whether 
this particular issue was resolved, the fact that the Administrative Department was at least 
partially under Mikoian’s purview suggests that this claim could not have gone entirely 
ignored.819 
 The imperative of securing assistance from the party-state led some survivors to 
air mental health struggles that under most circumstances would have been considered 
taboo in Soviet society. Rozaliia Isaakovna Lipskaia’s husband, Nikolai Pavlovich 
Chaplin, had been an early First Secretary of the Komsomol Central Committee who also 
put in time in the Transcaucasian Party apparat prior to his repression. Mikoian took an 
active hand in securing Chaplin’s posthumous rehabilitation; even though the extended 
Chaplin family had addressed its story of “woe” to Khrushchev, it was Mikoian who 
signed off on it with Rudenko.820 In her July 19, 1955 letter, Lipskaia noted how “deeply 
touched” she was by Mikoian’s “warmth and concern,” and effusively assured that his 
                                                
818 GARF f. 5446, op. 120, d. 1169, l. 108; GARF f. 10249, op. 4, d. 982. Earlier that year Moskatov had 
recommended that pensions for rehabilitees and their survivors be made more generous, and that the system 
for awarding them be standardized. The Presidium accepted his first proposal, but rejected the second, with 
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particular circumstances of the individual in question.” See Dobson, Khrushchev’s Cold Summer, 55. 
819 Mikoian remained engaged with the Maksimov family through at least 1964, when he recommended 
that the Central Committee’s Ideological Department comply with Maksimova’s request to arrange the 
publication of an article in honor of what would have been her husband’s 70th birthday. See RGANI f. 5, 
op. 55, d. 67, ll. 155-175. 
820 GARF f. 8131, op. 32, d. 4001, l. 7. 
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“heartfelt response (serdechnoe otnoshenie) to the Chaplin family’s woe will never be 
forgotten.”821 Prompted by Mikoian’s “sensitivity,” Rozaliia Abramovna ventured to 
address “things that in my position are uncomfortable and difficult to call to mind” with 
him.822 She was confident that Mikoian would not “condemn” her for stating that in light 
of her own infirmity and the “constrictions” on the lives of her children, particularly her 
daughter, a patient at a psychiatric clinic who “after a grave illness was rendered an 
invalid,” the provision of a one-time payment and pensions for her family would do much 
to ease their misery, and inquired whether there was anything he could do to bring about 
such benefits.823 Presumably prompted by Mikoian, or those on his staff, Lipskaia 
reproduced the major points of this correspondence three days later in a concise, 
officially-worded petition still addressed to Mikoian, but stripped of all the previous 
iteration’s endearments.824 What carried through, though, was the emphasis on the 
family’s unwarranted impoverishment and its consequences for their wellbeing: 
 From the moment of my husband’s arrest until the present time, in 
addition to emotional suffering, I have endured great material hardships. I 
have two children – a son Boris, who just graduated from the Mining 
Institute, and a sick daughter Klara, who is registered at the Kiev District 
Psychiatric Clinic. I myself suffer from angina and with difficulty work as 
a nurse at the Moscow Council Polyclinic No. 13. 
 I ask you to lend me assistance by issuing a one-time payment.825 
 
Within several days of receiving Lipskaia’s revised missive Mikoian forwarded copies to 
Moscatov regarding the pensions and Krupin for the lump sum assistance; in memos to 
                                                
821 GARF f. 5446, op. 120, d. 1169, l. 65. 
822 Ibid. 
823 Ibid. 
824 This is immediately reminiscent of the pair of appeals from Rita Kornblium cited in Chapter One. It is 
possible that Mikoian believed an impersonal appeal was more likely to sit well with functionaries, though 
he also might have been concerned about perceptions of excessive favoritism. 
825 GARF f. 5446, op. 120, d. 1169, l. 63. 
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both he identified Chaplin as a “former candidate member of the Central Committee.”826 
With this action, Mikoian gave tacit endorsement to the notion that the physiological and 
psychological wounds of the state’s betrayal of its loyal servitors warranted could be 
mitigated through financial recompense.  
As with Maksimova, Aleksandra Konstantinovna Volkova – writing to Mikoian 
in December 1955 – envisaged a return to the luxurious environs of the domiciles built 
for the Soviet elite as key to surmounting the enduring consequences of state repression. 
In the aftermath of the arrests of Volkova’s husband – onetime deputy to the People’s 
Commissar of Light Industry Petr Iakovlevich Volkov – and herself, all of her family’s 
“property and belongings were seized and confiscated from our sealed apartment at our 
previous place of residence,” apartment 351 in the Government House.827 In response to 
her inquiries about the disposition of her property, Volkova was informed that “a portion 
of the property [had been] sold based on the first estimate at very cheap, obviously low 
prices,” while their “major property was not included on the inventory, thus nothing was 
left from the apartment.”828  
Without any meaningful assets to her name, Volkova “fervently ask[ed]” Mikoian 
to “order” the provision of relief to her family of six in the form of “a living space, 
preferably in the USSR Sovmin building in Moscow at 110/120 Frunzenskaia 
naberezhnaia, or in the Government House at 2 ulitsa Serafimovicha, which would make 
our difficult lives easier, as in this building we would be guaranteed complete calm and 
peace of mind after enduring serious trauma.”829 Additionally necessary to efface this 
                                                
826 GARF f. 5446, op. 120, d. 1169, ll. 63-64. 
827 GARF f. 5446, op. 120, d. 1168, l 77. 
828 Ibid. 
829 GARF f. 5446, op. 120, d. 1168, ll. 77-78. 
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past, in Volkova’s estimation, was “monetary assistance for the acquisition of clothes, 
belongings and property that my family and I need […] the establishment of a personal 
pension for me through my husband” and “required [medical] treatment” for herself and 
her immediate relatives.830 Perhaps as a means of securing Mikoian’s compliance – or as 
a reflection of his prior track record with other rehabilitees – Volkova closed with an 
expression “in advance” of “deep appreciation and gratitude for your sympathetic, kind 
treatment of and help for my children and me – the family of a rehabilitated 
Communist.”831 Mikoian quickly determined that her claims warranted support, and 
before the year was out he mandated that Moscatov “expedite” Volkova’s pension 
application and that Korobov “fulfill as possible (po vozmozhnosti udovletvorit’)” her 
housing requirements.832  
Remarkably – though as other cases will demonstrate, not uniquely – Volkova’s 
stated preference for being rehoused at the official Council of Ministers residence on 
Frunzenskaia naberezhnaia was deemed within the realm of possibility and ultimately 
honored. A memorandum written by the deputy chief of the Administrative Department 
from late August 1956 ordered the Moscow police (militsiia) passport division to register 
(propisat’) Volkova and her daughter, along with the latter’s two children, in apartment 
177 of this fashionable building, while her mother and son were allowed to maintain their 
residency at the space that all six members of the extended family previously occupied.833 
While it was rare that rehabilitees were able to dictate the terms of their own restitution to 
the point that Volkova did, the outcome of Volkova’s overture to Mikoian indicates that 
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832 GARF f. 5446, op. 120, d. 1168, 1. 77. 
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the Party leaders and bureaucrats responsible for administering and directing the Soviet 
state’s massive distributive apparatus proved – albeit in limited circumstances – to be 
unexpectedly attuned and responsive to the specifics of entreaties from Old Bolsheviks’ 
survivors for relocation. 
 
Regimes of Redress: Courts, Bureaucrats, and the Kvartirnyi vopros 
While the previously cited sources suggest that many if not most requests for 
housing were handled without judicial intervention, in some instances Soviet courts did 
indeed mediate between the recently rehabilitated and the current occupants of disputed 
dwellings.834 Through December 1937, the Latvian Civil War-era Red Army commander 
Reingol’d Berzin, his wife Gil’degart Dimze, and their daughters Ariia and Margarita 
lived in two rooms at 13 ulitsa Vesnina (near the present-day Italian embassy on what is 
now Denezhnyi pereulok), but were dispossessed in connection with Berzin’s arrest and 
subsequent execution in March 1938.835 Despite their parents’ status as enemies of the 
people the daughters were allowed to remain in the building, but moved into a single 
room less than half the size of their previous domicile.836 Following her own 
imprisonment – but prior to her husband’s exoneration – Dimze brought suit to evict the 
current residents, one A. G. Trofimova and her family, from her former apartment. Dimze 
                                                
834 The RSFSR Supreme Court ruled in 1962 that because members of dacha cooperatives did not actually 
own the structures, but only had a right to their use, that the son of the posthumously rehabilitated Savitskii 
was denied the return of the dacha where his family previously stayed, and was only entitled to a 
reimbursement equal to the value of his father’s share in the cooperative. See Donald D. Barry, “Soviet 
Housing Law: The Norms and Their Application,” in Soviet Law after Stalin, Part I: The Citizen and the 
State in Contemporary Soviet Law, ed. Donald D. Barry, George Ginsburgs, and Peter B. Maggs (Leyden: 
A. W. Sijthoff, 1977), 17.  
835 Reingol’d Berzin is frequently conflated in historical works with fellow Latvian Bolshevik Edouard 
Berzin, who was an early commandant of the Dal’stroi camp at Kolyma, though the former never worked 
in the Gulag system. The title of Ariia’s memoir of the period prior to her father’s arrest, which was posted 
by a (purported) relative on a Russian art web forum, is entitled “Dom nomer trinadtsat’.”  
836 GARF f. 7523, op. 107, d. 138, l. 28. Berzin’s two rooms together measured some 46.79 square meters, 
while the single room that Ariia and Margarita were granted was only 21.4 square meters; these figures 
became a point of contention as the case progressed over the course of 1955.  
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invoked the same January 1954 Supreme Court Plenum decree Naneishvili-Kosareva 
named to support her claim, which the people’s court in Moscow’s Kiev District 
apparently found persuasive. On December 18, the court upheld Dimze’s suit, and 
ordered that Trofimova be displaced and resettled into the single room that Dimze’s 
daughters occupied, with the understanding that she would be apportioned a larger living 
space elsewhere.837 Dimze’s victory was short-lived, however, as procedural errors led 
the verdict to be overturned the following September. 
 In March 1955 Trofimova contacted the Moscow Department of Registration and 
Allocation of Living Space to complain that the 25-square-meter apartment she had been 
promised in the court’s decision had yet to materialize. Previously unaware of the lawsuit 
and the relevant ruling, the department made its displeasure evident in a memo to USSR 
Supreme Court Chairman Anatolii Volin from July 29. The department’s deputy chief 
urged Volin to sign on to his organization’s protest to overturn the lower court’s ruling on 
the grounds that its representatives had been improperly excluded from the earlier 
proceedings.838 Although the department raised no objections to Trofimova’s initial 
eviction, because she was living in a space deemed sufficient for one adult and two 
children and registering her in a different region would “lead to a violation of the 
passport regime,” it pushed Volin to “[rescind] the contested decision with regard to the 
portion referring to the department’s obligation to provide Trofimova a second room.”839 
 The Moscow City Court Presidium heard Trofimova’s appeal on September 27 
and overturned the December 1954 verdict on the grounds that the exclusion of the 
Department of Registration and Allocation of Living Space from the previous trial 
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constituted a breach of the RSFSR Code of Civil Procedure. The case was remanded to 
the people’s court for final adjudication, with the understanding that the Moscow City 
Executive Committee’s housing department would be involved in deliberations.840 The 
Dimze family, which now consisted of five members, had enjoyed nine months of 
relative comfort in their reclaimed home when they were informed on October 6 that they 
once again had to vacate the premises and return to the single, 21-square-meter room. 
Ariia brought this situation to the attention of Kliment Voroshilov, who had served with 
her father during the Civil War and took an active part in his rehabilitation – even going 
so far as to provide a photograph of Berzin to his surviving relatives – in the hope that he 
could either intervene in the People’s Court hearing or help the family secure a suitable 
domicile in the event that the judge did not decide in their favor.841 Though it is unclear 
how precisely the court ruled, the Dimzes’ judicial frustrations are emblematic of the 
inconsistently applied policies, confusion, and infighting among various state organs that 
marred early Soviet restitution efforts to the families of the posthumously exculpated. 
The absence of a standardized policy outlining the Soviet government’s 
obligations before rehabilitated individuals afforded bureaucrats a great deal of leeway in 
reviewing petitions, frustrating the ambitions of appellants who had what appeared to be 
strong grounds for recompense. In keeping with his status as a leading figure within the 
Soviet judiciary, onetime Procurator General People’s Commissar of Justice Nikolai 
Krylenko, his second wife, Zinadia Zhelezniak, and their children were housed in the 
1930s at the famed Constructivist Narkomfin (People’s Commissariat of Finance) 
building, just outside Moscow’s Garden Ring. However, Krylenko ran afoul of one of his 
                                                
840 GARF f. 7523, op. 107, d. 138, l. 28-29. The presidium transferred the case from the Second District of 
the People’s Court to its Third, likely to avoid potential conflicts of interest. 
841 GARF f. 7523, op. 107, d. 138, ll. 30-31.  
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successors as head of the Procuracy, Andrei Vyshinskii, and was arrested at the height of 
the Terror in January 1938; the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court sentenced him 
to death on July 29 that same year.842 Following Krylenko’s conviction his remaining 
family was ejected from their desirable apartment as “family members of an enemy of the 
people.” In October 1954 his widow appealed to the Central Committee seeking his 
rehabilitation, which was ultimately realized the following August; that same month 
Rudenko addressed himself to Korobov at the Sovmin on Zhelezniak’s behalf.843 When 
informed of her husband’s exoneration, Zhelezniak made a point of emphasizing to 
Rudenko the “dire conditions” in which she and her family of four were living.844 
Apparently eager to intervene on behalf of one of his fallen predecessors, who already in 
the early 1930s had warned of concentrating too much power in the hands of the secret 
police, the procurator general requested that Korobov “render N. V. KRYLENKO’s 
family help in obtaining the requisite living space.”845 
At this same time Rudenko’s deputy Vladimir Afanas’evich Boldyrev wrote to 
Minister of Higher Education Viacheslav Petrovich Eliutin with a further complaint from 
Zhelezniak. One of her sons with Krylenko, Sergei– who was living under his mother’s 
last name to avoid association with his “criminal” father – had attempted to enroll the 
previous year at Moscow’s Ordzhonikidze Geological Prospecting Institute, but was 
                                                
842 GARF f. 8131, op. 32, d. 4001, l. 116. On the dispute between Vyshinskii and Krylenko, see Eugene 
Huskey, “Vyshinskii, Krylenko, and the Shaping of the Soviet Legal Order,” Slavic Review 3/4 (Autumn – 
Winter 1987): 414-428. 
843 Aleksandr Zviagintsev and Iurii Orlov, Prokurory dvukh epokh: Andrei Vyshinskii i Roman Rudenko 
(Moskva: OLMA-PRESS, 2001), 108; for Rudenko’s report to the Central Committee on Krylenko’s case 
from May 11, 1955, see Artizov et al, Reabilitatsiia, vol. 1, 217-218, 403 fn19.  
844 GARF f. 8131, op 32, d. 4001, l. 116. 
845 Ibid. On Krylenko’s opposition to the “Chekaization” of the police, see David Shearer, Policing Stalin’s 
Socialsim: Repression and Social Order in the Soviet Union, 1924-1953 (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 2009), 109. This is not to suggest that Krylenko was a principled opponent of state terror, as he 
vigorously prosecuted Oppositionists and other perceived threats, but his tenure was held up in the 1950s 
and 1960s as exemplary of socialist legality prior to Beriia et al’s corruption.  
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prevented from doing so by the mandatory committee when it was discovered that his 
father had been “convicted of anti-Soviet activities.”846 Boldyrev explained that because 
Krylenko’s conviction was predicated on “falsified materials” the Military Collegium had 
“fully rehabilitated him,” and therefore asked that Eliutin “consider the possibility” of 
allowing Sergei Zhelezniak to matriculate at the Geological Prospecting Institute; it bears 
mentioning that Boldyrev did not object to such stigmatization in principle, only to its 
application in the case of a now-undeserving subject.847 Although there is no response 
from the Ministry of Higher Education on the matter preserved in the Procuracy’s fond, 
the Council of Ministers’ Administrative Department’s handling of Rudenko’s initial 
petition demonstrates the difficulties faced even by those who received direct support 
from the highest levels of the Soviet state. 
In a blunt memo dated August 29, 1955, a representative of the Sovmin 
Administrative Department rejected outright Rudenko’s proposal to find suitable housing 
for Zhelezniak as “impossible (ne imeet vozmozhnosti).”848 No further explanation was 
provided for the dismissal, and there is no indication that the Procuracy pursued the 
matter past this point. Even though Krylenko’s prior residency at the Narkomfin building 
could have easily been established, once the Administrative Department made its 
unwillingness to cooperate evident the Zhelezniaks’ appeal was rendered a dead letter. It 
is unclear whether Zhelezniak and her children were able to successfully press their claim 
at a later juncture, but the Procuracy continued to keep tabs on Krylenko’s direct 
relations. A report from October 1956 drafted by the Chief Military Procuracy detailed 
the fates of Krylenko’s siblings, including a brother who also faced execution and three 
                                                
846 GARF f. 8131, op. 32, d. 4001, 118. 
847 Ibid. 
848 GARF f. 8131, op. 32, d. 4001, l. 117. 
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sisters, two of whom were sentenced to eight years in the Gulag, and one of whom was 
confined to a psychiatric hospital. Even though the courts eventually cleared both of the 
sisters who “sat” for eight years of any supposed wrongdoing neither was able to secure a 
living space in Moscow, and both were staying “in private apartments or with 
acquaintances.”849 In this way, injustices acknowledged by the central authorities 
continued to severely disrupt the lives of those who had been wrongfully persecuted for 
the better part of two decades. In an attempt to rectify this situation, Party and state 
bodies collaborated over the course of 1954 and 1955 to draft a decree that committed the 
government to honor certain claims from the rehabilitated and their families. 
Introduced into force on September 8, 1955, the Council of Ministers’ Resolution 
1655, “On Seniority, Employment and Provision of Pensions for Citizens Who Were 
Unjustly Prosecuted and Subsequently Rehabilitated” was intended to address the 
material needs of Gulag returnees and the families of the posthumously rehabilitated. As 
early as the autumn of 1954, the Council of Ministers Procuracy, Ministries of Justice and 
Finance, and All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions were debating the merits of 
various proposals intended to meet the needs of wrongfully convicted workers who were 
filtering back into Soviet society in huge numbers. These men and women sought 
employment commensurate with their qualifications and experience, but were often 
thwarted in resuming their former posts, which had been filled upon their arrests. The 
trade unions maintained that such laborers’ work history should not show a gap 
regardless of the duration of their imprisonment, that their previous housing should be 
returned to them via the courts, and that they should be granted a one-time payment 
                                                
849 GARF f. 8131, op. 32, d. 4001, ll. 117a-117b. 
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equivalent to two months’ salary at their last place of employment.850 This final point was 
included in deference to the Lenin-era labor code, which included a provision allowing 
employees to claim two-months’ back pay from their places of work in the event that 
they were arrested and either cleared before trial or acquitted in court; none of the 
framers of the labor code anticipated the possibility that Soviet citizens would be unjustly 
incarcerated for decades.851 Rudenko opined that existing legislation, including the 
Supreme Court Plenum degree of January 22, was sufficient to resolve these issues, and 
the Ministry of Finance – which would have been on the hook to come up with the 
requisite funds – agreed that it was inadvisable to change the existing laws.852  
 Despite this resistance, the trade unions continued to advocate for some sort of 
amelioration of rehabilitees’ standing, putting forward a series of recommendations over 
the course of 1955 that came under the withering scrutiny of the Justice and Finance 
ministries for supposedly replicating existing measures or failing to clarify how vital 
issues, such as whether workers were entitled to their former positions, would be dealt 
with.853 Nearly two years after the matter was first raised, though, the Council of 
Ministers finally settled on a document that addressed the trade unionists’ concerns, 
albeit in less ambitious fashion than initially proposed. Resolution 1655 incorporated the 
1922 labor code’s stipulation on two-months’ pay, underscoring the government’s 
position that rehabilitees were not due reparations for the extreme disruption to their 
lives, but it allowed time served in prison, camps, or exile to be counted toward work 
                                                
850 GARF f. 8131, op. 28, d. 1965, ll. 196-197. 
851 Elie, “Les anciens détenus,” 360. 
852 GARF f. 8131, op. 28, d. 1965, ll. 192-199. 
853 GARF f. 5451, op. 43, d. 1220, ll. 16-26. 
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seniority and pension calculations.854 There was no mention of courts’ involvement in 
mediating housing issues; rather, the rehabilitated were to be assigned housing “as a 
matter of priority,” which in practice created special waiting lists for exonerated former 
prisoners without any actual guarantee that such people would receive new dwellings in a 
timely fashion.855 The posthumously rehabilitated appear to have been included in the 
measure as something of an afterthought, given that a version drafted short months before 
its introduction made no mention of accommodating the survivors of workers who died in 
custody.856 The resolution in its final form confirmed that in the event of posthumous 
rehabilitation families members were entitled to the back pay and pensions that their 
relatives would have received, had they lived. 
The Council of Ministers did not seek to widely publicize Resolution 1655 – it 
bore the heading “not for publication,” and only 680 copies were distributed.857 Yet, 
through mechanisms that remain largely opaque, knowledge of the degree disseminated 
among the populace. In some cases, it was representatives of the Party, judiciary, or state 
security who informed rehabilitees of their newfound rights, while in other instances it 
appears that unions and workplaces assumed the burden of ensuring that the major 
                                                
854 E. A. Zaitsev, ed., Sbornik zakonodatel’nykh i normativnykh aktov o repressiiakh i reabilitatsii zhertv 
politicheskikh repressii (Moskva: Izdatel’stvo “Respublika,” 1993), 168-170. Estimates based on the 
number of rehabilitation recipients as of August 1955 – prior to the surge in numbers that met the 20th Party 
Congress – suggested that the two-month payments would total between 30 and 35 million rubles; see 
GARF f. 9474, op. 10, d. 122, l. 22. For those who held “responsible positions” in the Party and state, 
including most of the figures discussed in this chapter, receipt of a Union-level pension befitting their 
station was dependent upon the restoration of their Party membership. Thus, even though Levan 
Gogoberidze was legally exculpated in March 1954, it was not until two years later, when his Party card 
was returned, that a pension was established in his name. See GARF f. 10249, op. 4, d. 2825. 
855 Zaitsev, ed., Sbornik zakonodatel’nykh i normativnykh aktov, 170. Mark B. Smith notes that in Rostov in 
1961 249 rehabilitees were awaiting apartments, but only 42 were lucky enough to receive lodgings, and 
most of the spaces were drawn from the city’s old housing stock; see Smith, Property of Communists, 132.  
856 GARF f. 9474, op. 10, d. 122, ll. 23-25. 
857 Elie, “Les anciens détenus,” 360.  
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provisions were met.858 The September 8 ruling served to broaden the pool of those 
eligible for restitution far beyond the small clique that had up to that point been able to 
take advantage of the state’s largess, and additionally revised the grounds upon which 
such claims were to be made. Appellants for housing and financial aid were no longer 
required to justify themselves based on their relatives’ exceptional service or the 
hardships they had endured since their repression. Rather, the restoration of property and 
privileges became an obligatory transaction between the state and its citizens. However, 
as documents from the Administrative Department of the Council of Minister attest, elite 
families continued to be afforded a far greater degree of access to amenities and services 
than that of the average homo Soveticus, and increased demand for already-scarce 
resources served to further pit the rehabilitated against other Soviet welfare-seekers. 
Among the first individuals to take advantage of the regime Resolution 1655 put 
into place were the sons of Vlas Chubar’, who would become one of the most frequently 
invoked posthumously rehabilitated figures. Chubar’s descendants wasted little time in 
asserting their reclaimed status as privileged members of society. In a petition to the 
chairman of the Party Control Committee written a month after Chubar’ was restored to 
full Party membership that was eventually forwarded to Korobov, Aleksei and Vladimir 
Vlasovich Chubar’ detailed the path their lives had followed since the upheavals of 1938. 
Orphaned at the ages of 9 and 5, respectively, by the arrest of both parents Aleksei and 
                                                
858 Tamara Tanina, the widow of Mikhail Aleksandrovich Tanin, one of Khrushchev’s deputies at the 
Moscow Party Committee, first learned of her right to a pension and back-pay from the functionary at the 
Central Committee who was handling Tanin’s Party rehabilitation; though she went on to receive a 600-
ruble monthly pension, housing, and free rest stays in Crimea, she was critical of Khrushchev for not 
having taken a greater interest in the welfare of former subordinate’s family; see RGASPI, f. 560, op. 1, d. 
37, tom 2, ll. 214, 220-221. At a June 1956 meeting that restored several authors –including Isaak Babel’ – 
to membership in the Soviet Writers’ Union, the union also agreed to make onetime payments of between 
3,000 and 5,000 rubles, drawn from the USSR Literary Fund, to the men’s families, and to request that the 
Sovmin establish pensions on behalf of some of them; see RGALI f. 631, op. 30, d. 549, ll. 4-5. 
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Vladimir sought refuge with their infirm grandmother. The brothers remained with her 
until 1941 when they were evacuated from Moscow, at which point they were taken in by 
their maternal aunt, El’vis Ivanovna Adrianova, herself a political exile.859 Yet the “stain” 
of their family name continued to haunt Chubar’s sons into the postwar years: between 
1948 and 1950 both were “ripped from the training” they were receiving at vocational 
schools and sent to Dzhambul (today’s Taraz, Kazakhstan).860 The ensuing years were 
marked, in their words, by “great emotional torment […] and material hardship.”861 
Determined to overcome the legacy of their time as “children of enemies of the people” 
Aleksei and Vladimir presented the Party Control Committee with a list of demands for 
assistance that they believed were their due in late December 1955. 
The brothers first requested that the Party make provisions for Aleksei to 
complete his interrupted education in the Department of Radio at the Krasin Electro-
Mechanical Technical School and provide them both with increased stipends through the 
duration of their studies. On the domestic front, they sought an apartment large enough 
for themselves, Aleksei’s wife, as well as their aunt and uncle to live together 
comfortably, and “in accordance with Resolution 1655 of the USSR Council of 
Ministers,” the two months’ back-pay they were owed as their father’s heirs – most likely 
a generous sum, given the lofty positions Chubar’ held at the time of his arrest.862 In early 
February the Council of Ministers announced a plan to displace one of its own employees 
who lived in a 40.31 square meter apartment in the Arbat district, but this was evidently 
insufficient for the extended Chubar’ family’s needs, as a week later Korobov instructed 
                                                





his assistants to give them apartment 171 at the Government House where the brothers 
had previously lived; this unit had an additional room and was larger by some 17 square 
meters.863 On February 9 Korobov received a briefing from his deputy on the fulfillment 
of his orders: the Chubar’ family had successfully relocated to the Government House, 
Moskatov at the Personal Pension Committee confirmed that both brothers would receive 
funding while still in school, and they had received payments from both of their parents’ 
workplaces.864 As remarkable a case as this proved to be, given the fact that the Chubar’ 
family was granted more compensation by the authorities than they initially sought, it is 
emblematic of the ways in which the Administrative Department understood its 
obligations before the relatives of those notables who were newly returned to grace.865 
 
From Personal Belongings to State Furnishings: Challenges in Reclaiming Elite 
Property 
 
Despite her setbacks in the courtroom, Gil’degart Dimze ultimately obtained 
remuneration for some of the substantial losses her family incurred as a result of 
Reingol’d Berzin’s arrest and execution. In December 1955 Voroshilov received a report 
from the KGB – in response to his own directive – detailing the measures taken to satisfy 
Dimze’s request for the restoration of her and Berzin’s belongings. After combing its 
files, the KGB established that the organs of state security had seized a broad array of 
items from Berzin, including unspecified “furniture, an upright piano, a typewriter, a 
                                                
863 GARF f. 9542, op. 1, d. 166, ll. 3-4. 
864 GARF f. 9542, op. 1, d. 166, l. 5. There is no indication from either Sovmin Administrative Department 
documents or the files of the Pension Committee that a pension was created in Vlas Chubar’s name, though 
one might have been established through alternate channels. 
865 In addition to the Chubar’ siblings only three other pre-Terror residents successfully returned to 2 ulitsa 
Serafimovicha: M. P. Goreva (the widow of Aleksei Chernosvitov, an employee of the Sovnarkom 
Administrative Department), F. M. Zarkhi, and A. Z. Peters. See Shmidt, Dom na naberezhnoi, 91. 
Malenkov offered the widow and daughter of Red Air Force General Iakov Smushkevich their former 
apartment in the Government House, but they refused in order to avoid the painful memories within. See 
Adler, The Gulag Survivor, 155.  
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camera, two radio receivers, hunting rifles, a bicycle, 16 pocket watches and other 
valuables, 3,500 books, two rugs, two bolts of wool, men’s garments, shoes, and several 
household items, and also 13,815 rubles’ worth of bank deposits and 4,395 rubles in 
government bonds”; at the time of its expropriation, the Moscow City Financial 
Department estimated the property’s value at 41,222 rubles in total.866  
The report noted that of this hefty sum Dimze had already been remitted 36,582 
rubles – nearly ninety percent, presumably at the KGB’s expense – and the financial 
department assured the KGB that in “the near future” Dimze would “be issued the 
remaining amount, and the cash deposits from the savings books will be restored and the 
government bonds returned.”867 Apparently no provisions were to be made, however, for 
to Berzin’s onetime domiciles: the 20-square-meter room that was sealed upon his arrest 
had since been “inhabited by order of the Moscow City Council Housing Department,” 
and there was no available information as to the seizure of his dacha.868 Though Dimze 
was unable to wrest back her longtime home, this did not impede her efforts to obtain 
significant financial concessions – with Voroshilov’s help – from the Soviet state. 
In mid-April 1955 Aleksandra Ivanovna Proskurova sought Voroshilov’s 
assistance in locating items that had been taken from her apartment after the arrest of her 
husband, Red Army Air Force Lieutenant General Ivan Proskurov, almost immediately 
following the Nazi invasion in late June 1941. Proskurova expressed her appreciation to 
the party-state for its “responsiveness (chutkosti) and fairness” in restoring Proskurov’s 
good name and seeing to her needs after years in prison, camps, and exile, but she was 
                                                
866 GARF f. 7523, op. 107, d. 138, l. 34. 
867 Ibid. 
868 Ibid. It is unclear whether the room mentioned referred to a portion of the discussed apartment on ulitsa 
Vesnina or another living space that Berzin had been granted in connection with his position. 
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dismayed at her inability to obtain compensation for the vast majority of her household 
belongings.869 State security had already remitted over 12,500 rubles to Proskurova for 
various confiscated items, but she maintained that this represented a fraction of the 
articles that had gone missing. To substantiate her claim, Proskurova prepared a list 
“from memory” of nearly 50 categories of objects, including a sedan “with a full 
complement of spare parts and registration,” a pair of daggers, three bicycles, 250-300 
phonograph records, and two quilts that remained unaccounted for.870 Voroshilov 
forwarded the dossier to Serov at the KGB, who responded in late May 1955 with a 
memo that absolved his organization of any obligations in the matter on the grounds that 
the Proskurovs’ missing property “was neither seized nor confiscated by the organs of 
state security.”871 Upon Proskurov’s arrest his property was “formally taken into custody” 
but “left in A.I. Proskurova’s keeping.”872 The Nazis’ rapid advance on Moscow 
forestalled any plans that the NKVD might have had for Proskurov’s belongings, and 
when she was evacuated to Kuibyshev along with the rest of the buildings’ residents all 
of their possessions remained in the apartment. Then-superintendent Bobkov and his 
assistants seized upon this opportunity to “plunder” the homes of the elite; the KGB 
estimated that in autumn 1941 they “helped themselves to a sum total of around one 
million rubles’ worth of evacuees’ property.”873 Because of this malfeasance the KGB 
was able to absolve itself and the Administrative Department of any duty to compensate 
                                                
869 GARF f. 7523, op. 107, d. 123, l. 49  
870 GARF f. 7523, op. 107, d. 123, ll. 51ob-53. Proskurova’s act of composing an inventory of her property 
from memory is immediately reminiscent of the processes Auslander describes in “Coming Home?” 
871 GARF f. 7523, op. 107, d. 123, l. 54. 
872 Ibid. 
873 Ibid. Serov’s memo closed with the terse observation that “[t]he criminals were convicted.” Slezkine 
notes that the culprits also included members of a special NKVD unit billeted at the Government House, 
and that they showed “a particular preference for watches, razors, revolvers, hunting rifles, leather coats, 
gramophone records, and sewing machines.” See Slezkine, House of Government, 924. 
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Proskurova, either monetarily or in kind, thereby denying her recourse with regard to her 
vanished articles. 
Theft of a related, though far more widespread and pernicious variant prevented 
other rehabilitees from pressing their claims on the government. As many historians have 
noted, NKVD officers involved in property confiscations during the 1930s and 1940s 
treated the execution of their duties as an opportunity to enrich themselves, 
misappropriating all manner of goods and on occasion even taking up residence in the 
already-furnished apartments previously occupied by their targets.874 In order to divvy up 
spoils amongst themselves without leaving any trace of their offenses against “socialist 
property” responsible chekisty deliberately falsified inventories drawn up during 
confiscations, omitting items that they coveted.875 Anton Antonov-Ovseenko ruefully 
recalled the NKVD inventory of items belonging to his father, Vladimir, which falsely 
gave the impression of a “used-clothing shop”:  
He had a very valuable collection of books, as you’d expect of an active 
writer fluent in several European languages. But his library was not placed 
on the list. The same with the original etchings by famous artists, the 
typewriter, the phonograph with eight albums of records, his wife’s 
jewelry, her squirrel coat, expensive French perfumes purchased in Paris 
on the way home from Spain, and much, much more.876  
                                                
874 See Rogovin, Stalin’s Terror, 288; for a particular account of NKVD property theft and its 
consequences in the Moscow region, see Vatlin, Agents of Terror, 58-68. It was not the first time that many 
of the objects concerned had been expropriated, as much of the material plenty that the Soviet state 
disbursed to the Party faithful had been seized from its previous, bourgeois owners. My thanks to Juliane 
Fürst for this observation. 
875 Agnessa Mironovna-Korol, the wife of leading secret policeman Sergei Mironov, branded the NKVD 
officers who rifled through her family apartment in the Government House “bandits,” who “seemed to have 
the right to leave with full pockets of our valuable things – little boxes, pens, souvenirs.” See Mirnovna-
Korol, Agnessa, 125.  
876 See Anton Antonov-Ovseyenko, The Time of Stalin: Portrait of a Tyranny, trans. George Saunders 
(New York: Harper & Row, 1981), 152-153. Despite the disappearance of these coveted items, Antonov-
Ovseenko and his siblings were able to claim significant concessions from the state on behalf of their 
deceased parents. In September 1956 when Vladimir’s sister, Galina, traveled from Vladivostok to Moscow 
to meet with D. P. Terekhov at the Chief Military Procuracy, the Pacific Ocean Fleet Procuracy paid her 
210 ruble train fare; the following August all three Antonov-Ovseenko children were acknowledged as 
their parents’ heirs, entitling them to the formers’ bank accounts with accrued interest, accumulated shares 
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In this same vein, Adler quotes the wife of a posthumously rehabilitated Old Bolshevik 
who noted incredulously when shown the NKVD’s list of items from her home, 
“[j]udging by this description, we were sitting on stools and eating from earthen bowls 
with tin spoons.”877 Once erased from official existence, though, plundered objects could 
not be redeemed through Soviet bureaucratic means, which depended entirely on state-
generated documents to substantiate ownership.878  
 Izabella Emmanuilovna Belaia-Iakir’s ambition to be reunited with some of her 
most valued possessions was frustrated by such misrepresentation. The sister of 
renowned Red Army tactician Iona Iakir and wife of Moscow City Committee secretary 
Semen Korytnyi, upon her return from Magadan Belaia-Iakir was uniquely positioned to 
take advantage of the reformist efforts spearheaded by the post-Stalin leadership.879  By 
April 1955, at which point both Belaia-Iakir and Korytnyi had been rehabilitated – the 
latter posthumously – Belaia-Iakir enjoyed a standard of living far higher than that of 
most former zeks. She and her daughter had been provided an apartment on the Garden 
Ring (ulitsa Sadovo-Sukharevskaia), and afforded access to the inventory prepared by the 
NKVD in 1939 when her apartment and personal belongings therein were expropriated. 
However, in an indignant letter to the Sovmin Administrative Department she sharply 
                                                                                                                                            
in the “Workers of Science and Art” dacha-building cooperative worth 18,041 rubles, and the copyright to 
their fathers’ writings. This last provision was particularly significant, as in May 1957 the Sovmin 
introduced a resolution stating that the descendants of posthumously rehabilitated authors could claim 
copyright on their relatives’ work starting from the date they were notified of the latter’s rehabilitation; this 
provided heirs with a major boon, as copyright typically expired 15 years after an authors’ death. See 
GARF f. 8415, op. 2, d. 2, ll. 4, 7; Artizov et al, Reabilitatsiia, vol. 2, 273; Serge L. Levitsky, Introduction 
to Soviet Copyright Law (Leyden: A. W. Sijthoff, 1964), 129. 
877 Adler, The Gulag Survivor, 187. This quotation, as well as Antonov-Ovseenko’s, underscores the 
persistent mental divide between Soviet elites and ordinary citizens, as the material conditions that the 
claimant dismissed as insultingly primitive were the quotidian reality for many millions across the USSR.   
878 This dilemma was only acknowledged by the legal establishment in 1963; see E. Efimov, “Pravovye 
voprosy vozvrata konfiskovannogo imushchestva reabilitirovannym grazhdanam ili ikh naslednikam,” 
Sotsialisticheskaia zakonnost’ 8 (1963): 26-31.  
879 On Khrushchev’s relationship with the Korytnyis and Iakir, see Chapter 3. 
 305 
questioned the omission of several treasured items from the list, including a mirrored 
cabinet and a dressing table.880 After pointedly noting that she could not understand how 
certain of her possessions had come to be left off the NKVD’s register, she entreated the 
Administrative Department to issue “instructions” mandating the return of her 
furniture.881 
 The head of the Administrative Department’s Housing Directorate apprised 
Belaia-Iakir in early September 1955 that his organization did “not possess any 
documents confirming the presence of your furniture at 2 ulitsa Serafimovicha.”882 
Inherent in this abdication of responsibility for the items in question was tacit 
acknowledgment of a force majeure that prevented the Administrative Department from 
meeting the demands even of former luminaries like Belaia-Iakir. A thoroughgoing effort 
to recover the disappeared furniture would have necessitated a confrontation with the 
KGB, which jealously guarded its institutional prerogatives from encroachment by other 
state organs, and would likely have generated little additional information in light of 
NKVD officers’ extensive fabrications. Given that the file on Belaia-Iakir’s petition ends 
with the denial from the Housing Directorate it is doubtful that she pressed the issue any 
further with the Administrative Department, and while she may have found an alternate 
route for forwarding her claim through her ties to Khrushchev, even his influence might 
not have been sufficient to surmount the combined effects of malfeasance and 
bureaucratic inertia. 
 Even when official records attested to expropriated objects’ existence Sovmin 
employees often exploited the porous distinctions between private and state property 
                                                
880 GARF f. 9542, op. 1, d. 163, ll. 1-2. 
881 GARF f. 9542, op. 1, d. 163, l. 2. 
882 GARF f. 9542, op. 1, d. 163, l. 4. 
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engendered by Stalin-era purges to stonewall those seeking restitution. By spring 1955 
Mariia Abramovna Demchenko-Shmaenok, the widow of former Kiev and Khar’kov 
Party obkom head Nikolai Demchenko, had been resettled in the TASS apartment 
building on today’s Prospekt Mira (then 1st Meshchanskaia ulitsa) and promised 
compensation for at least a portion of her family’s confiscated effects.883 While at the 
Lubianka to collect payment a KGB officer “familiarized” Demchenko-Shmaenok with 
the list prepared by the NKVD when apartment 349 of the Government House was 
inventoried in February 1938, over six months after the Demchenkos’ arrest. 
Demchenko-Shmaenok was dismayed to learn that some 48 items– including fourteen 
oak chairs, seven soft leather-covered chairs, and four mahogany armchairs – had at the 
time been turned over to the complex’s management, as she maintained that all of the 
furnishings belonged to her family, and that they had not “take[n] a single thing from the 
building management.”884 On these grounds Demchenko-Shmaenok petitioned for the 
“immediate return” of the disputed furniture.885 Having produced copies of the 
questioned inventory and an accompanying receipt signed by the Housing Directorate’s 
deputy commandant “stating that the listed items belong to the building management,” 
superintendent Grigorii Zhuravlev informed Demchenko-Shmaenok that it was “clear 
from the documents” that all the furniture in apartment 349 was the Government House’s 
property, and that in the intervening years it had been moved around the complex “as 
                                                
883 The apartment that the Administrative Department granted Demchenko-Shmaenok previously belonged 
to the musician and composer Mikhail Fikhtengol’ts, who sold it the previous year upon moving into the 
Government House to live with the family of his wife, Iuliia Kaganovich, daughter of Mikhail Kaganovich. 
See GARF f. 9542, op. 1, d. 53, l. 147. 
884 GARF f. 9542, op. 1, d. 155, l. 37. Slezkine maintains that all the Government House’s residents 
received some furniture from the woodworking shop in the building’s basement, but confirms that many 
households supplemented such pieces with property of their own to which they were particularly attached. 
See Slezkine, House of Government, 389, 488. 
885 GARF f. 9542, op. 1, d. 155, l. 37. 
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needed (po prinadlezhnosti)”; the prospect of returning pieces that could be located went 
unacknowledged.886 
Undeterred by Zhuravlev’s obstructionism, over the next two years Demchenko-
Shmaenok wrote multiple letters to the building management, assiduously maintaining 
that none of her furniture had been drawn from the Government House’s stock and that it 
was described as such on the inventory due to either “malice or haste (zloupotrebleniia ili 
speshki).”887 Eventually, in March 1957 Zhuravlev tersely informed Demchenko-
Shmaenok that there were “no grounds to honor [her] request,” because the building 
management could produce no documentation suggesting that it had taken possession of 
any personally owned property from apartment 349; a memo addressed to the 
Administrative Department written the following month confirmed that the matter was 
considered “settled,” cutting Demchenko-Shmaenok off from any further recourse.888 
However, despite Zhuravlev’s assurances to the contrary, recently uncovered records 
attest to the validity of Demchenko-Shmaenok’s claim: a 1938 Housing Directorate 
report itemizing “property received without compensation (bezvozmezdno) from 
organizations outside our system” – i.e., taken from repressed families – listed Nikolai 
Demchenko as one of the largest contributors to the state’s new store of appointments.889 
This revelation suggests that as apparently benevolent as Sovmin organs may have been 
in their dealings with some rehabilitees, the imperative to conceal past transgressions and 
                                                
886 GARF f. 9542, op. 1, d. 155, ll. 38, 40. 
887 GARF f. 9542, op. 1, d. 155, ll. 41-42, 50-51. 
888 GARF f. 9542, op.1, d. 155, ll. 48, 53. 
889 Shmidt, Dom na naberezhnoi, 92 fn36.  
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retain items that had since been disbursed to current-day residents of the Government 
House often superseded considerations of former enemies of the peoples’ welfare.890 
Although Resolution 1655 did not deal explicitly with moveable property 
restitution, in the aftermath of its introduction – and the 20th Party Congress shortly 
thereafter – the administration of the Government House proved somewhat more 
accommodating of petitions for the restoration of individuals’ effects.891 One such 
beneficiary of this turn was Margarita Levitskaia, whose father, Konstantin Levitskii had 
been an early Social Democratic activist, while her husband, Ivan Kleimenov, was a 
former protégé of Mikhail Tukhachevskii’s within the USSR’s nascent rocketry 
program.892 Following her and Kleimenov’s rehabilitations in mid-1955 – which were 
expedited thanks to the intervention of author Mikhail Sholokhov, whose novel And 
Quiet Flows the Don was edited by Levitskaia’s mother – Levitskaia returned to 2 ulitsa 
Serafimovicha in search of tangible vestiges of her former life there.893 As narrated in a 
series of exchanges from late February and March of 1956 between the Sovmin 
Administrative Department and the housing complex’s representatives, Levitskaia wrote 
to the building’s management once she was allowed back into Moscow in reference to 
several pieces of furniture belonging to her that had remained in apartment number 475 
                                                
890 An analogous case from the spring through fall of 1957, that of Elizaveta Veller-Gurevich (wife of 
Gosplan deputy Aleksandr Gurevich), is noteworthy for the quarter from which Veller-Gurevich received 
support in pressing her claim. Based on its own records the KGB repeatedly pressured the Housing 
Directorate to look into Veller-Gurevich’s demand for the return of a cupboard, wardrobe, and several 
bookshelves and bedframes, but was also rebuffed on the (likely false) grounds that the items in question 
were government issue, though she was paid over 10,000 rubles in compensation. See GARF f. 9542, op. 1, 
d. 155, ll. 107-112. 
891 Guidelines regarding the protocol for compensating rehabilitees for their confiscated property were only 
introduced by the KGB and Ministry of Finance in the autumn of the following year. See Artizov et al, 
Reabilitatsiia, vol. 2, 181-183, 194-197. 
892 On Kleimenov’s career and downfall see Asif A. Siddiqi, “The Rockets’ Red Glare: Technology, 
Conflict, and Terror in the Soviet Union,” Technology and Culture 44, 3 (July 2003): 470-501. 
893 Sholokhov visited the Chief Military Procuracy and personally requested that Kleimenov and 
Levitskaia’s cases be reopened. See Viktorov, Bez grifa “Sekretno,” 276.  
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when she was arrested, including a bookshelf, a writing table, a rifle cabinet, and an 
armchair.894 An examination of the apartment revealed that the bookshelf and writing 
table were “on temporary loan (vo vremennom pol’zovanii) to the current occupants” and 
were listed in the building’s inventory, while the other two furnishings remained to be 
found.895  
Having reported the results of investigation into Levitskaia’s seized property to 
his superiors at the Administrative Department, Zhuravlev, the Government House 
superintendent, requested instruction as to how to proceed. Administrative Department 
bureaucrats proposed that the bookshelf and writing table be written off from the 
building’s inventory and returned to Levitskaia, along with a cabinet and armchair 
selected from the building’s stock to replace the items that had gone missing between 
1937 and 1956.896 Having uncovered documents that attested to the fact that the rifle 
cabinet and armchair had “indeed been turned over to the house management” the 
Administrative Department instructed Zhuravlev to proceed with the plan.897 Thus, in this 
instance, the state bodies involved in property restitution not only returned items that had 
been confiscated nearly twenty years prior, but also took pains to uncover documentary 
evidence that compelled them to provide suitable substitutes for possessions that had 
gone missing in that interval. 
By the time Liia Vladimirovna Polonskaia and her brother, Vladimir 
Vladimirovich, demanded the restoration of the Miul’bakh upright piano that had 
belonged to their family the instrument itself had passed through a rather storied 
                                                
894 GARF f. 9542, op. 1, d. 155, l. 69. 
895 Ibid. 
896 GARF f. 9542, op. 1, d. 155, l. 70. 
897 GARF f. 9542, op. 1, d. 155, l. 71. 
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assortment of hands. A relic of Russia’s pre-Revolutionary years, the piano was 
manufactured by the noted Miul’bakh firm in Saint Petersburg and managed to survive 
the chaotic years of world war, revolution, and civil war before it made its way to the 
Government House.898 It was apparently one of the Polonskiis’ most valued possessions 
while they lived in apartment 233, but was confiscated along with the rest of their 
property following the arrest of their father – the career revolutionary and onetime Party 
Secretary of Azerbaijan Vladimir Ivanovich Polonskii – in June 1937.899 The piano 
remained in the apartment, where Mikhail Kaganovich and his family took up residence; 
although the surviving Kaganoviches were not dispossessed after Mikhail’s 1941 suicide, 
the piano was eventually moved down the hall to apartment 235 in 1943, and it thus 
became the property of the Ukrainian author Aleksandr Korneichuk.900 By June 1952 the 
piano had once again passed into new hands, those of one I. O. Smol’ko, who was so 
taken with the instrument that he purchased it from the building for the handsome sum of 
3,500 rubles, even though it was only valued at 3,000 rubles according to the building’s 
inventory.901 All these details emerged as representatives of the Government House’ 
functionaries attempted to locate the piano; when it became evident that it was no longer 
                                                
898 Slezkine notes that there were two obligatory items in every elite apartment at the Government House: a 
large table for hosting gatherings, and a piano; Slezkine, House of Government, 490. 
899 Some books from Polonskii’s private collection were eventually incorporated into the holdings of the 
Lenin Library, though it is unclear if these were voluntary donations; see GARF f. 7907, op. 1, d. 7. On the 
younger Vladimir Polonskii’s experiences in exile in Kazakhstan, see Vladimir Polonskii, “‘Doroga v piat’ 
let v Kazakhstan i obratno’: Zapiski ssyl’nogo,” Istochnik 1 (1996): 66-77.  
900 GARF f. 9542, op. 1, d. 155, ll. 120, 123. 
901 Ibid. There is one other mention in the Housing Directorate files consulted of a resident, a certain R. B. 
Afanas’eva, being allowed to purchase furniture from a Sovmin-run building on an installment plan, 
showing that furnishings held by the Housing Directorate could occasionally end up in private hands, for 
the right price; see GARF f. 9542, op. 1, d. 155, l. 97. Numerous accounts also exist of Stalin-era 
authorities using property seized from repressed people as a source of revenue; Lev Razgon recalled 
encountering his repressed father-in-law’s furniture in a store in the center of Moscow, and Markoosha 
Fischer wrote of stores on the city’s outskirts filled articles that had belonged to “enemies of the people.” 
See Lev Razgon, Plen v svoem otechestve (Moskva: “Knizhnyi sad,” 1994), 80-81; Markoosha Fischer, My 
Lives in Russia (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1944), 159. My thanks to Brigid O’Keeffe for bringing the 
Fischer memoir to my attention. 
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in their possession, they resolved to compensate the surviving Polonskiis monetarily, an 
arrangement the two siblings accepted in June 1956, but with which they eventually took 
exception when it became apparent that they had been shortchanged.   
Because the payment to Liia and Vladimir Vladimirovich was calculated based on 
the piano’s value as listed in the building’s inventory, rather than its sale price, they were 
only issued 3,000 rubles.902  In a joint letter dated May 20, 1958 they complained that in 
the time since the deal had been transacted it had become “absolutely clear that the 
money restored to us represents a small part of the upright piano’s value.”903 The 
Polonskiis demanded that the Administrative Department review its decision from June 
1956 and either pay them the outstanding balance or “return the instrument to us upon the 
condition that we refund the three thousand rubles we received.”904 Once made aware of 
this discrepancy, the Administrative Department again set out to make amends, and 
Zhuravlev was ordered to remit the difference to the Polonskiis.905 Though the additional 
five hundred rubles the Polonskii siblings received in 1958 was likely far less than they 
anticipated, the steps taken by the Council of Ministers’ subsidiary bodies to redress this 
situation are indicative of the emphasis that was placed upon making restitution to certain 
onetime members of the early Soviet elite, though much of the success that some heritors 
experienced appears to have come down to the luck of the draw, as families that 
theoretically should have enjoyed particular favor – such as the Demchenkos with their 
ties to Khrushchev – encountered their share of prolonged frustrations. This haphazardly 
                                                
902 GARF f. 9542, op. 1, d. 155, l. 121. 
903 GARF f. 9542, op. 1, d. 155, l. 119. The source of this impression is unclear, as is the amount that the 
Polonskiis thought they were due. 
904 GARF f. 9542, op. 1, d. 155, l. 119ob. 
905 GARF f. 9542, op. 1, d. 155, l. 124. The following explanatory note was handwritten on this undated 
memo: “their piano was sold for 3500 rubles, they were paid 3000 rubles.” 
 312 
applied policy reaffirmed – for those fortunate enough to receive relief – that rehabilitees 
were entitled to expect the restoration of key elements of their pre-repression living 
standards. However, by that same token, individuals repeatedly denied recompense or 
dissatisfied with the terms of their restitution were consistently reminded of the fact that 
much of Soviet society had moved on from the founding years of state socialism and the 
Terror, and for all their protestations, neither their status as survivors of honored servitors 
of the Bolshevik project nor the letter of the law could guarantee them the exact manner 
of compensation they believed they were owed.  
 
The Frustrated and the Neglected 
Recipients of aid under Resolution 1655 did not shy away from expressing their 
dissatisfaction with the compensation afforded to them when it fell short of their 
expectations, which were predicated on the benefits to which they had been entitled prior 
to their repression. The most pointed critique preserved in the Sovmin’s files came from 
Ekaterina Arkad’evna Kuznetsova, the widow of former USSR Deputy Commissar of 
Trade Zakhar Samuilovich Bolotin. In a letter to Korobov from May 23, 1956 
Kuznetsova wasted no time in asserting her rights as an aggrieved party. On February 23 
of that year, one day after receiving word of her husband’s posthumous rehabilitation 
from the Military Collegium, Kuznetsova presented herself at Bolotin’s former 
workplace “with all the requisite documents to receive a so-called ‘stipend.’”906 By May 
11 the Ministry of Trade had “settled up (rasplatilos’)” with Kuznetsova, an accounting 
that she found inadequate.907  
                                                
906 GARF f. 9542, op. 1, d. 155, l. 74. 
907 Ibid. 
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Apparently Bolotin’s two months of back-pay had been calculated according to 
the “‘harsh’ rate (po zhestokoi stavke)” of 4,000 rubles per month; Kuznetsova was 
surprised to discover that income tax had been withheld from this amount, “given as a 
‘stipend’ for the lives of innocently killed people,” and observed that the Ministry of 
Trade had failed to factor the length of Bolotin’s service into its calculation of the 
payment, as she claimed Resolution 1655 obliged.908. Apparently the most galling 
omission, though, was the Ministry of Trade’s failure to pay the contents of the infamous 
“second ‘packet,’” a supplemental sum provided to responsible Party members equal to 
anywhere between half and their entire monthly salary.909 Kuznetsova could not “find 
room in [her] mind for the notion that for people who have not suffered these ‘envelopes’ 
are necessary, while for those who for long years unjustly bore the yoke of ‘enemy of the 
people’ they are not in order.”910 She thus understood Bolotin’s rehabilitation as a means 
not only of making amends for the injustices of previous decades, but also as a way to 
restore the pre-Terror socio-economic status quo. 
 Kuznetsova likewise gave voice to frustration over the apparent indifference and 
parsimoniousness with which state functionaries responsible for dispensing aid 
performed their duties. While taking delivery of Bolotin’s rehabilitation paperwork, 
Kuznetsova was twice asked whether she was receiving a personal pension; when she 
replied that she did not have enough time on the job, she was made aware that the 
pension was dependent on her husband’s former position.911 Kuznetsova thus took issue 
                                                
908 Ibid. 
909 Ibid.; on the “packet” system, see Matthews, Privilege in the Soviet Union, 37. 
910 GARF f. 9542, op. 1, d. 155, l. 74. 
911 Ibid. 
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with the fact that no one at the Ministry of Trade offered to assist her in claiming her 
rights:  
The cashier window opened, the cashier’s generous hand passed the 
“stipend” in the amount of 2 months’ salary with income tax deducted and 
THAT’S IT! And regarding how I feel, or whether I need something – 
likewise no one took an interest. 
  We talk a lot about sensitivity (chutkosti), but where is it?912 
Rejecting the notion that she was a “greedy person (korystoliubiva),” Kuznetsova insisted 
that her dissatisfaction was born out of a desire to “defend [her] rights,” condemning 
those “who so zealously guard the state’s ‘kopek’ while infringing on the interests of 
traumatized people” for “committing an anti-political act (delaiut antipoliticheskoe 
delo).”913 Though it remains unclear whether Korobov heeded Kuznetsova’s call to “do 
all that you are obliged to by the PARTY” – a pension was created for Bolotin that July – 
Kuznetsova’s impassioned rhetoric speaks to the resilience of deeply ingrained notions of 
privilege even in the face of the privations and indignities of decades of state terror, and 
the degree to which such perceptions continued to inform former elites’ individual 
prerogatives.914 
The experiences of one former ChSIR whose housing claims were repeatedly 
denied provide a stark counterexample to accounts of successful resettlement and 
property restitution narrated in many of the documents cited in this chapter. Tat’iana 
                                                
912 GARF f. 9542, op. 1, d. 155, ll. 74-74ob. This apparent indifference on the part of the Ministry of 
Trade’s employees can likely be attributed to the fact that pensions fell under the Council of Ministers’ 
purview.  
913 GARF f. 9542, op. 1, d. 155, l. 74ob. 
914 Ibid.; GARF f. 10249, op. 4, d. 5519. As determined as Kuznetsova was to secure the state benefits 
owed her, in at least one documented instance a ranking Party member’s survivor declined such assistance. 
Nataliia Il’inichna Sats, the children’s theater director and wife of USSR Commissar of Internal Trade 
Izrail’ Iakovlevich Veitser, recalled that she was offered a “large pension as the wife, or more precisely, the 
widow of a fully rehabilitated member of the government.” Though tempted by the prospect of receiving a 
subsistence allowance without having to work, Sats ultimately opted to decline the pension, as she was 
convinced that idleness would be detrimental to her mental state. See Nataliia Sats, Zhizn’, iavlenie 
polosatoe (Moskva: Novosti, 1991), 490. 
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Petrovna Ivanova – whose husband Colonel Petr Ivanovich Ivanov served as the Soviet 
Union’s military attaché in Finland from 1933 until the spring of 1938 – remained 
trapped in a sort of interminable exile nearly a decade following her exculpation. Upon 
being recalled to Moscow from Helsinki in 1938 the Ivanovs were placed in temporary 
accommodations at the Hotel National – directly across Manezh Square from the Kremlin 
– which, as Ivanova later deduced, was where military envoys returning from postings 
abroad were “deliberately concentrated” before being taken into NKVD custody.915 
Shortly after her husband’s arrest at the end of April Ivanova was herself imprisoned and 
eventually transferred to a labor camp; after serving her sentence she settled to the 
northeast of Moscow in the village of Petrovo-Gorodishche, near Suzdal’. It was there 
that Ivanova first received confirmation of her husband’s death, though she noted that the 
form provided contained a significant error: a functionary had mistakenly listed Ivanov’s 
place of residence as Petrovo-Gorodishche, though neither he nor Ivanova – both lifelong 
Muscovites before being dispatched to Finland – had ever been there prior to his arrest.916 
When Ivanova brought this fact to the attention of the local state security officials she 
was assured that “the error would be corrected, however to date this has not been 
done.”917 This uncorrected typo, among other issues, ultimately cost Ivanova her ability 
to reclaim residency in the capital, to which she was entitled as a fully rehabilitated 
person.  
Following her release from the labor camp system but prior to her rehabilitation 
Ivanova – like all former zeks – was prohibited from entering Moscow for reasons of 
“social undesirability.” Yet from autumn 1956, when she and Ivanov were both 
                                                




exculpated, Ivanova was determined to exercise her prerogative to return to her native 
city and reestablish residence there. Undaunted by the fact that the house in Moscow 
where her father had lived and raised her son while she was incarcerated had been 
demolished, Ivanova maintained that “according to the USSR Council of Ministers’ 
Resolution 1655 from September 8, 1955, I, like many other innocent victims (nevinno 
postradavshie), received the right to residence in Moscow, i.e. returning to our permanent 
residence, and was granted the right to priority access to living space.”918 Ivanova 
assumed that this guaranteed an end to her years of displacement, but as she soon 
discovered her “suffering and torment began anew with regard to registering in Moscow 
and receiving a living space.”919  
Beginning in 1957 Ivanova turned to various agencies for redress, but in each 
instance her overtures were automatically forwarded to the Moscow City Council, where 
she came up against a strain of “callous bureaucratism (bezdushnyi biurokratizm) on the 
part of those comrades who are entrusted with examining such petitions.”920 Ivanova 
alleged that workers at the city council did not “want to see the long-suffering 
(mnogovystradavshego) person behind the petition”; instead, they deferred to the “formal, 
dry letter of the law, contriving all manner of reasons just to answer with a rejection.”921 
When told that one denial was due to the “acute shortage of space in Moscow” Ivanova 
bristled: how could such an issue apply to her, “a rehabilitated person who before her 
                                                
918 RGALI f. 2528, op. 5, d. 238, l. 51. Ivanova’s understanding of Resolution 1655 was actually somewhat 
faulty, as Elie notes that the degree included no location-specific provisions, and many former Muscovites 
and Leningraders ended up stuck in provincial backwaters. See Elie, “Rehabilitation in the Soviet Union,” 
34-35. 




arrest lived in Moscow since childhood and who, like all rehabilitated persons, is covered 
by Resolution 1655 of the USSR Council of Ministers?”922  
Ivanova saw the obduracy of Moscow’s civil servants, compounded by the 
unresolved confusion over Ivanov’s actual residence, as the source of a bureaucratic 
impasse that she believed Minister of Defense Rodion Iakovlevich Malinovskii – to 
whom she directed her appeal in March 1965 – might be able brush aside and thereby 
bring her “woe” to an end.923 Unfortunately for her, it appears as though Malinovskii 
proved similarly inattentive, as her letter was found among the personal papers of the 
writer Sergei Sergeevich Smirnov, to whom a mutual friend had forwarded it in the hope 
that he might be able to help break this impasse. In the absence of any additional 
documentation, it seems unlikely that any progress on Ivanova’s behalf was made at this 
relatively late juncture. This serves as a stark reminder that the guarantees enshrined in 
decrees such as Resolution 1655 ultimately hinged on individual functionaries’ 
willingness and ability to carry them out, without which there was little to distinguish the 




In February 1957, as the widow of the posthumously rehabilitated Komsomol 
Secretary Kosarev, Mariia Naneishvili-Kosareva was assigned a small plot of land from 
the state forestry fund. After initial interagency haggling between the Sovmin 
Administrative Department and the Ministry of Defense, which controlled the land in 
question, a parcel of .12 hectares near the village of Istra northwest of Moscow was 
                                                
922 Ibid. 
923 RGALI f. 2528, op. 5, d. 238, ll. 51-52. 
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settled upon. There, Naneishvili-Kosareva was to build her family a new dacha, to 
replace the fabled one where 20 years prior her husband made the impolitic comment that 
allegedly cost their family so dearly, but later served as her ticket out of perpetual 
exile.924 Naneishvili-Kosareva would be responsible for covering the construction costs 
herself – frowned upon by the nomenklatura of the time, who availed themselves of state-
owned dachas lest they be suspected of “petty bourgeois materialism” – but once 
completed the structure would indisputably belong to her and her family.925  
The decision to grant Naneishvili-Kosareva the lot on which to build the new 
dacha, narrated in two short memoranda written by the Administrative Department’s 
chief, is a small but deceptively significant component of the Soviet government’s 
attempt to provide once-privileged families with the trappings of their former existences. 
In the years before Kosarev’s fall from grace, his access to a dacha symbolized his 
responsible role within the Party leadership; during the Terror, it was a site of intriguing 
and ultimately of loss, when it was seized with the rest of his possessions. That the 
authorities facilitated Naneishvili-Kosareva’s acquisition of a substitute dacha by dint of 
her marriage to Kosarev, and the suffering that she incurred as a result of his arrest, 
eloquently reveals the material significance with which posthumous rehabilitation was 
vested. For the surviving Kosarevs it represented, to a certain extent, the saga of their 
experience of state repression having come full circle.   
At the most pragmatic level, the Soviet government’s property restitution efforts 
provided returnees with housing and material comforts at a time of profound shortages 
and increasing demand on the state’s welfare system. Yet the adoption of this policy also 
                                                
924 GARF f. 9542, op. 1, d. 155, ll. 32-33.  
925 Stephen Lovell, Summerfolk: A History of the Dacha, 1710-2000 (Ithaca and London: Cornell 
University Press, 2000), 171-172. 
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held deep personal significance for the families of the posthumously rehabilitated. 
Demands for the return of items that were of little apparent use to people who had spent 
the better part of the past two decades in Gulag camps – such as rifle cabinets, upright 
pianos, and overstuffed armchairs – were not only exercises in sentimentality, but also 
constituted a central element in the reconstruction of elite identity. The notions of 
normality of erstwhile denizens of the Government House and other exclusive dwellings 
were indelibly shaped by their experiences within these edifices’ walls, and by the 
coveted objects with which they surrounded themselves. As much as these buildings may 
have been haunted by the specters of past violence and trauma, their attraction for former 
residents remained undiminished.  
If returnees could not occupy the actual physical spaces where they lived prior to 
their repression, or reclaim many of the seized objects that previously distinguished them 
from the vast majority of the Soviet populace, by acknowledging that they were entitled 
to, and making compensation – albeit capriciously – for these possessions, the Soviet 
government offered them the opportunity to re-inhabit the privileged status that they had 
been afforded and suddenly denied under Stalin. Conversely, by obstructing other 
rehabilitees’ efforts to recover property that had vanished in the 1930s, the authorities 
reinforced their marginality and prevented them from attaining “rehabilitation” in the 
fullest sense of the term. This suggests that even under Soviet state socialism – which 
nominally sought to promote state and collective ownership of immovable property and 
consumer goods – individuals’ homes and the objects within them were understood both 
by citizens and the party-state as factors central to the fashioning, maintenance, and 




When Stalin was removed from the Mausoleum and 
buried at the Kremlin Wall, a wreath appeared at 
his grave with the inscription: “To the posthumously 
repressed, from the posthumously rehabilitated.”926 
 
 On September 24, 1967, the Central Committee received an open letter from “the 
surviving children of Communists wrongfully repressed by Stalin.” Though Stalin’s 
corpse had been disinterred from the mausoleum it shared with Lenin’s remains 
following the 22nd Party Congress in October 1961, the letter’s drafters perceived a 
softening of the Party line on the disgraced dictator since Leonid Brezhnev assumed the 
post of General Secretary of the Communist Party. In anticipation of the fiftieth 
anniversary of the October Revolution, this group cautioned against any official 
backsliding on Stalin’s place in history, which would be an affront to “the memory of 
people who perished in the hellish machinery of the cult of personality.”927 Among the 43 
signatories were a considerable number of individuals whose families had been direct 
beneficiaries of Khrushchev-era posthumous rehabilitation policies. These included Petr 
Iakir, the tormented son of Iona Iakir and likely initiator of the open letter, along with his 
daughter Irina and son-in-law Iulii Kim, Anton Antonov-Ovseenko, Ariia Dimze-Berzin, 
the daughters of Gleb Bokii and Valerian Osinskii-Obolenskii, and the sons of Ivan 
                                                
926 Vladimir Bukovskii, “I vozvrashchaetsia veter…” Pis’ma russkogo puteshestvennika (Moskva: 
Demokraticheskaia Rossiia, 1990), 108. My thanks to Benjamin Nathans for bringing this anekdot to my 
attention. 
927 “Pis’mo 43 detei kommunistov, neobosnovanno repressirovannykh Stalinym, v TsK KPSS ob opasnosti 
neostalinizma, 24 sentiabria 1967 g.,” Sobranie dokumentov samizdata, vol. 1, AS no. 134 (New York, 
Radio Liberty Committee, 1972), 1-2. These concerns largely echoes those articulated in the so-called 
“Letter of the 25” written the previous year to coincide with the 23rd Party Congress and signed by notable 
academics, writers, and artists, including Petr Kapitsa, Kornei Chukovskii, and, in one of his first acts of 
open dissent, Andrei Sakharov. See Artizov et al, eds., Reabilitatsiia, vol. 2, 485-487. It warrants mention 
that at this time there were also popular expressions of support for Stalin’s rehabilitation; see, for example, 
the collection of letters and poems also from 1967 sent to A. N. Kosygin in GARF f. 5446, op. 101, d. 
1423. 
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Akulov, Vasilii Shmidt, Nikolai Demchenko, and Osip Piatnitskii.928 The overlap 
between this cohort and those who successfully reclaimed vestiges of their pre-repression 
lives speaks to these privileged survivors’ determination to harness the state’s 
readmission of their relatives into the ranks of the Bolshevik faithful as a source of moral, 
political, and at times even legal authority.929   
Despite some scholars’ insistence that widespread social disaffection over living 
standards and unrest among Gulag prisoners obliged Stalin’s successors to reform an 
untenably punitive system, there were no demands from below that necessitated that they 
pursue posthumous rehabilitation at all, let alone in the particular manner that they did.930  
Like other rulers who participated in and subsequently inherited legacies of violence, 
they could have refused to readjudicate the outrages of previous decades, trusting in the 
ability of a state that had recently survived the existential threat of Nazism to weather a 
power transition. This approach would not have been without considerable liabilities, 
insofar as it likely would have required the maintenance of a high level of state coercion, 
and could have occasioned further bloodshed at the top of the Party, but such challenges 
were already familiar to those who had built their political careers under Stalin. Instead, 
though, the new collective leadership opted to wrestle with the demons of the recent past, 
                                                
928 Ibid., 2-3.  
929 Two years after (presumably) spearheading the letter to the Central Committee, Petr Iakir composed an 
open missive to Party’s ideological organ Kommunist, in which he charged that, according to the logic of 
posthumous rehabilitation, Stalin could, and should, be held posthumously criminally responsible for the 
offenses imputed to him at the 22nd Party Congress; Polly Jones argues that Iakir’s “‘indictment’ […] 
exhibited ‘radical obedience’ to party and state discourse, but also claimed the right to individual moral 
judgment, no doubt partially fuelled by his own family history of repression.” See P. Iakir, “Otkrytoe 
pis’mo v redaktsiiu zhurnala ‘Kommunist’ o reabilitatsii Stalina, 2 marta 1969 g.,” Sobranie dokumentov 
samizdata, vol. 1, AS no. 99 (New York, Radio Liberty Committee, 1972), 1-11; Jones, Myth, Memory, 
Trauma, 246. 
930 Vladimir Naumov offers a version of this thesis, in which he suggests that the new collective leadership 
was impelled by disaffection over substandard living conditions and ideological malaise to embark upon 
reforms that could revitalize the regime while preserving its “essence.” See Naumov, “Repression and 
Rehabilitation,” 102-103. 
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hoping to extract some lessons of value from the years of bloodshed and betrayal. The 
decision to plumb the depths of the cannibalistic 1930s and 1940s – insofar as they 
affected the Party – markedly diverged from both Soviet precedent and the conduct of 
other authoritarian regimes.931  
 Marc Elie has dubbed rehabilitation in the post-Stalin Soviet Union “a policy 
unachieved,” and in many respects this characterization is apt.932 Even the most generous 
estimates of nearly one million completed legal exonerations prior to October 1964 – a 
significant number of which, it should be noted, involved individuals arrested in the late 
1950s for anti-Soviet agitation and quickly rehabilitated – left millions of falsely charged 
former political prisoners whose appeals went unheard or were denied outright.933 
Authorities took few steps to demystify the rehabilitation process for the populace at 
large, and in critical matters such as death dates they actively obfuscated; promised social 
benefits at times failed to materialize, or were seen as stinting, and acceptance of former 
zeks among the wider populace was rarely forthcoming. Yet in the midst of these evident 
shortcomings, rehabilitation was a transformative process that indelibly shaped the Soviet 
Union and its successor states’ relationships to mass violence, justice, and the haunted 
past by creating a mechanism through which the authorities acknowledged certain 
atrocities, made partial amends, and opened grounds upon which the state’s history could 
                                                
931 A particularly telling, and still-controversial example of a state attempting to leave behind its 
authoritarian past is the so-called “Pact of Forgetting” in post-Franco Spain, in which all involved parties 
opted for “amnesia” over indemnities. See Paloma Aguilar, “Justice, Politics, and Memory in the Spanish 
Transition,” in The Politics of Memory, 92-118. 
932 See Elie, “Rehabilitation in the Soviet Union,” 25-45. 
933 The figure Elie cites for the total number of rehabilitees, 960,000, accounted for only one third of the 
people estimated at the time to have been repressed on political charges, and presumably does not include 
members of ethnic groups subjected to collective punishment; see Elie, “Rehabilitation in the Soviet 
Union,” 25. On the preponderance of Khrushchev-era prisoners as recipients of rehabilitation and other 
forms of clemency in the late-1950s and early-1960s, see Hornsby, Protest, Reform, and Repression, 232-
235, and V. A. Kozlov and S. V. Mironenko, eds., 5810. Nadzornye proizvodstva Prokuratury SSSR po 
delam ob antisovetskoi agitatsii i propagande. Mart 1953-1991. Annotirovannyi katalog (Moskva: 
Mezhdunarodnyi fond “Demokratiia,” 1999). 
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be reassessed. Survivors of the rehabilitated as well as the regime itself took seriously the 
categories that the legal and political processes created, and in the case of the former, 
they sought to capitalize on their parents’ status as a means of influencing the trajectory 
of Soviet political developments. Although such developments stand as a far cry from 
what the Presidium’s members could have foreseen when they endorsed the first 
posthumous rehabilitations in November 1953, the process largely functioned as intended 
and its overarching objectives were met: the secret police no longer threatened the 
primacy of the Party, the question of Khrushchev and his allies’ culpability in the Terror 
was shunted aside, and Soviet power endured for nearly forty years after Stalin’s demise. 
Thus, as much as the rehabilitation process may have failed to achieve the broader and 
more abstract goals of promoting truth and reconciliation within Soviet society, it 
ultimately succeeded in protecting the interests of those who first conceived it, and 
demonstrably improved the lot of some of the most stigmatized families in the USSR.      
While the early Brezhnev years have been depicted as a period of retreat from 
Khrushchev-era policies that favored rehabilitees, the historical record suggests a more 
nuanced picture.934 Though the number of rehabilitations indeed declined precipitously 
over the course of the 1960s, this trend began before Brezhnev’s tenure as General 
Secretary, and the winding down of the judiciary and Party Control Committee’s work in 
this sphere did not curtail the public recognition of figures who had already been 
posthumously rehabilitated.935 Articles marking significant birthdates of “loyal sons of” 
                                                
934 On the notion that rehabilitees fell out of “fashion,” see Cohen, The Victims Return, Chapter 5. 
935 Jane Shapiro notes that a prime reason rehabilitation lost much of its urgency with the rise of Brezhnev, 
Kosygin, and others of their generation is the fact that “none of the aspirants to succeed Khrushchev was an 
important party leader during the Great Purge,” and therefore no one stood to gain from issuing charges of 
complicity against other challengers. See Jane Shapiro, “Rehabilitation Policy under the Post-Khrushchev 
Leadership,” Soviet Studies 20, 4 (April 1969): 495. 
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and “fighters for” the Party – many of whose names had already been brought up during 
the proceedings against Beriia’s confederates or at Party Congresses – appeared with 
regularity in Soviet press outlets alongside those of dignitaries who had never fallen into 
disgrace, though they were devoted almost entirely to their subjects’ revolutionary 
exploits, and denuded of the grim details of their demise.936 Streets were renamed in 
honor of onetime pariahs, and memorial plaques were erected on certain buildings where 
they previously lived; some of their visages would grace postage stamps. Works by 
rehabilitated authors were returned to print – a potential boon for their heirs – and 
laudatory accounts of rehabilitees’ lives could be found on the shelves of bookshops and 
libraries. Rather than disappearing from view, posthumously rehabilitated notables whom 
Khrushchev and others had named in moments of political extremis were gradually, but 
surely, woven back into the fabric of Soviet daily life.937  
 This is not to suggest, however, that the controversy over posthumous 
rehabilitation had been settled. Mikhail Gorbachev’s resurrection of rehabilitation as a 
legal and political concern defied key precedents set in the 1950s. By exonerating almost 
all of the lead defendants from the Moscow show trials, Gorbachev crossed the Rubicon 
                                                
936 An exemplary such article in Pravda marking Mamiia Orakhelashvili’s 80th birthday was actually 
published two years late due to an error in his official Party biography, though this was corrected in 
subsequent recognitions of his 90th and 100th birthdays published in Izvestiia; see L. Shaumian, “Vernyi 
boets leninskoi partii,” Pravda, June 10, 1963, 4. For the Central Committee Ideological Commission’s 
discussions of commemorating the posthumously rehabilitated, including Orakhelashvili, see RGANI f. 5, 
op. 55, dd. 9, 68, 69, 102, 124. 
937 Perhaps the single best encapsulation of this trend is the prominent featuring of Vladimir Kirshon’s 
poem “I Asked the Ash Tree (Ia sprosil u iasenia),” set to music by Mikael Tariverdiev, in the 1975 film 
The Irony of Fate, or Enjoy Your Steambath! (Ironiia sud’by, ili S legkym parom!), which has become a 
staple of New Year’s Eve celebrations across the Russian-speaking world. Kirshon is credited as the 
piece’s lyricist in the film’s opening credits, but it seems unlikely that most of the song’s fans were or are 
aware of its author’s violent death 37 years before the film’s release, or that his entire oeuvre had been 
suppressed prior to 1956. For the degree to which Kirshon has become associated with the song, see 
Ekaterina Kovalevskaia, “Ironiia sud’by: za chto rasstreliali avtora pesni ‘Ia sprosil u iasenia…,’ 
Rossiiskaia gazeta, June 29, 2015, available at https://rg.ru/2015/06/29/reg-skfo/kirshon.html (accessed 
March 14, 2018); Ol’ga Kuz’mina, “On sprosil u Stalina,” Vechernaia Moskva, January 17, 2018, available 
at http://vm.ru/news/452502.html (accessed March 14, 2018). 
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that Khrushchev and his councilors could not ford, declaring that opposition to Stalin’s 
general line was neither inherently criminal, nor did it constitute grounds for expulsion 
from the Party.938 Furthermore, in the interest of radical truth-telling the authorities began 
to abandon the pretense that executed persons had died while serving out camp sentences, 
laying bare the scale of extermination during the Terror, and divesting functionaries of 
the burden of misleading petitioners that had spawned so much confusion, turmoil, and 
anger. Most significantly, a 1988 resolution opened all cases initiated under Stalin’s rule 
to judicial scrutiny, regardless of whether a protest had been filed, and in 1989 the 
Politburo issued a blanket decree rendering all verdicts imposed extrajudicially null and 
void, and automatically rehabilitating all who had been repressed by bodies such as 
NKVD troikas and the Special Board.939 In one fell swoop some 850,000 people were 
exonerated, fulfilling the judiciary’s longstanding desire to rid itself of responsibility for 
extrajudicial cases, and – arguably – realizing Mikoian’s fear of what such a 
thoroughgoing reprieve might reveal about the nature of the Soviet regime.940 
 As Gorbachev lost his grip on power and the Soviet Union splintered into its 
constituent republics, rehabilitation emerged as a wedge issue between the ascendant 
Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic and the All-Union establishment; the 1991 
law “On the Rehabilitation of Victims of Political Repression” was introduced by the 
RSFSR Supreme Soviet and signed by the republican President Boris El’tsin. In 
recognizing any individual who had suffered repression “for class, social, national, 
                                                
938 Although there were many calls for Trotsky to be rehabilitated at this time as well, because he was never 
officially convicted in Soviet court Trotsky was not eligible for official exoneration as Bukharin, Kamenev, 
and Zinov’ev were. Also, as David Remnick notes, unlike Bukharin, whose attempts to resolve Marxism-
Leninism with market forces presaged Gorbachev’s perestroika, Trotsky’s vision of permanent, global 
revolution held no appeal for the reformers of the 1980s; see David Remnick, “Trotsky in Afterlife,” The 
Washington Post, August 20, 1990. 
939 Smith, Remembering Stalin’s Victims, 53. 
940 For the figure of 850,000 rehabilitated in 1989, see GARF f. 9474, op. 10, d. 1062, ll. 80-82. 
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religious, or other reasons” as eligible for rehabilitation, the measure cast Communist 
state violence in most of its permutations as illegitmate, and it supplanted the existing 
restitution regime by affirming victims’ rights to the restoration of seized property and 
onetime residences, financial compensation calculated against time served up to 100 
months, and priority access to medical treatment.941 Critically, for the first time 
rehabilitees and their survivors were granted access to their archival investigative files. 
This shattered the jealously guarded monopoly over information relating to the purges 
that that had defined almost every aspect of the rehabilitation process of the 1950s and 
1960s. Although citizens still had to go through the organs of state security, rather than 
having curated details doled out by secret policemen, they were empowered to personally 
examine unredacted documents, and draw their own conclusions from the grim contents 
therein.942 While the newly independent Russian Federation relinquished its exclusive 
authority over materials that had served as the basis for the destruction and subsequent 
expiation of hundreds of thousands of innocents, it retained control over the legal 
processes by which suspect cases from the past were adjudicated.   
 In addition to ruling on rehabilitations that went unheard in previous decades or 
were denied for procedural reasons, the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation 
continues to act as arbiter of who does not merit consideration for exoneration, thereby 
serving as custodian of the Soviet legacy. In the years since the USSR’s dissolution the 
Supreme Court has repeatedly been called upon to consider whether perpetrators of state 
                                                
941 Smith, Remembering Stalin’s Victims, 200-201; Cathy A. Frierson, “Russia’s Law ‘On Rehabilitation of 
Victims of Political Repression’: 1991-2011, An Enduring Artifact of Transitional Justice,” NCEEER 
Working Paper, 2014, 6-7; Nanci Adler, “In Search of Identity: The Collapse of the Soviet Union and the 
Recreation of Russia,” in The Politics of Memory, 288. 
942 By the close of the 20th century, over 115,000 individuals had availed themselves of this opportunity. 
See Frierson, “Russia’s Law,” 43. 
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repression who were themselves executed between the late-1930s and mid-1950s are now 
eligible for legal rehabilitation. Though in a handful of cases the court has revised 
individuals’ sentences – as it did with Viktor Abakumov, commuting his capital 
punishment to 25 years’ imprisonment ex post facto – it has consistently refused to 
reprieve state security chiefs such as Iagoda, Ezhov, Frinovskii, and Beriia, despite 
having dismissed charges of treason, espionage, and conspiracy against the first three.943 
Applying reasoning with strong echoes of that used to bar Izrail’ Dagin from attaining 
rehabilitation forty years prior, the Supreme Court found that even though there was no 
evidence to link these men to the concocted charges with which they had been impugned, 
their demonstrable abuses of office were sufficiently egregious to disqualify them from 
judicial absolution; succinctly put, the right men were killed, but for the wrong 
reasons.944 The October 1991 law excludes individuals who have “committed offenses 
against justice” from rehabilitation, but as Russian historian Alter Litvin notes, the 
legislation does not specify the conception of justice to which it refers.945 As a result, the 
present-day Russian judiciary, bound by precedents set during the 1950s and 1960s, 
continues to operate within a framework of responsibility for the Terror that endorses the 
results – if not the rationale – of Soviet-era proceedings against secret police perpetrators, 
                                                
943 Litvin and Keep, Stalinism, 71; Jansen and Petrov, Stalin’s Loyal Executioner, 190-191. Until a recent 
overhaul, the website of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation featured an online docket of rulings 
from recent years that included numerous denials of rehabilitation for prominent NKVD officers; 
unfortunately this information appears to have been completely scrubbed from the website, and there are no 
cached or archived versions forthcoming. 
944 A counterpart to this trend can be detected in the January 2010 ruling by the Kyiv Court of Appeal that 
held the Soviet leadership of the early 1930s – including Stalin, Molotov, Kaganovich, Postyshev, and 
Kosior – criminally responsible for the Ukrainian famine of 1932-1933, though the court declined to pursue 
the charges further in light of the deaths of the accused. Postyshev and Kosior were thus effectively 
“dehabilitated” in eyes of Ukrainian justice for their roles in an atrocity that has persistently remained 
outside the bounds of Soviet terror as recognized by the contemporary Russian government, reflecting the 
leading role that the disputed past plays in the growing divide between the two states. See “Ruling in the 
criminal proceedings over genocide in Ukraine in 1932-1933,” Human Rights in Ukraine, available at 
http://khpg.org/en/index.php?id=1265217823 (accessed March 12, 2018). 
945 Litvin and Keep, Stalinism, 71-72. 
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while eliding Stalin’s guiding hand. Much in the same way that Stalin remained largely 
invisible at critical junctures during rehabilitations in the Khrushchev years, in 
contemporary Russia his responsibility for unleashing the Terror is obscured by the 
state’s ongoing deference to its Soviet forebears. 
 Born out of the perceived need to tar Beriia’s reputation in the interest of asserting 
the Party’s supremacy over state security, posthumous rehabilitation quickly assumed 
dimensions far beyond its fairly limited tactical aims. As surviving relatives of the 
disappeared clamored for some indication of the fates that had befallen their loved ones 
and relief from the stigma that hounded them, the authorities concocted a patchwork of 
responses that at once reaffirmed some of their most underhanded behaviors while 
simultaneously extending consideration and privileges to families far beyond what most 
citizens expected from the government. The archival record shows a strong correlation 
between the men whom Khrushchev and his allies invoked to discredit and condemn their 
rivals, and the survivors who had the most success in extracting concessions from the 
state. Though the figures involved in this process were by no means benevolent actors, 
the image of the state that emerges through the study of early posthumous rehabilitations 
is one that was at times responsive to and invested in restoring patterns of duty and 
privilege that dated to the Soviet Union’s formative years that were seemingly splintered 
by the Great Terror. This readmission of onetime “enemies of the people” and their 
descendants into the ranks of the valorized revolutionary elite figures among the most 
enduring legacies of the post-Stalin revisionist project: just as posthumous rehabilitation 
showed that physical death was no impediment to the restoration of an individual’s 
reputation, or his ability to be of service to the party-state, so too did it underscore the 
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persistence of notions of inheritance – in terms of both personal obligations and property. 
In the post-Stalin Soviet government’s quest for a redemptive narrative of the recent past, 
posthumous rehabilitation of Old Bolsheviks repressed by the regime they helped build 
proved a compelling and enduring means of overcoming state violence and its 
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